TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2011 (1) TMI 1195
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.... 22, 2008. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the first respondent on January 8, 2009, which was dismissed by order dated July 18, 2009. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred a second appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (the STAT) on August 3, 2009. The said appeal is said to be still pending before the STAT. The third respondent issued a notice in form VAT 203A dated December 4, 2008, proposing to levy penalty under section 53(3) of the VAT Act. After examining the petitioner's objections thereto, the proposed penalty of Rs. 20,76,106 was confirmed by order dated January 29, 2009, which was served oh the petitioner on February 4, 2009. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed W. P. No. 2653 of 2009 on February 10, 2009 (Agarwal Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer). The operative portion of the order passed on July 20, 2009, whereby the said writ petition was dismissed, reads as under:- "In view of the binding judgment of the three-judge Bench in C. A. Abraham, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the case. Whether the petitioner under-declared the tax and/or whether the petitioner claimed excess/over input-tax cred....
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.... Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by Lrs. [2003] 3 SCC 272 and Sunder Theatres v. Allahabad Bank, Jhansi AIR 1999 All 14. Section 31(1) of the VAT Act enables a VAT dealer to prefer an appeal, against an order of assessment, within thirty days of the order or proceedings being served on him. Under the first proviso thereto, the appellate authority has been conferred the discretion to admit an appeal, preferred within a period of thirty days after the period of thirty days prescribed for filing the appeal under section 31(1) of the VAT Act, if sufficient cause is shown for not filing the appeal within the time prescribed. The discretion conferred on the appellate authority to entertain an appeal, even in cases where sufficient cause is shown for the delay, is only for, a period of thirty; days after the original period of thirty days, as stipulated under section 31(1) of the VAT Act, and not beyond. If the Legislature, in a special statute, prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder, and provides in clear terms that such a period, on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended in the maximum only up to a specified time-limit and no ....
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....ers Pvt. Ltd. [2005] 142 STC 52 (AP) observed (pages 59, 60, 72 and 73 in 142 STC):- "A perusal of the above clearly shows that prior to the amended proviso, inserted by Act 8 of 1997, the appellate authority was given unlimited discretion to condone the delay, if he is satisfied that the dealer had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within a period of thirty days. But this unlimited discretionary power conferred on the appellate authority was restricted, confining such power to condone the delay up to a maximum period of thirty days by Act 8 of 1997. Even in such case, the appellate authority is entitled to admit the appeal if he is satisfied that the dealer had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed limit. Even if the appellate authority is satisfied that the dealer was prevented for sufficient cause, it has no power to condone the delay beyond the period of thirty days. . . . . . From the provisions existing prior to the enactment and after the enactment of the Amendment Act, it is clear that the Legislature had intentionally brought the new provisions so as to curtail the unlimited discretionary powers of the appellate a....
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.... such power of condonation of delay is restricted to a period not exceeding thirty days in the case of the first appellate authority, and not exceeding sixty days in the case of the second appellate authority (Tribunal) if satisfied that the dealer had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period. . ." (emphasis supplied) When a statute is repealed and re-enacted, and words in the repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute, they should be interpreted in the sense which had been judicially put on them under the repealed Act, because the Legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the courts have put upon the words and, when they repeat the same words, they must be taken to have accepted the interpretation put on them by the court as correctly reflecting the legislative mind. (Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar [1955] 6 STC 446 (SC) ; [1955] 2 SCR 603). Where a word or phrase has received clear judicial interpretation the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context, must be construed 'so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that ha....
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....0+30) for an appeal tp be entertained by the appellate authority, and not beyond. As the right of appeal conferred by the VAT Act is subject to the restrictions prescribed therein, and as the delay in the present case of 528 days is far in excess of the maximum period of 60 days within which alone can the appellate authority entertain an appeal under section 31(1), the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium has no application. A substantive right of appeal is circumscribed by the restrictions stipulated in the statute for such an appeal to be entertained and, as such, the doctrine of precedence of substantive rights over procedural law has also no application. W. P. No. 2653 of 2009 dated July 20, 2010 was not even entertained by this court, and was dismissed at the stage of admission. The mere fact that the said writ petition filed by the petitioner was pending admission for some time does not confer on him arty right to claim exclusion of the period, during which the writ petition was pending admission before this court, in computing the period of limitation for preferring an appeal under section 31(1) of the VAT Act. It is no doubt true that, as far as possible, court....