AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1964 (7) TMI 21
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...., 1950, the assessee-firm, which carries on the business of manufacture and sale of bidis with its head office at Maihar, claimed that it was not liable to tax in respect of the sales of bidis of the value of Rs. 31,059-12-0 inasmuch as the bidis sold were delivered outside the former Vindhya Pradesh State for consumption; that the transactions of despatches of bidis of the value of Rs. 4,01,255-4-0 from its head office at Maihar to its various branches in Uttar Pradesh were not sale transactions but merely transfer of goods from the head office to its branches; and that, therefore, it could not be assessed to sales tax in respect of those transactions. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Rewa, rejected the first claim of the assessee. He, however, accepted the latter claim and accordingly excluded the amount of Rs. 4,01,255-4-0 from the taxable turnover of the assessee. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax did not, however, make any order for refund of sales tax paid by the assessee on the amount of Rs. 4,01,255-4-0. The assessee then preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur. The Deputy Commissioner rejected the appeal holding that the form....
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....nal that the questions stated earlier have been referred to us for decision. 4.. It is obvious from what has been stated above that the main question that requires an answer in this reference is the one relating the applicability of Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution to the former State of Vindhya Pradesh during the material assessment period. If that question is answered in the way the Tribunal decided, then if the sale transactions referred to in question Nos. (2) and (3) were transactions of goods actually delivered at places outside the State of Vindhya Pradesh as a direct result of sale transactions for purposes of consumption, no sales tax could be levied on those transactions in view of the Explanation to Article 286(1), as it stood at the material time, and the second and third questions must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, it is held that Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution had no applicability to the State of Vindhya Pradesh during the assessment period, then no answer can be given to the second and third questions for the simple reason that the Sales Tax Tribunal did not at all determine whether the transactions of sale of bidis of the value o....
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....d Simonds in Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover[1957] A. C. 436 at p. 461. for the meaning of the word "context", and said that the word should be construed liberally. In the case just referred to, Lord Simonds said: "I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use the word 'context' in its widest sense...........as including not only the enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern the statute was intended to remedy." Shri Dharmadhikari also referred us to the Explanation to section 2 of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, as pointing to the fact that the expression 'law of a State' in Article 286 also meant any law made by the Legislature of a Part C State as also a law extended to a Part C State by a notification issued under section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950. 6.. Before dealing with the question of the effect of Article 264(b) on the construction of Article 286, it would be convenient to dispose of the contention of the learned counsel fo....
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....te does not contain the qualifying words "unless the context otherwise requires", little weight is to be attributed to such an omission and "some such words are to be implied in all statutes where the expressions which are interpreted by a definition clause are used in a number of sections with meanings sometimes of a wide and sometimes of an obviously limited character". Here, however, Article 264(b), by using the words "unless the context otherwise requires", specifically provided that the word "State" in Part XII of the Constitution shall be read as not including a Part C State, unless the context required, that is to say, made it necessary, that the word shall be read "otherwise" than as pointed out in clause(b). The words "unless the context otherwise requires" used in clause (b) of Article 264 clearly show that the interpretation clause cannot be applied for determining the meaning of the word "State" used in any article contained in Part XII of the Constitution if there are indications in the context of the article in which the word occurs expanding the meaning of the word beyond that given by the interpretation clause. 8.. The word "requires" in the expression "unless th....
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....f the two can be harmonized, there can be no objection to allowing the interpretation clause to control the language defined. To give the interpretation clause precedence where the two cannot be harmonized, would operate to make the ancillary portion of the statute superior to the primary portion. The statute's meaning would in all probability be distorted, and the legislative intent defeated." The effect of the qualification of repugnance to context contained in a definition clause has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in V. F. & G. Insurance Co. v. M/s. Fraser & RossA. I. R. 1960 S. C. 971. thus"........all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore in finding out the meaning of the word 'insurer' in various sections of the Act, the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause. But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will be giving effect to the ope....
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.... discouragement in the free flow of trade within India, regarded as one economic unit, for the free flow of foreign trade and for preventing commodities essential for the life of the community throughout India from being subjected to sales tax, then clearly there is no ground whatsoever to differentiate a Part C State from a Part A or Part B State in the matter of restrictions put by Article 286 on the legislative power of the States. It is easy to see that if the word "State" as used in Article 286 had been read in the sense given to it by Article 264(b), then the very object of Article 286 of putting restrictions on the legislative powers of the States would have been defeated to a great extent if not wholly. In that event, the Explanation to Article 286(1) would have been ineffective leaving many loop-holes, and the principle that commodities declared as essential for the life of the community throughout India should not be subjected to sales tax would have been difficult of implementation. Article 286, as it was worded, clearly contemplated that the restrictions put by it on the legislative power were in regard to all States and not to any one State entirely independent of the ....