TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1960 (8) TMI 72
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.... the meaning of Article 286 of the Constitution. Appeals were carried by the appellants against these assessments to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. During the pendency of the appeals, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar [1955] 6 S.T.C. 446; (1955) 2 M.L.J. 168. It was inter alia decided there that Article 286 of the Constitution enacted two prohibitions and that "until Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested in it under clause (2) of Article 286 provided otherwise, no State could impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases of goods when such sales or purchases took place in the course of interState trade or commerce." This pronouncement reversed the view of that Court expressed earlier in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors[1953] 4 S.T.C. 133; (1953) 1 M.L.J. 743. Following this decision, the Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeals and set aside the assessments made by the Sales Tax Officer. To get over the difficulty created by the Supreme Court's ruling in the Bengal Immunity case(1), the Sales Tax Laws Validation Ordinance, 1956 (Ordinance III of 1956) was promulgat....
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....C.) 179., and the decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dunlop Rubber Co.[1960] 11 S.T.C. 632; (1960) 1 An. W.R. 145., the Board of Revenue felt that the appellants were liable to be taxed in respect of their sales in the erstwhile Hyderabad State for the period up to 6th September, 1955, and that the order of the Deputy Commissioner setting aside the assessments required revision. Therefore, exercising the powers vested in it under section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, suo motu, the Board issued a notice to the appellants proposing to set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner referred to above and restore the assessments made by the Sales Tax Officer, Hyderabad, limiting, however, the demand of the tax to the amount actually collected by the dealers by way of tax. The dealers were also required to file their objections, if any, to the proposal within seven days of the receipt of that notice, failing which it would be considered that they had no objections to file and orders passed as proposed. Instead of filing their objections, the appellants asked for two months' time. This request was not granted and the assessments for the years 195....
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.... strength of the remarks contained therein, it is urged by Sri Ranganadhachari that as the Board of Revenue relied upon the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act (VII of 1956), which was passed subsequent to the order of the Deputy Commissioner, and the rulings of the Supreme Court and of this Court, which were rendered subsequent to that order, the order of the Board of Revenue has to be quashed as being opposed to the principle laid down in the two cases cited by him. Maharaj Kumar v. Commissioner of Income-tax[1959] 35 I.T.R. 1; (1959) M.L.J. (S.C.) 92. is pressed into service to substantiate the proposition that the word "information" used in section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act is not confined to factual information but includes information as to the true and correct state of law and will also cover information as to the relevant judicial decisions. In our opinion, neither of the two cases has any bearing on the problem to be solved by us. In the first of the two cases cited above, i.e. Manepalli Venkatanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh[1959] 10 S.T.C. 254., the point that presented itself for determination was whether it was competent for the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial T....
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....dure Code, by reason of which the powers of the appellate court are coextensive with those of the original court, and in the absence of such provision in this Act, there is no scope for invoking such a doctrine here. We do not think that we can assent to this theory. It is true that Order 41, rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, has specifically conferred such powers upon an appellate court, but de hors this provision, an appellate court is possessed of as wide powers as those of the original court, having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction of the appellate court. This is inherent in the very nature of jurisdiction vested in an appellate authority. Even under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, which did not contain a provision similar to Order 41, rule 33, it was laid down by a Bench of the Madras High Court that when an appeal was preferred from a decree of the court of first instance the suit should be deemed to continue in the court of appeal and reheard either fully or in part (Vide Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal.)(1902) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 91. In Kanakayya v. Janardhana(1910) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 439; 21 M.L.J. 31. , a Full Bench of the Madras High Court took note of the provisions of th....