TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2004 (1) TMI 640
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....ng out unnecessary details, the factual position is as follows: On 13.7.1998 information was received from Tagore Hospital, Jalandhar that Reema Aggarwal the appellant had been admitted on having consumed poisonous substance. On reaching hospital, ASI Charanjit Singh obtained opinion of the doctor regarding her fitness to make a statement. Appellant stated before Investigating Officer that she was married to Anupam the respondent no.1 on 25.1.1998 and after the marriage, she was harassed by her husband-respondent no.1, mother-in-law, father-in-law and brother-in-law (respondents 2, 3 and 4) respectively for not bringing sufficient and more dowry. It was also disclosed that it was the second marriage of both the appellant and respondent no.1. On the date of incident at about 5.00 p.m. all the four accused persons forced her to take something to put an end her life and forcibly put some acidic substance in her mouth. She started vomiting and was taken to the hospital in an unconscious state. The first information report was registered accordingly and on completion of investigation the charge sheet was placed and charges were framed for offences punishable under Sections 307....
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.... application for grant of leave as well as the revision filed by the appellant by such cryptic orders. Important questions of law are involved. In fact, various High Courts have taken view different from the one taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vungarala Yedukondalu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1988 Crl.L.J. 1538 (DB)) and State of Karnataka v. Shivaraj (2000 Crl.L.J 2741). The Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Karnataka High Court have taken different view. According to him the expressions "husband" and "woman" appearing in Section 498-A IPC are to be read in a manner so as to give full effect to the purpose for which Section 498-A was brought into the statute. The restricted meaning as given by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramnarayan case (supra) does not reflect the correct position of law. On the other hand, contrary view expressed by the Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh High Courts reflect the correct view. In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that to constitute a marriage in the eye of law it has first to be established that the same was a valid marriage. Strong reliance was placed on Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande and Anr. v. The State of Ma....
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....cited with approval in Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh and Ors. (AIR 1994 SC 135). At first blush, it would seem that these observations run counter to the long catena of decisions noted above. But on closer examination of the facts of those cases it is clear that this Court did not differ from the views expressed in the earlier cases. In Lokhande's case (supra), this Court was dealing with a case of prosecution for bigamy. The prosecution had contended that second marriage was gandharva form of marriage and no ceremonies were necessary and, therefore, did not allege or prove that any customary ceremonies were performed. In that background, it was held that even in the case of gandharva marriages, ceremonies were required to be performed. To constitute bigamy under Section 494 IPC, the second marriage had to be a valid marriage duly solemnized and as it was not so solemnized it was not a marriage at all in the eye of law and was therefore invalid. The essential ingredient constituting the offence of Bigamy is the "marrying" again during the lifetime of husband or wife in contrast to the ingredients of Section 498A which, among other things, envisage subjecting the woman concerned to cru....
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..... (AIR 1988 SC 644) a woman claimed maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.'). This Court applied the provision of the Marriage Act and pointed out that same was a law which held the field after 1955, when it was enacted and Section 5 lays down that for a lawful marriage the necessary condition that neither party should have a spouse living at the time of the marriage is essential and marriage in contravention of this condition therefore is null and void. The concept of marriage to constitute the relationship of 'husband' and 'wife' may require strict interpretation where claims for civil rights, right to property etc. may follow or flow and a liberal approach and different perception cannot be an anatheme when the question of curbing a social evil is concerned. The question of origin of dowry or dos has been the subject of study by theoreticians. Mayne says that it was a contribution by the wife's family, or by the wife herself, intended to assist the husband in bearing the expenses of the conjugal household (Mayne on "Early History of Institution" page 319). While dos or dowry previously belonged to husband, his right over i....
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....4 makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable security as a consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the graver offence under Section 3 of the Act punishable with higher imprisonment and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more. The definition of the expression 'dowry' contained in Section 2 of the Dowry Act cannot be confined merely to be 'demand' of money, property or valuable security' made at or after the performance of marriage. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of 'dowry' emphasized that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, 'before, at or after' the marriage would be covered by the expression 'dowry' and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression 'dowry' occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression 'dowry' as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4, mere demand of 'dowry' is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any 'demand' of money, property or....
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.... of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the 'Evidence Act') were introduced cannot be lost sight of. Legislations enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively requires to be interpreted with certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper technically. The obvious objective was to prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital relationship with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed for money. Can a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to take a shelter behind a smokescreen to contend that since there was no valid marriage the question of dowry does not arise? Such legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Such hairsplitting legalistic approach would encourage harassment to a woman over demand of money. The nomenclature 'dowry' does not have any magic charm written over it. It is just a label given to demand of money in relation to marital relationship. The legislative intent is clear from the fact that it is not only the husband but also his relations who are covered by Section 498A. Legislatur....
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....t if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean or evocative or can reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction, such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light, on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation. In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1988 SC 1883), this Court held: "....But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as out paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to th....
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....nk of India etc. etc. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others etc. etc. (1987 (1) SCC 424) while dealing with the question of interpretation of a statute, this Court observed: "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statue is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the en....