TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2003 (8) TMI 473
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....ild animals, birds and plants and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto or incidental therewith. Indian elephant was brought within the purview of Schedule A of the Act on or about 5.10.1977. The Union of India also banned export of ivory in the said year. Chapter V of the said Act deals with trade or commerce in wild animals, animal articles and trophies. By Act No. 28 of 1986 Chapter V-A was inserted therein whereby and restrictions were imposed on trade or commerce in wild animals, cattle and trophies. By Act No.44 of 1991, Section 49-C was inserted in Chapter V-A whereby and where-under a total prohibition in trade of imported ivory was imposed. The said Act was brought into force by the Government of India by issuing a Notification dated 27.9.1991 with effect from 2.10.1991. Six months' time had been granted to make the said Act operational, that is to say, until 2.4.1992. Within the aforementioned period, the trader, thus, could dispose of his stock. The appellants herein filed writ petitions before the Delhi High Court, inter alia, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the 1991 Amendment Act prohibiting trade in the imported ivo....
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....eld ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Another vs. Union of India and Others [(1960) 2 SCR 671]. Mr. Sanghi, would further submit that the ivory which has legally been imported by the appellants herein prior to coming into force of the 1991 Amendment Act, having not vested in the Government, the appellants should be held to be at liberty to deal therewith. According to the learned counsel ivory having lawfully been imported and the appellants having, thus, been in lawful possession thereof, there could be no reason as to why they should be deprived of the possession therefrom, particularly having regard to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 49-C thereof. It was urged that once such a declaration is filed in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 49-C, the Chief Wild Life Warden should be held to be statutorily obligated to give to the appellants a certificate of ownership in respect of the entire stock-in-trade, entitling them to transfer the same to any person whether by way of gift, sale or otherwise, as is provided under sub-section (6) thereof. The lear....
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....etence. By reason of the provisions of the Amending Act 28 of 1986, trade in various articles had been prohibited. Imported ivory was, however, brought within the purview of Act 44 of 1991. The learned counsel would contend that a bare perusal of the provisions of the 1986 and 1991 Amending Acts would clearly go to show that the intention of the Parliament was that those who carry on trade or business in the imported African ivory should dispose of the same within a period of six months i.e. before coming into force thereof whereafter their possession would become illegal, subject, however, to the grant of certificate of ownership by the Chief Wild Life Warden in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 49-C of the said Act. It was submitted that a trader cannot claim the entire imported ivory or the articles manufactured therefrom to be necessary for his bona fide personal use and in that view of the matter the Chief Wild Life Warden has been conferred with a discretionary jurisdiction in relation thereto and only such articles in respect whereof the certificate of ownership is issued, can be subject matter of the transfer in terms of sub-section (6) of Section 49-C of the Act. Any art....
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....(1)(c) occurring in Chapter V of the said Act provides that every ivory imported into India and an article made from such ivory in respect of which any offence against this Act or any rule or order made there-under has been committed, shall be the property of the State Government. Section 40 provides for declaration. Sub-section (1) whereof is in the following terms : 40. Declarations.--(1) Every person having at the commencement of this Act the control, custody or possession of any captive animal specified in Schedule I or Part II of Schedule II, [or animal article, trophy or uncured trophy] derived from such animal or salted or dried skins of such animal or the musk of a musk deer or the horn of a rhinoceros, shall, within thirty days from the commencement of this Act, declare to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer the number and description of the animal, or article of the foregoing description under his control, custody or possession and the place where such animal or article is kept". Sub-section (2) of Section 40 prohibits acquisition, receiving, keeping in his control, custody or possession, sell, offer for sale or otherwise transfer or t....
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....t any time before the commencement of the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2002 shall not be proceeded with and all pending proceedings shall stand abated. (3) Any captive animal, animal article, trophy or uncured trophy declared under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed." Section 41 deals with inquiry and preparation of inventories which is in the following terms : 41. Inquiry and preparation of inventories.-- (1) On receipt of a declaration made under section 40, the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer may, after such notice, in such manner and at such time, as may be prescribed,-- (a) enter upon the premises of a person referred to in section 40; (b) make inquiries and prepare inventories of animal articles, trophies, uncured trophies, salted and dried skins and captive animals specified in Schedule I and Part II of Schedule II and found thereon; and (c) affix upon the animals, animal articles, trophies or uncured trophies identification marks in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) No person shall obliterate or counterfeit any identification mark referred to in this Chapter....
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....al of the Director, may, if he is satisfied that the person is in lawful possession of such items, issue certificates of ownership in favour of such person with respect to all, or as the case may be, such of the items as in the opinion of the Chief Wild Life Warden, are required for the bona fide personal use of such person and affix upon such items identification marks in such manner as may be prescribed : Provided that no such items shall be kept in any commercial premises. (4) No person shall obliterate or counterfeit any identification mark referred to in sub- section (3). (5) An appeal shall lie against any refusal to grant certificate of ownership under sub- section (3) and the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 46 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to appeals under this sub-section. (6)Where a person who has been issued a certificate of ownership under sub-section (3) in respect of any item, - (a) transfers such items to any person, whether by way of gift, sale or otherwise, or (b) transfers or transports from the State in which he resides to another State any such item, he shall, w....
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....erm which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that in the case of a second or subsequent offence the term of imprisonment may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. Section 63 empowers the Central Government to makes rules. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT: The provisions of the said Act must be construed having regard to the purport and object it seeks to achieve. Not only inter alia wild animal is to be protected but all other steps which are necessary therefor so as to ensure ecological and environmental security of the country must be enforced. The interpretation provisions as regard 'wild animal' employs the word 'includes' and, thus, must be assigned a broad meaning. The Amending Acts must be viewed in that perspective. Protection and conservation of wild animal is essential for very existence of human life. A trade in wild animal which is sought to be prohibited with an object to oversee survival of human beings must be given its full effect. The CITES was formulated keeping in view the aforementioned policy. India is a member State of the Convention.....
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....als from Botswana, Namibia and South Africa that they be allowed to made one - off sales of 20, 10 and 30 tonnes, respectively, of ivory. The ivory is held in existing legal stocks that have been collected from elephants that dies of natural causes or as a result of government - regulated problem - animal control. Similar proposals from Zambia and Zimbabwe for 17 and 10 tonnes, respectively, were not accepted. Today's decisions by CITES must still be formally adopted by the full Plenary on Friday, when the current two - week conference ends." The rival contention as regard the interpretation and application of the said Act must be considered having regard to the aforementioned principles as also the international treaties and developments which took place subsequently. WHETHER THE AMENDING ACT 44 OF 1991 IS ULTRA VIRES ARTICLES 19(1)(g) AND 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Appellant No. 1 herein appeared to have imported ivory from 1971 to 1986. It was in possession of 755.930 Kgs. Of solid Ivory Articles and 10.050 Kgs. with metal. Dealing in imported ivory so long the law permits may be a fundamental right but if the statute prohibits it, it....
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....4], this Court held: "...We fail to see how the plea of contravention of Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 can arise in these cases. The Government's power to sell the exclusive privilege set out in Section 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that these privileges could be sold by public auction. Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate. It will be seen from these observations that the validity of clause (6) of the Order dated January 6, 1971 was upheld by this Court on the ground that having regard to the object of holding the auction, namely, to raise revenue, the Government was entitled to reject even the highest bid, if it thought that the price offered was inadequate. The Government was bound to accept the tender of the person who offered the highest amount and if the Government rejected all the bids made at the auction, it did not involve any violation of Article 14 of 19(1)(g). This is a self-evident prop....
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....ght. Where the law providing for grant of a licence or permit confers a discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by rules or principles, express or implied, and exercisable in consonance with the rules of natural justice, it will be presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where, however, power is entrusted to an administrative agency to grant or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion the law ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). Imposition of restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right may be in the form of control or prohibition. "20. The tests of reasonableness have to be viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and in judging their validity, courts must approach the problem from the point of view of furthering the social interest which it is the purpose of the legislation to promote. They are not in these matters functioning in vacuo but as part of society which is trying, by the enacted law, to solve its problems and furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole. (See Jyoti Prasad v. Union Territory of Delhi ((1962) 2 SCR 125....
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.... new section for sections 9, 29 and 55 of the Principal Act; (ii) It omitted sections 10, and 13 to 17 of the Principal Act; (iii) It inserted two new chapters, namely, Chapter IIIA and Chapter IVA, in the Principal Act; and (iv) It inserted new Schedule, namely, Schedule VI, in the Principal Act." At this juncture, we may usefully take notice of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act. "Poaching of wild animals and illegal trade of products derived therefrom, together with degradation and depletion of habitats have seriously affected wildlife population. In order to check this trend, it is proposed to prohibit hunting of all wild animals (other than vermin). However, hunting of wild animals in exceptional circumstances, particularly for the purpose of protection of life and property and for education, research, scientific management and captive breeding, would continue. It is being made mandatory for every transporter not to transport any wild life products without proper permission. The penalties for various offences are proposed to be suitably enhanced to make them deterrent. The Central Government Officers as well as individuals now can also fil....
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....by Mr. Sanghi, recently a similar view has been taken in Kapila Hingorani Vs. State of Bihar [JT 2003 (5) SC 1] and John Vallamattom and Anr. Vs. Union of India [JT 2003 (6) SC 37]. In this case, however, we are faced with a different situation. We are concerned with the reason and object for which the amendments have to be made. We must take into consideration the text and context of the amending Acts and the circumstances in which they had to be brought about. The provisions of the statute are also required to be considered keeping in view Article 48-A and Article 51A(g) of the Constitution of India which are in the following terms: "48-A. Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life.-- The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country." "51-A. Fundamental duties. -- It shall be the duty of every citizen of India -- ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures;" We cannot shut our eyes t....
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....rendra Vs. Union of India (supra), the Supreme Court has sustained even a permanent law leading to the elimination of middle-men from the business in essential commodities in order to ensure the supply of such goods to the consumers at a minimum price." The Amending Acts satisfy also the strict scrutiny test. The stand of the State that by reason of sale of ivory by the dealers, poaching and killing of elephants would be encouraged, cannot be said to be irrational. Mr. Sanghi, as noticed hereinbefore, has drawn our attention to the changes sought to be effected in CITES at the instance of Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The question as to whether a reasonable restriction would become unreasonable and vice-versa would depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. In the year 1972 when the said Act was enacted there might not have been any necessity to preserve the elephant as also ivory. The species might not have been on the brink of extinction. The Objects and Reasons set out for brining in amendments in the said Acts in the years 1986, 1991 and 2003 clearly bring into fore the necessity to take more and more stringent measures so as to p....
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.... still waters in which there is only stagnation and death." Although in that case Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act was declared unconstitutional but we are of opinion that legal principles enunciated therein will have to be applied for the purpose of judging the constitutionality of impugned provisions keeping in view the subsequent changes. Submission of Mr. Sanghi to the effect that the Amending Acts provide for arbitrary unguided and unbridled power is stated to be rejected. The submission of learned counsel was made on the premise that after ban was imposed on trade in ivory, all traders become non- traders and, thus, traders and non-traders could not have been treated differently. When a trade is prohibited as has sought to be done by reason of the 1991 Amendment Act by inserting Chapter VA, the matters incidental thereto or connected therewith must be dealt with accordingly. For all intent and purport the statute would treat the traders on a different footing than non-traders. They form a different and distinct class. The appellants used to trade in ivory stands admitted. They, thus, would come within the purview of the definition of the t....
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.... Constitution being vague in nature. We do not find any such vagueness in any of the provisions of the impugned Acts including the definition of 'wild animal'. It is clear and unambiguous. Reliance placed by Mr. Sanghi on Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra)is equally mis-placed. In that case, this Court was dealing with nationalization of banks. The Court held that the provisions impugned therein are ultra-vires. In that situation, it was held: "Impairment of the right of the individual and not the object of the State in taking the impugned action, is the measure of protection. To concentrate merely on power of the State and the object of the State action in exercising that power is therefore to ignore the true intent of the Constitution." There is no quarrel with the aforementioned propositions inasmuch as herein we are upholding vires of the statutes holding that the restrictions imposed is reasonable. The Amending Acts in our opinion are constitutional, legal and valid. RES-EXTRA COMMERCIUM: We, however, agree with Mr. Sanghi that in a case of this nature the doctrine of 'res extra commercium' cannot be invoked. When trade i....
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....nd business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does certainly have a content of its own, distinct from the others. Be that as it may one thing is clear - imparting of education is not and cannot be allowed to become commerce. A law, existing or future, ensuring against it would be a valid measure within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19. We cannot, therefore, agree with the contrary proposition enunciated in Sakharkherda Education Society v. State of Maharashtra (air 1968 Bom LR 690) Andhra Kesari Education Society v. Govt. of A.P. (AIR 1984 AP 251 : (1984) 1 APLJ 45)and Bapuji Educational Assn. v. State.(AIR 1986 Kant 80)" An 11-Judge Bench of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka [(2002) 8 SCC 481], however, held that imparting of education would come within the purview of the definition of occupation within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. This court following Sodan Singh Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee [(1989) 4 SCC 155] opined: "In Unni Krishnan's case (Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645 at p. 687) while referring to education, it was observed as follows :- "It may perhaps fall unde....
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....icence therefor. The law was upheld negativing the contention that the restriction was unreasonable. It was not held therein that trade of liquor is impermissible in all situations. Restriction in trade, therefore, would depend upon the nature of the article and the law governing the field. By reason of judicial vagaries, fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution cannot be further restricted. (See Krishna Kumar Narula Vs. The State of Jammu and Kashmir & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1368). Dr. D.D. Basu in his Commentary on the Constitution of India (Sixth Edition) Volume L at page 238 stated: "In Chamarbaugwala's case (supra) as well as in Fatehchand's case (AIR 1977 SC 1825), the Court relied upon the observations of Taylor, J. in Mansell's case (1956) C.L.R. 550, in support of the theory of res extra commercium, but as appears from the following observations of Wynes (1970), p. 263, the doctrine has not had a peaceful career in Australia, and has produced conflicting decisions which are not beyond criticism: "The question whether exceptions to the otherwise express provisions of s.92 based upon inherent quality of goods can be made ....
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.... the commencement of the 1972 Act as specified in Section 40 of the Act. By reason thereof another chance has been given to the non-traders to make a declaration. All the appellant traders on the other hand had admittedly applied within the period of 30 days as specified in Section 44 of the Act. Hence, the object and purpose of Section 40-A is limited to individual non-traders and does not discriminate the traders or inter se the traders. In any event after the incorporation of Chapter V-A and the inclusion of ivory in the said Chapter the appellant traders are governed by the provisions of Chapter V-A. The provisions of Chapter V which includes Section 40-A is not applicable to the appellant traders. Chapter V-A is a complete Code in itself and it would be a fallacy to read into or extend by implication the mitigating provision of Section 40-A into Chapter V-A. The Legislature, had it so desired could have incorporated a similar provision in Chapter V-A. Section 49-C provides that every person carrying on the business or occupation referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 49-B, within thirty days from the specified date, declare to the Chief Wild Life Warden ....
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....orted into India or any article made therefrom is completely prohibited. Despite such provision, however, a person carrying on a business or occupation or dealing in trophies, animal articles etc. derived from scheduled animals would be, in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 49-C of the Act, entitled to file a declaration disclosing his stocks of ivory imported into India or articles made therefrom. Once such a declaration is made and in the event such person makes a declaration expressing his desire to retain with himself any of the items specified therein for his bona fide use, a certificate of ownership may be granted for such item or items which in the opinion of the Chief Wild Life Warden are required therefor. Only in relation to items for which such certificate of ownership has been granted, a transfer thereof is permissible subject to the restrictions imposed under sub-section (6) of Section 49-C. Sub-section (7) of Section 49-C, however, provides for prohibition of such ivory imported into India or any article made therefrom from being kept under the control of the trader for sale or offer for sale or transfer to any person whatsoever. The upshot of the aforesai....
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....ecified therein under the Act was not reasonable. Articles which cannot be subject matter of trade or commerce can only be kept for personal use. Such personal use must be a bona fide one. Once the requirement for keeping the possession of such article by a trader had specifically been laid down, it cannot be said that the Chief Wild Life Warden had been conferred with unguided and uncanalized power. In the event, an order is passed, the person dissatisfied therewith, may prefer an appeal in terms of sub-section (5) thereof. Against such original orders or appellate orders, even a judicial review would be maintainable. Sub-section (7) of Section 49-C would be applicable only in relation to such items or articles wherefor certificate of ownership has not been granted. If a person keeps under his control, sells or offers for sale or transfers the same to any other person, he would be subject to a penalty as provided under sub-section (1-A) of Section 51 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 51 empowers the competent court to direct that such property be forfeited by the Government, in which event, clause (c) of Section 39 would be attracted. We, therefo....
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....ds of the executive authority. As and when a seizure is made and the trader is prosecuted for alleged commission of an offence having regard to sub-section 7 of Section 49-C of the Act; adjudication therefor must be made by a competent court of law having jurisdiction in this behalf. Before a person is convicted a Court has to arrive at the finding that the accused has committed an offence wherefor a full-fledged criminal trial would be necessary. In absence of such criminal trial and offence having been found committed, Section 39 may not have any application. In that view of the matter it is evident that the properties do not stand vested in the Government in terms thereof. HOW THE DICHOTOMY SHOULD BE RESOLVED? The question, however, would remain as to what would happen to the property in question. In our opinion, the answer must be found out by reading all the provisions in their entirety. It is now well-settled that for the purpose of interpretation of statute the entire statute is to be read in entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, principles of purposive constru....
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....ll not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences." In District Mining Officer Vs. Tata Iron & Steel Co. [JT 2001 (6) SC 183 : (2001) 7 SCC 358], this Court stated: "A statute is an edict of the legislature and in construing a statute, it is necessary, to seek the intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to the intent of them that make it and the duty of the court is to act upon the true intention of the legislature. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature. This task very often raises difficulties because of various reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey one's thought or that the assembly of legislatures consisting of persons of various shades of ....
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....e opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex-parte Brind, (1991 AC 696 at 766-67 and 762). It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled." In High Court of Gujarat and Another Vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Others[(2003) 4 SCC 712] this Court noticed: "In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless Co. reported in 1987(1) SCC 424, this Court said:- "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such conte....
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....erms:- "..I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. vs. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (1971 AC 850) provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn t....
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....f his family' which are found in sub-clause (ii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act have to be read also into sub-clause (iii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) both deal with the non-residential buildings. They could have been enacted as one sub-clauses by adding a conjunction 'and' between the said two sub-clauses, in which event the clause would have read thus : 'in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; and in case it is any other non- residential building, if the landlord or member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own'. If the two sub-clauses are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Ors. reported in (1990) 3 SCC 682, this Court held: "The court has to in....
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.... the will of the norm-creating authority that is to be determined somehow, (c) with the expression which the norm-creating authority has chosen, (d) with the one or the other of the contradictory norms; or (e) the concrete case to which the two contradictory norms refer may be decided under the assumption that the two contradictory norms annul each other. In all these cases, the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame." In S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1996) 4 SCC 596 this Court observed : "It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary." (See also M/s. DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Edu. Charit. Trust Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. 2003 (2) SCALE 145) The words, which are used in declaring the meaning of oth....
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....means any one else excepting the State Government applying to a State Government for permission to establish the proposed medical college at proposed location to be decided by the State Government." The doctrine of purposive construction, thus, must be applied in a situation of this nature. A trader in terms of a statute is prohibited from carrying on trade. He also cannot remain in control over the animal article. The logical consequence wherefor would be that he must be deprived of the possession thereof. The possession of the animal article including imported ivory must, therefore, be handed over to the competent authority. In a case of this nature where a statute has been enacted in public interest, restriction in the matter of possession of the property must be held to be implicit. If Section 49(7) is not so construed, it cannot be given effect to. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the appellants have no right to possess the articles in question. Keeping in view of the fact that the provisions of the statute have been held to be intra vires the question of compensating the appellants would not arise as vesting of possession thereof in the Sta....