2001 (10) TMI 1047
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.... 2. The Commission instituted a suo motu enquiry under section 10(a)(iv ) of the Act vide order dated 11-12-1987 against the appellant alleging 3 specific violations of the Act. Since the first two charges, thus, levelled against the appellant having been found 'not established', it is unnecessary for us to go into the facts of those charges. By the impugned order, the Commission held that the appellant has violated the provisions of section 2(o)( ii) of the Act, hence, it had passed the order of cease and desist against the appellant under section 37(1), as stated above, and has further directed the appellant to pay interest at the prevalent bank rate on all the securities collected from the students of the appellant-institution as refunda....
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....this appeal, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that collection of refundable deposit without payment of interest is a general practice obtaining in all public schools and the said practice does not amount to restrictive trade practice. Elaborating this argument, it is contended that the restrictive trade practice is a trade practice which prevents, restricts or distorts competition in any manner as per section 2(o). The practice of non-payment of interest on 'caution money' which is followed by almost all public schools is an extremely relevant factor which demonstrates that the said practice does not prevent, distort or restrict competition in any manner and this relevant fact is not taken note of by the Commission. Based on this,....
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....efore the Commission, therefore, the same should not be permitted for the first time in this appeal. 7. We are not impressed with this argument addressed on behalf of the respondents. This being a statutory appeal and the question raised before us being a question involving the jurisdiction of the Commission to pass the impugned order, we reject this objection raised on behalf of the respondents and will proceed to consider the case of the appellant on merits. 8. This Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (supra) had held : "...Now, it is true, as laid down by this Court in the Telco case, that an application by the Registrar under section 10(a)( iii) 'must contain facts which, in the Registrar's opinion, constitute restrictive t....
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.... Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (supra) held that in the absence of any evidence to hold that the appellant (in that case) had indulged in restrictive trade practice, the direction given by the Commission that the appellant shall discontinue the alleged restrictive trade practice and not repeat the same in future, cannot be sustained. While coming to the said conclusion, this Court in Rajasthan Housing Board's case (supra) placed reliance on the following passage in the judgment of this Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.'s case (supra) wherein it was held : "14. It is now settled law as a result of the decision of this Court in the Telco case that every trade practice which is in restraint of trade is not necessarily a restrictive trade ....