TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2004 (2) TMI 344
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ansporting their goods through the branch line to the appellants from Alnavar to Dandeli wherefor the common rate fixed in respect of all commodities on the basis of weight was being levied as freight. However, a revision was made in the rate of freight with effect from February 1, 1964. 3.. Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, the respondents herein filed a complaint petition before the Railway Rates Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), challenging the same as unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory as the standard telescopic class rates on three times of inflated distance was adopted for levy of freight on goods traffic. The Tribunal by a judgment dated April 18, 1966, declared the said levy as unreasonable whereagainst the appellants herein filed an application for grant of special leave before this Court. 4.. While granting special leave, this Court also passed a limited interim order which is in the following terms: "The railway may charge the usual rates without inflation of the distance, and the respondent will give a bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court for rupees two lakhs to be renewed each year until the disposal ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....y complied with the direction of the Tribunal by refunding the excess freight charged from the respondent for the period April 18, 1966, to September 25, 1966. Learned counsel, however, would contend that the suit for refund of excess amount of the freight for the disputed periods (a) June 24, 1963, to February 1, 1964, and (b) February 1, 1964, to April 18, 1966, were barred by limitation in terms of article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the cause of action for filing the suit had arisen on the date on which such declaration was made by the Tribunal. 10.. Mr. Malhotra would further contend that in the absence of an order staying the operation of the judgment, it became enforceable and, thus, the plaintiff-respondent was required to file the suit within the period of limitation specified therefor. Furthermore, learned counsel would urge that in terms of section 46A of the Indian Railways Act, the judgment of the Tribunal being final, the starting period of limitation for filing the suit would be three years from the said date. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Juscurn Boid v. Pirthichand Lal [1918-19] LR 46 IA 52 (PC), P.K. Kutty case (1996) 2 SCC 496, Maqbul ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....appeal is considered to be a continuation of the suit and a decree becomes executable only when the same is finally disposed of by the court of appeal. 16. The starting point of limitation for filing a suit for the pur- pose of recovery of the excess amount of freight illegally realised would, thus, begin from the date of the order passed by this Court. It is also not in dispute that the respondent herein filed a writ petition which was not entertained on the ground stated hereinbefore. The respondents were, thus, also entitled to get the period during which the writ petition was pending, excluded for computing the period of limitation. In that view of the matter, the civil suit was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. 17. The trial Judge as also the High Court have recorded a concurrent opinion that the respondents were entitled to the benefits of sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We have no reason to take a different view. 18. It is beyond any cavil that in the event the respondent was held to have been prosecuting its remedy bona fide before an appropriate forum, it would be entitled to get the period in question excluded from computation of the p....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way-whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, Tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, Tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view." 24.. It was further observed (page 383 of 6 SCC and page 381 of 245 ITR): "41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of the doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reve....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ason why any narrow or ultra technical restriction should be placed on them. Justice should, in my opinion, be administered in our courts in a common sense liberal way and be broad based on human values rather than on narrow and restricted considerations hedged round with hair-splitting technicalities..." 29.. However, in that case also a distinction was sought to be made between a judgment of a "court" and a "Tribunal". 30.. In S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582; [1989] 75 FJR 425, 431, noticing the earlier Constitution Benches decision of this Court in Mohammad Nooh [1958] SCR 595; AIR 1958 SC 86, Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secy. to the Government of Orissa [1962] Supp 3 SCR 906, Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. [1963] 2 SCR 563 as well as the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Somnath Sahu v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 384, this Court observed [page 589 of (1989) 4 SCC]: "14. The distinction adopted in Mohammad Nooh's case [1958] SCR 595; AIR 1958 SC 86 between a court and a Tribunal being the appellate or the revisional authority is one without any legal justification. Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in courts are being exerc....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....June 7, 1920, whereafter the decree-holder proceeded to seek execution under the preliminary decree. In the aforementioned situation, it was held (page 87): "It is impossible to say, apart from any other objection, that the application to obtain execution under the preliminary decree was an application for the same relief as the application to the court for a final mortgage decree for sale in the suit. That being so, it is not permissible, on the basis of section 14, in computing the period of limitation prescribed, to exclude that particular period." 36.. The question which falls for consideration in this case did not arise therein. 37.. Before we advert to P.K. Kutty (1996) 2 SCC 496 we may notice another decision of this Court in Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf [1958] 9 STC 747 (SC); AIR 1959 SC 135. In that case an order of assessment was in question which came up before this Court. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether section 72 of the Indian Contract Act had any application. This Court held that cause of action for filing the suit for recovery would arise from the date when such payment of tax made under a mistake....