TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1992 (4) TMI 183
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....d, as on March 31, 1987, a sum of Rs. 2,45,534 was payable as rent to the respondents. The respondents issued a legal notice dated April 1, 1987, calling upon the appellant-company to pay the said amount. The appellant-company, while admitting the liability to pay the aforesaid sum, stated that it was expecting certain sums of money towards developmental loan from the Government of Karnataka and as soon as the same was received it would clear the outstanding payable by it to the respondents. Since the amount was not paid, the respondents issued a notice under section 434 of the Companies Act and, thereafter, a petition was filed in the High Court of Karnataka under section 433(e) of the Companies Act for winding up of the appellant-company. While the said winding up petition was pending the appellant-company, claiming that it has become a sick industrial company, filed a reference under section 15(1) of the Act before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, hereinafter referred to as "the Board", on December 12, 1988. After hearing the concerned parties, the Board formed a prima facie opinion that it would be just and equitable as also in public interest that the app....
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....h the said writ petition, notice was issued for May 10, 1991, and in the meanwhile, operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991, was stayed. We have been informed that the said writ petition is still pending in the Delhi High Court and the stay order passed by the said court is also operative. After the dismissal of the appeal of the appellant-company by the Appellate Authority, the winding up petition was taken up for consideration and it was allowed by a learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court by order dated August 14, 1991. The learned single judge was of the view that pendency of the writ petition in the High Court of Delhi and the stay of operation of the order of the Appellate Authority did not stand in the way of the court from proceeding with the matter. The appellant-company filed an appeal against the said order of the learned single judge which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by order dated November 6, 1991. Civil Appeal No. 126 of 1992 has been filed by the appellant-company against the said order of the Karnataka High Court dated November 6, 1991. On February 26, 1988, the respondents filed a petition seeking e....
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....e case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the premises up to the date of payment. The learned single judge found that neither the tenancy nor the amount claimed in the petition towards the arrears and the subsequent rents due as on February 28, 1991 (amounting in all to Rs. 9,35,618) was disputed. The learned single judge rejected the prayer for exemption from the applicability of section 29(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act claimed on the basis of the statutory protection granted to the appellant-company under section 22 of the Act. It was held that no enquiry under section 16 was pending nor any scheme referred to under section 17 was under preparation or consideration and that there is also no sanctioned scheme under implementation and that the appeal filed by the appellant-company under section 25 of the Act has also been rejected. It was held that the stay order which had been passed by the Delhi High Court in the writ petition did not entitle the appellant-company to invoke the protection under section 22 of the Act as if the appeal under section 25 of the Act was pending. The revision petition filed by the appellant company was, therefore, rejected. Civil Appea....
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....he like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority." A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that it is applicable in respect of an industrial company where (i) an inquiry under section 16 is pending; or (ii) a scheme referred to in section 17 is under preparation or consideration; or (iii) a sanctioned scheme is under implementation ; or (iv) where an appeal under section 25 relating to the industrial company is pending. In any of these events, no proceedings for winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further. This injunction is, however, subject to the exception that the proceedings can be instituted or proceeded with further with the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority. In other words, there is no absolute bar to the institution of proceedings referred to in section 22(1) and, for the operation of th....
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....n spite of the said order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991, by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991, does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991, and it cannot be said that, after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the Appellate Authority. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that any proceedings under the Act were pending before the Board or the Appellate Authority on the date of the passing of the order dated August 14, 1991, by the learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court for winding up of the company or on November 6, 1991, when the Division Bench passed the order dismissing O.S.A. No. 16 of 1991, filed by the appellant-company against the order of the learned single judge dated August 14, 1991.....
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....proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any other properties of the industrial company. The words "or the like" have to be construed with reference to the preceding words, namely, "for execution, distress" which means that the proceedings which are contemplated in this category are proceedings whereby recovery of dues is sought to be made by way of execution, distress or similar process against the property of the company. Proceedings for eviction instituted by a landlord against a tenant who happens to be a sick industrial company cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as falling in this category. We may, in this context, point out that, as indicated in the preamble, the Act has been enacted to make special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by a Board of experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined. The provision regarding suspension of legal proceedings contained in section 22(1) seeks to advance the object of the....
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.... a statutory tenant governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. In Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 1, this court has laid down that the termination of a contractual tenancy does not bring about a change in the status and legal position of the tenant unless there are contrary provisions in the relevant Rent Act and the tenant, notwithstanding the termination of tenancy, does enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises. It is further laid down that this interest or estate which the tenant continues to enjoy despite termination of the contractual tenancy creates a heritable interest in the absence of any provisions to the contrary. This court has also held that the Legislature which, by the Rent Act, seeks to confer the benefit on the tenants and to afford protection against eviction is perfectly competent to make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractual tenancy of the tenant including the rights and the nature of protection of the heirs on the death of the tenant. In the instant case, we are concerned with the right of....