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1999 (12) TMI 409

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....90 and rejected the claim of the appellants for classifying the item under Chapter 71 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. 5. Appellants are manufacturers of 'liquid gold' and additives at their factory at Agra. They filed a declaration under Rule 173B for the year 1995-96 classifying their products under Chapter 3207.90 attracting Central Excise duty at the rate of 20%. The declaration was approved by the Range Superintendent on 15-1-1996. Subsequently, on 1-4-1996 appellants filed another declaration under Rule 173B for the year 1996-97 seeking to classify the product under Chapter 71 which attracted nil rate of duty. 6. The matter was adjudicated by the Assistant Commissioner who by his order-in-original dated 12-12-1996 rejected the claim of the assessee for classification of their product under heading 107.39 (sic) and held that the goods were classifiable under Chapter Heading 3207.90. The Assistant Commissioner observed that the assessee's claim for classification of 'liquid gold' under Chapter 71 was based on their claim that liquid gold was an alloy of gold. After referring to the Dictionary meaning of "alloy", the Assistant Commissioner foun....

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....ments in a finished form, made of, manufactured from or containing gold......." was in pari materia with the definition given in the Gold (Control) Act. Therefore, the Allahabad High Court decision in Ratan Lal Garg case would clearly apply to the interpretation of the same expression in the CEGAT Notification though the said High Court decision might have been given in the context of Defence of India Rules, 1962. Further, the respondent Commissioner being within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, all rulings of the jurisdictional High Court would be binding on him. It was also contended that as per the Customs Notification No. 117/94, dated 27-4-1994 gold in any form including liquid gold would be classifiable under Chapter 71. 9. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Allahabad High Court had already held in Indian Ceramic House v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1970 (26) STC 413] that liquid gold was a chemical and was taxable as a chemical and not as a bullion under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. Chemicals came under Chapter 28 of the Central Excise Tariff. There was no contrary judgment of any other High Court. Further, items covered under Chapter 32 of the Cent....

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....) E.L.T. 20 held that liquid gold can be considered as ceramic colour. He reiterated the finding of the authorities below holding that the specific Chapter sub-heading 3207.90 covered the item in dispute and such items were excluded under Chapter Note 1(c) of Chapter 71. 11. We have considered the submissions and perused the records. We find no merit in the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the Allahabad High Court judgment relied on by them would be applicable to the facts of the present case and the question raised herein. The dispute presently before us is in relation to classification of liquid gold for purposes of the Central Excise Tariff Act. The interpretation given to an expression used in another statute or Rules made thereunder will not have binding effect on the authorities administering/adjudicating a matter under a different statute or Rules made thereunder. Any definition in any statute is primarily meant for the interpretation of the provisions of that statute. Even where the definition per se may be in pari materia with a definition given in another statute, the interpretation given in the context of one statute can have only pursuasive value ....

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....matter was considered by the Commissioner (Appeals) against the said adjudication order, the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the Order-in-Original and allowed the Departmental Appeal. 15. As regards the present appellants' claim that they had become owners of the brand name "Golden Oriole", the Commissioner (Appeals) noted that Shri Syad Zaki Israti, Managing Director of the appellant firm could not categorically state whether the brand name was owned by them or by M/s. National Gold Industries when the Officers visited the appellant's factory on 10-8-1994. The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that if the brand name had been transferred by M/s. National Gold Industries to the appellants by deed of assignment on 3-4-1993, and if such deed was actually in existence, nothing prevented the appellants from producing it before the Investigating Officers. Further, the Commissioner (Appeals) had found that the appellants had submitted the application for registration of "Golden Oriole" brand name in their name only on 24-2-1995, about six months after the seizure of the quantity of liquid gold from the appellant's factory by the Officers. He also observed that since one of the partne....