TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1957 (10) TMI 5
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.... is founded. Very briefly put, the relevant facts are these. The assessee, respondent before us, is a non-resident company which has its head office in London and branches in India. It sells and publishes books and magazines in various parts of the world. For the assessment year in question, it submitted a return of income in which with regard to all publications sold in India, whether printed in India or elsewhere, a fixed percentage of what was known as the marked price was adopted as the cost of production. This, if one may so put it, was the method of accounting on which the assessee company submitted its return. The Income-tax Officer apparently accepted it and subject to certain minor modifications as respects some items of expenditure and an alleged bad debt with which we are not now concerned, assessed the assessee on an income of Rs. 82,623. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The latter issued a notice under section 31(3) of the Act against the assessee, and after hearing the assessee, enhanced the assessment of the assessee company's business income to Rs.1,11,616. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found : " It is noticed that on total....
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.... invoke the provisions of rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax on Rules for the purpose of computing the income of a non-resident, the Income-tax Officer not having done so ? (3) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal to enhance an assessment in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 31(3)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, where as a result of definite information he is of opinion that the income of the assessee has been under-assessed ?" By its judgment and order dated 4th March, 1953, the High Court answered the first two questions in the negative and held---rightly in our view---that the third question did not arise. The appellant then asked for and obtained special leave to appeal from the said judgment and order of the Bombay High Court. The first question appears to us to have been somewhat widely framed and, in the terms in which it has been expressed, is not confined to the method of accounting referred to in section 13 of the Act. The Income-tax Officer, even when he accepts the assessee's method of accounting, is not bound by the figure of profits shown in the accounts. If and when an appeal is taken by the assessee to the Ap....
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....e Income-tax Officer may determine. Thus far, there is no divergence of opinion as to the true scope and effect of section 13 and its proviso. The divergence starts when section 13 is read along with section 31, and we come to the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Section 31, in so far as it is relevant for our purpose, is in these terms : " 31.(3) In disposing of an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment,---- (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or (b) set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such further inquiry as the Income-tax Officer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment, and determine where necessary the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment.... Provided that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall not enhance an assessment or a penalty unless the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement: Provided further that at the hearing of any appeal against an o....
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....rity only. According to him, into the first class of cases the entire hierarchy of income-tax authorities are included; but in the second class of cases, the decision must be that of the named authority only. He has referred us to certain other sections of the Act where, according to him, the determination is also subjective, such as---section 4A(a)(iv), section 10(2)(vi), section 12B(2), section 23A etc. In some other sections, it is pointed out, two or more authorities are named, e.g., sections 27, 38, 48, etc. By What we must admit is a very adroit and plausible piecing together of some of these sections, learned counsel has built up his argument that in the present case the opinion of the Income-tax Officer that the income, profits and gains can be properly deduced from the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee is a subjective determination of the Income-tax Officer alone, and the opinion of no other officer or authority can be substituted therefore. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had, therefore, no jurisdiction to go behind that opinion. We are unable to accept this line of argument as correct, and our reasons are, these. Firstly, we think that learn....
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.... not see what other distinctive, objective conditions there are which put those sub-sections in a different category. The words "in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer" are not to be construed in the sense of a mere discretionary power ; but in the context of the words used in the proviso to section 13 they impose a statutory duty on the Income-tax Officer to examine in every case the method of accounting and to see (i) whether or not it is regularly employed, and (ii) to determine whether the income, profits and gains can properly be deduced therefrom. Section 30 of the Act gives the assessee a right of appeal in respect of certain orders including an order of assessment made under section 23. Section 31 deals with the hearing of an appeal and powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Before disposing of the appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, if he thinks fit, make a further enquiry himself or cause it to be made by the Income-tax Officer, and in disposing of the appeal he may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annual the assessment ; he may set it aside and order a fresh assessment. There is nothing in the language of sec....
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....mmissioner has no jurisdiction to go behind that opinion. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is to be remembered that with regard to both conditions, the first and initial duty is that of the Income-tax Officer to determine whether the conditions or any of them are fulfilled ; secondly, if the opinion of the Income-tax Officer with regard to the second condition is to be inviolate by reason of the difference in language, then it should be inviolate in all cases. Why should it be inviolate in one case and not so when the assessee appeals against a determination made adverse to him ? We feel that the second condition is expressed in the terms in which it has been expressed, because it involves an inferential process and the expression "in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer" is aptly used as that officer must in the first instance make the determination. It does not necessarily follow that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot revise the determination and exercise the power which the Income-tax Officer could exercise. A reference was also made by counsel for the respondent to the definition of "Appellate Assistant Commissioner" and "Income-tax Officer" in....
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....te Assistant Commissioner in enhancing the assessment or setting aside the assessment and directing a fresh assessment to be made by the Income-tax Officer. Dealing with the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Chagla, C. J., in Narandas's case, said: " It is clear that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has been constituted a revising authority against the decisions of the Income-tax Officer; a revising authority not in the narrow sense of revising what is the subject-matter of the appeal, not in the sense of revising those matters about which the assessee makes a grievance, but a revising authority in the sense that once the appeal is before him he can revise not only the ultimate computation arrived at by the Income-tax Officer but he can revise every process which led to the ultimate computation or assessment. In other words, what he can revise is not merely the ultimate amount which is liable to tax, but he is entitled to revise the various decisions given by the Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment and also the various incomes or deductions which came in for consideration of the Income-tax Officer. " We are in agreement with these observations....
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....oviso? On one side, there is the language of the proviso, and on the other the language of section 31 which gives wide power to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. At first sight, there may appear some conflict between the two. But on a closer scrutiny there is, we think, no conflict. As we have said before, the language of the proviso means only this that, in the first instance, the Income-tax Officer must form his own opinion as to whether the income, profits and gains can be properly deduced from the method of accounting regularly employed, if any; but if he fails to apply his mind to the proviso or comes to a wrong determination for or against the assessee in the computation of the income, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can correct the error in computation, provided he has seizin of the assessment on an appeal filed by the assessee. If the assessee files no appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner does not come into the picture, because the Revenue has no right of appeal from an assessment made by the Income-tax Officer. Whether in a particular case a remand will be the proper order or whether the error can be corrected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner himsel....
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....d after he ceased to do business, it was a capital receipt which was not subject to tax. His further contention was that as he kept his accounts on cash basis, this amount could not be included in his accounts of the business done from 1st January to 30th June, 1944, inasmuch as this amount was not realised during that period but was realised during a period subsequent to the period for which accounts were kept. When the matter went before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, he took the view that the assessee continued to carry on the business till 31st December, 1944; he also held that a sum of Rs. 2,13,306 was recovered from 1st July to 31st December, 1944, and not a sum of Rs. 2,02,209 as alleged by the assessee. When the assessee appealed to the Tribunal from the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, his contention regarding the sum of Rs. 2,02,209 was upheld by the Tribunal. His contention with regard to the termination of his business was also upheld by the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that the business came to an end on 30th June, 1944, and not on 31st December, 1944. The assessee further contended before the Tribunal that the nett amount of Rs. 1,15,559 whic....
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....ority to come to a different conclusion. It may be that if an opinion is formed by the Income-tax Officer that opinion may be subject to an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal; but in the first instance an opinion has to be formed by the Income-tax Officer as required by the proviso. " While we agree that, in the first instance, the Income-tax Officer as the first assessing officer has to form an opinion about the applicability of the proviso to section 13, we do not agree that it is not open to any other authority, which is lawfully in seizin of the order of assessment of which the method of accounting under section 13 is only a part, to come to a different conclusion with regard to the applicability of the proviso. Let us examine this point a little more closely. The Income-tax Officer may proceed in one of three ways: (1) he may fail to apply his mind to the statutory duty imposed on him by section 13 and its proviso and may accept the assessee's method of accounting without at all considering if (a) the method was regularly employed and (b) if the income, profits and gains of the assessee can be properly deduced therefrom ; (2) he may apply his min....
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....nd Furnishing Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax where a view contrary to that of the Bombay High Court was taken. Though we hold that the conclusion arrived at in this decision is correct, there is no detailed discussion in the judgment of the issues involved, except the bare statement that the powers of the Appellate Tribunal under section 33 are very wide. Apart from the aforesaid two decisions which directly bear on the question under our consideration, there are some other decisions which have an indirect but not a decisive bearing on the question. First, in order of priority, is the decision of the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sarangpur Cotton Manufacturing Co. Ltd. In that case, the assessees had for years past adopted regularly the method of valuation of stocks by taking some price well below both cost and market price and they followed this method in the relevant accounting year. The object of this striking under-valuation was the creation of a "secret reserve" which involved the retention of profits so as not to be included in the profits shown to the shareholders by the profit and loss account and the balance sheet, but which constituted part of t....
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....Commissioner of Income-tax. We do not think that these decisions touch the question at issue before us. The present is not a case where the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has travelled outside the ambit of his jurisdiction under section 31 of the Act. For the reasons given above, we would answer question No. 1 in the affirmative. As to question No. 2, only a few words are necessary. Rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, is in these terms : " 33. In any case in which the Income-tax Officer is of opinion that the actual amount of the income, profits or gains accruing or arising to any person residing out of the taxable territories whether directly or indirectly through or from any business connection in the taxable territories or through or from any property in the taxable territories, or through or from any asset or source of income in the taxable territories, or through or from any money lent at interest and brought into the taxable territories in cash or in kind cannot be ascertained, the amount of such income, profits or gains for the purposes of assessment to income-tax may be calculated on such percentage of the turnover so accruing or arising as the Income-tax ....
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....bmitting its return of income for the said assessment year 1944-45 and in the assessment proceedings before the Income-tax Officer for that year, the respondent took the aforesaid invoice value as representing the cost of the books produced by it. The business income returned by the respondent was Rs. 79,131. By his assessment order dated 24th March, 1945, the Income-tax Officer accepted the method of accounting employed by the respondent and its books of account for the Indian business. He, however, added back certain items of expenses shown in the respondent's balance sheet and profit and loss account and computed the income at Rs. 82,623 and disallowed the respondent's claim for a bad debt of Rs. 3,592. The respondent appealed against the said disallowance to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the respondent's claim for bad debt. He was, however, of the view that the assessee's method of accounting, viz., taking the aforesaid invoice value as representing the respondent's actual cost of production, was such that the respondent's profits could not be properly deduced therefrom and issued notice to the respondent under the first p....
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.... it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal to reject the assessee's books of account, which have been accepted by the Income-tax Officer ? (2) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal to invoke the provisions of rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax Rules for the purposes of computing the income of a non-resident, the Income-tax Officer not having done so ? (3) Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal to enhance an assessment in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 31(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, where as a result of definite information he is of opinion that the income of the assessee has been under-assessed ? " The said reference was heard by the High Court on 4th March, 1953, and the High Court, following its own decision in K. F. Vakeel's case, answered the referred questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the negative and stated that the referred question No. 3 did not arise. The appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to this court under section 66A(2) of the Act but without success. The appellant thereupon applied for and obtained from this court special lea....
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....oportion to the total profits of the business of such person (such profits being computed in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act) as the receipts so accruing or arising bear to the total receipts of the business, or in such other manner as the Income-tax Officer may deem suitable." It is contended by the learned Solicitor-General for the appellant that even though no right of appeal is conferred upon the Revenue against an assessment order made by the Income-tax Officer, once the assessee carries an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the assessment order is wholly robbed of its finality and the whole of the assessment is at large before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with the result that it is then open to the Revenue to urge all the contentions which it could have done before the Income-tax Officer and ask the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to re-open the whole enquiry and, in effect, re-assess the assessee and even enhance the assessment, provided of course, that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall not enhance the assessment unless and until he has afforded the assessee a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against suc....
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.... thereto which vest such power only in the named authority and no other. There is paucity of authority on the construction of section 13 of the Act. The High Court in deciding the reference in question relied upon an unreported judgment of its own delivered on 11th October, 1950, in K. F. Vakeel v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax. In that case the Tribunal for the first time came, to the conclusion that it was not possible to discover the profits made by the assessee if the accounts were maintained on cash basis and, therefore, the proper method of accounting was the mercantile, i.e., the accrual basis, and not the cash basis, even though the Income-tax Officer had accepted the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had concurred in the same. The question that arose before the High Court was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to do so. The High Court construed the provisions of section 13 of the Act and was of opinion that : " It is for the Income-tax Officer to form the opinion that income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced from the method adopted by the assessee and if such an opinion ....
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.... examining the assessee's method of accounting and the records placed before the Income-tax authorities came to the conclusion that the basis of computation adopted by the Income-tax authorities was faulty and the accounts books did not reflect the correct account of the assessee. It accordingly computed the income of the assessee under the proviso to section 13 of the Act and the question which arose for the consideration of the court was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to do so. The High Court was of opinion that (1) the Tribunal's power of dealing with an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner was plenary, and had been expressed in section 33(4) of the Act as widely as could be conceived and (2) in an appeal under section 33 the Tribunal was competent to decide facts as well as law and possessed authority to substitute its own order of assessment for the order under appeal. These are the only two decisions bearing on the construction of the proviso to section 13 of the Act and dealing with the question whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, could for the first time exercise the power of rejecti....
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....ng come into operation the computation of the income has to be made upon such basis and in such manner as the Income-tax Officer may determine. The basis and manner thus adopted by the Income-tax Officer can be examined on appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner while exercising the appellate powers vested in them under the Act. This case is no authority for the proposition that the power of rejection of the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee can also be exercised by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner concerned while entertaining an appeal by the assessee against the order of the Income-tax Officer. There is, however, a decision of the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Sarangpur Cotton Manufacturing Co. Ltd., which throws some light on the construction of section 13 and the nature and scope of the power to be exercised by the Income-tax Officer under the proviso thereto. The assessees in that case had employed a regular method of accounting but had also for some years past adopted regularly a method of valuation of stock by taking some price under both cost and market price with the object....
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....he Privy Council and their Lordships found themselves unable to agree with the view of the High Court as to the meaning of section 13 of the Act and they were of the opinion that the section related to a method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee for his own purpose and did not relate to a method of making up the statutory return for assessment to income-tax. Secondly, the section clearly made such a method of accounting a compulsory basis of computation unless in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer the income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom. The duty of the Income-tax Officer was to determine whether it was possible to deduce the true profits from the account and the judgment of the Income-tax Officer under the proviso must be properly exercised. Their Lordships laid it down that it is the duty of the Income-tax Officer where there is a method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee not to prima facie accept the profits and gains shown by the assessee but to consider whether the income, profits and gains can properly be deduced therefrom and to proceed according to his judgment on the question. On the facts of the case before them th....
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....n for that of the Income-tax Officer concerned and proceed to assess the assessees applying the proviso to section 13 of the Act. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case before them did not do anything of the kind and observed that it would be then for the Income-tax Officer himself to proceed to the proper discharge of his duty under section 13 of the Act in the light of the opinion expressed in their judgment. They did not send back the case either to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, or to the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax but after having answered the amended question in the negative simply stated that the Income-tax Officer would doubtless proceed to reach a proper decision in behalf of the applicability of the proviso to section 13 of the Act having regard to his experience in the preceding years of assessment. They neither left that duty to be performed by the Commissioner of Income-tax nor by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax but referred the performance of that duty to the proper authority who was the Income-tax Officer who alone was invested with the duty of performing it under the terms of the proviso to section 13 of the Act. Certain deci....
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....of the Act and in the exercise of these powers the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may in the case of an order of assessment (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or (b) set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such further enquiry as the Income-tax Officer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment, and determine where necessary the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment. If the Appellate Assistant Commissioner chooses to exercise the powers conferred upon him under the first alternative and enhance the assessment he is enjoined by the proviso to section 31(3) of the Act to give to the appellant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. There are no doubt limitations grafted on this power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but these limitations have to be found from the very nature of the proceedings themselves. These limitations will be indicated at the appropriate place hereafter. The High Court of Bombay no doubt expressed the opinion in Commissioner ....
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....s and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom. This decision does not help the appellant in its contention that if the Income-tax Officer has not in fact done so it will be open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner while hearing an appeal filed before him by the assessee to exercise such power in the first instance. The position contended for by the appellant as emerging from the decision of the High Court of Bombay just referred to is contrary to the one which was enunciated by the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay in K. F. Vakeel's case. I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay did not intend to lay down any such position. In fact, in the later unreported decision of theirs in Narrondas Manordass v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay laid down that however wide in terms the powers conferred upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 31 of the Act may have been worded, they are not absolute but are circumscribed by the very nature of the proceedings themselves. The learned Judges in that context observed : " Now, in order to understand what the competence of the Appe....
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.... not in the sense of revising those matters about which the assessee makes a grievance, but a revising authority in the sense that once the appeal is before him he can revise not only the ultimate computation arrived at by the Income-tax Officer but he can revise every process which led to the ultimate computation or assessment. In other words, what he can revise is not merely the ultimate amount which is liable to tax, but he is entitled to revise the various decisions given by the Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment and also the various incomes or deductions which came in for consideration of the Income-tax Officer. " The learned Judges then cited with approval the observations of the Patna High Court in Jagarnath Therani v. Commissioner Income-tax : " Now this section [section 31(3)] relating to appeals is enacted for the benefit of the subject and also, to the limited extent therein stated, for the benefit of the Crown. But the subject-matter of the appeal is the assessment and the scope of the appeal must, in my opinion, be limited by the subject-matter. The appellate authority has no power to travel beyond the subject-matter of the assessment, and, for al....
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....on the construction of section 13 of the Act above referred to except the observations of the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay in K. F. Vakeel's case. This judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay has not been dissented from either in Bombay or elsewhere and stands unchallenged and would prima facie go to establish the position canvassed before us by the assessee that it is the Income-tax Officer and the Income-tax Officer alone who is invested with the power to determine whether the method of accounting employed by the assessee is such that the income, profits and gains of the assessee cannot properly be deduced therefrom. Not much help can be derived also from the comparison of the various provisions of the Act where the Income-tax Officer is vested with the power of arriving at the determinations on his own, viz., section 4A(a)(iv), section 10(5), section 12B(2), section 22(2), section 22(4), section 23(2), section 23A, section 34 and section 42(2) or where there are several authorities named besides the Income-tax Officer for arriving at determinations of the relative questions, viz., section 28(1) and (2), section 37, section 38, section 48, and ....
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....t effect is the condition of the rejection by him of the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee and unless and until he comes to that conclusion he cannot reject the same and compute the income, profits and gains of the assessee upon such basis and in such manner as he may determine. The difference in the language of these two conditions is advisedly adopted by the Legislature. The fact that no method of accounting has been regularly employed by the assessee would be obvious to any Income-tax Officer merely on a perusal of the statement of account furnished by the assessee and would not require any mental process which can be properly described as a determination. The mental process involved, however, in the case of the second condition is of a much more elaborate character and the Income-tax Officer has to apply his mind to the question whether even though the method of accounting has been regularly employed by the assessee, such income, profits and gain cannot properly be deduced therefrom. Here, the Income-tax Officer concerned has to form a definite opinion on the question and if he comes to the conclusion that the income, profits and gains of the assessee cann....
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....ssee and the computation of the income, profits and gains of the assessee upon such basis and in such manner as the Income-tax Officer himself may determine. To that extent the decision of the High Court of Bombay in K. F. Vakeel v. Commissioner of Income-tax & Excess Profits Tax would appear to be correct. It is however urged that this interpretation would involve the necessary consequence that the determination of the Income-tax Officer within the proviso to section 13 of the Act would be final so far as the Revenue was concerned as it had no right to appeal against the determination of the Income-tax Officer, whereas the assessee would have the right under section 30 of the Act to carry an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and such a result could certainly not have been contemplated by the Legislature while enacting this measure. It is also contended that once the assessee carries an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner he himself destroys the finality of the determination made by the Income-tax Officer and the whole matter is at large so much so that even though the Revenue could not have preferred an appeal on its own, once the appeal is en....
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....re statutory and they are to be found in the four corners of section 31 of the Act. The nature and scope of these powers have been already discussed above and these powers are not absolute in character but are circumscribed in the manner indicated in the judgment of the High Court of Bombay above referred to. The Income-tax Officer who appears before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner either in person or by his representative is concerned to support his own decision and therefore he cannot be ever heard to say that the decision which he has reached in the matter of the proviso to section 13 of the Act is wrong in any manner whatever. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner even though he is exercising these appellate powers, cannot on its own or suo motu arrive at the conclusion that the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee is such that the income, profits and gains of the assessee cannot be properly deduced therefrom. He can only arrive at the conclusion on the record before him and on the materials presented before him by the assessee as well as the Income-tax Officer appearing before him either in person or by a representative that the conclusion which has been....
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....The learned Solicitor-General urged that if the proviso to section 13 of the Act was so interpreted it would not only deprive the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of the power to bring the proviso to section 13 of the Act into operation in a proper case but would also deprive the Commissioner of the power which he has to revise the Income-tax Officer's order of assessment under section 33B of the Act. As already indicated, the court is not concerned here with the interpretation of section 33B of the Act and it may also be noted that there was no such provision to be found in the Act as it stood at the relevant period. Assuming, however, that the power of the Commissioner to revise the Income-tax Officer's orders under section 33B, of the Act has to be considered in this context, there is nothing in the terms of that section which militates against the conclusion arrived at on the construction of the proviso to section 13 of the Act. If the Commissioner considers that any order passed in the record of any proceedings under the Act by the Income-tax Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, it is open to him, after giving the assessee an opp....