TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2002 (3) TMI 223
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....Hyd/96 1537/Hyd/96 13-11-1996 8,11,18,963 1984-85 70/Hyd/96 1538/Hyd/96 13-11-1996 2,92,89,516 1986-87 71/Hyd/96 1539/Hyd/96 13-11-1996 2,74,49,693 1987-88 72/Hyd/96 1540/Hyd/96 13-11-1996 95,43,608 1990-91 73/Hyd/96 1541/Hyd/96 13-11-1996 4,81,82,048 1992-93 5/Hyd/95 1705/Hyd/95 13-02-1996 1,28,42,484 1993-94 74/Hyd/96 1542/Hyd/96 13-11-1996&nbs....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....appeals are delayed which cannot be attributed to the assessee as it has been requesting the Tribunal for an early disposal of the appeals. The petitioner Corporation is not in a position to pay such huge demand as directed by the Assessing Officer as its funds are meant only for carrying out its objects, i.e., public distribution of essential commodities and not for any other purpose. There is no liquid resources, and even for procuring essential commodities, the Corporation has to depend on overdraft being accorded by the RBI and subsidy from the Government. Hence, prayed for grant of further absolute stay of the disputed tax till the disposal of appeals by this Tribunal and an interim stay till the disposal of the stay petitions. 3. On the other hand, the learned representative for the Revenue countered, to say in brief, by submitting THAT: As has been correctly pointed out by the assessee, for all the assessment years in question, the Tribunal has granted stay of the recovery proceedings pending disposal of the appeals. It is stated by the assessee that only for the assessment year 1997-98 the stay that has been granted by the Tribunal got expired on the completion of six mo....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....stment Co. (P.) Ltd. AIR 1976 SC 2610 at 2617. (b) CIT v. Bhikari Charan Panda [1976] 104 ITR 73 (Ori.). (c) CIT v. M. Nagappa [1978] 114 ITR 707 (Kar.). 4. In reply, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted THAT: it cannot be disputed that the Tribunal has already granted by its respective orders for the relevant assessment years detailed above, stay of the recovery proceedings of the Department on the assessee. When the amendment to section 254(2A) is made, it is specifically mentioned therein that the proviso inserted by such amendment takes operation with effect from 1-6-2001 only as clearly mentioned. It does not say that it takes its operation retrospectively. When there is no word 'retrospectively' mentioned therein, the Tribunal cannot give effect to such amendment retrospective operation. If such amendment has been specifically mentioned as retrospectively operative, then, there will not be any difference when it mentioned retrospectively and when it is not mentioned, as of, now, retrospectively, to give the meaning as interpreted by the Department. Therefore, for all the assessment years in question except for the assessment year 1997-98 the order of which ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....l, where it is possible, may hear and decide such appeal within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 253: Provided that where an order of stay is made in any proceedings relating to an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of section 253, the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of such order: Provided further that if such appeal is not so disposed of within the period specified in the first proviso, the stay order shall stand vacated after the expiry of the said period." 5.3 It may be seen from the Act that sub-sections (2A) and (2B) have been inserted by the Finance Act, 1999 with effect from 1-6-1999 and the provisos to the aforesaid section are inserted by the Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 1-6-2001. Nowhere in the language employed in the aforesaid section, particularly in the said sub-section (2A) and especially in the footnote provided thereunder, the word 'retrospectively' has been couched by the Parliament. It simply states "provisos inserted by the Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 1-6-2001....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... with effect from 1-4 1971 introduced a new scheme of limitation and no right had accrued to the assessee when the law was changed and that, therefore, the law as in force on the date when the order was made must be applicable; (c) In the case of M. Nagappa, the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court held that the power of the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner to impose penalty under section 275 of the Act as it stood before amendment had not come to an end on 1-1-1971 when section 275 was substituted by a new section which provided for extended period of limitation and that it was open to the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner to exercise his power until the expiry of the extended period prescribed by the new section, thus resulting that as the IAC could impose penalty till 31-3-1972, penalties which were imposed on 28-2-1972 were levied in time. (d) In the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, which would be worthwhile to be extracted, as below: "It is now well settled that where a statutory provision which is not expressly made retrospective by the Legislature seeks to affect vested rights and corresponding obligation of parties, such provision cannot be said t....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....in a party the moment when proceedings are first initiated and before a decision is given by an inferior tribunal. Such a right cannot be taken away except by an express enactment or necessary intendment; (ii) In Sampath Iyengar's Law of Income-tax, Eighth Edition (revised by Justice S. Ranganathan) Vol. I at page 57 under Sl. 38 with the head note 'Retroactive Legislation' it is said that ordinarily, a statute is prospective, in its operation, but the Legislature has power to make laws with retroactive force and such retroactive operation may be expressed totidem verbis as 'shall have effect and shall be deemed for all purposes to have had effect as if had ordinarily been enacted' or by any other words which would manifest a clear intention to retroact. It also further states that the general rule is that all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to the unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that this was the intention of the Legislature. At page 60 thereof, it is clearly stated that a fiscal statute will not ....