TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Dec 20,2021

Summary order. Court granted four weeks to the respondent to file a counter affidavit and one week to the petitioner to file a rejoinder; refused to grant any interim relief; directed that appropriate interim orders may be passed if the counter affidavit is not filed within the time specified.

Summary order. Notice issued in writ petition seeking refund and direction to set up GST Appellate Tribunal; respondents directed to file counter affidavits within four weeks and rejoinders, if any, before the next date; matter listed on 29th March, 2022.

Demand notice challenge in writ jurisdiction - duty to upload orders under the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Act, 2017 and Rules - service of order and hearing notice - appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Act, 2017 - discretion to dispense with certified copy before appellate authority

Demand notice challenge in writ jurisdiction - appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Act, 2017 - Maintainability of writ petition challenging the demand notice and alleged non-uploading of the order when an alternative statutory appeal lies. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that although the petitioner challenged the demand notice dated 24.12.2019 and contended that the order was not uploaded as required, an alternative statutory remedy was available before the Appellate Commissioner under Section 107 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Act, 2017. In view of the existence of the appellate remedy, the Court declined to entertain the writ petition and directed that the petitioner be permitted to pursue the appellate remedy within a limited time. The Court further directed the Appellate Commissioner to decide the appeal on merits and in accordance with law, preferably within three months of receipt of a copy of this order, and authorised the Appellate Commissioner to dispense with the requirement of a certified copy of the order dated 18.12.2019 if the appeal is filed within the stipulated time. [Paras 6, 7, 8]

Writ petition dismissed; petitioner permitted to file appeal under Section 107 within thirty days; Appellate Commissioner to decide on merits preferably within three months and may dispense with certified copy.

Service of order and hearing notice - duty to upload orders under the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Act, 2017 and Rules - Petitioner's contention that it was not issued with a hearing notice (and related contentions about non-receipt/non-uploading) was without merit. - HELD THAT: - The Court considered the parties' contentions and the materials placed before it, noting the respondent's assertion that the order dated 18.12.2019 was sent to the petitioner's designated email after reminders and that a reply dated 27.05.2019 had been acknowledged. The Court found no merit in the petitioner's submission that a hearing notice was not issued and recorded that the factual complaints did not justify relief by way of writ in the presence of the statutory appellate mechanism. [Paras 4, 6]

Petitioner's plea regarding non-issuance of hearing notice/non-uploading rejected; no interference by this Court.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition challenging the demand notice dismissed for want of merit and on the ground of available alternative remedy; petitioner granted liberty to appeal to the Appellate Commissioner under Section 107 within thirty days, the Appellate Commissioner directed to decide the appeal on merits preferably within three months and may dispense with production of a certified copy.

Revocation of cancelled GST registration - Extension of limitation by Removal of Difficulties order and subsequent notifications - Acceptance of revocation application despite portal-imposed time restriction - Condition of filing returns and payment of tax for entertaining revocation - Fresh consideration of revocation application on merits by proper officer

Revocation of cancelled GST registration - Extension of limitation by Removal of Difficulties order and subsequent notifications - Acceptance of revocation application despite portal-imposed time restriction - Condition of filing returns and payment of tax for entertaining revocation - Petition for mandamus directing respondents to permit filing and consideration of application for revocation of cancelled GST registration and to accept returns and payment as pre-condition. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that cancellations were effected on 24.08.2019 and the statutory 30-day period for filing revocation expired in October 2019. The Central Board issued the Central Goods and Services Tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2020 and later notifications and circulars which extended the period for filing applications for revocation (up to 31.08.2020 and subsequently up to 30.09.2021), taking into account the pandemic-induced difficulties and Supreme Court extensions. Although the petitioner attempted to file for revocation on 30.09.2021, the GST portal rejected the application citing an independent portal restriction (stating filing not allowed after 579 days). Having regard to the Government's decision to permit similarly placed registrants to apply within the extended timeframe, and subject to the statutory requirement that the petitioner must file returns and pay the tax due (as a condition for entertaining the revocation application in terms of Rule 23), the Court found it appropriate to direct the respondents to accept the returns and facilitate payment of tax and to consider the revocation application despite the portal endorsement. [Paras 17, 18]

Writ petition allowed; respondents directed to accept the returns filed in terms of proviso to Rule 23, facilitate payment of tax, and entertain the petitioner's application for revocation of cancelled registration.

Fresh consideration of revocation application on merits by proper officer - Whether the revocation application must be considered afresh on merits by the proper officer. - HELD THAT: - The Court emphasised that acceptance of the application for revocation is without expressing any opinion on the merits of the original cancellation. The matter is to be dealt with afresh: once the petitioner complies with the requirement of filing returns and payment of tax under the relevant rules, the proper officer is to consider and decide the revocation application on its own merits and in accordance with law within a specified time period. [Paras 18]

Application remitted to the proper officer to be considered on merits and decided in accordance with law within 45 days from receipt of a copy of the order, subject to compliance with Rule 23 requirements.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed. Respondents are directed to accept the petitioner's returns and facilitate payment of tax as required, and thereafter to consider and decide the petitioner's application for revocation of cancelled GST registration on merits and in accordance with law within 45 days of receipt of this order; no view has been expressed on the merits of the original cancellation.

Extension of limitation during COVID-19 - application of Supreme Court suo motu orders on limitation - binding effect of Supreme Court decisions under Article 141 - condonation of delay under Section 107(4) of the CGST Act - time barred appeals

Application of Supreme Court suo motu orders on limitation - extension of limitation during COVID-19 - binding effect of Supreme Court decisions under Article 141 - time barred appeals - Whether the dismissal of the appeal as barred by limitation was contrary to the Supreme Court's orders extending limitation during the COVID 19 period and whether the appellate authority was bound to give effect to those orders. - HELD THAT: - The High Court examined the impugned appellate order which dismissed the appeal as time barred under Section 107 after treating the statutory three month period and the one month condonable extension as exhausted. The court noted the Hon'ble Supreme Court's suo motu order providing that where limitation would have expired between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021, a 90 day period from 15.03.2021 (or the longer remaining period) would apply, and the subsequent extension of limitation by the Supreme Court. The court further observed that a departmental Circular (Circular No.157/13/2021 GST) expressly advised that appeals to appellate authorities would stand extended in accordance with the Supreme Court's orders. In view of the binding nature of Supreme Court orders under Article 141, the appellate authority ought to have applied those orders and the Circular when dealing with appeals falling within the covered period instead of mechanically dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation. [Paras 4, 5, 6, 9, 10]

The appellate authority's dismissal on the ground of limitation was contrary to the Supreme Court's orders and the departmental clarification; the authority should have applied the extension of limitation laid down by the Supreme Court and Circular No.157/13/2021 GST.

Condonation of delay under Section 107(4) of the CGST Act - time barred appeals - Whether the appeal filed by the petitioner should be taken up and considered on merits in view of the Supreme Court orders and the departmental Circular. - HELD THAT: - The High Court recorded that the impugned order by the adjudicating authority was dated 15.06.2020 and the appeal was filed on 05.11.2020. Taking into account the Supreme Court's orders extending limitation for the COVID 19 period and the departmental Circular clarifying that appeals stand extended accordingly, the court held that the appellate authority ought to have numbered and taken up the appeal for hearing rather than dismissing it as beyond the condonable period. The court therefore directed the appellate authority to take up the appeal and decide it on merits in accordance with law. [Paras 9, 10, 11]

The appeal is to be taken up and considered on merits by the appellate authority in accordance with law; the authority is directed to do so within sixty days from receipt of this order.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; the appellate authority is directed to take up the appeal and decide it on merits in accordance with the Supreme Court's orders and the departmental Circular, within sixty days of receipt of this order.

Supply in the course or furtherance of business - Incidental or ancillary activity to main business - Provision of transport facility to employees as received service from third party, not an outward supply by employer

Supply in the course or furtherance of business - Incidental or ancillary activity to main business - Provision of transport facility to employees as received service from third party, not an outward supply by employer - Part recovery of renting of motor vehicles/cab services from employees is a supply of service by the applicant to its employees or not - HELD THAT: - The Authority examined whether the partial recovery from employees for third party cab services constitutes a 'supply' under Section 7, which requires the transaction to be made in the course or furtherance of business. The applicant's core business is software development and support; providing transport was characterised by the Authority as a welfare, security and safety measure not connected to or integrally linked with the functioning or furtherance of the applicant's software business. The transport service in question is procured from third party vendors who bill and supply the service to the applicant; the applicant merely pays the vendor and recovers part of the cost from employees. The Authority found that the applicant is a recipient of the transport service from the vendor and is not itself supplying transport or a lease/rental service as an output of its business. Reliance was placed on analogous advance rulings where nominal recoveries for employee transport were held not to attract GST. Consequently, the element of being an activity in furtherance of the applicant's business was absent and the partial recovery cannot be treated as an outward supply by the applicant to its employees. [Paras 5]

Partial recovery from employees for third party cab services does not constitute a supply by the applicant and is not leviable to GST.

Final Conclusion: The Authority answered Question 1 in the negative: the part recovery from employees for cab services provided by third party vendors is not a supply by the applicant and not subject to GST. Questions 2 and 3 were left unanswered as redundant in view of the negative answer to Question 1.

Renting of immovable property as supply of services - Value of supply - Consideration - Transaction value - Incidental expenses - Pure agent - Rule 33 of CGST Rules

Value of supply - Consideration - Incidental expenses - Transaction value - Reimbursed electricity and water charges collected by the applicant from licensees are liable to GST and form part of the transaction value of renting of immovable property. - HELD THAT: - The Authority found that the applicant's activity is renting of immovable property which is a taxable supply of services. Electricity and water are basic amenities essential for enjoyment of the premises and, as per the terms of the agreement, the variable utility amounts recovered at actuals are treated by the parties as part of the monthly license fee. Under Section 15 the value of supply includes incidental expenses and any amounts charged by the supplier in respect of the supply. Consequently, electricity and water charges reimbursed to the applicant, even if recovered at actuals, constitute incidental expenses/consideration connected with the renting service and are includible in the transaction value for levy of GST. [Paras 5]

Reimbursed electricity and water charges are includible in the value of the renting service and are liable to GST.

Pure agent - Rule 33 of CGST Rules - The applicant does not qualify as a 'pure agent' for excluding reimbursed electricity and water charges from the value of supply. - HELD THAT: - Rule 33 permits exclusion of expenditures incurred as a pure agent only if specific conditions are satisfied: authorization by the recipient to act as pure agent, separate indication in the invoice, supplies procured as pure agent being in addition to supplies on supplier's own account, and other explanatory conditions. The Authority observed that the main electricity and water connections and meters are in the applicant's name, the applicant bears primary responsibility to procure and pay for the utilities, there is no evidence of recipient authorization directing the applicant to act as their pure agent or directing the supplier of utilities, and the utilities are not procured on instructions of the tenant. On these facts the applicant failed to satisfy Rule 33 conditions and therefore cannot exclude the reimbursed amounts from the value of supply. [Paras 5]

The applicant is not a pure agent; reimbursed utility charges cannot be excluded from the value of supply under Rule 33.

Hypothetical question - Whether the applicant must add utility charges to the monthly license fee where the tenant pays the service provider directly but meters remain in the applicant's name was not answered on the facts presented. - HELD THAT: - The Authority declined to answer the hypothetical question because the facts of the case did not demonstrate a situation where the tenant pays the service provider directly while meters remain in the applicant's name. The Authority observed that a ruling cannot be rendered on assumptions unsupported by proper underlying facts and therefore did not decide the hypothetical scenario.

The hypothetical question has not been answered for want of specific factual basis.

Final Conclusion: The Advance Ruling holds that electricity and water charges reimbursed by the licensee to the applicant form part of the transaction value of the renting service and are taxable under GST; the applicant does not qualify as a 'pure agent' under Rule 33 to exclude such amounts from value; a hypothetical scenario where the tenant pays the service provider directly (despite meters remaining in the applicant's name) was not adjudicated for lack of factual basis.

Reopening of assessment and validity of notice under Section 148 - Applicability of Section 14A to disallowance of expenditure relatable to tax free income - Prohibition on reassessment where income involving matters are the subject matter of any appeal, reference or revision (third proviso to Section 147) - Writ of Certiorari to quash reassessment notice

Prohibition on reassessment where income involving matters are the subject matter of any appeal, reference or revision (third proviso to Section 147) - Reopening of assessment and validity of notice under Section 148 - Applicability of Section 14A to disallowance of expenditure relatable to tax free income - Whether the notice issued under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2002-2003 was valid when the disallowance under Section 14A was the subject matter of an appeal pending before the ITAT. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the third proviso to Section 147 (as then in force) bars the Assessing Officer from assessing or reassessing income "which are the subject matters of any appeal, reference or revision." The disallowance under Section 14A, which formed the basis for initiating proceedings under Section 148, was already under challenge before the ITAT by way of appeal against the CIT(A)'s order. By issuing the notice under Section 148 while that appeal was pending, the Assessing Officer was effectively attempting to re examine and reassess a matter that was the subject of an appeal, thereby impermissibly sitting in appeal over the CIT(A)'s determination. If the Revenue disagreed with the quantum of disallowance made by the CIT(A), the appropriate remedy was to challenge that order before the ITAT; having not done so, the Assessing Officer could not resort to reopening the assessment under Section 148. For these reasons the notice under Section 148 and the order rejecting objections were quashed. [Paras 10, 11, 12]

Notice dated 20/3/2007 under Section 148 and the order dated 30/11/2007 rejecting objections were quashed and set aside; Rule made absolute.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed: the reassessment notice under Section 148 (and the order rejecting objections) relating to Assessment Year 2002-2003 was quashed because the subject matter (disallowance under Section 14A) was the subject of an appeal pending before the ITAT, invoking the bar in the third proviso to Section 147.

Sanction under Section 151 - re-opening of assessment under Section 148 - requirement of reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer before sanction - assessment re-opening sanction vitiated by non-application of mind

Sanction under Section 151 - requirement of reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer before sanction - Validity of the sanction for issuing notice under Section 148 where the sanction predates the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer. - HELD THAT: - Section 151 requires that no notice under Section 148 shall be issued after the prescribed period unless the Commissioner is satisfied, on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer, that it is a fit case for issuing such notice. The Court held that the reasons must be final and be before the Commissioner when he applies his mind to grant sanction. A procedure in which draft reasons are first submitted for approval, sanction obtained, and only thereafter the Assessing Officer records the final reasons is contrary to Section 151. The sanction cannot be given mechanically or on draft reasons; it must be accorded after the Commissioner is satisfied with the reasons actually recorded by the Assessing Officer. [Paras 3, 5, 7]

Sanction dated prior to the reasons recorded is invalid and the notice under Section 148 set aside.

Assessment re-opening sanction vitiated by non-application of mind - re-opening of assessment under Section 148 - Whether the sanction is vitiated by demonstrable non-application of mind in the approval granted by Addl. CIT. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the approval/communication by the Addl. CIT referred to a different entity and an unrelated communication, indicating that the Addl. CIT had not applied his mind to the reasons for re-opening. Granting sanction without reading or applying mind to the reasons recorded is impermissible and renders the sanction vitiated. Given this lack of application of mind, the sanction cannot sustain the subsequent notice under Section 148. [Paras 8, 9]

Sanction vitiated by non-application of mind; consequent notice and objection disposal order must be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The notice dated 05/09/2017 under Section 148 is set aside as the sanction under Section 151 was invalid - both because the recorded reasons post-dated the sanction and because the Addl. CIT displayed non-application of mind; the order dated 14/10/2019 disposing of objections is consequently set aside and the petition is disposed.

Double claim of depreciation - section 40A(9) applicability to employer contributions - allowability of revenue expenditure for employee training - valuation of closing stock - factual findings of tribunal as last fact-finding authority - remand to Assessing Officer for fresh consideration - substantial question of law under section 260A

Double claim of depreciation - factual findings of tribunal as last fact-finding authority - Whether depreciation claimed separately under 'Social Overhead' amounted to a double claim and was rightly disallowed by the Assessing Officer/CIT(A). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the computation and the depreciation schedules placed on record and found that the depreciation debited to the profit and loss account (as per Companies Act) had been added back in the computation and thereafter depreciation allowable under the Income-tax Act was claimed separately with supporting schedules. The Tribunal, as the last fact-finding authority, accepted the documents on file and concluded that the Assessing Officer's premise of a double claim was factually incorrect. The High Court declined to reappraise these factual findings, observing that the dispute was essentially factual and that the Tribunal had re-examined the records and rendered a reasoned conclusion. [Paras 9]

Tribunal's deletion of the disallowance of depreciation upheld; no substantial question of law arises.

Section 40A(9) applicability to employer contributions - allowability of revenue expenditure for employee training - factual findings of tribunal as last fact-finding authority - Whether amounts debited as contribution to Indian Institute of Coal Management (IICM) were hit by section 40A(9) and rightly disallowed as not incidental to business. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal considered documentary material showing IICM to be a registered society providing training programs and that charges were apportioned by the holding company and borne by subsidiaries as fees for participation in training. The Tribunal found the payments to be revenue expenditure for training with direct nexus to the assessee's business and not contributions covered by section 40A(9). The High Court accepted that this was a factual conclusion by the Tribunal based on records and refused to reappraise those findings under section 260A. [Paras 10]

Tribunal's deletion of the addition was upheld; expenditure allowed and no substantial question of law accepted.

Valuation of closing stock - factual findings of tribunal as last fact-finding authority - Whether the assessee's valuation of certain coal stock at NIL (being coal mixed with Matti) was unsustainable and the Assessing Officer/CIT(A) rightly made additions. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal reviewed the technical evaluation relied upon by the assessee that the coal mixed with Matti was not saleable and therefore valued at NIL. The Tribunal noted that the revenue did not challenge the technical evaluation as incorrect and held that the assessee was entitled to determine sellability; further any future realization would be taxed under section 28 or brought to tax under section 41(1). The High Court treated this as a factual conclusion properly reached by the Tribunal and refused to interfere. [Paras 11]

Tribunal's deletion of the addition in respect of closing stock upheld; no substantial question of law shown.

Factual findings of tribunal as last fact-finding authority - Whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting additions made by the Assessing Officer/CIT(A) in respect of guest house expenses, grant to sports and recreation, environmental expenditure, miscellaneous expenses, current liabilities and HRA arrear. - HELD THAT: - For each of these heads the Tribunal examined the records, the submissions and the documents available on file and granted relief where it found the assessee's contentions supported by material. The High Court observed that these were factual determinations by the Tribunal after re examination of records and declined to reappraise those findings in exercise of jurisdiction under section 260A, noting that the appeal concerned no substantial question of law. [Paras 12]

Tribunal's deletions of the various additions were upheld; the High Court found no substantial question of law.

Remand to Assessing Officer for fresh consideration - Whether the matter relating to hire charges of bus, cars, ambulances and school bus (issue vii) was finally decided by the Tribunal. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal decided all issues in favour of the assessee except issue (vii), relating to hire charges of vehicles, which it remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. The High Court noted this remand in its narration and did not disturb the Tribunal's order; it treated the remand as part of the factual process undertaken by the Tribunal. [Paras 4]

Issue (vii) stood remanded to the Assessing Officer by the Tribunal; High Court did not interfere with the remand.

Substantial question of law under section 260A - factual findings of tribunal as last fact-finding authority - Whether any substantial question of law arises for consideration under section 260A warranting interference with the Tribunal's factual conclusions. - HELD THAT: - Applying the tests for 'substantial questions of law' as laid down by the Supreme Court (Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.), the High Court examined the material and concluded that none of the tests were satisfied. The Court emphasised that the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority and, since the issues were essentially factual and the Tribunal had re-examined the records and given reasoned findings, there was no ground for interference under section 260A. [Paras 13, 14]

No substantial question of law arises; revenue's appeal dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal under section 260A was dismissed. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's factual findings and deletions of the additions (except that issue (vii) was remanded by the Tribunal to the Assessing Officer), concluding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.

Reopening of assessment - reason to believe - tangible material - change of opinion - prior approval for reopening under Section 151 - participation in reassessment proceedings as bar to collateral challenge - extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226

Reopening of assessment - reason to believe - tangible material - Validity of the notice under Section 148 based on whether there was material to constitute a 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment. - HELD THAT: - The court applied the post-1989 Supreme Court test that reopening requires a 'reason to believe' supported by tangible material and must not be a mere change of opinion. The court examined the reasons provided by the Assessing Officer and the information received from the investigation wing and held that the reasons disclosed a tangible basis for formation of belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. At the initiation stage it is sufficient that relevant material existed on which a reasonable person could form the requisite belief; conclusive proof of escapement is not required. Having found such tangible material, the court concluded it would not be appropriate to prevent the Assessing Officer from proceeding with the enquiry. [Paras 9, 10]

The notice under Section 148 was validly issued as the reasons disclosed tangible material forming a 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment.

Prior approval for reopening under Section 151 - change of opinion - Whether the prior approval for issuance of the notice was vitiated by non-application of mind because of the short interval between receipt of information and grant of approval. - HELD THAT: - While recognising that the power to grant approval is coupled with a duty to apply mind and cannot be exercised perfunctorily, the court found no material in the present facts to infer non-application of mind. The mere fact that the information was received late in the day and the notice issued the same night was held to be speculative and not sufficient to impugn the approval. The court distinguished precedents where approval was set aside on the particular facts showing non-application of mind. [Paras 11]

There was no demonstrated non-application of mind in granting prior approval; the approval was not vitiated.

Participation in reassessment proceedings as bar to collateral challenge - extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 - Whether the petitioner could invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction to quash the notice after participating in assessment proceedings. - HELD THAT: - The court observed that the petitioner had participated in the reassessment process by filing objections, complying with notices and furnishing information. Relying on established authority, the court held that a party who participates in assessment proceedings cannot, in that factual matrix, seek to restrain the authorities by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction; the appropriate course is to avail the statutory remedies after the assessment is concluded. Given the petitioner's participation, the court found no reason to exercise its Article 226 jurisdiction to prohibit continuation of the proceedings. [Paras 13, 14]

Petitioner, having participated in the reassessment proceedings, is not entitled to prohibit the authorities by extraordinary writ; the court declined to exercise Article 226 jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed; the re-opening and approval were held valid on the said findings and the court declined to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction, leaving the petitioner to pursue remedies under the Act.

Revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 - limitation for exercise of power under Section 263 - mat credit under Section 115JAA - giving effect to appellate order - impugned revision assessment order declared non est

Revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 - limitation for exercise of power under Section 263 - mat credit under Section 115JAA - giving effect to appellate order - Whether the Commissioner could validly exercise powers under Section 263 to reopen the assessment in respect of MAT credit where the alleged error arose in an earlier assessment order and the later order merely gave effect to an appellate decision. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal recorded that the MAT credit was originally allowed by the Assessing Officer in the assessment completed on 08.12.2011. The subsequent order dated 29.11.2012 only increased that MAT credit by including surcharge and education cess while giving effect to the appellate order. The alleged error complained of by the Commissioner under Section 263 thus pre-existed in the order dated 08.12.2011 and was not an error originating in the order dated 29.11.2012. Applying the principle that the period of limitation for exercise of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 is to be reckoned from the date of the order in which the error originally occurred, the Tribunal held the Commissioner's action to be time-barred. The Tribunal also noted and applied the controlling authority on limitation, concluding that the Section 263 order was hopelessly barred by limitation. On that basis the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal. The High Court, following the Tribunal's reasoning, found no error in that conclusion and answered the substantial question against the Revenue.

The Tribunal rightly held that the Section 263 revision was barred by limitation because the alleged error existed in the order dated 08.12.2011 and the later order of 29.11.2012 merely gave effect to an appellate decision; the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal is dismissed; the substantial question of law is answered against the Revenue and the application IA No. GA 2 of 2021 is also dismissed.

Power of revision under Section 263(1)(c) - principle of merger of appellate orders - finality of Tribunal order - invocation of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - scope of revisional jurisdiction where appellate order has attained finality

Power of revision under Section 263(1)(c) - principle of merger of appellate orders - finality of Tribunal order - Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in setting aside the Commissioner's exercise of revisional power under Section 263(1)(c) in respect of deductions allowed under Sections 80-IA/80-IB. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that where the Assessing Officer's order is examined and the appellate authority (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) grants relief which is thereafter challenged by the Revenue and the Tribunal considers those specific items and dismisses the Revenue's appeal, the appellate orders merge and attain finality. In such circumstances the Commissioner cannot thereafter invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 263(1)(c) to reopen matters which have been considered and decided by the Tribunal. The Court relied on the principle as laid down in Nirma Chemicals Works (P) Ltd. and followed in Slum Rehabilitation Authority, observing that Section 263(1)(c) was enacted recognising the principle of merger so as to avoid conflict between quasi-judicial authorities of the same rank. The Court distinguished the Revenue's reliance on Arbuda Mills to the extent that Arbuda Mills applies to matters not considered or decided in appeal; in the present case the specific disallowances were considered and decided by the Tribunal against the Revenue, and hence the Commissioner's exercise of power under Section 263(1)(c) was unjustified. [Paras 8]

Tribunal was justified in nullifying the Commissioner's exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263(1)(c) in respect of the deductions; the revisional order was set aside.

Invocation of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - finality of Tribunal order - Whether penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) could be sustained after the Tribunal upheld the deductions. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that once the order permitting the deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB was maintained by the Tribunal, there was no occasion to impose penalty under Section 271(1)(c) in respect of those items. Because the substantive disallowances were reversed and the appellate order attained finality, the consequential penalty imposed by the Commissioner could not stand and was rightly cancelled by the Tribunal. [Paras 9]

Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) in respect of the items upheld by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and is set aside.

Final Conclusion: The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeals, holding that the Tribunal correctly nullified the Commissioner's revisional order under Section 263(1)(c) in view of the principle of merger and the Tribunal's final decision; consequential penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) likewise could not be sustained.

Power of the High Court to condone delay in applications under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Express exclusion under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Special law as a complete code - Test in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (scheme of special law) - Per incuriam

Express exclusion under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Special law as a complete code - Reference made for determination whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stand expressly excluded by Section 378(4) and (5) Cr.P.C. for complainant appeals against acquittal. - HELD THAT: - The High Court declined to decide the question itself. Having examined conflicting Supreme Court precedents (including the two-Judge decision in Mangu Ram and the three-Judge decision in Hukumdev Narain Yadav) and divergent single-judge decisions of this Court, the court found the issue to be of substantial importance and requiring consideration by a bench of two or more judges. The court framed the question in terms of whether the scheme and nature of Section 378(4)-(5) Cr.P.C., treated as a special law, exclude application of Sections 4-24 of the Limitation Act under Section 29(2) of that Act. [Paras 34]

Question referred to a bench of two or more judges for authoritative determination; no adjudication on the merits.

Per incuriam - Power of the High Court to condone delay in applications under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. - Reference made whether the two-Judge Bench decision in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi is per incuriam in view of the earlier three-Judge decision in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra and whether that affects the High Court's power to condone delay. - HELD THAT: - The High Court observed an apparent conflict between the two-Judge and three-Judge Supreme Court precedents and noted subsequent Supreme Court decisions endorsing the three-Judge test. Given the unresolved conflict and its centrality to the question of the Court's jurisdiction to condone delay under Section 378(5) Cr.P.C., the court refrained from resolving the issue and submitted it for consideration by a larger bench. [Paras 33, 34]

Question referred to a bench of two or more judges for resolution; no final determination made by this court.

Test in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (scheme of special law) - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Reference made whether the test laid down in Hukumdev Narain Yadav must be applied to applications for special leave to appeal under Section 378(4)-(5) Cr.P.C. in the context of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. - HELD THAT: - The court noted that the three-Judge test requires examination of the scheme and nature of the special law to determine whether Sections 4-24 of the Limitation Act are excluded. Because authority is divided and the issue determines whether Section 5 (extension of limitation) applies to Section 378 applications, the court referred the question to a larger bench rather than decide it itself. [Paras 30, 34]

Question referred to a bench of two or more judges for authoritative ruling; no conclusion reached here.

Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar - Per incuriam - Reference made whether the Supreme Court's decision in Gopal Sardar holds that Mangu Ram is not good law in light of Hukumdev Narain Yadav. - HELD THAT: - The court reviewed Gopal Sardar and related Supreme Court jurisprudence showing endorsement of the three-Judge approach. Because these authorities bear directly on the High Court's jurisdiction to condone delay under Section 378(5) Cr.P.C., the question was framed for consideration by a larger bench instead of being finally decided. [Paras 26, 27, 34]

Question referred to a bench of two or more judges for determination; no ruling made in this order.

Single-judge precedent - Power of the High Court to condone delay in applications under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. - Reference made whether the single-judge decision in M/s. Sharmaji Textiles v. M/s. Sandeep Traders correctly held that Gopal Sardar did not disturb Mangu Ram. - HELD THAT: - The High Court found that single-judge authority on the point is inconsistent with the line of Supreme Court decisions analysing Section 29(2). Given the conflict between single-judge rulings and Supreme Court precedents, the matter was referred to a larger bench for authoritative resolution rather than being affirmed or overruled in this order. [Paras 31, 32, 34]

Question referred to a bench of two or more judges; no determination on correctness of the single-judge decision.

Special law as a complete code - Applicability of Sections 4-24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Reference made whether, upon applying the Hukumdev test to Section 378(4)-(5) Cr.P.C., Sections 4-24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are excluded in their applicability to applications for special leave to appeal by complainants. - HELD THAT: - The High Court recognized this to be the core legal question: whether the scheme and nature of Section 378 render the Limitation Act's provisions inapplicable. Owing to conflicting authorities and the legal importance of the question, the court referred it to a larger bench instead of deciding it itself. [Paras 30, 34]

Question referred to a bench of two or more judges for authoritative adjudication; not decided here.

Power of the High Court to condone delay in applications under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Reference made whether the present application for condonation of delay filed by the applicant is maintainable. - HELD THAT: - Because the maintainability depends upon the resolution of the foregoing legal questions (particularly whether Section 5 applies to extend the limitation under Section 378(5) Cr.P.C.), the High Court declined to decide maintainability and instead referred the controlling legal questions to a larger bench for determination. The court therefore took no final view on the applicant's entitlement to condonation on merits. [Paras 29, 34, 35]

Maintainability not decided; matters referred to a bench of two or more judges.

Final Conclusion: The High Court declined to decide the disputed questions on applicability of the Limitation Act to applications under Section 378(4)-(5) Cr.P.C., identified conflicting precedents (including possible per incuriam), and referred seven framed questions to a bench of two or more judges for authoritative determination; the application for condonation of delay was not finally adjudicated in this order.

Deduction under section 10B of the Income-tax Act - re-computation of deduction under section 10B on allocation of depreciation between eligible and non-eligible units - effect of disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) on computation of deduction under section 10B in subsequent assessment year - follow the decision in assessee\'s own case (consistency / stare decisis within departmental proceedings)

Re-computation of deduction under section 10B on allocation of depreciation between eligible and non-eligible units - deduction under section 10B of the Income-tax Act - follow the decision in assessee's own case (consistency / stare decisis within departmental proceedings) - Validity of allocating depreciation of an asset used at both units between the 100% EOU (Manesar) and the non-eligible unit (Delhi) for recomputing deduction under section 10B. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s confirmation of the Assessing Officer's allocation of depreciation between the Manesar (10B-eligible) unit and the Delhi (non-eligible) unit. The CIT(A) relied on an identical earlier decision in the assessee's own case for A.Y. 2009-10 where allocation was held justified; the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had discussed the matter and given justifiable reasons and that no contrary material was produced before the Tribunal. Applying that reasoning to both assessment years, the Tribunal found no infirmity in re-computing the 10B deduction by allocating depreciation to the non-eligible unit and therefore dismissed the challenge to that allocation. [Paras 6, 9, 10]

Allocation of depreciation to recompute deduction under section 10B was upheld and the assessee's grounds challenging that allocation were dismissed for both A.Y. 2010-11 and A.Y. 2011-12.

Effect of disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) on computation of deduction under section 10B in subsequent assessment year - deduction under section 10B of the Income-tax Act - Whether deduction under section 10B for A.Y. 2010-11 ought to be enhanced on account of a reduction in taxable income in A.Y. 2009-10 due to deposit of TDS and related rectification of a prior disallowance under section 40(a)(ia). - HELD THAT: - The CIT(A) held that the AO had computed the 10B deduction for A.Y. 2010-11 based on the profit figures shown by the assessee for that year and that such computation complied with law; the CIT(A) also observed that the question of corrective action arising from the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) pertained to A.Y. 2009-10 and did not mandate adjustment of the 10B deduction for A.Y. 2010-11. The Tribunal found no infirmity in this approach, noting that the CIT(A) had considered the submissions and there was no contrary material before the Tribunal to warrant interference. [Paras 6]

Denial of enhancement of the section 10B deduction for A.Y. 2010-11 on account of adjustments arising from the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) in A.Y. 2009-10 was upheld and the assessee's ground on this point was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals filed by the assessee for A.Y. 2010-11 and A.Y. 2011-12 were dismissed: the Tribunal upheld the recomputation of section 10B deductions by allocating depreciation to the non-eligible unit and rejected the claim for enhancement of the 10B deduction on account of the prior year 40(a)(ia) disallowance.

Revision under section 263 - characterisation of income - capital gains versus income from other sources - capital asset - rights arising under a banakhat / MOU - scope and limits of revisional jurisdiction - limited scrutiny and legal plausibility of Assessing Officer's view

Characterisation of income - capital gains versus income from other sources - capital asset - rights arising under a banakhat / MOU - limited scrutiny and legal plausibility of Assessing Officer's view - Whether the revisional order under section 263 correctly held that receipts received as compensation on release of rights under the banakhat should be taxed under the head "income from other sources" instead of as "capital gains", and whether the revisional order was sustainable. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted the assessee's position that the receipts flowed directly from the banakhat/MOU and from the sale deed which recognised the assessee as a confirming party; such receipts were received on relinquishment/release of a right which falls within the wide expression of "capital asset" and therefore the relinquishment is chargeable as capital gain. The Assessing Officer, in a limited-scrutiny assessment, had examined the documents (banakhat and sale agreement), endorsed the claim and assessed income as capital gains on a legally plausible view. The revisional authority attempted to substitute its view by treating the banakhat as unenforceable and directing re-verification and re-characterisation without identifying any concrete error in the A.O.'s appraisal; that approach exceeded the scope of section 263 because the A.O.'s conclusion was tenable in law and fact. Further, if the PCIT's premise (that the banakhat was void) were accepted, no compensation would arise at all, which undercuts the basis for taxing the receipt as income from other sources. The revisional order thus failed to demonstrate the requisite error prejudicial to revenue and impermissibly directed the A.O. to follow the revisional officer's view rather than correcting a shown legal or factual mistake. [Paras 17, 18]

Revisional directions insofar as characterisation of the compensation received for release of rights under Survey No.847 are concerned are set aside and the assessment treating the receipts as capital gains is restored.

Revision under section 263 - scope and limits of revisional jurisdiction - Whether the revisional directions of the PCIT in respect of other land parcels (plots other than Survey No.847) call for interference. - HELD THAT: - The assessee conceded that for other land parcels the Assessing Officer has passed consequential orders and no substantive prejudice remains; the Tribunal therefore treated those aspects as academic. Having regard to the concession and the factual position that the A.O. has already addressed those transactions, the Tribunal declined to interfere with the revisional directions in respect of those other land parcels. [Paras 14, 18, 21]

Revisional directions in respect of other land parcels are not set aside and the grievance on those transactions is answered against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals are partly allowed: the revisional order under section 263 is set aside and the assessment restored insofar as taxability of receipts relating to Survey No.847 (treated as capital gains) is concerned; the revisional directions in respect of other land parcels remain undisturbed.

Penalty under section 271G - penalty under section 271AA - failure to keep and maintain information and documents under section 92D - specified domestic transaction - omnibus show-cause notice and requirement to strike off irrelevant portions in notice under section 274 - non-application of mind in issuing penalty notice - prejudice requirement in penalty proceedings

Penalty under section 271G - failure to keep and maintain information and documents under section 92D - Whether penalty under section 271G for alleged contravention of section 92D(3) should be sustained. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the orders of the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) were mechanical and did not specify which documents or information required under section 92D(3)/Rule 10D(3) were not maintained. The assessee had produced relevant material during assessment proceedings and before the appellate authorities; however the lower authorities failed to identify the precise omission or to issue a specific notice requiring particular documents before invoking penalty. In absence of an identification of the missing documents and given the non-application of mind in recording the charge, the penalty could not be sustained. Applying precedent and principles of fair procedure, the Tribunal set aside the orders below and deleted the penalty levied under section 271G. [Paras 10, 11]

Penalty under section 271G deleted and appeal allowed.

Penalty under section 271AA - specified domestic transaction - omnibus show-cause notice and requirement to strike off irrelevant portions in notice under section 274 - non-application of mind in issuing penalty notice - prejudice requirement in penalty proceedings - Whether penalty under section 271AA for alleged failure to keep and maintain information under section 92D(1)/(2) is sustainable where the statutory notice was omnibus and the penalty was levied on a different ground than that stated as the basis. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied the Full Bench exposition of the Bombay High Court (as discussed at length in the impugned order) that an omnibus printed notice that does not strike off inapplicable portions betrays non-application of mind and vitiates penalty proceedings. The Tribunal observed that in the present case the notice was generic/omnibus, irrelevant portions were not struck off, and the penalty ultimately imposed related to non-disclosure in the return rather than any specified failure to keep particular documents under section 92D(1)/(2). Given that the notice did not properly inform the assessee of the precise charge and that the penalty on the asserted ground was not shown to be the charge for which proceedings were initiated, the Tribunal held the notice defective and the penalty unsustainable. On merits, the Tribunal also found the AO had levied penalty on a ground different from that which would attract section 271AA. For these reasons the penalty was deleted. [Paras 20, 21]

Penalty under section 271AA deleted and appeal allowed.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals are allowed: the penalties imposed under section 271G and section 271AA for AY 2015-16 are set aside and deleted by the Tribunal.

Additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) - plant and machinery versus office equipment/office premises - deduction under Section 80G - Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure and Chapter VI-A benefit - remand for verification of eligibility

Additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) - plant and machinery versus office equipment/office premises - Claim for additional depreciation on computers and software under Section 32(1)(iia) for the block 'Computers including Computer Software'. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined whether the assets on which additional depreciation was claimed qualified as 'plant or machinery' and whether they fell within the prohibition as being installed in 'office premises'. The bench noted the inclusive definition of 'plant' in section 43(3) and the prescribed depreciation rates for computers, but agreed with the finding that the assessee's software development activity could not be treated as manufacture of an 'article or thing' for the purposes of Section 32(1)(iia) in the facts of this case. Reliance was placed on precedents distinguishing office equipment from plant where material before authorities was insufficient to classify the assets as plant; the Tribunal found no infirmity in the disallowance of additional depreciation. However, the Tribunal admitted the alternative ground seeking allowance of depreciation in subsequent years on the enhanced written down value (WDV) and held that the assessee could claim depreciation in later years at the prevailing rates on the block's WDV.

Disallowance of additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) is upheld; alternative plea to allow depreciation in subsequent assessment year on enhanced WDV of the block is admitted and sustained.

Deduction under Section 80G - Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure and Chapter VI-A benefit - remand for verification of eligibility - Claim for deduction under Section 80G in respect of donations made as part of CSR activities. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that the assessee had disallowed the CSR expenditure while computing business income (u/s 37(1)) but sought deduction under Section 80G for donations to eligible institutions. Following the coordinate-bench view in First American (India) Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal held that Chapter VI-A benefits are considered at the stage of computing total taxable income and that denying Section 80G relief merely because payments formed part of CSR would result in double disallowance. The Tribunal also noted that lower authorities had not verified the nature and eligibility of the payments under Section 80G(1). Accordingly, the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification of conditions and quantum of eligibility, with directions to grant deduction to the extent found allowable under law after verification and opportunity to the assessee to substantiate the claim.

Issue remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification of eligibility and quantum for deduction under Section 80G; deduction to be granted to the extent admissible after such verification.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the disallowance of additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) is sustained but the alternative claim to claim depreciation in subsequent years on the enhanced WDV is admitted; the claim under Section 80G in respect of CSR-related donations is remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification and grant of deduction if eligible.

Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act - defective show cause notice under Section 274 of the Income-tax Act - concealment of income - furnishing inaccurate particulars of income - requirement to specify the limb of clause (c) in the notice to meet principles of natural justice - independence of penalty proceedings from assessment proceedings - requirement of recorded satisfaction/direction before initiation of penalty proceedings

Defective show cause notice under Section 274 of the Income-tax Act - penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act - concealment of income - furnishing inaccurate particulars of income - requirement to specify the limb of clause (c) in the notice to meet principles of natural justice - Validity of the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) in view of the show cause notice issued under Section 274 which did not specify whether the charge was for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued under Section 274 was defective because it did not indicate which limb of clause (c) - concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income - was being invoked and the irrelevant portions in the printed form were not struck out. Relying on the legal principles articulated by the jurisdictional High Court in CIT v. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory and followed in CIT v. SSA's Emerald Meadows , the Tribunal observed that a notice under Section 274 must specifically state the grounds the assessee is called upon to meet; a blanket printed form listing all limbs without striking out inapplicable parts does not satisfy the requirement and offends principles of natural justice. The Tribunal also emphasised that penalty proceedings are distinct from assessment proceedings and that initiation and imposition of penalty must be confined to the grounds on which the assessee was given an opportunity to be heard. On these findings the Tribunal concluded that the penalty could not be sustained. [Paras 3, 10]

The penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) was held to be unsustainable and was cancelled.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the show cause notice under Section 274 was defective for failing to specify the limb of Section 271(1)(c) being invoked, consequently the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) is quashed.

Allowability of trade advances written off as business expenditure/trading loss - distinction between capital loss and revenue loss - inapplicability of section 36(2) to deny trading loss claim - accrual system of accounting and treatment of advances - exhaustion of remedies and timing of irrecoverability

Allowability of trade advances written off as business expenditure/trading loss - distinction between capital loss and revenue loss - accrual system of accounting and treatment of advances - exhaustion of remedies and timing of irrecoverability - inapplicability of section 36(2) to deny trading loss claim - Write-off of business advances made in the normal course of business was allowable as a trading loss/business expenditure for the year under consideration - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted the assessee's alternate plea that the advances were made in the ordinary course of its business (seminars/conferences) and, though shown as current asset in the earlier year, were debited to the profit and loss account when found irrecoverable under the accrual system. The Assessing Officer correctly held that the claim could not succeed as a bad debt under the condition in section 36(2) (because the advance had not been taken into account in computing income of an earlier year), but failed to examine the alternate claim under the head 'profits and gains of business' (section 37/section 28). The Tribunal held that a trading loss is a broader concept than a bad debt and, on the facts, the assessee had taken reasonable recovery steps (including proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and filing of complaint) and had written off the advances after those attempts proved unsuccessful. In view of precedents recognising that advances given in the ordinary course of business, when exhausted of remedies and found irrecoverable, may constitute trading loss, the Tribunal concluded that the write-off is a revenue loss allowable in computing business income and allowed the appeal on the alternate claim. [Paras 6, 10]

The write-off of the business advances is to be treated as a trading loss/business expenditure allowable in computing income for AY 2016-17; the assessee's grounds in this respect are allowed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed on the alternate claim: the advances written off, given in the normal course of business and subsequently found irrecoverable after recovery efforts, are treated as trading loss/business expenditure and allowed for the year under consideration (AY 2016-17).

Section 68 - unexplained credits - Genuineness of creditors and burden of proof - Admission of creditor confirmations filed at appellate stage - Capacity of lenders to advance funds - Remand for verification of purchase payables

Admission of creditor confirmations filed at appellate stage - Genuineness of creditors and burden of proof - Additions made in respect of Abhishek Alloys Pvt. Ltd., Accurate Gauging & Instruments Pvt. Ltd. and Shakti Enterprises were deleted. - HELD THAT: - The AO had made additions treating certain sundry creditors as non-genuine despite confirmations being on record. The remand report confirmed that confirmations for these three creditors had been received during assessment proceedings. The Tribunal held that where valid confirmation letters were filed before the AO and no further enquiry or contrary material was produced by the AO, the additions could not be sustained and the CIT(A)'s deletions in respect of these creditors were correct. [Paras 8]

Deletions in respect of the three creditors upheld.

Capacity of lenders to advance funds - Admission of creditor confirmations filed at appellate stage - Addition in respect of credits shown in the names of Mrs. Nirmala and Mrs. Vilva Lakshmi was partly deleted and partly sustained. - HELD THAT: - The assessee produced confirmations for both parties at the appellate stage. The CIT(A) examined records, including returns of these parties for relevant years, and concluded they had capacity to lend, thereby deleting the addition relating to Mrs. Vilva Lakshmi. However, the confirmation in respect of Mrs. Nirmala recorded a closing balance inconsistent with the assessee's books, creating an unexplained excess which the CIT(A) sustained. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s approach of accepting confirmations after verification of capacity and sustaining only the excess to be justified. [Paras 10, 11]

Addition sustained to the extent of the unexplained excess as held by the CIT(A); remaining deletions upheld.

Section 68 - unexplained credits - Genuineness of creditors and burden of proof - Addition in respect of Brakes India Pvt. Ltd. was not sustained to the extent claimed by the AO; CIT(A)'s deletion was upheld. - HELD THAT: - The AO added the entire outstanding balance treating it as unexplained credit. The CIT(A) relied upon a valid confirmation and the nature of the outstanding being on account of purchases; after considering the remand report, the CIT(A) sustained only a smaller portion of the addition. The Tribunal concurred that there was a valid confirmation and no basis to impugn the genuineness of the transaction or the lender's capacity, and therefore dismissed the revenue's challenge to the CIT(A)'s order. [Paras 12]

CIT(A)'s deletion in respect of Brakes India upheld; revenue's ground dismissed.

Remand for verification of purchase payables - Genuineness of creditors and burden of proof - Addition on account of purchase payables aggregating Rs. 2,13,57,434 was remanded to the AO for fresh consideration and verification. - HELD THAT: - The CIT(A) accepted the assessee's list of purchase payables and treated most credits as genuine without individual verification of identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of transactions. The Tribunal held that such purchases ought to be verified individually; since the CIT(A) failed to undertake this verification, the matter was remitted to the AO for fresh consideration. [Paras 13]

Issue remitted to the AO for fresh verification of purchase payables.

Section 68 - unexplained credits - Section 68 is applicable where amounts credited in the books as loans or payables are not satisfactorily explained. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that section 68 applies when any sum is found credited in the books and the source or nature is not explained satisfactorily. The AO invoked section 68 in respect of amounts found credited as loans or purchase payables which were not properly explained by the assessee. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the AO invoking section 68 and dismissed the corresponding grounds of the assessee's cross-objection, subject to the Tribunal's other findings and remand. [Paras 16]

Applicability of section 68 to unexplained credited amounts upheld (subject to remand and other findings).

Final Conclusion: Revenue appeal partly allowed for statistical purposes; specific additions were deleted or sustained in part as set out above, one issue relating to purchase payables remitted to the AO for fresh verification, and the assessee's cross-objection dismissed.

Revisional jurisdiction under section 263 - Twin conditions for exercise of section 263 (order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue) - Change of opinion - Effect of subsequent reassessment on validity of section 263 action

Revisional jurisdiction under section 263 - Twin conditions for exercise of section 263 (order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue) - Effect of subsequent reassessment on validity of section 263 action - Validity of the CIT's order under section 263 directing the AO to reconsider deferred revenue for AY 2009-10 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the sequence of proceedings and found that the assessment for AY 2009-10 was completed under section 143(3) and thereafter a reassessment under section 147 brought the alleged deferred revenue to tax by order dated 30.3.2015. The show cause notice under section 263 dated 22.1.2016 and the consequential order dated 11.3.2016 sought revision on the ground that deferred revenue had escaped assessment. Applying the twin conditions laid down in Malabar Industries Ltd. (that the order must be prima facie erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue), the Tribunal held that there was no prejudice or loss to revenue when the section 263 notice and order were issued because the deferred revenue had already been assessed in the reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal therefore concluded that one of the essential limbs of section 263 (that the order sought to be revised is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue) was absent and the revisional order was unsustainable. [Paras 6, 7, 8]

The order passed by the CIT under section 263 dated 11.3.2016 is quashed.

Effect of subsequent reassessment on validity of section 263 action - Change of opinion - Consequences for the order of assessment passed by the AO pursuant to the section 263 direction and the appellate confirmation by CIT(A) - HELD THAT: - Following the quashing of the foundational section 263 order, the Tribunal examined the order passed by the AO on 14.3.2017 (under section 143(3) r.w.s. 263) which had added the deferred revenue and the CIT(A)'s order confirming that addition. Because the section 263 order, which provided the basis for those subsequent orders, was set aside, the Tribunal found that the later orders lacked foundation and could not stand. The Tribunal therefore annulled the AO's consequential order and the CIT(A)'s confirmation. [Paras 9, 10]

The assessment order passed pursuant to the section 263 direction and the CIT(A)'s order confirming the addition are annulled.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals are allowed: the order under section 263 dated 11.3.2016 is quashed and, consequentially, the subsequent assessment and the CIT(A)'s confirmation of the addition are annulled for AY 2009-10.

Custodian liability for pilferage and unauthorized release under Section 45(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 - duty of Customs Cargo Service Provider under Handling of Cargo in Customs Area Regulations, 2009 - requirement of written permission for release of detained imported goods - penalty and suspension of custodianship under Regulation 12(8) of HCCAR, 2009

Custodian liability for pilferage and unauthorized release under Section 45(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 - requirement of written permission for release of detained imported goods - duty of Customs Cargo Service Provider under Handling of Cargo in Customs Area Regulations, 2009 - penalty and suspension of custodianship under Regulation 12(8) of HCCAR, 2009 - Whether the custodian (CFS) breached statutory/regulatory duties by releasing seized/detained imported goods without written permission and thereby became liable under Section 45(3) and subject to penalty and suspension under HCCAR, 2009 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found on the material placed before it that the container which had been detained on suspicion of mis-declaration was in the custody of the appellant and was released from the CFS at night without any written authority from the detaining/competent customs officer. The adjudicating authority's findings - that delivery was effected at an odd hour, cash payment was accepted and invoicing/records were irregular - gave rise to a reasonable suspicion regarding the propriety of the release (paras 5.3-5.4). The Tribunal noted that Regulation 6 (f) of HCCAR, 2009 and the statutory scheme prohibit release of detained imported goods except upon written permission of the Superintendent/Appraiser; exercising due diligence (KYC, verification of identity and written instructions) was mandatory and subsequent production of documents or FIRs did not cure the primary breach of the embargo (para 5.4). Given the unauthorized release and the absence of satisfactory explanation for releasing the goods at odd hours without verification, the natural consequence prescribed by Section 45(3) - making the approved custodian liable for duty for loss while in custody - would apply. The Tribunal therefore agreed with the adjudicating authority that serious violations of the Regulations occurred and that invocation of Section 45(3) and imposition of regulatory sanctions were justified (para 6.1). The Tribunal declined to accept the appellant's contentions about bona fides, cooperation, or lack of notice as sufficient to absolve the custodian from its statutory/regulatory obligations to withhold release until written instructions were obtained (para 5.5). [Paras 5, 6]

Findings of breach of HCCAR and of liability under Section 45(3) were upheld; penalty and suspension ordered by the adjudicating authority sustainment

Final Conclusion: Appeal dismissed; Tribunal upholds the adjudicating authority's finding that the custodian unlawfully released detained imported goods without written permission, thereby attracting liability under Section 45(3) and justifying penalty and suspension under HCCAR, 2009.

Finalization of provisional assessment under proviso to Section 18(2) - transaction value and application of Customs Valuation Rules for rejection and re-determination of value - DGOV valuation alert as illustrative guidance and not a minimum base price - confiscation of imported goods under Section 111(m) - redemption of confiscated goods and redemption fine under Section 125 - penalty consequential to confiscation under Section 112(a) - penalty for mis-declaration under Section 114AA

Transaction value and application of Customs Valuation Rules for rejection and re-determination of value - DGOV valuation alert as illustrative guidance and not a minimum base price - finalization of provisional assessment under proviso to Section 18(2) - Assessment of the bills of entry was to be finalized at the declared transaction value; the value could not be re-determined as proposed in the show cause notice. - HELD THAT: - The show cause notice relied upon a DGOV alert and an Office Note of the SIB that derived illustrative prices from raw material rates. The DGOV letter expressly states that such prices are only illustrative and cannot be treated as minimum base prices and that valuation must proceed under the Customs Valuation Rules when there are reasons to doubt declared value. The show cause notice did not record any specific reason to doubt the truth and accuracy of the transaction value (no suggested relationship between buyer and seller, no additional consideration, no manipulation), nor did it apply the sequential Rules (Rule 4 to Rule 9) for re-determination. In absence of recorded reasons for rejection of transaction value and without proper application of the Valuation Rules, the Commissioner correctly finalized the provisional assessments as per declared value. [Paras 9, 10, 11]

The provisional assessments were correctly finalized at the declared transaction value; the proposal to enhance value was not sustainable.

Confiscation of imported goods under Section 111(m) - description of goods versus composition found on testing - redemption of confiscated goods and redemption fine under Section 125 - Confiscation under Section 111(m) and the redemption fine imposed could not be sustained; the description in the bills of entry did not amount to mis-declaration warranting confiscation. - HELD THAT: - CIPET test reports described the composition of the imported items as 'Embroidery Beads/Stones (plastic content of ...)', which was an elaboration of the description 'Embroidery Beads/Stones' used in the bills of entry rather than a contradiction. The show cause notice sought confiscation on the basis of alleged mis-declaration of value, a proposition which was rejected on valuation grounds. Since no mis-declaration of the description or value was established-testing only provided compositional detail-the confiscation and consequential redemption fine under Section 125 cannot be sustained. [Paras 8, 12, 13]

Confiscation of goods under Section 111(m) and the redemption fine are set aside.

Penalty consequential to confiscation under Section 112(a) - relationship between liability to confiscation and penalty - Penalty under Section 112(a) could not be sustained and was set aside. - HELD THAT: - Section 112(a) penalty is predicated on acts or omissions that render goods liable to confiscation under Section 111. As the confiscation was held not sustainable, the foundational basis for imposition of penalty under Section 112(a) fell away. Accordingly, the penalty imposed under Section 112(a) cannot be sustained. [Paras 14]

Penalty under Section 112(a) is set aside.

Penalty for mis-declaration under Section 114AA - requirement of proposal in show cause notice before imposing penalty - Penalty under Section 114AA was not sustainable and is set aside because no proposal was made in the show cause notice and no mis-declaration was established. - HELD THAT: - No proposal to impose penalty under Section 114AA featured in the show cause notice; imposing a penalty beyond the scope of the notice is impermissible. Independently, the record does not establish mis-declaration of the goods or value. Therefore, the penalty under Section 114AA cannot be sustained on either procedural or substantive grounds. [Paras 7, 15]

Penalty under Section 114AA is set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order is set aside; the importer's appeal is allowed with consequential relief, the Revenue's appeal is rejected, and liabilities of confiscation and the penalties under Sections 112(a) and 114AA are quashed. The stay application and cross-objection(s) are disposed of accordingly.

Exclusive jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal in matters arising under the Companies Act - effect of striking off/dissolution of a company and cessation of corporate existence - restoration of name of a struck off company by the Tribunal and procedure for restoration - jurisdiction to entertain pending voluntary winding up proceedings where a company has been struck off

Exclusive jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal in matters arising under the Companies Act - effect of striking off/dissolution of a company and cessation of corporate existence - High Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the present proceedings once the company has been struck off and ceased to exist; remedy lies before the Tribunal under the statutory restoration procedure. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that publication of striking off under the Act on 14th December 2018 resulted in cessation of the company's existence by operation of law and that the statutory scheme provides an exclusive remedy before the Tribunal for persons aggrieved by such an order. The provisions reproducing the effect of dissolution and the appeal/restoration mechanism before the Tribunal demonstrate that questions arising from striking off are to be determined by the Tribunal and not by the Civil Court. Reading the provision relied upon by the appellants so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court would run counter to the scheme and purpose for which the Tribunal was constituted. [Paras 9, 10, 11]

The High Court is ousted of jurisdiction to decide the present matter while the company remains struck off; the appropriate remedy is to approach the Tribunal under the statutory restoration procedure.

Jurisdiction to entertain pending voluntary winding up proceedings where a company has been struck off - interpretation of provision conferring jurisdiction to courts in pending voluntary winding up proceedings - The contention that this Court can order voluntary winding up of a company struck off from the register was rejected. - HELD THAT: - The appellants' reliance on the provision dealing with pending voluntary winding up proceedings was considered and rejected because such a reading would conflict with the Act's overall scheme vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Tribunal for matters arising from striking off and dissolution. The Court noted that accepting the appellants' interpretation would render other provisions redundant and frustrate the statutory purpose of vesting these matters with the Tribunal. [Paras 6, 11]

The Court declined to exercise power to order voluntary winding up of the struck off company and refused the construction urged by the appellants.

Restoration of name of a struck off company by the Tribunal and procedure for restoration - Once the Tribunal restores the company's name in the register, the appellants are at liberty to approach this Court to agitate the grievances raised in the present appeal. - HELD THAT: - The Court made clear that its present jurisdictional objection was without prejudice to the substantive rights and contentions of the parties. If the Tribunal, on application under the statutory provisions, restores the company's name, the High Court may then be approached to pursue the reliefs sought in this appeal. The Court also recorded that the Registrar's statement made before it should be taken into account by the Tribunal to expedite any restoration application. [Paras 12, 14]

Liberty granted to the appellants to approach this Court after obtaining restoration from the Tribunal; the Registrar's statement should be drawn to the Tribunal's attention.

Final Conclusion: Appeal disposed of on jurisdictional grounds: while the company remains struck off and dissolved by operation of law the appropriate remedy is to seek restoration before the Tribunal; no order as to costs; substantive merits were not decided and rights remain expressly open.

Insolvency resolution process costs - Moratorium under Section 14 - Inclusion of lease rent within CIRP costs - Effect of liquidation order on moratorium - Contempt for non-compliance of appellate order - Rule 11 NCLAT Rules vs Section 425 Companies Act: invocation of jurisdiction

Inclusion of lease rent within CIRP costs - Insolvency resolution process costs - Moratorium under Section 14 - Rent payable to the lessor during moratorium is includible within insolvency resolution process costs and recoverable as such. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined Section 5(13) (definition of insolvency resolution process costs), Regulation 31 of the CIRP Regulations and Section 14(1)(d) (moratorium preventing recovery of property by lessor). Regulation 31(b) covers amounts due to a person whose rights are prejudicially affected on account of the moratorium; since the lessor's right to recover possession and rent was affected by the moratorium, rent falls within CIRP costs. The argument that rent cannot be included was rejected as inconsistent with Regulation 31(b) and the defined ambit of Section 5(13)(e). [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21]

Lease rent due to the lessor during the moratorium is part of insolvency resolution process costs and may be recovered as such.

Effect of liquidation order on moratorium - Moratorium under Section 14 - Moratorium ceases on approval of a resolution plan or on the date of the liquidation order; the CoC's liability to pay rent extended only up to the date moratorium ceased. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal construed Section 14(4) together with the proviso and Section 33(5). Section 14(4) expressly provides that the moratorium has effect until completion of CIRP but ceases from the date of approval of a resolution plan or the liquidation order. Section 33(5) does not extend the moratorium beyond the liquidation order; rather it restricts institution of suits during liquidation and permits filing claims before the liquidator. Applying these provisions to the facts, once the Adjudicating Authority passed the liquidation order, the moratorium ceased and the CoC's obligation to pay rent as CIRP costs ran only until that date. The Tribunal therefore held that entitlement under the appellate order extended up to 13.06.2019 (the date preceding initiation of liquidation as treated in the order). [Paras 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]

The moratorium ceased on initiation of liquidation and the respondents' liability to pay rent as CIRP costs subsisted only until the moratorium ceased (up to 13.06.2019 in this case).

Contempt for non-compliance of appellate order - Proof of compliance with appellate directions - Contempt proceedings were not maintainable as the Applicant had received the rent amounts due under the appellate order; no wilful disobedience was established. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal directed filing of an affidavit by the liquidator specifying amounts paid pursuant to the appellate order. The liquidator's additional affidavit recorded payments made by the RP and subsequently by CoC members, aggregating to the amount received by the Applicant after 31.01.2019. The Applicant did not dispute the affidavit figures. Comparing the amounts received against the entitlement for the period up to the moratorium, the Tribunal found that the Applicant had already received the rent due as per the appellate order. In view of the payments proved, wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order was not made out. [Paras 33, 34, 35]

Contempt petition dismissed as payments in compliance with the appellate order have been made and wilful non-compliance is not established.

Rule 11 NCLAT Rules vs Section 425 Companies Act: invocation of jurisdiction - Inherent jurisdiction and procedural mis-joinder - Mis pleading of the provision under which contempt was invoked (Rule 11 instead of Section 425) did not defeat the merits of the application; the preliminary objection was rejected. - HELD THAT: - The liquidator argued that contempt jurisdiction lies under Section 425 of the Companies Act and the application under Rule 11 was erroneously invoked. The Tribunal accepted that it does not possess power to punish for contempt of its own order in the manner suggested, but held that mere erroneous reference to a provision does not affect adjudication on merits. Accordingly, the preliminary objection based on the wrong provision cited was found to be without substance. [Paras 15, 16]

The objection based on invocation of Rule 11 instead of Section 425 is rejected as immaterial to the merits.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that lease rent affected by the moratorium is includible within insolvency resolution process costs; the moratorium ceased on initiation of liquidation and the CoC's liability to pay rent ran only up to that date (01.12.2018 to 13.06.2019 in this case). The liquidator's affidavit established payments in compliance with the appellate order and, accordingly, contempt was not made out. The application for contempt is disposed of with no order as to costs.

Limitation under Limitation Act for filing Section 9 application - continuing default versus single date of default - operational debt versus regulatory dues - validity and admissibility of agreement evidence (signatures and change of name)

Limitation under Limitation Act for filing Section 9 application - continuing default versus single date of default - The Section 9 application was barred by limitation as the right to apply was treated to have accrued on 01.04.2015 and the petition was time barred. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted the Adjudicating Authority's finding that the last recorded payment was on 28.06.2013 for FY 2013 14 and noted that the petitioner itself stated in its pleadings and Form 5 that the debt fell due on 01.04.2015. The Adjudicating Authority concluded that the application under Section 9 was barred by limitation and the Appellate Tribunal found no reason to interfere with that conclusion. The Appellant's contention that the default was a continuing cause of action arising from successive invoices and therefore not time barred was rejected in the light of the record and the dates relied upon in the petition. [Paras 14, 15]

Application under Section 9 was barred by limitation and the finding was upheld.

Validity and admissibility of agreement evidence (signatures and change of name) - The listing agreement filed could not be relied upon as valid evidence of contract between the parties. - HELD THAT: - The Adjudicating Authority observed that several pages of the agreement were blank, that initials/signature appeared only on the last page, and that the agreement bore no seal or signature purportedly for the Exchange. Although the corporate debtor had changed its name, no fresh agreement evidencing the change was produced. The Tribunal agreed with the Adjudicating Authority that, on this record, the document could not be treated as a valid agreement between the Appellant and the present respondent. [Paras 16, 17]

The agreement so filed was held not to be a valid, admissible contract between the parties.

Operational debt versus regulatory dues - Listing fees were treated as regulatory dues and not as operational debt recoverable under Section 9 of the IBC. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted the characterisation that listing fees fall within the regulatory domain which SEBI is entitled to recover, and recorded the Insolvency Law Committee's view that regulatory dues are not to be recovered as operational debt under the IBC. On this basis the Tribunal agreed with the Adjudicating Authority's conclusion that the dues in question were regulatory in nature and thus not recoverable by the Section 9 route as operational debt. [Paras 18, 19]

Listing fees were held to be regulatory dues, not operational debt under the IBC.

Final Conclusion: The Appellate Tribunal affirmed the Adjudicating Authority's order dismissing the Section 9 petition: the claim was time barred, the agreement relied upon was not a valid contract on the record, and the dues were regulatory rather than operational; appeal dismissed.

Liquidator's sale as sale on behalf of the corporate debtor - involuntary transfer versus voluntary transfer in liquidation - applicability of contractual transfer fee on sale by liquidator - interpretation of Invitation for Expression of Interest in business-efficacious manner - binding effect of earlier adjudicating authority directions / res judicata as to unchallenged orders

Liquidator's sale as sale on behalf of the corporate debtor - involuntary transfer versus voluntary transfer in liquidation - Whether transfer effected by the Liquidator is an involuntary transfer on which transfer fee is not payable - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that actions of the liquidator under the IBC, including sale of assets, are on behalf of the corporate debtor. Reliance was placed on Section 35(f) and (g) of the IBC and on precedent where the liquidator steps into the position of the company. The court rejected the submission that a sale by the liquidator is necessarily an involuntary transfer immune from contractual obligations, observing that sale by the liquidator under the IBC is a sale on behalf of the company and cannot be categorised as an involuntary sale for the purpose of avoiding contractual liabilities such as transfer fee. [Paras 14, 15]

Transfer effected by the Liquidator is not an involuntary transfer exempting the purchaser from payment of contractual transfer fee.

Applicability of contractual transfer fee on sale by liquidator - interpretation of Invitation for Expression of Interest in business-efficacious manner - Whether the purchaser was liable to pay the transfer fee under the sub-lease and the Invitation for Expression of Interest - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal construed Clause 7.1.12 of the Invitation for Expression of Interest commercially, holding the phrase "all other duties payable in connection with purchase of Sale Assets" to be wide enough to include transfer fee. The sub-lease's Clause 12.28 specifically contemplated payment of transfer fee on assignment/transfer, and that contractual obligation therefore attached to any transferee. The court concluded that the terms of the Invitation and the sub-lease, read together, render the purchaser liable to bear the applicable transfer fee. [Paras 16, 17, 18]

The purchaser is liable to pay the contractual transfer fee; Clause 7.1.12 and sub-lease Clause 12.28 encompass the transfer fee.

Binding effect of earlier adjudicating authority directions / res judicata as to unchallenged orders - Whether the Appellant can challenge payment of transfer fee despite earlier Adjudicating Authority orders directing purchaser to pay such fee which were not challenged - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the Adjudicating Authority had earlier directed payment of transfer fee while granting time to pay balance amounts (order dated 23 June 2020) and had refused modification of that direction (order dated 29 July 2020). Those orders were not challenged by the Appellant. The court held that the Appellant, having accepted or not challenged those directions, cannot thereafter repudiate the obligation and is bound by them; the subsequent challenge was therefore without merit. The court also relied on the Appellant's own correspondence (letter dated 26 June 2019) undertaking to pay transfer charges as reinforcing the obligation. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 22]

The Appellant is bound by the earlier Adjudicating Authority directions to pay transfer fee and cannot re-open the issue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed. The Tribunal held that a sale by the liquidator under the IBC is a sale on behalf of the corporate debtor (not an involuntary transfer absolving contractual obligations); the Invitation for Expression of Interest together with the sub-lease requires the purchaser to bear the transfer fee; and the Appellant, having not challenged earlier Adjudicating Authority orders and having undertaken to pay transfer charges, is bound to pay the transfer fee. The contempt proceeding is closed; no order as to costs.

Share Application Money treated as deposit on non allotment - Statutory interest under Section 42(6) of the Companies Act as consideration for time value of money - Definition of Financial Debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Adjudicating Authority's duty under Section 7 of the IBC to ascertain existence of default from records

Share Application Money treated as deposit on non allotment - Definition of Financial Debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Share application money paid for preferential allotment that is not allotted and not refunded within statutory time is of the character of a loan/ deposit and falls within the ambit of 'Financial Debt'. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that where shares are not allotted within sixty days and refund is not made within the further fifteen days, Section 42(6) read with the Deposit Rules deems the application money to be a deposit repayable with statutory interest. Once the law treats the amount as a loan/deposit with interest, that statutory transformation gives the amount the character of money disbursed which carries the feature of consideration for the time value of money. Applying the statutory definitions and the precedents relied upon, the Tribunal held that the share application money in the facts of this case qualified as a 'Financial Debt' under Section 5(8) of the Code and thus the creditor could invoke proceedings under Section 7. [Paras 17, 18, 20]

Share application money on non allotment attracts the character of a deposit/loan and falls within the definition of 'Financial Debt'.

Statutory interest under Section 42(6) of the Companies Act as consideration for time value of money - Definition of Financial Debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Statutory accrual of interest under Section 42(6) constitutes 'consideration for the time value of money' required by Section 5(8) of the Code. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal analysed Section 42(6) which mandates repayment with interest where allotment is not completed and refund not made, and held that statutory interest provides compensation for the time value of money. The court applied the principle from higher judicial authority that the essential element for a 'Financial Debt' is disbursal against consideration for time value of money, and concluded that statutory interest under Section 42(6) satisfies that requirement, bringing such claims within Section 5(8). The Tribunal therefore rejected contentions that the monies remained non financial in character merely because they were originally meant for equity allotment. [Paras 12, 18, 20]

Interest under Section 42(6) is consideration for time value of money and the claim qualifies as 'Financial Debt'.

Adjudicating Authority's duty under Section 7 of the IBC to ascertain existence of default from records - Intervention applications alleging fraud and seeking forensic audit were not maintainable and did not preclude admission of the Section 7 petition where the adjudicating authority was satisfied on the evidence of debt and default. - HELD THAT: - Relying on the framework of Section 7 and the settled principle that the adjudicating authority must ascertain existence of default from records or evidence produced, the Tribunal observed that allegations of fraud and parallel criminal or regulatory complaints do not, without more, prevent admission of a Section 7 application where a debt and default are shown. The Tribunal therefore found no sufficient grounds to allow the I.A.s for intervention or to stay the admitted proceedings, and dismissed those applications as non maintainable. [Paras 19, 20]

Intervention applications alleging fraud/forensic audit are dismissed as non maintainable and do not vitiate admission under Section 7 where debt and default are established on record.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed; the Tribunal affirms that unrefunded share application money (with statutory interest under Section 42(6)) qualifies as 'Financial Debt' under Section 5(8) of the IBC and that the Section 7 petition was rightly admitted; intervenor applications are dismissed as non maintainable.

Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - acknowledgement of debt - prospective operation of statutory notification - moratorium under section 14 - appointment of Interim Resolution Professional - public announcement and claim submission

Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - acknowledgement of debt - Admission of the petition under Section 9 of the IBC, 2016 and initiation of CIRP against the corporate debtor. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal proceeded ex parte after noting due service and the corporate debtor's non-appearance and apparent avoidance of the proceedings (recorded before admission). The petition contained an email acknowledgement of debt by the corporate debtor dated 15.12.2018, which the Tribunal accepted as clear acknowledgment. On the basis of the proved default and the admitted acknowledgement, the application under Section 9 was admitted and CIRP was ordered to be initiated against the corporate debtor. [Paras 3, 4, 5]

The petition under Section 9 is admitted and the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process is initiated against the corporate debtor.

Prospective operation of statutory notification - Whether the Ministry of Corporate Affairs' notification enhancing minimum amount of default to Rs. one crore (issued 24.03.2020) applies to the present case. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that the default complained of occurred prior to the notification dated 24.03.2020. Applying the ordinary presumption that governmental notifications altering statutory thresholds operate prospectively unless expressly stated otherwise, the Tribunal held that the notification does not apply to the present proceedings. Consequently, the enhanced minimum default threshold was held inapplicable to this case. [Paras 5]

The MCA notification dated 24.03.2020 is not applicable to the present case; the petition may be proceeded with despite the later enhancement of the minimum default amount.

Appointment of Interim Resolution Professional - public announcement and claim submission - moratorium under section 14 - Appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional, declaration of moratorium and ancillary directions on the IRP and operational creditor. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal appointed an Insolvency Professional from the IBBI list as Interim Resolution Professional and directed him to take charge of the corporate debtor's management. The IRP was directed to make the public announcement and call for claims in accordance with the Code. A moratorium was declared effective from the date of the order until completion of the CIRP, prohibiting institution or continuation of suits, transfer or disposal of assets, enforcement of security, and recovery of property in possession of the corporate debtor, subject to statutory exceptions for supply of essential goods or services. The Tribunal further directed compliance by the IRP with relevant statutory provisions and required cooperation from the directors, promoters and persons associated with management. The operational creditor was directed to furnish a specified payment to meet IRP's initial expenses and to send a copy of the order to the IRP; the registry was directed to inform the Registrar of Companies for updating the MCA database. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]

An IRP is appointed; the IRP shall take charge, make the public announcement and call for claims; moratorium under Section 14 is declared; statutory compliances and specified administrative directions are ordered, including payment to the IRP and updating of MCA records.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal admitted the Section 9 petition and initiated CIRP against the corporate debtor, holding the earlier acknowledgement of debt sufficient and the subsequent MCA notification inapplicable; an Interim Resolution Professional was appointed, moratorium declared, statutory steps directed to be taken and administrative directions issued for compliance.

Site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition - service (as excluding transfer of title in immovable property) - transfer of title in immovable property not a taxable service - levy of service tax depends on the service rendered and not on unfulfilled agreements

Site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition - Whether activities undertaken by the appellant under Phase I attract service tax as "site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition" for the period up to 30.06.2012. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the agreements and evidence and found that Phase I activities were limited to purchase of land from farmers, execution of agreements in favour of society members, processing papers and obtaining in-principle approval for layout plans; no physical site works or earthmoving activities under Phase II/III were performed. The appellant's partner's affidavit and society's payment confirmation supported that only Phase I obligations were discharged. The definition of "site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition" under Section 65(97a) lists activities such as drilling, soil stabilization, demolition and similar physical operations; the Phase I tasks did not fall within any clause of that definition. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the Phase I activities do not attract the service tax category under Section 65(97a) for the pre-01.07.2012 period. [Paras 6, 7]

Phase I activities do not amount to taxable "site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition" for the period up to 30.06.2012; the demand cannot be sustained on that basis.

Service (as excluding transfer of title in immovable property) - transfer of title in immovable property not a taxable service - Whether the appellant's Phase I activities constitute a "service" chargeable to service tax under the post-01.07.2012 definition of "service" contained in Section 65B(44). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal considered the amended statutory definition under Section 65B(44), which excludes activities that are merely a transfer of title in immovable property by way of sale. The evidentiary record showed the appellant merely procured land, paid government fees and facilitated approvals, i.e., activities incidental to transfer of immovable property in Phase I. No physical development work was performed. On this basis the Tribunal concluded that such activity falls within the exclusion and does not constitute a taxable "service" under Section 65B(44) for the post-01.07.2012 period. The Tribunal also noted that reliance placed by Revenue on other authorities involved different facts and that levy depends on the service actually rendered, not on unfulfilled contractual obligations. [Paras 6, 7]

Phase I activities are not taxable as "service" under Section 65B(44) from 01.07.2012 onwards; no service tax liability is attracted on that basis.

Levy of service tax depends on the service rendered and not on unfulfilled agreements - Whether confirmation of service tax demand, interest and penalties can be sustained where no taxable service was rendered and agreements for later phases remained unexecuted. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal emphasised the settled principle that service tax liability arises from the service actually rendered and not from mere terms of an agreement which were not performed nor remunerated for the specified service. The record contained no evidence that Phase II or Phase III works were executed or that any taxable activity, as defined in the statute, had been performed during the disputed period. Therefore the adjudicated demand, interest and penalties premised on a finding of taxable service were unsustainable. [Paras 7, 8]

Confirmation of service tax demand, interest and penalties was set aside as unsustainable where no taxable service was rendered.

Final Conclusion: The impugned adjudication order confirming service tax demand, interest and penalties is set aside; the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant as Phase I activities did not attract service tax either under Section 65(97a) (pre-01.07.2012) or under Section 65B(44) (post-01.07.2012) for the period in dispute.

Cenvat credit of service tax paid under reverse charge mechanism - transitional refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act - prohibition on input tax credit under Section 142(8)(a) of the CGST Act - reverse charge on ocean freight from non-taxable territory - absence of mala fide / bona fide compliance

Cenvat credit of service tax paid under reverse charge mechanism - reverse charge on ocean freight from non-taxable territory - Entitlement to Cenvat credit for service tax deposited on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the levy of service tax on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism was a contested and debatable legal question and that the assessee had deposited the tax after an audit objection without any mala fide intent. In view of these findings, the Tribunal held that the appellant was entitled to Cenvat credit of the service tax amount deposited under the erstwhile service tax law. The determinative reasoning was that the deposit was not the result of deliberate avoidance but followed an audit objection in a highly debatable area of law, and therefore entitlement to credit should be recognised.

Allowed; appellant entitled to Cenvat credit of the service tax so deposited.

Transitional refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act - prohibition on input tax credit under Section 142(8)(a) of the CGST Act - absence of mala fide / bona fide compliance - Entitlement to refund under the transitional provisions of the CGST Act for Cenvat credit not available after implementation of GST. - HELD THAT: - Although the revenue relied upon the bar in Section 142(8)(a) of the CGST Act to deny input tax credit, the Tribunal determined that since the appellant was entitled to Cenvat credit under the erstwhile law but could not avail it after GST implementation w.e.f. 1st July 2017, the appellant was entitled to claim refund under the transitional provision in Section 142(3) of the CGST Act. The Tribunal also took into account that the deposit was made following an audit compliance and that there was no mala fide on the part of the appellant, thereby supporting allowance of the transitional refund.

Allowed; appellant entitled to refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act and directed adjudicating authority to disburse refund with interest.

Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to Cenvat credit for service tax deposited under reverse charge on ocean freight and, as Cenvat credit could not be availed after GST implementation, was entitled to a refund under the transitional provision of Section 142(3) of the CGST Act; the adjudicating authority was directed to disburse the refund with interest within thirty days.

Interest on delayed refund - refund under Section 11B - interest under Section 11BB - prematurity of claim - remand for fresh adjudication - automaticity of statutory interest

Interest under Section 11BB - refund under Section 11B - prematurity of claim - automaticity of statutory interest - remand for fresh adjudication - Claim for interest on refund under Section 11BB when the refund itself is pending adjudication. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that entitlement to interest under Section 11BB is consequential upon and not independent of the grant of refund under Section 11B. Since the First Appellate Authority had remanded the refund claim for fresh adjudication, any adjudication on interest at this stage would be premature and could affect the denovo proceedings pending before the Adjudicating Authority. The Tribunal further observed that interest under Section 11BB is automatic once the refund is sanctioned, and therefore should follow the outcome of the refund claim rather than be separately decided while the refund itself remains under consideration. For these reasons the Tribunal set aside the rejection of the interest claim by the First Appellate Authority and remitted the issue to the Original Authority for consideration in the course of the fresh adjudication of the refund claim. [Paras 4, 5, 6]

Rejection of the claim for interest under Section 11BB held premature; impugned finding set aside and the interest claim remanded to the Original Authority to be considered in the fresh adjudication of the refund claim.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed to the extent that the rejection of the claim for interest is set aside and the issue is remanded to the Original Authority for fresh consideration in the adjudication of the refund claim for the period April 2011 to June 2011.

Summary order. Notice issued limited to the question whether the remedy under efficacy of remedy under section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is available against the impugned order; respondents accepted and waived formal notice; matter posted to 25.02.2022.

Penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 - liability of a director for dealing with clandestinely cleared excisable goods - judicial discretion to reduce the quantum of penalty - adjournment limits under the proviso to Section 35C(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944

Penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 - liability of a director for dealing with clandestinely cleared excisable goods - Whether the appellant, being a director of the recipient company, is liable to penalty under Rule 26 for having paid consideration for clandestinely cleared goods. - HELD THAT: - Tribunal upheld the concurrent finding of the lower authorities that the appellant was liable under Rule 26. The determination rests on the uncontroverted statement of the ex accountant of the recipient company that the appellant, in his capacity as director, paid cash consideration to the main noticee towards clandestinely cleared MS ingots. The appellant failed to produce evidence to rebut that statement. The Tribunal accepted the reasoning that a director cannot evade liability by asserting lack of personal handling of the goods when the record indicates his involvement in payment for the clandestine clearance. Consequently, the imposition of penalty on the appellant under Rule 26 was sustained.

Liability of the appellant as director to penalty under Rule 26 was upheld.

Judicial discretion to reduce the quantum of penalty - Whether the quantum of penalty imposed on the appellant ought to be interfered with and, if so, to what extent. - HELD THAT: - While affirming liability, the Tribunal exercised its discretion in respect of the penalty quantum. Having noted that a higher penalty had been imposed on the company and considering the overall facts and ends of justice, the Tribunal found it appropriate to mitigate the penalty imposed on the appellant. Applying equitable discretion, the Tribunal reduced the penalty originally imposed on the appellant from the amount determined below to a lesser sum, deeming the reduction to Rs. 1,00,000 to meet the ends of justice.

Penalty imposed on the appellant was reduced from the earlier amount to Rs. 1,00,000.

Adjournment limits under the proviso to Section 35C(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - Whether further adjournment should be granted when the appellant had repeatedly failed to appear. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal declined to grant a further adjournment after noting multiple prior adjournments on account of non appearance and having recorded a final notice for appearance. The Tribunal considered the statutory limitation on adjournments under the proviso to Section 35C(1A) and, on that basis, directed the counsel to proceed with argument instead of granting another adjournment.

Request for further adjournment was refused and the matter proceeded to argument.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal affirmed the appellant's liability under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, refused further adjournment in view of repeated non appearance and statutory limits thereon, but in exercise of judicial discretion reduced the penalty imposed on the appellant to Rs. 1,00,000.

Admissibility of Cenvat credit on outward GTA services - treatment of supplies on FOR basis and transfer of ownership at buyer's premises - availability of benefit of administrative Circulars and non-retrospective withdrawal of beneficial instructions - time-bar/limitation where the law was unsettled and subject to litigation - remand for factual verification by adjudicating authority

Admissibility of Cenvat credit on outward GTA services - treatment of supplies on FOR basis and transfer of ownership at buyer's premises - remand for factual verification by adjudicating authority - Appeal allowed by way of remand directing the adjudicating authority to verify whether supplies were on FOR basis and ownership of goods passed at buyer's premises, and if so to allow Cenvat credit on outward GTA services. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted its earlier decision in M/s. Ultratech Cement Ltd. and the adjudicating authority's view in the assessee's prior period, accepting that where contracts are on FOR basis and ownership of goods remains with the supplier until delivery at the buyer's premises, Cenvat credit on outward GTA may be admissible. Having regard to the identical factual contention in the present case and the settled position that beneficial Circulars operative at the relevant time cannot be withdrawn retrospectively, the matter is remitted for factual examination. The adjudicating authority is directed to examine the contracts and supply terms; if it is found that the contract of supply is on FOR basis and ownership transfers at the buyer's premises, the benefit of credit shall be allowed. The Tribunal also recorded that where the issue was not free from doubt and had been the subject of prolonged litigation, demands for extended periods may be vulnerable to time-bar objections, but the present order confines relief to remand for factual verification. [Paras 4, 5]

Remitted to the adjudicating authority to verify contractual terms; if supply is on FOR basis with transfer of ownership at buyer's premises, grant Cenvat credit on outward GTA; appeal allowed by way of remand.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed by way of remand: the adjudicating authority shall verify whether supplies were made on FOR basis and ownership passed at the buyer's premises, and if so, grant the Cenvat credit on outward GTA in accordance with the Tribunal's guidance and applicable circulars.

Notice under Section 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 - Scope of Section 6(2) - copy to person holding property through any other person on his behalf - Illegally acquired property - Person to whom the Act applies (relatives, associates, present holder) - Burden of proof under Section 8 - Recording of reasons to believe as a jurisdictional precondition - Forfeiture of properties held in the name of relatives/associates to reach convict's assets - Primary notice to the convict not mandatory where properties are held by relative in his name and possession

Notice under Section 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 - Person to whom the Act applies (relatives, associates, present holder) - Primary notice to the convict not mandatory where properties are held by relative in his name and possession - Whether a primary notice under Section 6(1) must mandatorily be served on the convict when the properties proposed to be forfeited are held in the name and possession of his relatives. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Section 6(1) requires service of notice upon the person to whom the Act applies who is holding the property (either as recorded owner or in legal possession), and not invariably upon the convict. Where the illegally acquired property is in the name of, and in possession of, a relative who is a person to whom the Act applies, there is no mandatory requirement to serve a primary notice on the convict, because the person so holding is the immediately affected person who must discharge the reverse burden under Section 8. The judgment reasons from the scheme of the Act, the definitions of "person" and "illegally acquired property", and the purpose of reaching properties wherever held; in such factual situations issuing notice to the convict would serve no purpose. The High Court's contrary view that notice to the convict is always mandatory is reversed. [Paras 49, 50, 51, 64, 65]

Section 6(1) does not mandate serving a primary notice on the convict when the properties proposed to be forfeited are held by a relative in whose name and possession the properties stand; notice to the person holding the property is sufficient.

Scope of Section 6(2) - copy to person holding property through any other person on his behalf - Forfeiture of properties held in the name of relatives/associates to reach convict's assets - Person to whom the Act applies (relatives, associates, present holder) - The meaning and application of Section 6(2) - whether a copy of the notice must be served on 'such other person' and the class of persons covered. - HELD THAT: - The Court explained that Section 6(2)'s reference to "such other person" applies where the primary noticee is holding the property "through any other person on his behalf". In that setting the competent authority must serve a copy on that other person (who may not be a person covered by Section 2(2)). "Such person" in Section 6(2) refers back to the primary noticee (a person to whom the Act applies), and "such other person" refers to the person actually holding possession on behalf of the noticee. The provision enables the authority to reach de facto holders so as to unravel devices by which illegally acquired property is screened, while preserving that the primary notice and the reverse burden under Section 8 operate against the person to whom the Act applies. [Paras 52, 53, 54, 55, 56]

Section 6(2) requires serving a copy of the notice on the person who holds the property on behalf of the primary noticee where the notice specifies that the property is so held; that "such other person" may be outside Section 2(2) and is brought within the notice-procedure to enable effective adjudication.

Recording of reasons to believe as a jurisdictional precondition - Burden of proof under Section 8 - Whether the Competent Authority's recording of 'reasons to believe' is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement before issuing notice under Section 6 and the consequences of noncompliance. - HELD THAT: - The Court reiterated that the statutory phrase "reasons to believe" requires objective material and is not satisfied by mere suspicion; recording such reasons in writing is a jurisdictional precondition to issuing Section 6 notice. The reasons must have a rational connection to the belief and cannot be extraneous; failure to record valid reasons vitiates the exercise of power. Section 8 (reverse burden) operates only after a valid notice under Section 6 has been issued based on validly recorded reasons to believe; the Competent Authority cannot circumvent this precondition by relying on Section 8. [Paras 57, 58, 60, 61]

Recording of 'reasons to believe' based on objective material is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement before issuing Section 6 notice; Section 8's reverse burden applies only after such valid notice is issued.

Forfeiture of properties held in the name of relatives/associates to reach convict's assets - Illegally acquired property - Whether the writ petitions should be finally disposed on the single ground that proceedings were vitiated for lack of primary notice to the convict, or whether other contentions require fresh adjudication. - HELD THAT: - The Court reversed the Madras High Court's sole-ground holding and held that, having answered the legal question on notice, the remaining factual and legal contentions (including alleged inordinate delay, absence of nexus, sufficiency of reasons recorded, and other pleas raised before the High Court) were not finally adjudicated and must be considered afresh. The matter is therefore remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal on all other issues and contentions available to both sides in accordance with law. The Court also noted the factual point that the convict had died before the impugned notices were issued, and that in the present factual matrix no notice on the deceased convict would have been necessary. [Paras 67, 68, 69, 70]

The Madras High Court's order setting aside proceedings solely on the ground of nonservice of primary notice to the convict is set aside; the writ petitions are restored for fresh consideration of all other issues and contentions (including delay and nexus) by the High Court.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed insofar as the Court holds that Section 6(1) does not mandate serving a primary notice on the convict when the properties proposed for forfeiture are held in the name and possession of a relative who is a person to whom the Act applies; Section 6(2) requires copy to the person holding on behalf of the noticee; recording of 'reasons to believe' is a jurisdictional precondition; the Madras High Court's sole-ground order is set aside and the writ petitions are restored to the High Court for fresh consideration of all other issues in accordance with law.

Power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. - Recall and re-examination of witness - Evidence essential to the just decision of the case - Fair trial and opportunity to adduce defence evidence - Filling up of lacuna in the case

Power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. - Recall and re-examination of witness - Evidence essential to the just decision of the case - Fair trial and opportunity to adduce defence evidence - Applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. seeking recall and re examination of the complainant to place on record documents referred to in the complaint and in earlier deposition. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the settled test that Section 311 Cr.P.C. confers a wide discretionary power to summon, recall or re examine witnesses where their evidence appears essential for a just decision, and that such power must be exercised judiciously to secure a fair trial. The petitioner had expressly averred in the complaints that receipts existed for the advance payments and had admitted in cross examination (in December 2018) possession of the Bayana Receipts, Agreements to Sell and Collaboration Agreements, but these documents were inadvertently not produced. Distinguishing the facts from cases where recall is sought belatedly to fill deliberate gaps in defence, the Court found prima facie that permitting re examination to place those documents on record was in the interest of justice and necessary for a just decision. The Court therefore held that the trial court erred in dismissing the Section 311 applications and that re examination ought to be permitted subject to appropriate safeguards (single opportunity and right of cross examination by the respondent). [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14]

Applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recall and re examination of the complainant to place on record documents were allowed and the trial court order dismissing them was set aside; re examination to be permitted on one date with liberty to the respondent to cross examine.

Filling up of lacuna in the case - Distinction from precedents where recall was abused - Whether permitting re examination in the present facts would amount to impermissible filling up of lacuna in the case or causing prejudice to the respondent. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined precedent relied upon by the respondent and held it distinguishable: in the cited authority the accused repeatedly sought recall after multiple opportunities and to introduce material already on record but not used; there the defendant's conduct caused inordinate delay and prejudice. By contrast, in this case the complainant had earlier admitted existence of the documents and their production was inadvertent. The Court emphasised that Section 311 must not be used as a vehicle to re trial or to gain unfair advantage, but where the evidence sought is germane and necessary for a just decision, re examination should be allowed. Accordingly, the Court found that allowing the limited re examination did not constitute filling up of lacuna in an impermissible sense and would not cause unjust prejudice if confined to one occasion with opportunity for cross examination. [Paras 12, 13, 14]

The request to re examine and bring the documents on record was not an impermissible attempt to fill lacuna in the case and could be allowed with safeguards to prevent prejudice.

Final Conclusion: The petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were allowed; the impugned order dismissing the Section 311 applications is set aside, the trial court directed to permit the complainant one opportunity to re examine himself and place the documents on record with liberty to the respondent to cross examine on that date; petitioner ordered to pay a composite cost to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority.