Issues: (i) whether the petitioners' detention became illegal after filing of the prosecution complaint and before cognizance was taken, in the absence of a fresh remand order; (ii) whether issuance of production warrants and the surrounding procedural record preserved the legality of the petitioners' custody.

Issue (i): whether the petitioners' detention became illegal after filing of the prosecution complaint and before cognizance was taken, in the absence of a fresh remand order.

Analysis: The petitions were founded on the claim that custody after 07.12.2023 was unsupported by a valid judicial order and therefore offended personal liberty. The applicable framework under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was examined. It was held that the investigative-stage remand and the post-cognizance remand are distinct, but custody must remain continuous and in accordance with law. Once the prosecution complaint had been filed within time, the accused remained in the custody of court until the next judicial stage, and the absence of an immediate fresh remand order did not by itself create an illegal break where the custody had not lapsed in substance.

Conclusion: The detention did not become illegal merely because cognizance was deferred and no separate remand order was passed on the same day.

Issue (ii): whether issuance of production warrants and the surrounding procedural record preserved the legality of the petitioners' custody.

Analysis: The Court placed emphasis on the fact that the petitioners were represented before the successor court, the complaint had been transferred, the matter was posted for consideration of cognizance, and production warrants were issued for the next date. The Court treated this as maintaining continuity of judicial custody. It rejected the submission that non-production before the court on that date necessarily rendered the custody void, and held that the record showed no gap sufficient to characterise the detention as unlawful.

Conclusion: The issuance of production warrants sustained the legality of custody and negatived the plea of illegal detention.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions failed because the petitioners remained in lawful custody of the court and no case for habeas corpus relief was made out.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a prosecution complaint is filed in time and the court issues production warrants while the matter is pending for cognizance, custody remains continuous and does not become illegal merely because a fresh remand order is not separately recorded on that date.

Issues: Whether the appeal should be dismissed for non-prosecution in view of repeated absence of the appellant and the statutory limit on adjournments.

Analysis: Section 35C(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits adjournment only on sufficient cause, and the proviso restricts adjournments to not more than three times during the hearing of an appeal. Rule 20 of the CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982 also empowers the Tribunal, where the appellant does not appear on the hearing date, either to dismiss the appeal for default or to hear and decide it on merits. The appellant remained absent on multiple dates, no adjournment request was made on the final occasion, and the record showed repeated opportunities having already been granted.

Conclusion: The appeal was liable to be dismissed for non-prosecution, and dismissal of the appeal for default was justified.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellant repeatedly defaults in appearance and no sufficient cause is shown, the Tribunal may dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution, particularly after the statutory ceiling on adjournments is reached.

The short question involved in these present appeals for determination is whether the principles of unjust enrichment be applicable to the amount excess paid before adjusting the same with the amount short-paid while finalizing provisional assessment under Rule 7 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Undisputedly, the appellant has resorted to provisional assessment under Rule 7 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 at the time of clearance of the goods from the factory to the depots, since certain conditional discounts passed on to the customers on sale from depots subsequently, the exact quantum of which is known only after its clearance from the factory and sale from depots. When the exact amount of discount is ascertained, the admissible discounts are calculated on a month-to-month basis and the assessable value at the time of clearance from the factory is redetermined and the duty payable is accordingly arrived at. Consequently, the difference between the duty paid and the duty payable is calculated and the assessment is finalized. The result of the said exercise may end up with the recovery of differential duty short paid or refund of excess paid.

The Revenue's contention is that after determination of the exact duty payable on finalization of assessment, excess duty paid cannot be adjusted against duty short paid, without testing its incidence of excess duty whether passed on to any other person in compliance with the statutory presumption under section 12B of CEA, 1944. It is their argument that netting of duty by passing the statutory presumption is not laid down under Rule 7 of Central Excise Rules, 2002. Accordingly, duty liability is calculated against the duty provisionally paid at the time of clearance of the goods from the factory and the amount payable. During the said exercise for a particular month, the result could be excess payment of duty in certain cases and short payment in other cases. The assessing authority after adjusting the duty excess paid against the short-paid, arrives at the net result i.e., either excess payment or short-paid during the month is recoverable or refundable. Consequently, the recovery/refund is accordingly directed. The Revenue's objection is that the duty excess paid cannot be adjusted against the duty short-paid during a particular month/period of assessment to arrive at the net result of refund or liability. It is the Revenue's contention that there are no specific provisions under Rule 7 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 directing such adjustment/netting off duty.

Revenue has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of TVS Electronics Ltd. case (supra) which followed the judgment in Addison & Co. Ltd. passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in directing that the refund amount arising due to provisional assessment be subjected to unjust enrichment.

The appellant's contention on the other hand is that the very purpose of provisional assessment is for adjustment of excess duty-paid to short-paid during a particular period and determining the net effect of the duty, that is, either by way of payment or seeking refund of the amount paid. In support, they referred to the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Vikrant Tyres Ltd's case and in Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts Pvt. Ltd's case (supra).

The Revenue's argument may seem attractive in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Madras High Court in TVS Electronics's case (supra), but we find that the jurisdictional Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the appellant's own case taking note of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Addison & Co. Ltd. case and in the context of finalization of provisional assessment for different periods of the same assessee held as follows:

"In Addison & Co. Ltd., supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the assessee had admitted the incidence of duty was originally passed on to the buyer. No material was placed on record to show that the buyer to whom the incidence of duty was passed on by the assessee did not pass it on to any other person. It has been thus held that the sine qua non for a claim for refund as contemplated in Section 11B of the Act is that the claimant has to establish that the amount of duty of excess in relation to which such refund is claimed was paid by him and that the incidence of such duty has not been passed on by him to any other person.

In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the refund of excess duty paid can be allowed only in cases where the burden of duty has not been passed on to any other person including the ultimate customer as well and moreover, Hon'ble Apex Court was considering the case of normal refund and not adjustment at the time of finalization of provisional assessment. Hence, it is distinguishable. Thus, the authorities were conscious of Rule 7(6) and the factual findings of the authorities held in favor of the assessee is not challenged by the Revenue.

Nextly, it is also significant to note the methodology and manner of challenge made by the Revenue. Indisputedly, for the assessment years from 2002-03 to 2008-09 refund claim of the manufacturer assessee was allowed and the same has reached finality. The Revenue has cherry-picked the assessment years in question to challenge, giving a finality to the other assessment years. In this context, it would be preferable to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad vs. Surcoat Paints (P) Ltd. [2008) E.L.T. 4 (SC) wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Revenue having accepted the decision given by the Tribunal in another case of the same nature, is precluded from challenging the similar order passed in respect of another unit. If so, in the very same assessee's case if the refund orders are accepted for particular years, the same cannot be challenged relating to other years. Revenue cannot pick and choose the assessment years for challenging the orders having a similar effect. Moreover, as observed by the First Appellate Authority, the issue of unjust enrichment has been raised for the first time on the sanction of refund order consequent on finalization of provisional assessment. The authorities have admitted that the credit notes were issued by the assessee to their dealer representing various discounts which have been actually passed on, in accordance with marketing circulars/policies. It is also observed that on verification of sample depot invoices at the time of completion of provisional assessment, that the assessee has not issued any cenvatable invoice from the depot which are prescribed documents for availment of cenvat credit under Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. Thus, it cannot be held that the assessee has not subjected to the test of unjust enrichment."

It has been brought to our notice that the said judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court has been accepted by the Revenue as communicated through their letter dated 17.11.2023. Needless to mention, the principle laid down by the jurisdictional High Court is binding on the Tribunal in view of the judgment of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs. Kashmir Conductors: 1997 (96) E.L.T. 257 (Tri.-LB).

Following the said judgments, the impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed with consequential relief, if any, as per law.

(Order pronounced in Open Court on 19. 12. 2023.)

Issues: (i) Whether the complainant proved that the cheque amounts were issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and whether the accused rebutted the presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) Whether the cash loan transaction could be rejected on the basis of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the complainant proved that the cheque amounts were issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and whether the accused rebutted the presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The evidence established advancement of money, issuance of cheques by the accused, dishonour of the cheques for insufficiency of funds, and service of statutory notice. The accused's defence of theft and forged signatures was not supported by any police complaint, stop-payment instruction, or convincing proof. The statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 operated in favour of the complainant, and the accused failed to rebut them on the test of preponderance of probabilities.

Conclusion: The ingredients of Section 138 were proved and the accused was liable to be convicted.

Issue (ii): Whether the cash loan transaction could be rejected on the basis of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 269SS prohibits acceptance of loan or deposit in cash by the taker and does not bar the lender from recovering the amount advanced. A violation, if any, would not defeat the enforceability of the cheque liability in the present proceedings. The reliance placed on the income-tax provisions to discredit the complainant's case was therefore misplaced.

Conclusion: Section 269SS did not bar the complainant's claim or justify acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The acquittal was unsustainable, the complaint under Section 138 succeeded, and the conviction and sentence were affirmed in consequence of the findings recorded on the cheque liability and the inapplicability of the income-tax objection.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the drawer's statutory presumptions stand unless rebutted by probable evidence, and Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act does not prevent recovery of a cash loan by the lender.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 despite the embargo in Section 45, and whether the alleged benefit attributed to him, his custody period, and the surrounding circumstances satisfied the statutory twin conditions.

Analysis: The complaint alleged money-laundering arising from the predicate offence, but the material against the petitioner was limited to an alleged benefit of Rs. 50,000/- for signing a power of attorney. The Court applied Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the settled principle that, at the bail stage, the Court is not to conduct a meticulous examination of evidence but to assess the material on broad probabilities. It was noticed that the petitioner had already spent more than three months in custody, the attributed amount was comparatively small, and further pre-trial incarceration was found unjustified. The Court also held that the risk of absconding, influencing witnesses, or tampering with evidence could be addressed by stringent conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to bail, subject to strict terms and conditions.

Final Conclusion: The Court granted bail and directed release of the petitioner on compliance with the imposed conditions, while leaving the merits of the prosecution case untouched.

Ratio Decidendi: In a bail application under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Court may grant bail where the available material on broad probabilities does not justify continued pre-trial detention and the statutory concerns can be secured through appropriate conditions.

Issues: (i) whether a writ of mandamus could be issued restraining issuance or enforcement of summons in an investigation under the goods and services tax law, and (ii) whether the petitioner was entitled to a restricted schedule for appearance in view of his physical condition and the ongoing investigation.

Issue (i): Whether a writ of mandamus could be issued restraining issuance or enforcement of summons in an investigation under the goods and services tax law.

Analysis: The investigation concerned alleged fraudulent passing on of input tax credit under the GST framework. In light of the settled distinction between a petition for anticipatory bail and a writ seeking protection from arrest or investigation, and the principle that a mandamus cannot be used to prevent the performance of statutory functions, the blanket restraint sought against summons was not warranted. The Court also noted that such interference is justified only in exceptional cases.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to a blanket restraint against the summons or investigation.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner was entitled to a restricted schedule for appearance in view of his physical condition and the ongoing investigation.

Analysis: The Court accepted that the petitioner was physically challenged and that repeated day-to-day questioning would cause inconvenience and hardship. At the same time, the investigation involved numerous taxpayers and required the petitioner's presence in several connected matters, so a balanced arrangement was necessary to facilitate inquiry without undue hardship.

Conclusion: The petitioner was granted limited relief by directing appearance only on every Monday and Friday during office hours, with full cooperation in the investigation.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by refusing a general restraint on summons while granting a limited accommodation regulating the petitioner's appearance for investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: In an investigation under the GST law, a writ of mandamus cannot be used to obstruct the discharge of statutory investigative powers, though the Court may fashion limited procedural relief where the facts justify accommodation without defeating the investigation.

Issues: Whether the assessment order, which did not bring to tax deemed rental income from completed unsold flats held as stock-in-trade for assessment year 2018-19, was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to justify revision.

Analysis: The unsold flats were held as stock-in-trade by a builder-developer. The statutory amendment applicable from assessment year 2018-19 subjected the annual value of such unsold property to tax, subject to the two-year moratorium under Section 23(5). The moratorium was unavailable because the projects had been completed before assessment year 2018-19 and the flats constituted opening/closing stock for the relevant year. The Assessing Officer had not applied the amended provision while accepting the returned income, resulting in non-assessment of the deemed rental income.

Conclusion: The assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and revision under Section 263 was valid.

Issues: Whether the writ petitions challenging the orders under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notices under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the relevant assessment years were liable to be allowed in view of the earlier judgment of the Court, and whether the other questions of law required adjudication.

Analysis: The petitions were stated to be covered by the Court's earlier decision, and the respondent did not dispute that position. The earlier decision had held that reassessment actions under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notices under Section 148 of the amended 1961 Act for the relevant assessment years could not be sustained. The present order followed that binding view and noted that the remaining questions of law were not being decided.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were allowed in terms of the earlier judgment, and the impugned reassessment actions did not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether the cheques were issued for any legally enforceable debt; (ii) Whether petitioners are punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act where stop-payment instructions were given despite sufficient funds.

Issue (i): Whether the cheques were issued for any legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: The dispute arises from payments and alleged settlement obligations founded on a Memorandum of Understanding and related transactions. Section 138 and its Explanation require that the cheque be drawn for the discharge, in whole or in part, of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The materials show contested claims about the nature and enforceability of the underlying obligation, including assertions of fraud, deficient performance and illegality of the agreement relied upon by the payees. The presumption created under Section 139 may operate in favour of the holder, but the existence of a bona fide dispute about the underlying debt and allegations that the agreement itself is tainted or not legally executable are matters going to the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

Conclusion: The court found that the existence of a legally enforceable debt was disputed on the materials and factual matrix and that the alleged underlying obligation was not established for purposes of sustaining proceedings under Section 138 at the stage before the High Court.

Issue (ii): Whether petitioners are punishable under Section 138 where stop-payment instruction was given despite sufficient funds in the account.

Analysis: Section 138 covers dishonour by reason of insufficiency of funds or arrangement limits, subject to provisos including presentation and notice requirements. The category of stop-payment instructions where funds are otherwise sufficient is cognisable but remains rebuttable; the accused can show the stop-payment was for valid causes such as bona fide dispute. The record shows a stop-payment instruction was issued after a prior notice calling upon the payees not to present the cheques. Bank records indicate sufficient balance on presentation and the cheques were returned with endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer." Given the prior notice and the factual allegations of fraud and disputed entitlement, the court treated the stop-payment circumstance as sufficient to negate the applicability of Section 138 on the facts before it.

Conclusion: The court concluded that, on the record before it, the offence under Section 138 was not attracted because the cheques were presented despite a prior stop-payment instruction communicated to the payees and sufficient balance existed, and the stop-payment related to bona fide disputed circumstances.

Final Conclusion: The impugned criminal prosecutions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were quashed and the petitions to set aside those proceedings were allowed, because the presentational and stop-payment circumstances together with the disputed nature of the underlying obligation rendered continuation of the criminal proceedings inappropriate at this stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Where cheques are presented after a communicated stop-payment instruction and the account shows sufficient funds, and where there exists a bona fide dispute about the existence or enforceability of the underlying debt, proceedings under Section 138 are not maintainable and may be quashed on that basis.

Issues: (i) Whether damages under a liquidated damages clause could be awarded without proof of actual loss or legal injury; (ii) Whether the arbitral award awarding liquidated damages was liable to be set aside for patent illegality.

Issue (i): Whether damages under a liquidated damages clause could be awarded without proof of actual loss or legal injury.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the interplay between Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 74 permits recovery of reasonable compensation up to the stipulated amount, but the award of compensation still presupposes some legal injury or loss. Where actual loss can be proved, proof is not dispensed with merely because the contract contains a liquidated damages clause. Only where loss is difficult or impossible to prove may a genuine pre-estimate in the contract be awarded as reasonable compensation. The record showed that no evidence was led and the arbitrator itself noted absence of documentary proof of damage suffered by either side.

Conclusion: Damages could not be awarded merely on proof of breach and contractual stipulation; proof of loss remained necessary, so the claim for liquidated damages could not stand on the material before the arbitrator.

Issue (ii): Whether the arbitral award awarding liquidated damages was liable to be set aside for patent illegality.

Analysis: The award recorded breach by the petitioner but also recorded that there was no evidence to prove damages. Even so, it granted liquidated damages by relying on the contractual clause and selective extracts of precedent, without returning a finding that the respondent suffered loss or that loss was incapable of proof. Such an approach ignored the settled requirement that compensation under Section 74 must be linked to legal injury and reasonable compensation. An award based on no evidence or ignoring vital evidence is perverse and falls within patent illegality under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Conclusion: The award was liable to be set aside for patent illegality.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral award could not be sustained because it granted liquidated damages without proof of loss or a legally supportable finding of reasonable compensation, and it was therefore interfered with in the Section 34 proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A contractual liquidated damages clause does not dispense with the requirement of proving legal injury or loss where such loss is capable of proof; compensation can be awarded only as reasonable compensation and an award granting damages without that foundation is vulnerable to challenge as patent illegality.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether the option under section 115BAA can be availed where Form 10-IC was not uploaded before the due date for filing the return, and whether the assessing machinery (CPC/CIT(A)) was justified in denying taxation at 22% on that ground.

2. Whether Form 10-IC may be filed belatedly (after the extended return due date) pursuant to applicable statutory scheme or relaxations, and if so, whether the assessee's failure to upload the form before the return due date can be cured.

3. Whether, in the alternative, the assessee is entitled to have tax computed at the lower corporate rate (25% / relevant concessional rate) applicable by reference to turnover thresholds, despite not having specifically selected that option in the ITR due to software constraints when an attempt was made to select section 115BAA.

4. Whether the appellate authority was required to admit additional grounds and pass a speaking order thereon.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Denial of section 115BAA option for non-filing of Form 10-IC

Legal framework: Section 115BAA grants a concessional corporate tax rate subject to exercise of option in the prescribed manner on or before the due date under section 139(1); Rule 21AE prescribes Form 10-IC for exercising the option.

Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal followed its coordinate bench decisions holding that timely filing of Form 10-IC is mandatory to avail section 115BAA where Form 10-IC was not filed before the due date; the issue was not treated as res integra and existing Tribunal jurisprudence was followed.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal accepted that marking the option in the ITR alone is insufficient under the statute and rules; Rule 21AE requires exercise of option by filing Form 10-IC within the statutory time. The absence of Form 10-IC by the extended due date (as applicable) meant the statutory condition precedent for section 115BAA was not satisfied, permitting CPC to process tax at the normal rate.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - timely filing of Form 10-IC is a mandatory condition to avail section 115BAA and omission cannot be remedied by merely marking the ITR. Obiter - any other alternative remedies remain unaffected (expressly noted without deciding).

Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld denial of taxation under section 115BAA where Form 10-IC was not uploaded before the due date; the appellate order dismissing that ground was affirmed.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Belated filing of Form 10-IC / effect of statutory relaxations

Legal framework: Interaction of section 115BAA/Rule 21AE with temporary relaxations enacted by pandemic-era amendments (including relevant provisos and notifications) that altered timelines for filing returns and related forms.

Precedent Treatment: Coordinate-bench decisions were considered: one line of Tribunal authority held that statutory relaxation extended the permissible date for filing Form 10-IC; counter decisions held the prescribed Form 10-IC remained required to be filed by the due date for returns. The Tribunal followed the decision holding Form 10-IC must be filed within the prescribed period where it was not filed by the extended date applicable in that case.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined the timeline and concluded that for the assessment year in question the extended date for filing the return/Form 10-IC remained the operative cut-off; since the Form 10-IC was not filed by that date, the option could not be treated as validly exercised. The Tribunal declined to expand the return-timeline relaxation to permit a belated cure in the factual matrix before it.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - statutory relaxation did not, on facts before the Tribunal, validate belated filing of Form 10-IC where it remained unfiled by the operative extended date. Obiter - recognition that alternate remedies (if any) were not adjudicated and remain open.

Conclusions: Belated filing of Form 10-IC after the operative extended due date was not allowed to validate the section 115BAA option in the facts; the Tribunal refused to permit retrospective curing of the omission.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Alternate claim for 25% rate where software prevented dual selection

Legal framework: Finance Act amendments and provisions prescribing alternative lower corporate tax rates (25% or other concessional rates) linked to turnover/gross receipts thresholds; requirement of determining applicable rate by reference to statutory conditions (turnover in specified prior year).

Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal referred to prior coordinate-bench authority which, faced with similar software-induced inability to select both options in the ITR, remanded the matter to the assessing officer for factual verification and application of the correct statutory rate after hearing the assessee.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal recognized the practical constraint that the ITR software did not permit selecting both the section 115BAA option and the alternative turnover-based option; where an assessee had indicated intention (by the ITR selection) and where factual eligibility for the lower turnover-based rate was asserted, the Tribunal treated the alternate plea as meriting factual verification rather than outright technical rejection. Remand was appropriate so the assessing officer could verify relevant turnover figures and compute tax under the correctly applicable provision after affording opportunity to be heard.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - when an alternate statutory rate may apply based on verifiable turnover thresholds, the matter should be remanded to the assessing officer for factual verification and computation rather than being rejected on a technicality caused by software limitations. Obiter - the Tribunal's direction is procedural (remand for verification) and does not pre-determine the outcome of the factual enquiry.

Conclusions: The Tribunal restored the alternate plea to the file of the assessing officer, directing computation of tax at the applicable rate (including 25% if facts support) after verification and opportunity of hearing; the appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes on this ground.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Admission of additional grounds / speaking order requirement

Legal framework: Appellate principles requiring that additional grounds, if raised, be considered or that a speaking order be passed when such grounds are not admitted, to enable effective appellate challenge.

Precedent Treatment: The impugned order raised a grievance that additional grounds were not admitted and no speaking order was passed; the Tribunal's decision does not explicitly elaborate on this point beyond disposing the substantive grounds.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal did not find cause to overturn the impugned order on the basis of non-admission of additional grounds where the substantive issues before it were determinative and disposed by application of governing law and precedent. There is an implicit finding that the resolution of the principal issues rendered the admission question non-determinative of the outcome.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Obiter - absence of a detailed ruling on admission of additional grounds; not a ratio for broader principle but the Tribunal proceeded to decide merits where necessary.

Conclusions: No separate relief was granted on the procedural ground concerning admission of additional grounds; the substantive disposition addressed the material issues.

OVERALL CONCLUSION

The Tribunal affirmed denial of the section 115BAA concession where Form 10-IC was not filed by the operative due date; it declined to permit belated curing of that omission on the facts. However, the Tribunal remanded the alternate claim for taxation at the lower turnover-linked rate for verification and recomputation by the assessing officer after giving the assessee an opportunity to be heard. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes accordingly.

Issues: Whether the arbitral awards were liable to be set aside on the ground that the sole arbitrator had been appointed unilaterally from a restricted panel, contrary to the governing arbitration clause and the statutory bar under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and whether any waiver could be inferred from the petitioner's participation in the arbitral proceedings or from the recorded statement withdrawing the objection.

Analysis: The arbitration clause required the lessor to propose three names and permitted the lessee to choose the sole arbitrator from that restricted panel. Such a procedure was inconsistent with the settled law on party autonomy and impartial appointment of arbitrators. A unilateral appointment made after the lessee had expressly ed the panel was contrary to the mandate of Section 12(5) and the principles governing independence and neutrality of the arbitral tribunal. The Court held that waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5) can arise only from an express agreement in writing after disputes have arisen, and not from conduct, participation, or a statement recorded in arbitral proceedings. The ineligibility of the arbitrator went to the root of jurisdiction and rendered the resulting awards unsustainable.

Conclusion: The arbitral awards were set aside because the arbitrator was ineligible to continue as sole arbitrator, and the objection to appointment was not waived in the manner required by law.

Ratio Decidendi: An arbitrator appointed unilaterally in breach of the agreed appointment mechanism is de jure ineligible under Section 12(5), and such ineligibility can be waived only by an express agreement in writing after disputes have arisen, not by conduct or procedural participation.