Issues: Whether a writ petition can be disposed of by declining to entertain it on the ground of an efficacious alternative remedy while still granting interim protection to the petitioner; and whether such a course is permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The order reiterates that once the High Court, after applying its mind, refuses to entertain a writ petition because an efficacious alternative remedy is available and has not been pursued, the writ proceeding comes to an end. In that situation, no final relief survives for grant in the writ petition. Interim protection by way of stay of the impugned order or maintenance of status quo cannot be granted merely to facilitate recourse to the alternate forum, because such relief is only ancillary to substantive relief on merits. The order treats this position as controlled by the settled principle that interim relief cannot be used as the only and final relief under Article 226.

Conclusion: Such interim protection is impermissible when the writ petition itself is not entertained on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy, and the writ proceedings must terminate upon that refusal.

Final Conclusion: The special leave petition was not entertained, and the judgment affirms the limited reach of Article 226 where the High Court declines writ jurisdiction in favour of an alternative statutory remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim relief cannot be granted as the sole or final relief under Article 226 after the Court declines to entertain the writ petition for availability of an efficacious alternative remedy; such relief must be merely ancillary to substantive adjudication.

Issues: Whether the writ petition could be entertained in Delhi when the award, the pending challenge under Section 34, and the recovery proceedings all had their substantial connection with Agra, and whether the doctrine of forum conveniens required relegation to the court having the dominant territorial nexus.

Analysis: The territorial reach under Article 226 depends not on any isolated or slender fact, but on whether the pleaded facts form a material, essential, and integral part of the cause of action. Even where some consequence of the impugned action is felt within the forum, the High Court may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriately connected with the lis. The decision-making authority, the underlying arbitral proceedings, the pending Section 34 proceedings, and the recovery steps were all centred at Agra, while the Delhi connection was only incidental. The writ remedy, being discretionary, could not be treated as available merely because a recovery notice was received within Delhi.

Conclusion: The petition was not fit to be entertained in Delhi and the petitioner was required to pursue remedies before the court of competent jurisdiction at Agra.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking a mandamus to direct issuance of an OTS sanction letter was maintainable when the petitioner disputed the existence of the attachment said to have accompanied the email communication.

Analysis: The relief sought was for issuance of an OTS sanction letter. The communication relied upon by the petitioner stated that the sanction communication was attached, but the petitioner's grievance was that no attachment was found. In such a situation, the dispute was not one for determination in writ jurisdiction, and the appropriate remedy, if the sanction letter was not attached, lay elsewhere.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and the relief was declined.

Issues: Whether the arrest and remand of the arrestee were illegal for failure to disclose the grounds of arrest and comply with the mandatory arrest-memo requirements, and whether habeas corpus relief was maintainable.

Analysis: The arrest memo was tested against the requirements flowing from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the statutory safeguards under Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Court found that the memo did not substantially contain the grounds and supporting material required by the prescribed format, and that mere intimation of the offence, sections invoked, and arrest-related formalities did not amount to compliance with the mandate to communicate full particulars of the grounds of arrest. Non-compliance with these requirements was treated as a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing arrest and detention.

Conclusion: The arrest and consequent remand were held illegal, and habeas corpus relief was granted.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to communicate the grounds of arrest and to comply with the mandatory arrest-memo safeguards required by Article 22(1) and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 renders the arrest illegal and justifies release in habeas corpus proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether notices under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are mandatorily required in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years; (ii) Whether, in the absence of the conditions in Section 35(1)(b)(i) and Section 35(1)(b)(ii), an arrest in such cases is legally justified.

Issue (i): Whether notices under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are mandatorily required in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years

Analysis: Section 35(3) is a safeguard provision meant to operate where arrest is not required under Section 35(1). In cases punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, the provision has to be read harmoniously with Section 35(1)(b), which makes arrest discretionary and conditions it on both reason to believe and satisfaction as to necessity. The statutory scheme shows that issuance of notice is the normal course, and the notice requirement cannot be treated as optional merely because arrest power exists in exceptional situations.

Conclusion: Yes. A notice under Section 35(3) is the rule in such cases.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the absence of the conditions in Section 35(1)(b)(i) and Section 35(1)(b)(ii), an arrest in such cases is legally justified

Analysis: Arrest under Section 35(1)(b) requires the simultaneous existence of reason to believe and at least one statutory necessity under clause (ii), and even then arrest is not automatic. Where a notice has been issued and complied with, Section 35(5) prohibits arrest unless recorded reasons show that arrest is still necessary. If notice is not complied with, arrest remains a matter of discretion and must be based on materials justifying the need for custody, not on routine or subjective convenience.

Conclusion: No. In the absence of the statutory conditions, arrest is not legally justified.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme under Section 35 treats notice as the ordinary course and arrest as a narrowly confined exception, controlled by recorded necessity and constitutional safeguards of liberty.

Ratio Decidendi: In offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, arrest is not mandatory; it is permissible only when the police officer satisfies the statutory preconditions of reason to believe and necessity, and notice under Section 35(3) ordinarily governs the process unless recorded reasons justify the exceptional course of arrest.

Issues: (i) whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration in a prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 justified bail on Article 21 grounds notwithstanding Section 43D(5); (ii) whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, satisfied the prima facie true standard under Section 43D(5) qua each accused; and (iii) whether the role attributed to each appellant, including parity claims, warranted a uniform result.

Issue (i): whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration in a prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 justified bail on Article 21 grounds notwithstanding Section 43D(5).

Analysis: The Court held that delay and prolonged custody are serious constitutional concerns, but they do not automatically override the statutory restraint in special-statute prosecutions. The inquiry must be contextual and must consider the nature of the allegations, the stage of the proceedings, the causes of delay, the role attributed to the accused, and the legitimacy of continued detention. Prolonged incarceration can justify intervention only where it becomes demonstrably disproportionate and constitutionally impermissible on a cumulative assessment of the record.

Conclusion: Prolonged custody was not, by itself, sufficient to secure bail for all appellants; Article 21 did not mechanically displace Section 43D(5).

Issue (ii): whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, satisfied the prima facie true standard under Section 43D(5) qua each accused.

Analysis: The Court reiterated that Section 43D(5) requires a limited but real threshold inquiry, not a mini-trial. The material must disclose, on its face, a prima facie nexus between the accused and the alleged unlawful activity. The assessment is accused-specific and must be made on a cumulative reading of the prosecution case, without weighing evidence or deciding credibility. The statutory embargo operates where the prosecution material, accepted as it stands, reasonably indicates a prima facie true accusation.

Conclusion: The prima facie threshold was held to be attracted for Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, but not for the appellants whose roles were found to be operational, facilitative, or local in nature.

Issue (iii): whether the role attributed to each appellant, including parity claims, warranted a uniform result.

Analysis: The Court held that the prosecution itself differentiated between principal conspirators and local or executory participants. Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam were treated as occupying central, formative and strategic roles, while Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed were found to be associated with site-level mobilisation, funding, logistics, or execution. Parity could not be invoked mechanically; it depends on similarity of role and material. On the facts, the latter group was held entitled to bail subject to stringent conditions, while the former group remained within the statutory bar.

Conclusion: Bail was declined to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam and granted to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed.

Final Conclusion: The Court applied an accused-specific and cumulative approach under the special bail regime, balancing Article 21 against the statutory restrictions, and ultimately granted bail only to those appellants whose roles were found to be non-central and operational, while refusing bail to the two appellants found to have prima facie central roles in the alleged conspiracy.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under a special statute, prolonged incarceration is only a trigger for heightened scrutiny and does not by itself displace the statutory bar on bail; the deciding factor remains whether, on a cumulative and accused-specific assessment of the material, the prosecution case is prima facie true.

Issues: (i) Whether bail could be granted solely on the ground of parity with a co-accused. (ii) Whether a bail order that does not disclose relevant reasons or consider material factors can be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether bail could be granted solely on the ground of parity with a co-accused.

Analysis: Parity is not a standalone entitlement to bail. It operates with reference to the role, position, and factual similarity of the accused in relation to the offence. Mere participation in the same occurrence does not establish parity where the roles are different. Bail decisions must consider the nature of the accusation and the specific role attributed to the applicant.

Conclusion: Bail cannot be granted solely on the basis of parity when the accused does not stand on the same footing as the co-accused.

Issue (ii): Whether a bail order that does not disclose relevant reasons or consider material factors can be sustained.

Analysis: An order granting bail must reflect application of mind and consideration of relevant factors such as the gravity of the offence, the role of the accused, and other circumstances bearing on the exercise of discretion. An order bereft of reasons, or one that fails to engage with the material considerations, cannot be allowed to stand. Where the defect is confined to the order of grant of bail and the matter requires reconsideration, remand to the High Court is appropriate.

Conclusion: A bail order lacking relevant reasons and consideration of material factors is unsustainable and may be set aside, with the bail question remitted for fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The appeal concerning one accused was allowed and bail was set aside, while the connected appeal was set aside and remitted for fresh consideration on proper principles. The overall effect is that parity alone is insufficient for bail and reasoned consideration remains essential.

Ratio Decidendi: Parity in bail depends on comparable role and position in the offence, and a bail order must show application of mind to the relevant factors before it can be sustained.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether an Investigating Agency has power under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to attach or debit freeze a bank account merely because amounts suspected to be linked to a cyber fraud are credited to that account.

(ii) Whether, and in what manner, debit-freezing/attachment of a bank account suspected to contain "proceeds of crime" is required to be undertaken under the BNSS, including the role of Section 107 and the Magistrate's authority.

(iii) Whether banks may debit freeze accounts on their own or upon investigative communications not amounting to a competent freezing/attachment order, and what is the permissible course indicated by the Court.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Power of Investigating Agency to debit freeze/attach under Section 106 BNSS

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 106 of the BNSS (treated as akin to the earlier seizure provision) and contrasted it with Section 107 BNSS (dealing with attachment/forfeiture/restoration). The Court relied on, and applied, the reasoning adopted in an identical context that Section 106 concerns "seizure" during investigation and does not confer authority to attach/debit freeze an account as proceeds of crime.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted the distinction that seizure under Section 106 is meant to secure evidence and can be done by the police with an ex post facto report to the Magistrate, whereas attachment (including measures aimed at securing "proceeds of crime" by preventing disposal) falls within Section 107 and requires Magistrate's order. The Court treated debit freezing of a bank account as an attachment-type measure rather than a mere investigative seizure.

Conclusion: The Court conclusively held that debit freezing/attachment of a bank account is not permissible under Section 106 BNSS; therefore, the Investigating Agency has no power under Section 106 to attach or debit freeze accounts.

Issue (ii): Proper route under BNSS for debit freezing/attachment of accounts suspected to contain proceeds of crime

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 107 BNSS as the provision enabling attachment of property believed to be derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity or commission of an offence, upon approaching the jurisdictional Magistrate.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court endorsed the mechanism that the investigating officer must move the jurisdictional Magistrate for attachment; the Magistrate may order attachment after hearing parties or may issue an interim attachment order where notice would defeat the purpose. The Court accepted that subsequent steps concerning confirmation of proceeds of crime and distribution/restoration are to follow the Magistrate's process contemplated under Section 107.

Conclusion: The Court held that the Investigating Agency may proceed under Section 107 BNSS to debit freeze or attach a bank account, i.e., only through Magistrate-authorised attachment, not by unilateral action under Section 106.

Issue (iii): Legality of banks debit freezing accounts without a competent freezing/attachment order; permissible course

Legal framework: The Court took note of the "Citizen Financial Cyber Frauds Reporting and Management System" and its guidance indicating that banks/intermediaries may place the disputed amount on lien on the basis of acknowledgement details, enabling later refund after investigation, but this does not equate to debit freezing the entire account. The Court also considered the factual position that in several matters there was no clear investigative communication placed showing an instruction to debit freeze, making it unclear how the banks debit froze the accounts.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that banks should not proceed to debit freeze accounts merely upon communications that do not specifically require debit freezing by a competent authority, particularly when the lawful framework differentiates between lien on disputed amounts and account-wide debit freeze/attachment requiring appropriate authority. The Court recognized that wrongful debit freezing can cause day-to-day losses and expressly permitted affected persons to seek compensation through appropriate proceedings, to be decided on merits.

Conclusion: The Court directed that banks should act in terms of the stated management system unless there is a specific debit-freezing order by a competent authority; and it left open compensation claims to be pursued separately on merits.

Final operative determination (material to outcome): Since the impugned debit freezes were imposed under Section 106 BNSS, the Court held them unlawful and quashed and set aside the Investigating Agency's orders debit freezing the concerned accounts, allowing the petitions to that extent.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 of BNSS 2023 (formerly Section 50 CrPC) require that grounds of arrest be furnished in writing in every case, including offences under the general penal code.

2. Whether non-communication in writing of grounds of arrest at or immediately after arrest vitiates the arrest in all circumstances, or whether exceptions exist where oral communication followed by subsequent written supply suffices.

3. If exceptions exist, what is the permissible timeframe and manner for supplying written grounds of arrest so as to satisfy Article 22(1) and the statutory mandate; and what is the remedial consequence of non-compliance.

4. Ancillary questions considered: (a) whether the grounds must be in a language understood by the arrestee; (b) the role of informing relatives/friends under Section 48 BNSS 2023 (formerly Section 50A CrPC) and the magistrate's duty to satisfy compliance; and (c) the effects of an unconstitutional arrest on subsequent remand/orders and filing of charge-sheet.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Constitutional and statutory requirement to furnish grounds of arrest in writing in every case

Legal framework: Article 22(1) guarantees that an arrested person shall be informed "as soon as may be" of the grounds for arrest and shall have the right to consult a legal practitioner. Section 47 BNSS 2023 (formerly s.50 CrPC) imposes a duty on the arresting person to "forthwith communicate" full particulars of the offence or other grounds for arrest. Section 48 BNSS 2023 (formerly s.50A CrPC) requires informing a nominated relative/friend and the magistrate to satisfy compliance.

Precedent treatment: Earlier Supreme Court decisions (including the judgment in Pankaj Bansal and the subsequent Prabir Purkayastha) held that, to serve the purpose of Article 22(1), grounds of arrest should be furnished in writing as a matter of course and without exception; other precedents (notably Vihaan Kumar) recognised practical difficulties and did not read a rigid statutory mandate for written communication in every situation.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reasoned that the constitutional mandate is mandatory and not statute-specific: its object is to enable the arrested person to understand allegations, consult counsel, oppose remand and seek bail. Written communication in a language understood by the arrestee best serves that object by eliminating disputes about compliance, facilitating counsel's preparation, and preserving dignity and liberty. The Court harmonised earlier authorities by reaffirming the general rule in favour of written communication while acknowledging operational realities.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - the constitutional duty to inform grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences and must, as a general rule, be communicated in writing in a language the arrestee understands. Obiter - observations describing the stigmatic and psychological impacts of arrest and policy remarks about police practices beyond immediate legal prescriptions.

Conclusions: The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrested person in each and every case and in a language understood by him/her, to effectuate Article 22(1) and Section 47 BNSS 2023, subject to the nuanced temporal exceptions addressed below.

Issue 2 - Whether non-communication in writing at the time of arrest always vitiates the arrest; permissible exceptions

Legal framework: Article 22(1)'s phrase "as soon as may be" permits temporal flexibility; Section 47 BNSS 2023 requires "forthwith" communication. No express statutory timetable or mandatory mode is prescribed in the statute.

Precedent treatment: Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha emphasised written communication generally and treated non-compliance as vitiating arrest; Vihaan Kumar emphasised practical difficulty and observed written communication may not be possible in every situation.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reconciled authorities by distinguishing routine/documentary arrests from exigent, flagrante delicto situations. Where the arresting agency already possesses documentary material or the circumstances permit, written grounds must be furnished on arrest. Where immediacy of arrest is compelled by the nature of the offence (e.g., offences committed in the presence of police, imminent risk of absconding or further harm), oral communication at arrest is permissible provided a written copy is supplied subsequently within a defined reasonable interval. The Court balanced constitutional safeguards with legitimate operational exigencies of law enforcement.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - non-supply of written grounds at arrest does not ipso facto vitiate arrest if (i) oral grounds are provided at arrest due to exigency and (ii) written grounds are furnished within the prescribed reasonable timeframe; Obiter - illustrative examples of exigent scenarios and policy comments about police efficiency.

Conclusions: Non-communication in writing at the moment of arrest will not automatically vitiate the arrest where exigent circumstances necessitate immediate action and oral communication is given; but written grounds must follow within the temporal limits set by the Court (see Issue 3). In non-exigent situations the written grounds must be furnished upon arrest.

Issue 3 - Permissible timeframe, manner and remedial consequence of non-compliance

Legal framework: Derived from Article 22(1), Section 47 and Section 48 BNSS 2023 together with remand provisions (Section 187 BNSS 2023 formerly s.167 CrPC) and judicial duty to scrutinise remand applications.

Interpretation and reasoning: To make the right meaningful, the Court prescribes that where written grounds could not be supplied immediately due to exigency, a written copy must be provided within a reasonable time and in any event not later than two hours prior to production before the magistrate for remand proceedings. The two-hour minimum is founded on ensuring counsel has adequate time to review and prepare to oppose remand and to preserve the practical ability to exercise rights. Remand papers must contain the grounds and, if there is delay, a note explaining the cause for the magistrate's information.

Precedent treatment: This calibrated temporal rule reconciles Pankaj Bansal/Prabir Purkayastha (emphasis on written grounds) with Vihaan Kumar (recognition of practical exceptions) by setting a concrete deadline consistent with Article 22(1)'s "as soon as may be".

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - written grounds must be supplied in the language understood by the arrestee and, if not delivered at arrest for valid reasons, must be supplied not later than two hours before remand hearing; failure to comply renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal; Obiter - guidance about magistrate's expeditious disposal of applications after release and procedural entries at the police station.

Conclusions: Written grounds must be supplied before remand within the two-hour pre-production threshold where immediate written supply was impractical; non-adherence to this schedule vitiates arrest and remand and entitles the arrested person to be released. Following release, custody/remand may be sought again only after written grounds are supplied and the magistrate adjudicates any fresh remand application expeditiously.

Issue 4 - Language, informing relatives/friends, magistrate's duties, and effect of unconstitutional arrest on subsequent proceedings

Legal framework and precedent: Harikisan and subsequent authorities require communication in a language and script the detenue/arrestee understands; Section 48 BNSS 2023 mandates informing a nominated relative/friend and keeping a station record; magistrate must satisfy himself about compliance.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized that communication in a language not understood by the arrestee defeats Article 22(1)'s purpose. Section 48's duty to inform relatives/friends and the magistrate's supervisory role are complementary safeguards to ensure prompt access to legal assistance. An arrest rendered unconstitutional by non-compliance cannot be validated retroactively by filing of a charge-sheet or subsequent cognizance; continued custody based on void arrest/remand is rendered unlawful.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - grounds must be in language understood by the arrestee; arrest rendered unconstitutional by breach of Article 22(1)/s.47 cannot be cured by subsequent procedural acts such as charge-sheet or cognizance; magistrate has duty to ensure statutory requirements are fulfilled; Obiter - observations on stigma, mental health and social impact of arrest.

Conclusions: Grounds must be in an understandable language; arresting officers must inform nominated persons and record compliance; magistrates must verify compliance; and an unconstitutional arrest/remand is not validated by later prosecutorial steps.

Supplementary/Concurred Position

A judge supplemented the opinion to reiterate that the written communication requirement extends equally to informing nominated relatives/friends so as to operationalize early legal assistance; the supplement underscored the purpose of Section 48 BNSS 2023 in empowering third parties to secure prompt legal relief for the arrested person.

Net Holding / Practical Directions

i) Grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing in each and every case and in a language understood by the arrestee as the general rule.

ii) In true exigencies where immediate arrest is necessary, oral communication is permissible at arrest but a written copy must be supplied within a reasonable time and in any event not later than two hours before production for remand; remand papers must record grounds and explain any delay.

iii) Failure to comply with the above will render the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the arrested person to release; remedial applications for custody/remand may be heard afresh post-supply of written grounds.

Issues: (i) Whether, on admitted execution of the cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose and were rebutted by the accused; (ii) whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, could upset concurrent findings of conviction in the absence of perversity; (iii) whether the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged cash-transaction violation under Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 destroyed the existence of a legally enforceable debt; and (iv) whether the accused's defence of issuance of a signed blank cheque and the non-reply to statutory notice displaced liability.

Issue (i): Whether, on admitted execution of the cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose and were rebutted by the accused.

Analysis: Once the cheque and signature were admitted, the statutory presumptions that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt arose. The presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable, but the initial burden lies on the accused to raise a probable defence. The accused did not adduce independent evidence or documents to show that the cheque was not issued towards liability, and the material brought on record did not establish rebuttal of the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 operated in favour of the complainant and were not rebutted.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, could upset concurrent findings of conviction in the absence of perversity.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is limited and does not authorise reappreciation of evidence to disturb concurrent factual findings unless those findings are perverse or suffer from jurisdictional error. The Trial Court and the Sessions Court had both accepted the complainant's case and found the accused guilty. No perversity was shown so as to justify revisional interference.

Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact.

Issue (iii): Whether the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged cash-transaction violation under Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 destroyed the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: The complainant's evidence, read as a whole, did not show incapacity to advance the loan. The accused failed to produce convincing material to establish that the complainant lacked means. A breach of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 attracts penalty under Section 271D of that Act, but the statute does not declare the transaction void or unenforceable. Therefore, such a breach does not by itself defeat a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or negate the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The complainant's financial capacity was not disproved, and a Section 269SS violation did not render the debt legally unenforceable.

Issue (iv): Whether the accused's defence of issuance of a signed blank cheque and the non-reply to statutory notice displaced liability.

Analysis: The defence that a signed blank cheque had been issued merely to facilitate a bank loan was found improbable on the facts. The accused also failed to reply to the statutory notice and took no prompt legal action after receiving notice, which supported the complainant's version. The absence of a reply and the lack of any supporting action or material weakened the defence and reinforced liability.

Conclusion: The defence was not accepted, and non-reply to the notice supported the complainant's case.

Final Conclusion: The impugned acquittal was set aside, the conviction and concurrent findings were restored, and the complainant succeeded with the monetary directions and broader procedural guidelines issued for cheque dishonour cases.

Ratio Decidendi: On admitted execution of a cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise and can be displaced only by a probable defence supported by material on record; revisional interference with concurrent findings is impermissible absent perversity, and a violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not by itself render the underlying debt unenforceable for the purposes of Section 138.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether a notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is valid when the amount demanded in the notice differs from the amount stated on the dishonoured cheque.

2. Whether a plea that the discrepancy in the amount stated in the statutory notice is a typographical or inadvertent error can cure the non-compliance and render the notice valid.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Validity of notice when amount demanded differs from cheque amount

Legal framework: Section 138 creates a penal offence for dishonour of cheque and makes the proviso conditions (a), (b) and (c) mandatory preconditions for prosecuting the offence; proviso (b) requires that the payee "makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money" within the prescribed period.

Precedent treatment: The Court relied on established jurisprudence holding that the phrase "said amount" in proviso (b) refers to the cheque amount and that a statutory notice must specifically demand the sum covered by the dishonoured cheque. Prior decisions have consistently required strict and literal compliance with the proviso, while allowing that separately stated additional claims (interest, costs) may be severable only if the cheque amount is expressly demanded.

Interpretation and reasoning: Reading Section 138 as a whole, the words "said amount" link to "any amount of money" in the substantive portion; thus the proviso's demand must be for the exact cheque amount. The provision being penal and technical mandates strict construction; the statutory scheme shows the legislature intended the demand in the notice to be identical to the cheque amount so as to give the drawer a clear, specific opportunity to remedy the exact liability covered by the cheque.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A valid notice under proviso (b) must demand the very amount of the dishonoured cheque; divergence in amount is fatal. Obiter - Clarification that separately claimed incidental charges may be severable only when the cheque amount itself is correctly and expressly demanded.

Conclusions: If the amount stated in the demand notice is different from the cheque amount, the notice does not satisfy proviso (b) and is invalid; non-compliance with this mandatory ingredient renders proceedings under Section 138 unsustainable.

Issue 2 - Role of typographical/inadvertent error plea in curing discrepancy

Legal framework: Penal statutes are to be construed strictly; conditions in provisos to Section 138 are mandatory and not susceptible to implied compliance. The integrity of the notice requirement is essential to the statutory scheme; thus, errors affecting the demanded amount engage strict technical scrutiny.

Precedent treatment: Prior authorities have repeatedly refused to permit typographical mistakes or asserted inadvertence to validate notices where the demanded amount did not correspond to the cheque amount. Courts have distinguished cases where the cheque amount is correctly specified and incidental demands are separately itemised from those where the primary demanded amount is incorrect or ambiguous.

Interpretation and reasoning: The strictness of penal construction means courts cannot rewrite the notice or supply missing or corrected figures on the basis of an asserted slip. Even where cheque particulars are otherwise described, an incorrect stated amount creates ambiguity as to the "said amount" and therefore defeats the statutory requirement. Repetition of the same erroneous amount in multiple notices strengthens the conclusion that the discrepancy is not a one-off slip but a defect in the notice.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A claim of typographical or inadvertent error cannot validate a notice where the demanded amount differs from the cheque amount; such error is fatal to proviso (b) compliance. Obiter - Emphasis that errors limited to non-material particulars (e.g., peripheral typographical errors not affecting the cheque amount) are distinct but must not be conflated with errors in the demanded sum.

Conclusions: A plea of typographical or inadvertent error cannot cure a notice that demands an amount different from the cheque amount; the notice remains invalid and proceedings under Section 138 cannot be sustained on that basis.

Ancillary points and applied principles

1. The requirement to make demand for the "said amount" is an essential ingredient of the offence and not a mere formality; compliance must be literal and precise.

2. The doctrine of reading a notice "as a whole" does not permit relaxation of the mandatory requirement that the cheque amount be specifically demanded; general references to cheque particulars do not substitute for an explicit demand of the cheque sum.

3. The strict construction canon for penal statutes governs interpretation here: courts must ensure that the offence charged falls within the plain and literal meaning of the statutory language and cannot expand the provision to cover mistakes or omissions inconsistent with the text.

Cross-reference: Issues 1 and 2 operate conjunctively - invalidity of a notice for wrong amount (Issue 1) is not remedied by an asserted typographical error (Issue 2); both lead to the inescapable consequence that prosecution under Section 138 must fail when the statutory demand is defective.

Final conclusion

Given the mandatory and technical nature of proviso (b) to Section 138 and the requirement that the demand be for the exact cheque amount, a notice demanding an amount different from the cheque amount is invalid; a contention that the discrepancy arose from typographical inadvertence does not cure the defect. Consequently, proceedings predicated on such defective notice cannot be maintained.

Issues: Whether the inspection, search and seizure conducted under Section 15 of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, without a prior warrant and without recording reasons to believe, was lawful and whether the consequential notices and orders could be sustained.

Analysis: Section 15 of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 authorises entry, search, inspection and seizure only where the officer has reason to believe, based on information or personal knowledge, that an offence has been or is likely to be committed. The provision also requires compliance with the search-and-seizure safeguards contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The expression "premises" under Section 2(n) is wide enough to include warehouses and other business locations, and the fact that a place may be open during business hours does not dispense with statutory safeguards. The Court held that the general provisions relating to searches, including Sections 100(4) and 100(5) and the requirement of independent respectable witnesses, applied to the case. It further held that the officer must record reasons to believe before undertaking the search and before seizing goods, and that a warrant is ordinarily required unless a valid statutory exception is shown. On the facts, no warrant was obtained, no reasons were recorded, and the witness requirement was not satisfied. The simultaneous seizure and compounding notices, issued without the required foundation, also reflected non-application of mind. The alleged defect in packaging declarations was treated as, at most, technical and did not cure the illegality in the search and seizure process.

Conclusion: The search, seizure and consequential proceedings were illegal and unsustainable, and the relief granted to the appellant was justified.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute incorporates Cr.P.C. safeguards for search and seizure, strict compliance with the requirement of reasons to believe, warrant procedure and independent witnesses is mandatory, and non-compliance vitiates the action and its consequences.

Issues: (i) the meaning and import of the expression "within such period" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963; (ii) the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an order condoning delay; and (iii) whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal.

Issue (i): the meaning and import of the expression "within such period" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Analysis: Section 5 permits admission of an appeal or application after the prescribed period only if sufficient cause is shown for not preferring it within such period. The expression "within such period" was interpreted in the setting of the provision as referring to the entire period commencing from the time limitation begins to run and continuing until the actual filing, not merely to the delay after expiry of limitation. The provision was held to require an explanation for the whole continuum of delay, while still leaving room for a justice-oriented and context-sensitive evaluation of sufficiency of cause.

Conclusion: "Within such period" covers the entire period of default up to the date of filing, and sufficient cause must be shown for that full period.

Issue (ii): the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an order condoning delay

Analysis: An order condoning delay is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on relevant material and in accordance with law. Appellate interference is warranted where the order is vitiated by absence of sufficient cause, non-consideration of relevant facts, reliance on extraneous considerations, or a view that is plainly unreasonable, arbitrary, or perverse. The appellate court does not sit to prefer one plausible view over another merely because it would have reached a different conclusion.

Conclusion: Appellate interference is justified where the discretion to condone delay is exercised on untenable grounds or contrary to law.

Issue (iii): whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal

Analysis: The explanation furnished by the respondent was found to disclose gross administrative lethargy rather than a bona fide and sufficient cause. The Court held that bureaucratic delay, inaction of officials, and reliance on the supposed merits of the underlying dispute do not by themselves justify condonation, especially where the delay is inordinate. The High Court was held to have erred in treating the merits of the case and the respondent's internal lapses as a sufficient basis to extend limitation.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in condoning the delay.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order condoning delay was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and execution of the decree was directed to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, condonation of delay requires a bona fide and sufficient explanation for the entire period of delay, and appellate interference is warranted where the discretion to condone is exercised on irrelevant, arbitrary, or legally untenable grounds.

Issues: Whether the canteen workers were employees of the Bank and whether their termination on closure of the canteen gave them a right to reinstatement with back wages.

Analysis: The decisive enquiry was whether an employer-employee relationship existed between the Bank and the canteen workers. The governing indicators included who appointed the workers, who paid them, who had disciplinary power, continuity of service, and the extent of control and supervision. The Bank had provided infrastructure and subsidies, but the canteen was set up and run through the Society, which engaged the workers. Mere financial assistance, provision of facilities, or monitoring of subsidy utilisation did not by itself establish a contract of service. The authorities on canteen workers show that a canteen becomes part of the establishment only where there is statutory or other legal obligation to maintain it, or where the employer exercises effective and complete administrative control over its running and over the workers. On the facts, the Bank had no direct role in recruitment, discipline, or management of the canteen staff, and the Society retained the operational control.

Conclusion: The canteen workers were not employees of the Bank, and the finding of master-servant relationship was unsustainable. The order of reinstatement with back wages could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of statutory obligation or effective and complete control over the canteen workers, provision of infrastructure and subsidy for a canteen does not by itself create an employer-employee relationship between the principal establishment and the workers engaged by the society or intermediary running the canteen.

Issues: (i) Whether an interim bail application in a case governed by the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 lies directly before the High Court without first approaching the Special Court; (ii) Whether bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 can be granted solely on the ground of delay in trial.

Issue (i): Whether an interim bail application in a case governed by the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 lies directly before the High Court without first approaching the Special Court.

Analysis: Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 makes an appeal to the High Court lie from an order of the Special Court, and the original bail application has to be moved before the Special Court in the first instance. The statutory scheme and the binding clarification relied upon by the Court distinguish between the forum for the original bail request and the forum for the appeal. Since the application was moved directly before the High Court without exhausting the remedy before the Special Court, the application did not satisfy the statutory route.

Conclusion: The interim bail application was not maintainable before the High Court and was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 can be granted solely on the ground of delay in trial.

Analysis: Section 43D(5) imposes a special bail restriction and requires the Court to examine whether the accusation is prima facie true on the basis of the case diary and the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court applied the settled principle that the embargo under the provision cannot be bypassed merely by pointing to delay or long incarceration; the constitutional right to speedy trial may be relevant, but only in a case where the delay is not attributable to the accused and the material on record otherwise justifies release. On the facts, the Court found that the delay in the trial was substantially occasioned by adjournments and conduct attributable to the accused side, and the appellant had not pressed the merits of the accusation so as to enable a prima facie assessment in his favour.

Conclusion: Bail could not be granted solely on the ground of delay in trial, and the rejection of bail was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the interim bail request was not maintainable and, in any event, the delay-based plea did not displace the statutory embargo governing bail under the UAPA on the facts of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, delay in trial by itself does not justify bail unless the Court can also conclude, on the material in the case diary and charge-sheet, that the accusation is not prima facie true and the constitutional delay is not substantially attributable to the accused.

Issues: (i) Whether the documents comprising agreement to sell, general power of attorney, receipt, affidavit and registered will conferred valid title over the immovable property; (ii) Whether the plaintiff could claim protection under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Issue (i): Whether the documents comprising agreement to sell, general power of attorney, receipt, affidavit and registered will conferred valid title over the immovable property.

Analysis: A sale of immovable property of the requisite value can be effected only by a registered deed of conveyance. An agreement to sell does not by itself create any interest or charge in the property, and a general power of attorney is only an instrument of agency and not a transfer of title. A will operates only after the death of the testator and must be proved in accordance with law by compliance with the statutory requirements of attestation and proof. The will relied upon was not proved as required by law, and the surrounding circumstances remained suspicious and unexplained. The affidavit and receipt also did not amount to conveyance of title.

Conclusion: The documents did not confer valid title on the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiff could claim protection under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Analysis: Protection under the doctrine of part performance is available only when the transferee has taken or continued possession in part performance of a written contract and satisfies the other statutory conditions. Since the plaintiff himself had sought possession, the record did not establish that he was in possession of the whole suit property so as to attract the doctrine.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of section 53A.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the plaintiff's suit stood dismissed, while the rights of the second defendant were left protected to the extent indicated in the judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: Title in immovable property passes only by a registered conveyance, a power of attorney does not transfer title, and statutory protection under part performance is unavailable without the requisite possession and compliance with the governing requirements for that defence.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court's order granting bail was liable to be set aside for non-application of mind, disregard of material factors, and premature appreciation of evidence in a grave offence case; (ii) Whether the alleged delay or defect in furnishing the grounds of arrest, by itself, justified grant of bail.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court's order granting bail was liable to be set aside for non-application of mind, disregard of material factors, and premature appreciation of evidence in a grave offence case.

Analysis: The power to interfere with a bail order is available where the order is perverse, unjustified, or passed by ignoring relevant considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offence, the prima facie material collected during investigation, and the possibility of interference with the trial. At the bail stage, the court is not expected to conduct a mini-trial or record findings on credibility of witnesses or the merits of the prosecution case. The impugned order was found to have gone beyond a prima facie assessment by evaluating witness statements, forensic material, and the prosecution theory in a manner reserved for trial, while also minimizing the seriousness of the alleged conspiracy, abduction, torture, and murder.

Conclusion: Yes. The bail order was unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged delay or defect in furnishing the grounds of arrest, by itself, justified grant of bail.

Analysis: The constitutional and statutory requirements only mandate that the arrested person be informed of the grounds of arrest; they do not prescribe a rigid form in every case. A procedural lapse, without demonstrable prejudice, does not automatically render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail. The record was treated as showing that the accused were aware of the accusations and were represented from the outset, and the High Court erred in treating the alleged defect as determinative while overlooking the seriousness of the charge and the prima facie material.

Conclusion: No. The alleged procedural lapse did not justify the grant of bail.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the bail orders were annulled, and the accused were directed to be taken back into custody, with the observations confined to the bail question alone.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against bail in a serious offence, an order may be set aside if it is perverse or based on non-application of mind or irrelevant considerations, but a procedural lapse in communicating arrest grounds does not warrant bail absent shown prejudice.

Issues: Whether the order granting regular bail was liable to be set aside for non-consideration of relevant factors, including the gravity of the allegations, the accused's conduct during investigation, and the likelihood of influencing the trial.

Analysis: An appeal against grant of bail stands on a different footing from an application for cancellation of bail. While post-release conduct is ordinarily relevant in cancellation proceedings, an appellate court can interfere where the bail order is illegal, perverse, arbitrary, or based on irrelevant or ignored material. In deciding whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion, the relevant considerations include the seriousness of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the possibility of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, and the overall impact on the fairness of the trial. On the facts, the accused had remained absconding, non-bailable warrants were issued, a reward was announced for information about his whereabouts, serious allegations of abduction and assault with deadly weapons were made, one victim died, and the record indicated witness hostility and potential influence.

Conclusion: The grant of bail was found to be unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: An order granting bail may be interfered with in appeal if the court below ignored material factors or acted illegally, perversely, or arbitrarily; the seriousness of the offence and the possibility of interference with the trial are relevant at the stage of appeal against grant of bail.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1.1 Whether an intra-court appeal (Letters Patent Appeal) lay against a Single Judge's order passed in contempt proceedings, where the order (a) held the appellants guilty of contempt, and (b) simultaneously determined substantive service rights of the respondent, including entitlement to promotion to the rank of IG.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

2.1 Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal against Single Judge's contempt order involving determination of substantive rights

Legal framework

2.1.1 The Court referred to the principles summarised in paragraph 11 of the decision in "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. and Others v. Chunilal Nanda and Others", particularly:

2.1.1.1 An appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 lies only against an order imposing punishment for contempt (para 11.I).

2.1.1.2 Directions or decisions made in contempt proceedings on the merits of the dispute between parties are not in exercise of the "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and are not appealable under Section 19 (para 11.IV).

2.1.1.3 However, if in contempt proceedings the High Court decides any issue or makes any direction relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, such order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal where available (para 11.V).

Interpretation and reasoning

2.1.2 The Court noted that the Single Judge's order dated 2 June 2023 did two distinct things:

2.1.2.1 It held the appellants (then respondents) guilty of contempt for willful disobedience of the Division Bench's judgment dated 24 December 2019 in respect of pay fixation, seniority and consequential benefits including promotion (para 39).

2.1.2.2 It effectively crystallised a substantive service right by proceeding on the basis that the respondent was entitled to promotion to the rank of IG, at least with effect from 2021, and granted six weeks' time to issue a fresh order granting such promotion to bring him at par with his immediate junior (para 41 read with para 38-39).

2.1.3 The Court emphasised that the finding of willful disobedience (contempt) was immediately preceded by the recording of the respondent's submission claiming entitlement to promotions up to the rank of IG from 2021 till retirement, and was followed by a direction to issue an order granting promotion to the rank of IG. On a plain reading, this meant that the Single Judge had gone beyond merely determining contempt and had adjudicated on substantive rights relating to promotion.

2.1.4 The Division Bench, in dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal as not maintainable, had proceeded on the understanding that:

2.1.4.1 No punishment for contempt had been imposed, and therefore no appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act was maintainable.

2.1.4.2 The Single Judge's observations were only for determining whether there was willful disobedience and did not crystallise any rights or obligations between the parties (paras 52-53).

2.1.5 The Court held that the Division Bench erred by confining its analysis only to Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and by relying on the respondent's submission about how the Single Judge's order should be "understood", instead of examining the order on its own terms.

2.1.6 Applying the principles in "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd.", the Court drew a distinction between:

2.1.6.1 The aspect of the Single Judge's order which related to holding the appellants guilty of contempt-appealable under Section 19 only upon imposition of punishment.

2.1.6.2 The aspect relating to adjudication of the respondent's entitlement to promotion to the rank of IG-constituting a determination of the merits of the underlying service dispute, which was amenable to challenge in an intra-court appeal (Letters Patent Appeal) in terms of para 11(V) of the precedent.

2.1.7 The Court clarified that the question whether an intra-court appeal lies must be determined by the true character and content of the Single Judge's order, not by later submissions seeking to limit its effect. Since the Single Judge's order had clearly crystallised a right to promotion and issued a direction to grant IG rank, that part of the order was appealable intra-court.

Conclusions

2.1.8 An appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act is not maintainable in the absence of an order imposing punishment for contempt; to that extent, the contempt finding alone was not appealable under Section 19 at this stage.

2.1.9 However, where, in contempt proceedings, a Single Judge adjudicates or crystallises substantive rights between the parties-such as directing promotion to a particular rank-such part of the order is not an exercise of "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and is amenable to an intra-court appeal (Letters Patent Appeal), in line with para 11(V) of "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd.".

2.1.10 The Division Bench erred in holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable and in treating the Single Judge's order as not deciding any dispute about rights and obligations other than contempt.

2.1.11 The impugned order of the Division Bench dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal for want of maintainability was set aside, and the Letters Patent Appeal, along with associated applications, was restored to the file of the Division Bench for consideration on merits, with all contentions of the parties kept open and a direction for expeditious disposal.

Issues: (i) Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt; (ii) whether a debt arising from a cash transaction above Rs. 20,000 in violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be treated as a legally enforceable debt; (iii) whether the accused rebutted the presumption and whether the complainant proved a legally enforceable debt on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: Section 138, read with its Explanation, treats the expression "debt or other liability" as a legally enforceable debt or liability. Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of the cheque received it for discharge of such debt or liability. The earlier view that the presumption did not extend to legally enforceable debt was held to be overridden by the later authoritative interpretation relied on by the Court.

Conclusion: Yes. The presumption under Section 139 covers legally enforceable debt.

Issue (ii): Whether a debt arising from a cash transaction above Rs. 20,000 in violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be treated as a legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: Section 269SS prohibits acceptance of loans, deposits, or specified sums above the statutory threshold otherwise than through prescribed banking modes, and Section 271D provides for penalty for contravention, subject to the reasonable-cause protection in Section 273B. The Court held that a transaction in cash beyond the statutory limit, when unsupported by a valid explanation, cannot be treated as a legally enforceable debt for the purpose of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The criminal process cannot be used to validate an illegal cash transaction or defeat the policy of curbing unaccounted cash dealings.

Conclusion: No. Such a cash-based illegal transaction is not a legally enforceable debt unless a valid explanation is established.

Issue (iii): Whether the accused rebutted the presumption and whether the complainant proved a legally enforceable debt on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The complainant admitted that the amount was paid in cash and gave no satisfactory explanation consistent with the statutory scheme. The Court found that the accused raised a probable defence sufficient to displace the statutory presumption on a preponderance of probabilities. On the evidence, the complainant failed to establish that the alleged liability was legally enforceable.

Conclusion: The presumption stood rebutted and the complainant failed to prove a legally enforceable debt.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were set aside and the revision petitioner was acquitted, with consequential reliefs flowing from the acquittal.

Ratio Decidendi: A cheque issued towards a liability arising from an unaccounted cash transaction contrary to Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not enforceable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 unless a valid statutory explanation is shown, and the presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities.