Issues: (i) Whether the appellants required leave to appeal against the order passed on their intervention applications; (ii) Whether the appellants could intervene in, and seek recall of an order passed in, a disposed writ petition.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants required leave to appeal against the order passed on their intervention applications.

Analysis: The appellants were applicants before the writ court and were parties to the impugned order determining their applications. The principles governing leave to appeal by a stranger to an order did not apply to persons whose own applications had been adjudicated.

Conclusion: The appellants were not required to obtain leave to maintain the appeals.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants could intervene in, and seek recall of an order passed in, a disposed writ petition.

Analysis: The appellants had ceased to be directors, demonstrated no tangible subsisting right affected by the writ order, and relied only on apprehensions arising from collateral disputes. A court that has finally disposed of a writ petition is functus officio; intervention in such concluded proceedings was consequently unavailable. Since intervention failed, no occasion arose to consider recall on merits.

Conclusion: The appellants were neither necessary nor proper parties and could not intervene or seek recall in the disposed writ petitions; this finding is against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The rejection of the intervention applications stands, without prejudice to any independent remedy available before the appropriate forum in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A person asserting no demonstrated subsisting right cannot intervene in a finally disposed writ proceeding, since the writ court is functus officio after final adjudication.

Issues: Whether transfers of shares by the Trust and individual shareholders to outsiders, without complying with the pre-emptive procedure in the Articles of Association, were valid.

Analysis: A private company may restrict share transfers through its Articles of Association. Article 15 required a shareholder intending to transfer shares to notify the Board, which was to act as agent for sale to existing members at an agreed or auditor-certified fair value. The transfers in question were not covered by the exceptions in Article 28. No requisite notice was given, the Board did not act as selling agent, no offer was made to existing members, and the prescribed valuation process was not followed. The restriction and pre-emptive right applied uniformly to shares held by the Trust and by individual shareholders. Objections to the transfers and the absence of the prescribed process precluded any finding of conscious waiver or acquiescence.

Conclusion: The transfers of both the Trust's shares and the individual shareholders' shares were void for non-compliance with Article 15. The company must reverse the transfers, rectify its registers and consequential records, and may reconsider sale of the shares only in accordance with the prescribed pre-emptive procedure; directors appointed solely on the basis of the cancelled transfers cease to hold office unless otherwise qualified.

Issues: Whether provisional release of goods seized under Section 67(6) is contingent on determination and payment under Section 74A(9), and whether the challenge to the show-cause notice warranted writ interference.

Analysis: The provisions concerning search and seizure, including provisional release of seized goods, and those concerning determination of unpaid or short-paid tax operate in separate and distinct fields. A constitutional challenge requires establishment of infringement of a constitutional mandate. The petitioner may respond to the show-cause notice and seek dropping of the proceedings.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of, leaving the petitioner to file a reply to the show-cause notice.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite an effective statutory appeal, on the grounds of allegedly parallel CGST and SGST proceedings and simultaneous adjudication for the same period.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prohibits initiation of CGST proceedings where State GST proceedings on the same subject matter have already been initiated. The CGST show-cause notice under Section 74 preceded the notices issued by the SGST authorities; therefore, the statutory bar did not disclose a jurisdictional defect. The earlier proceedings concerning goods seized during search were distinct from the later investigation-based adjudication concerning wrongful input tax credit and tax evasion. Although availability of an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction, its exercise remains discretionary and no exceptional circumstance justified bypassing the statutory appeal.

Conclusion: The challenge disclosed no jurisdictional infirmity warranting exercise of writ jurisdiction in preference to the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 1,221 days in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether a non-government employee retiring in the relevant assessment year is entitled to exemption of leave encashment up to Rs. 25,00,000 under Section 10(10AA)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 1,221 days in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The expression "sufficient cause" under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a liberal, justice-oriented construction. The assessee's explanation, involving illness and death of the spouse and subsequent beneficial statutory and judicial developments, was bona fide and disclosed neither deliberate inaction nor mala fides. Refusal to condone would foreclose adjudication on merits despite civil consequences in a fiscal matter.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a non-government employee retiring in the relevant assessment year is entitled to exemption of leave encashment up to Rs. 25,00,000 under Section 10(10AA)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Notification No. 31/2023 dated 24.05.2023 enhanced the monetary ceiling for leave-encashment exemption from Rs. 3,00,000 to Rs. 25,00,000. The enhancement rationalised an existing exemption, removed disparity between government and non-government employees, and mitigated hardship. Being beneficial and remedial, it was applied liberally to pending proceedings notwithstanding its stated effective date. The amount received by the assessee was within the enhanced ceiling.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exemption of the entire leave-encashment amount of Rs. 11,27,576 under the enhanced Rs. 25,00,000 limit, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The enhanced exemption limit applies to the assessee's leave encashment, and the restriction of exemption to Rs. 3,00,000 cannot be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A beneficial and remedial enhancement of an existing tax exemption, intended to remove hardship and disparity, may be applied to pending proceedings where no vested right of the Revenue is adversely affected.

Issues: Whether the entire alleged bogus purchases were liable to addition as unexplained expenditure.

Analysis: The corresponding sales were not questioned, and the possibility that purchases were sourced from unregistered dealers could not be ruled out. In these circumstances, a lump-sum disallowance of 2% of the alleged bogus purchases was considered appropriate.

Conclusion: Only 2% of the alleged bogus purchases is disallowable; the balance addition is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the bank could be treated as an assessee in default and charged interest for non-deduction of tax on leave fare concession payments made while interim judicial directions restrained such deduction or recovery.

Analysis: The interim directions governing the relevant period restrained deduction of tax from the employees' leave fare concession payments and stipulated that, if the underlying challenge failed, the employees would bear the tax liability. Compliance with those directions precluded the bank from deducting or recovering tax. Vacation of interim protection could not retrospectively impose a deduction obligation in respect of payments made while the protection operated; any such obligation could operate only prospectively. The later directions restraining recovery from employees further prevented recovery. Liability under the default provisions arises only where a deductor fails to deduct despite a subsisting legal obligation, and the Department must also ascertain whether the recipients have discharged their tax liability.

Conclusion: The bank was not an assessee in default under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) for the relevant leave fare concession payments, and the demand and interest were deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether interest for failure to deduct tax on lease-rent payments was to be computed only up to the date on which the deductee filed its return; (ii) Whether disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) could extend to interest capitalised as inventory/work-in-progress and not charged to the profit and loss account.

Issue (i): Whether interest for failure to deduct tax on lease-rent payments was to be computed only up to the date on which the deductee filed its return.

Analysis: The assessee accepted its liability to deduct tax on the lease-rent payments and accepted the direction restricting interest under section 201(1A) to the period from the date tax was deductible until the deductee filed its return. The direction for recomputation on that basis was sustained.

Conclusion: Interest under section 201(1A) is payable only up to the deductee's return-filing date; the finding is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) could extend to interest capitalised as inventory/work-in-progress and not charged to the profit and loss account.

Analysis: Only a portion of the interest was charged to the profit and loss account, while the balance was capitalised in work-in-progress under the percentage of completion method. Applying the cited coordinate-bench rulings, section 40(a)(ia) could not operate against expenditure that had not been claimed as a revenue deduction.

Conclusion: Interest capitalised in inventory/work-in-progress and not claimed in the profit and loss account cannot be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia); the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The interest liability for non-deduction of tax is confined to the period ending with the deductee's return filing, and the disallowance of capitalised interest is deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) applies only to expenditure claimed as a deduction in computing taxable income and does not extend to amounts capitalised as work-in-progress.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice and consequential reassessment for Assessment Year 2016-17 were valid where approval was granted by an authority not specified under section 151(ii) and the alleged escaped income was below the threshold permitting notice beyond three years.

Analysis: More than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year when the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 were issued. Approval by the Principal Commissioner was therefore not competent, as section 151(ii) required approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General, as applicable. Further, section 149(1)(b) permits issuance of a notice beyond three years only where escaped income represented in the form of an asset is at least Rs.50 lakh; the alleged escaped income was Rs.27,39,078.

Conclusion: The order under section 148A(d), notice under section 148, and consequential reassessment were invalid and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment on interest paid to an associated enterprise could be sustained where the transaction was claimed to be a specified domestic transaction and the assessee was taxable at a lower concessional rate than the associated enterprise.

Analysis: Revenue neutrality in domestic related-party transactions ordinarily applies unless profits are shifted from a profit-making entity to a loss-making entity, or from an entity subject to a higher tax rate to one subject to a lower tax rate. The assessee was taxable at 15% under the concessional regime, whereas the associated enterprise was taxable at 22%; any alleged profit shift would therefore be from a lower-tax entity to a higher-tax entity. The record also indicated that the authorities had treated the transaction as international, although the associated enterprise was shown as a domestic company and the assessee asserted that it was a specified domestic transaction. The transaction's nature required factual verification.

Conclusion: The matter is to be verified as to whether it is a specified domestic transaction between domestic entities; if so verified, the transfer-pricing adjustment is to be deleted as revenue neutral. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the cash deposits of Rs. 10 lakh and Rs. 5 lakh during demonetisation were unexplained investments liable to addition.

Analysis: The cash gift of Rs. 10 lakh from the assessee's mother was supported by her income-tax returns reflecting rental income. The Revenue did not dispute the mother's returned income, but did not enquire into her accumulated cash savings before rejecting the explanation solely because corresponding bank withdrawals were unavailable. The assessee also established that the HUF had disclosed rental income in its returns and had cash resources from which the Rs. 5 lakh deposit could have been made. The disclosed rental receipts of the mother and the HUF were not disputed, and the assessee had discharged the onus of explaining the sources of the deposits.

Conclusion: The deposits of Rs. 10 lakh received as gift from the mother and Rs. 5 lakh sourced from HUF cash balance were satisfactorily explained; both additions are deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessments based on documents seized during a search conducted on a third party could validly be initiated under Section 147 instead of Section 153C.

Analysis: The seized material was forwarded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person because it pertained to the assessee, and the reasons recorded treated the transactions in that material as relevant to determination of the assessee's income. Sections 153A and 153C contain non-obstante clauses overriding the general reassessment provisions, including Sections 147 and 148. Where search-seized material pertaining to another person forms the basis of proceedings, the prescribed statutory route is Section 153C. The reassessment route under Section 147 was therefore unavailable. The factual additions were not adjudicated as academic.

Conclusion: The reassessment orders under Section 147 were without jurisdiction and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a penalty for under-reporting of income could be sustained where the initiating notice and penalty proceedings did not identify the applicable statutory circumstance or specific charge, and the final penalty was imposed for a charge different from that initiated.

Analysis: Section 270A distinguishes under-reporting under sub-section (2) from under-reporting in consequence of misreporting under sub-section (9). The applicable clause and factual basis must be identified and communicated so that the assessee has a meaningful opportunity to meet the precise charge. The initiating notice did not specify the relevant circumstance under sub-section (2) or the alleged act falling under sub-section (9); further, proceedings were initiated for under-reporting in consequence of misreporting but penalty was imposed for under-reporting. This lack of identification and change in charge violated natural justice and invalidated the penalty proceedings.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 270A was quashed as invalid; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment orders passed in the name of a private company after its conversion into an LLP, despite prior intimation to the Assessing Officer, are valid and curable under section 292B.

Analysis: A private limited company and an LLP have distinct legal identities and are governed and taxed under different statutory regimes. The assessee had formally intimated the Assessing Officer of its conversion and supplied the certificate of conversion before issuance of notices under section 143(2) and completion of reassessments. Service of notice under section 143(2) following a return filed in response to section 148 is a jurisdictional precondition to reassessment. The defect was not confined to an incorrect notice description: both the jurisdictional notices under section 143(2) and the assessment orders were issued in the name of an entity that had ceased to exist. The precedents concerning a mere misdescription in a notice or cases where amalgamation was not disclosed were distinguishable. Such assessment of a non-existent entity constitutes substantive illegality incapable of cure under section 292B.

Conclusion: The reassessment orders made in the name of the non-existent company were void ab initio and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether Section 43CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be invoked where agreements for sale of land were executed and substantial consideration was received before that provision came into force, although sale deeds were registered subsequently.

Analysis: The agreements fixed the consideration in financial year 2011-12, and substantial consideration was received through RTGS in that year. The subsequent registrations merely fulfilled the contractual arrangements. Although Section 43CA permits adoption of stamp-duty value as on the agreement date where consideration is received otherwise than in cash, that mechanism does not make the provision applicable to a transaction substantially executed before its enactment. The analogous principles applied to provisions governing stamp-value substitution and inadequate consideration supported application of the law prevailing when the substantive contractual obligations were undertaken.

Conclusion: Section 43CA was inapplicable; the addition based on stamp-duty valuation was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the failure to video record the petitioner's statement constituted non-compliance requiring action in the contempt proceedings; (ii) Whether the alleged absence of an administrative signature on the copy of the show-cause notice could be adjudicated in contempt jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the failure to video record the petitioner's statement constituted non-compliance requiring action in the contempt proceedings.

Analysis: The respondents acknowledged that the statement was recorded without video recording and attributed the lapse to inadvertence. The explanation and unconditional apology were accepted, while the respondents were cautioned that judicial directions must be complied with scrupulously. The respondents were bound to video record the scheduled personal hearing.

Conclusion: The admitted lapse was addressed by accepting the unconditional apology, issuing a caution, and requiring video recording of the personal hearing.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged absence of an administrative signature on the copy of the show-cause notice could be adjudicated in contempt jurisdiction.

Analysis: The explanation recorded was that the show-cause notice was issued and signed by the competent Additional Commissioner, whereas the additional signature in the office copy was only administrative and related to dispatch. The challenge did not concern compliance with the earlier directions and fell outside the limited scope of the contempt proceedings.

Conclusion: No determination on the validity of the show-cause notice was made in contempt jurisdiction; independent remedies remain available in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The directions concerning the personal hearing were enforced prospectively, while matters unrelated to compliance with the prior judicial directions were left for appropriate legal remedies.

Ratio Decidendi: Contempt jurisdiction is confined to securing compliance with judicial directions and cannot be used to adjudicate independent challenges to administrative action.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal against rejection of a declaration filed in Form VCES-1 is maintainable; (ii) Whether payments made before filing the VCES declaration must be considered towards the declared tax dues.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal against rejection of a declaration filed in Form VCES-1 is maintainable.

Analysis: The Punjab and Haryana High Court's ruling treating such an appeal as maintainable remained operative despite recall of the Supreme Court's earlier disposal of the departmental appeal. The same view was also reflected in decisions of other High Courts. The circular relied upon for rejecting the appeal as non-maintainable could not prevail over those judicial decisions.

Conclusion: An appeal against rejection of a VCES declaration is maintainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payments made before filing the VCES declaration must be considered towards the declared tax dues.

Analysis: Payments made before the declaration may qualify as payments towards settlement under VCES where they relate to the case sought to be settled. Since no finding had been recorded on whether the appellant's pre-declaration deposits related to the declared case, factual verification was necessary.

Conclusion: Pre-declaration payments must be considered for VCES settlement if found connected with the case covered by the declaration, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The rejection based on non-maintainability could not stand, and entitlement under the scheme requires determination after verification of the nexus of the earlier deposits with the declared tax dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: Rejection of a VCES declaration is appealable, and payments made before filing the declaration must be reckoned towards the declared dues when they relate to the tax dispute sought to be settled.

Issues: (i) Whether an order refusing cognizance could be set aside in proceedings under Section 482 without hearing the person against whom allegations were made; (ii) Whether allegations arising from an unpaid money transaction and proposed sale of a flat warranted criminal cognizance.

Issue (i): Whether an order refusing cognizance could be set aside in proceedings under Section 482 without hearing the person against whom allegations were made.

Analysis: Setting aside the refusal of cognizance and remanding the matter would necessarily prejudice the person accused of the allegations. Dispensing with notice on the premise that such person had no right to be heard at the pre-cognizance stage was therefore inappropriate in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The order setting aside the refusal of cognizance without hearing the appellant was unsustainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether allegations arising from an unpaid money transaction and proposed sale of a flat warranted criminal cognizance.

Analysis: The transaction concerned recovery of money allegedly paid in instalments; the police enquiry and documentary material did not support the oral allegations, and prior orders had treated the dispute as civil. Criminal proceedings cannot be used to recover money or to coerce an accused to satisfy a monetary demand, particularly where the civil recovery remedy has become time-barred.

Conclusion: The allegations disclosed a civil dispute and did not warrant criminal cognizance, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The refusal of cognizance and dismissal of the complaint were restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Criminal process cannot be invoked as a coercive mechanism for recovery of money in a dispute that is essentially civil, and an order reopening refused cognizance cannot be made without hearing the affected accused where prejudice necessarily follows.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST adjudication order was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides a comprehensive appellate remedy empowered to reconsider questions of fact and law. The petitioner had participated through its authorised representative in the adjudication proceedings, attended the personal hearing and filed a detailed reply. The alleged defects in service, inadequacy of consideration of the reply and denial of effective hearing did not establish a patent breach of principles of natural justice or demonstrated prejudice. Objections concerning third-party electronic evidence, compliance with Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, forensic authentication, cross-examination, and the effect of an earlier audit under Section 65 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 required factual and evidentiary appraisal within the appellate forum. No exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of writ jurisdiction notwithstanding the alternative remedy was established.

Conclusion: The writ jurisdiction could not be invoked; the petitioner must pursue the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious statutory appeal is available, writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily exercisable unless a patent natural-justice violation, jurisdictional error, or other recognised exception is demonstrably established; challenges requiring appraisal of evidence belong to the appellate forum.