Limitation for certified copy exclusion under Section 12(2) turns on procedural default and surviving Original Side practice.
Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 excludes only the time properly required for obtaining a certified copy, not delay caused by a party's own failure to take necessary procedural steps. In winding-up matters, the Calcutta Original Side practice requiring a requisition for drawing up the order continued to operate under Rule 6, as it was not inconsistent with the Companies Act or the Companies (Court) Rules. On the facts, the appellant was not treated as being in default, the relevant time was excluded, and limitation did not bar the proposed appeal.
Issues: (i) Whether, for computing limitation for the proposed appeal, the appellant was entitled to exclusion of the time taken in obtaining a certified copy of the winding-up order under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, notwithstanding the delay in putting in a requisition for drawing up the order. (ii) Whether the Original Side practice requiring a requisition for drawing up the order survived in winding-up matters so as to affect the computation of the period for obtaining a certified copy and the appellant's entitlement to file the appeal in time.
Issue (i): Whether, for computing limitation for the proposed appeal, the appellant was entitled to exclusion of the time taken in obtaining a certified copy of the winding-up order under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, notwithstanding the delay in putting in a requisition for drawing up the order.
Analysis: The expression "time requisite" in Section 12(2) was treated as excluding only such time as is properly required for obtaining the copy, and not time lost by the party's own default. The Explanation to Section 12 was read as excluding time taken by the court after a copy application is made, but not the period wasted because the appellant failed to take steps necessary for the order to be drawn up when the law required such steps. At the same time, it was held that where the appellant was not at fault on the facts and had moved for a copy within time, the benefit of exclusion could not be denied merely because the order had not yet been completed.
Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to exclusion of the relevant time and the appeal was not time-barred on this ground.
Issue (ii): Whether the Original Side practice requiring a requisition for drawing up the order survived in winding-up matters so as to affect the computation of the period for obtaining a certified copy and the appellant's entitlement to file the appeal in time.
Analysis: The winding-up provisions in the Companies Act and the Companies (Court) Rules were held not to exclude the local Original Side practice requiring requisition for drawing up orders. Rule 6 preserved the practice and procedure of the Court where not inconsistent with the Act or the Rules. On that footing, the requisition requirement continued to operate, but the applicant-company's omission was not treated as laches in the circumstances because the steps were later taken with leave and the delay was not attributable to the applicant in a manner defeating limitation.
Conclusion: The requisition requirement continued to apply, but it did not bar the appellant from relief on the facts of the case.
Final Conclusion: The application for leave to appeal, condonation, and extension of time was allowed, and interim protection was granted on terms pending the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the time to be excluded is only the time properly required for obtaining the copy, and delays attributable to the party's own default in taking necessary procedural steps are not excluded unless the circumstances show that the delay was not due to the applicant's laches.
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AI Drafter ✕
TaxTMI 
