Construction of "that order" turned on context, with the Tribunal treating it as the second Collector's order.

The Tribunal clarified that the phrase "that order" in its earlier reasoning referred to the second Collector's order, not the first. The first order had not been communicated and was not the subject of appeal, so it could not have formed part of the operative setting aside. The later order was treated as the only order capable of being dealt with under Section 129D, and the reference was construed by ordinary language and contextual reading to match that order. The clarification turned entirely on the internal reference in the earlier order and the procedural status of the two Collector's orders.

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Issues: Whether the expression "that order" in the earlier order of the Tribunal referred to the second order passed by the Collector and not to the first order.

Analysis: The clarification turned on the internal reference in the Tribunal's earlier order and on whether the first or second Collector's order could have been the subject of setting aside. The order held that the second order alone was referred to and that the first order, having not been communicated and not having been appealed against, could not have been dealt with by the Tribunal. The reference to communication was treated as an administrative aspect and the second order was described as the one competent to be set aside under Section 129D.

Conclusion: The expression "that order" meant the second order passed by the Collector.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a prior order is expressly identified in the reasoning, a later generic reference to "that order" is construed by ordinary language and context as referring to the same order, and an uncommunicated order not under appeal is not the subject of the operative part.

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