Appealability of winding-up orders and prima facie proof require substantive rights to be affected and evidence, not pleadings alone.

An order in winding-up proceedings was treated as appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent or section 202 of the Indian Companies Act only if it amounted to a judgment affecting substantive rights or liabilities; an order that merely regulated the course of evidence and the onus did not qualify, and section 45N of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953 was inapplicable to a proceeding under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act. For invoking section 45H, the applicant had to establish a prima facie case by legally admissible evidence, not by allegations in the petition alone. The operative effect was to confirm non-appealability and reject shifting the onus on pleadings only.

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Issues: (i) Whether an appeal lay against the order under section 202 of the Indian Companies Act, clause 15 of the Letters Patent, or section 45N of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953. (ii) Whether, for invoking section 45H of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953, the applicant was required to make out a prima facie case by legally admissible evidence, and not merely by disclosing allegations in the petition.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal lay against the order under section 202 of the Indian Companies Act, clause 15 of the Letters Patent, or section 45N of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953.

Analysis: Section 202 was treated as co-extensive with the appellate test under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, so that an order in winding-up matters was appealable only if it amounted to a judgment affecting rights or liabilities. The impugned order merely directed the course of evidence and decided the onus question; it did not finally determine any substantive right or liability. Section 45N was held inapplicable because the proceeding was one under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act and not a civil proceeding under the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act itself.

Conclusion: No appeal lay under section 202 of the Indian Companies Act, clause 15 of the Letters Patent, or section 45N of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953.

Issue (ii): Whether, for invoking section 45H of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953, the applicant was required to make out a prima facie case by legally admissible evidence, and not merely by disclosing allegations in the petition.

Analysis: The expression "makes out a prima facie case" was held to mean proof to the satisfaction of the Court by legally admissible evidence. A mere disclosure of allegations in the petition was insufficient. The section was also treated as introducing only a procedural shifting of onus, and not as authorising a fresh departure from an evidentiary stage already reached under the existing order directing trial on evidence.

Conclusion: The applicant was required to establish a prima facie case by admissible evidence, and the contrary contention was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The order was held to be non-appealable, and the appellant's procedural challenge failed; the Court also upheld the refusal to shift the onus on the basis of the petition alone.

Ratio Decidendi: An order is appealable as a judgment only if it affects substantive rights or liabilities, and a statutory direction that an applicant has "made out a prima facie case" requires proof by admissible evidence, not a mere pleading disclosure.

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