Winding-up avoidance jurisdiction arises only after an actual winding-up has begun, not before a contingent future order.

Jurisdiction under section 173 of the Companies Act, 1929 arose only after an actual winding-up had commenced. The provision was directed to review of post-commencement transactions by the liquidator, not to anticipatory adjudication by the court on a contingent future winding-up. A conditional order would improperly pre-empt the liquidator's function and could not be made on an incomplete factual record. The court therefore had no jurisdiction to make an order before a winding-up order existed.

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Issues: Whether the Court had jurisdiction under section 173 of the Companies Act, 1929 to make an order in relation to company transactions before a winding-up order had actually been made.

Analysis: The statutory language contemplated a winding-up by the court and avoided transactions made after the commencement of an actual winding-up. The Court held that the purpose of the provision was to subject post-commencement transactions to review by the liquidator after a winding-up order, not to permit the Court to adjudicate beforehand on an incomplete factual record. A conditional or anticipatory order would improperly pre-empt the liquidator's function, and the Court declined to treat a merely possible future winding-up as sufficient to attract jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The Court had no jurisdiction to make an order under section 173 before a winding-up order was in existence.

Ratio Decidendi: The jurisdiction conferred by a winding-up avoidance provision framed in terms of a company "being wound up" arises only after an actual winding-up has commenced, and it cannot be exercised prospectively on a contingent future winding-up.

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