Court-ordered winding up controls statutory disclosure duties; Official Liquidator may call for statements without a separate court direction.

A company restored to the register and then ordered to be wound up by the Court is treated as being in a court-ordered winding up for the statutory duty to furnish information. The earlier voluntary liquidation does not control duties arising after restoration and the court's winding-up order. The Official Liquidator may also require former officers or liquidators to submit the required statement without a separate prior direction in every instance, because the statutory words "subject to the direction of the Court" do not impose that condition as a prerequisite. The court therefore upheld the demand for information.

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Issues: (i) Whether a company that had originally gone into voluntary liquidation but was later restored and ordered to be wound up by the Court could be treated as a company wound up by order of Court for the purpose of the statutory obligation to furnish information. (ii) Whether the Official Receiver, acting as Official Liquidator, could call upon former liquidators to submit the required statement without a separate direction of the Court.

Issue (i): Whether a company that had originally gone into voluntary liquidation but was later restored and ordered to be wound up by the Court could be treated as a company wound up by order of Court for the purpose of the statutory obligation to furnish information.

Analysis: The company had first undergone voluntary winding up and its name had been struck off, but the Court later restored the company to the register and directed that it be wound up by the Court. Once that order was made, the relevant proceedings were those of a court-ordered winding up, and the liquidator acting thereafter was the Court-appointed liquidator. The earlier voluntary liquidation did not govern the later statutory duties arising after restoration and court-ordered winding up.

Conclusion: The company was to be treated as one wound up by order of Court, so the petitioners could not avoid the statutory duty on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the Official Receiver, acting as Official Liquidator, could call upon former liquidators to submit the required statement without a separate direction of the Court.

Analysis: The persons in question had been officers of the company and were within the class bound to furnish information under the statutory provision. The words "subject to the direction of the Court" were not read as requiring a specific prior order in every case before the liquidator could seek the statement. The Court observed that the liquidator could call for the information and the Court's control operated to regulate the process where necessary. As the petitioners had custody of the records and were the proper persons to supply the information, the demand made upon them was held to be justified.

Conclusion: The Official Liquidator could validly require the information without a separate prior direction of the Court, and the conviction was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The revisional challenge failed on both jurisdictional objections, and the conviction and sentences were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a company is restored to the register and directed to be wound up by the Court, the statutory obligations applicable to a court-ordered winding up apply, and the Official Liquidator may call for the required statement from persons bound to furnish it without a separate prior direction in every instance.

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