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Issues: (i) Whether, for determining the three-month period under the fraudulent preference provision, the relevant date was the date of the resolution for voluntary winding up or the later date of the petition for compulsory winding up by the Court; (ii) Whether the assignment was supported by evidence showing an intent to prefer the appellant.
Issue (i): Whether, for determining the three-month period under the fraudulent preference provision, the relevant date was the date of the resolution for voluntary winding up or the later date of the petition for compulsory winding up by the Court.
Analysis: The provision treated the presentation of a winding-up petition, in the case of winding up by or under court supervision, and a resolution for winding up, in the case of voluntary winding up, as corresponding to the act of insolvency. Where a voluntary winding up is followed by a compulsory winding up, the later petition supersedes the earlier voluntary process, and the period is computed from the petition date. On that basis, the assignment made more than three months before the petition could not fall within the fraudulent preference rule.
Conclusion: The relevant date was the date of the petition for compulsory winding up, and the assignment was not avoidable as a fraudulent preference.
Issue (ii): Whether the assignment was supported by evidence showing an intent to prefer the appellant.
Analysis: The evidence showed that several creditors were left unpaid while the appellant and certain others were satisfied by transfer of promissory notes or other valuable securities. That state of affairs was sufficient to sustain an inference of preferential intent on the part of the bank.
Conclusion: The finding of intent to prefer was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the transfer fell outside the statutory period for fraudulent preference, although the finding of preferential intent was maintained.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a voluntary winding up is followed by a compulsory winding up, the petition for compulsory winding up is the operative date for computing the statutory period in a fraudulent preference inquiry.