Extension of time discretion preserved; defendants need no leave of the liquidating court to pursue appeals or revisions after company initiated proceedings.

The court upheld the appellate judge's discretionary grant of an extension of time under limitation principles, finding the revision by the auction purchaser attacking that favourable discretionary order incompetent and dismissed. On the Companies Act point, the court ruled that where a company originally instituted proceedings, unsuccessful defendants prosecuting appeals or revisions do not require leave of the liquidating court under the winding up prohibition; imposing such a leave requirement would permit approbation and reprobation and unfairly handicap defendants, so the preliminary objection under the winding up provision was overruled and petitioners may proceed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the revision petition of the auction-purchaser against the appellate Judge's finding on extension of time is competent and should be interfered with; (ii) Whether permission of the liquidating Court under section 171 of the Companies Act is necessary for appeals or revisions filed by unsuccessful defendants where the company originally instituted the proceedings.

Issue (i): Competence and correctness of dismissal of the auction-purchaser's revision petition against the appellate Judge's extension of time under limitation rules.

Analysis: The appellate Judge exercised discretion under the Limitation Act (section 5) in extending time by allowing days claimed to have been consumed by the Copying Department. The revision sought by the auction-purchaser attacked a decision that was favourable to that party and involved discretionary exercise by the appellate court. The Court examined whether revision lay against such a finding and whether interference was warranted.

Conclusion: The auction-purchaser's revision petition is incompetent and is dismissed; no interference is warranted with the appellate Judge's discretionary order granting extension of time.

Issue (ii): Necessity of leave of the liquidating Court under section 171 of the Companies Act for subsequent appeals or revisions by unsuccessful defendants where the company was the original plaintiff.

Analysis: Section 171 prohibits commencing or proceeding with suits against a company after a winding up order except by leave of the Court. Precedents (including-house-of-lords authority and decisions of the Lahore Chief Court) show that where a company originally institutes proceedings and an appeal by the company is pending or has been pursued, the unsuccessful defendant seeking subsequent appellate remedies should not be handicapped by a leave requirement that the company itself did not require when initiating proceedings. The Court reasoned that requiring leave in such circumstances would permit the company to approbate and reprobate and would produce an unfair advantage contrary to legislative intent.

Conclusion: The preliminary objection that permission of the liquidating Court is necessary is overruled; where the company was the original plaintiff and proceedings were begun by it, no leave of the liquidating Court is necessary for appeals or revisions prosecuted by unsuccessful defendants.

Final Conclusion: The Court dismissed the revision petition of the auction-purchaser and overruled the respondent's preliminary objection under section 171 of the Companies Act, allowing the petitioners to proceed with their applications; the decision upholds the appellate Judge's discretionary extension of time and establishes that leave of the liquidating Court is not required in the circumstances described.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a company originally initiates legal proceedings, subsequent appeals or revisions by unsuccessful defendants do not require leave of the liquidating Court under section 171 of the Companies Act.

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