Plain statutory language and factual disputes do not by themselves raise a referable question of law under customs licensing rules.

A challenge to a proposed reference under the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 1984 was held not to raise a referable question of law. The dispute over the distinction between Regulation 18 and Regulation 20 was treated as factual and application-based, not legal, and the argument for treating the provisions alike did not change that character. The regulations were also described as plain and unambiguous, so purposive construction could not be used to add words not found in the text. A complaint that the appeal had been allowed on technicalities was likewise treated as an attack on the correctness of the Tribunal's view, not a question of law.

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Issues: (i) Whether the proposed reference raised any question of law on the distinction between Regulation 18 and Regulation 20 of the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 1984. (ii) Whether the proposed reference raised any question of law by challenging the Tribunal's view that the two regulations were independent and by invoking purposive construction. (iii) Whether the proposed reference raised any question of law by contending that the appeal had been allowed on mere technicalities.

Issue (i): Whether the proposed reference raised any question of law on the distinction between Regulation 18 and Regulation 20 of the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 1984.

Analysis: The challenge proceeded on the footing that verification of antecedents was mandatory for one category of person and should equally apply to a power of attorney holder. The underlying inquiry, however, was whether a particular position in the firm exercised greater or lesser authority, which was treated as a factual enquiry rather than a legal one. The mere assertion that the two regulations ought to be treated alike did not convert the dispute into a question of law.

Conclusion: No question of law arose on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the proposed reference raised any question of law by challenging the Tribunal's view that the two regulations were independent and by invoking purposive construction.

Analysis: The regulations were regarded as clearly worded and capable of being applied on their own terms. Where the language is plain and unambiguous, there is no scope to depart from the text by reading into it what is not written. The proposed reference was also only an attack on the correctness of the Tribunal's conclusion, and such a challenge was treated as insufficient to generate a referable question of law.

Conclusion: No question of law arose on this issue.

Issue (iii): Whether the proposed reference raised any question of law by contending that the appeal had been allowed on mere technicalities.

Analysis: The contention merely sought to question the Tribunal's appreciation of the statutory scheme and the manner in which it applied the regulations. A grievance that the Tribunal adopted a strict or technical view, without more, was treated as a challenge to the correctness of the decision rather than a question of law.

Conclusion: No question of law arose on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The proposed reference was found to disclose no referable question of law, and the reference application was refused.

Ratio Decidendi: A challenge directed only to the correctness of the Tribunal's conclusion, or to factual matters and the manner of applying clear statutory language, does not by itself raise a referable question of law; plain and unambiguous regulations are to be applied as written.

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