Reference under the Customs Act cannot be used for review where the challenge concerns only sufficiency of evidence on penalty.

A reference application under section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be used as a device for review of the Tribunal's order. The challenge was directed only at the Tribunal's appreciation of evidence on penalty under section 112(b), including its view that the relied-upon statements were hearsay and came from a co-accused. That assessment was treated as a factual conclusion, and the sufficiency of evidence was held not to raise a referable question of law. The proposed question was therefore not maintainable for reference, and the application was rejected.

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Issues: Whether a reference application under section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 can be used to seek review of the Tribunal's order, and whether the question framed regarding setting aside of penalty under section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 raised a referable question of law.

Analysis: The application was found to be an attempt to review the Tribunal's earlier order rather than to raise a genuine question of law for reference to the High Court. The Tribunal's earlier finding was based on appreciation of evidence, including the view that the relied-upon statements were hearsay in nature and were statements of a co-accused. The insufficiency of such evidence to justify penalty was treated as a factual conclusion, and sufficiency of evidence was held not to constitute a question of law.

Conclusion: The proposed question was not a valid question of law for reference, and the reference application was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A reference under section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be used as a device for review, and a challenge directed only against appreciation or sufficiency of evidence does not give rise to a referable question of law.

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