Refund limitation for duty paid on release of seized goods runs from payment date, not later adjudication, where payment was not provisional.

Duty paid for release of seized goods pending adjudication was not treated as provisional merely because the underlying liability remained to be decided later. Release under Rule 206 did not convert the payment into a provisional assessment, so the refund limitation period ran from the date of payment, not from the subsequent adjudication order. On that basis, the refund claim was time-barred and the argument that limitation should start later was rejected.

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Issues: Whether refund of duty paid at the time of provisional release of seized goods was barred by limitation under the refund provision, and whether such payment could be treated as provisional so that the limitation period would run from the later adjudication order.

Analysis: Release of goods pending adjudication was under Rule 206, which did not itself provide that any duty paid on such release became provisional. The payment made when the goods were cleared pending adjudication was therefore not treated as a payment under provisional assessment merely because the adjudication later determined whether duty was in fact payable. The relevant date for refund limitation was the date on which duty was paid, not the date of adjudication.

Conclusion: The refund claim was barred by limitation and the view that the payment was provisional was rejected.

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