Estoppel based on prior factual representation cannot preclude contesting investment ownership where remand findings resolve the issue.

Estoppel based on a party's prior representation of fact binds only within the same assessment where prejudice has occurred; it does not override statutory taxing provisions or bind a Tribunal in separate subsequent assessments. Where a matter was remanded and the remand produced a concluded factual determination that the father had the wherewithal to make the investments, that factual finding controls and cannot be disregarded by invoking estoppel in a later appeal. Consequently, the investments could not be treated as the assessee's undisclosed income for the specified assessment years and estoppel could not bar the assessee from contesting ownership.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee was estopped from contending that the investments were made by his father, having earlier taken a contrary stand in Estate Duty proceedings; (ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the investments represent the assessee's income from undisclosed sources for assessment years 1954-55 and 1955-56.

Issue (i): Whether estoppel barred the assessee from denying his earlier statement in separate Estate Duty proceedings.

Analysis: The issue required distinguishing representations of fact from questions of law and assessing the effect of a prior remand on the finality of the Tribunal's position. Where a remand results in the Tribunal losing seisin and the remanded proceedings become a separate, concluded assessment, the Tribunal cannot, in a subsequent separate appeal, reopen or reverse an earlier remand-order opinion by treating it as a bar. Estoppel as a doctrine applies to conduct and representations of fact within the same assessment where the other party has suffered prejudice; estoppel does not operate to override statutory taxing provisions nor to bind the Tribunal in successive assessments. The revenue did not obtain a reference against the earlier remand-order and therefore could not invoke estoppel in the later, distinct appeal.

Conclusion: Estoppel did not bar the assessee from contesting that the investments were made by his father; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the investments represent the assessee's undisclosed income for assessment years 1954-55 and 1955-56.

Analysis: The remand to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner produced a detailed factual inquiry and a finding that the father had the wherewithal to make the investments. The Tribunal, on the subsequent appeal, accepted an estoppel plea without considering the merits or the factual finding returned on remand. Given that the remand produced a concluded factual determination in the separate assessment proceedings, the investments could not be sustained as the assessee's undisclosed income merely by invoking estoppel in a later appeal.

Conclusion: The investments do not represent the assessee's income from undisclosed sources for the specified assessment years; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The referred questions are answered negatively against the revenue and in favour of the assessee, confirming that estoppel could not be relied upon in the subsequent appeals and that the factual findings on remand preclude treating the investments as the assessee's undisclosed income.

Ratio Decidendi: Estoppel based on a party's prior representation of fact binds the party only within the same assessment where prejudice has occurred; a Tribunal that has remanded and lost seisin cannot, in a later separate appeal, reopen or reverse its remand-order conclusions by applying estoppel, and equitable doctrines cannot be used to override the statutory incidence of tax.

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