Reassessment limitation under the Estate Duty Act runs from the original assessment date, not the appellate order, and merger does not apply.

Section 73A(b) of the Estate Duty Act fixes the limitation for reassessment by reference to the original assessment, and section 59 remains subject to that time limit. The filing of an appeal does not suspend the operative effect of the initial assessment under section 58, so the three-year period runs from the date of that assessment and not from disposal of the appeal. The doctrine of merger does not apply for computing limitation in this context. On that interpretation, the reassessment notice was time-barred and invalid.

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Issues: Whether the notice for reassessment under section 59 of the Estate Duty Act was barred by limitation under section 73A(b), and whether the period of three years had to be computed from the date of the original assessment or from the date of disposal of the appeal.

Analysis: Section 73A(b) fixes limitation for reassessment by reference to the date of assessment, while section 59 makes the power to reassess subject to that limitation. The original assessment under section 58 was operative when made and was not suspended by the filing of an appeal. The word "assessment" in section 73A(b) was held to mean the initial assessment made by the primary authority, not the date on which appellate proceedings concluded. The doctrine of merger was found inapplicable for computing limitation in this context, and in any event a fiscal provision capable of two constructions had to be interpreted in the manner more favourable to the taxpayer.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred because the three-year period ran from the original assessment date, not from the appellate order. The notice was invalid and the petitioner was entitled to prohibition against further proceedings.

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