Reopening under estate duty law may rest on post-assessment information, and notice need not specify escaped property in detail.

A notice under section 59 of the Estate Duty Act was not invalid merely because it did not specify the property alleged to have escaped assessment; the provision only requires a call for a return, and the escaped assets may be identified in reassessment. Reassessment was also not barred by limitation, because the valid notice initiating proceedings was the earlier notice of 31 January 1967, not the later letter. On jurisdiction, the Controller could reopen the assessment under section 59(b) on post-assessment information, including material from appellate or tribunal orders, where that information had a rational nexus with the belief that chargeable property had escaped assessment.

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Issues: (i) Whether a notice issued under section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 was invalid for want of specification of the property alleged to have escaped assessment. (ii) Whether reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation under section 73-A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. (iii) Whether the Controller had jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 on the basis of information obtained after the original assessment.

Issue (i): Whether a notice issued under section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 was invalid for want of specification of the property alleged to have escaped assessment.

Analysis: Section 59 only requires the Controller to call upon the accountable person to submit an account as required under section 53. The statutory requirement is the issuance of a notice to furnish the return; it does not impose a condition that the notice must specify in detail the particular property believed to have escaped assessment. The accountable person is obliged to disclose all assets of the deceased fully and fairly, and the precise items escaping assessment can be identified during the reassessment proceedings.

Conclusion: The notice was not invalid on the ground that it did not specify the property said to have escaped assessment.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation under section 73-A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953.

Analysis: The notice dated January 31, 1967 was accepted as a valid notice under section 59, and the later letter dated February 19, 1969 was not treated as the initiating notice. Since the reassessment proceedings had validly commenced with the earlier notice, the contention of limitation did not survive on the facts found by the Court.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not barred by limitation.

Issue (iii): Whether the Controller had jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 on the basis of information obtained after the original assessment.

Analysis: Jurisdiction under section 59(b) depends on two jurisdictional facts: possession of information and a rational nexus between that information and the belief that property chargeable to estate duty had escaped assessment. The Court held that it may examine only whether such information existed and whether it was relevant to the belief formed, not whether the information was sufficient or correct. Information derived from appellate or tribunal orders can qualify as information within the section. The provisions were treated as in pari materia with the reopening provisions in section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 and section 47 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the Supreme Court authorities relied upon supported the view that post-assessment information from judicial or quasi-judicial sources can justify reopening.

Conclusion: The Controller had jurisdiction to commence reassessment proceedings under section 59(b).

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the reassessment notice failed, the writ petition was rejected, and the impugned reassessment proceedings were held to be within jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A reopening provision based on information permits reassessment when the authority receives post-assessment information from an external source that has a rational nexus with the belief that assessable property has escaped assessment, and the notice initiating such proceedings need not itself particularise the escaped property unless the statute expressly requires it.

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