Issues: Whether penalty for failure to furnish transfer-pricing documentation could be sustained where the penalty notice did not identify the specific information or documents allegedly not furnished, and the transfer-pricing study report was furnished in response to the specific notice under Section 92D(3).

Analysis: Penalty under Section 271G requires a failure to furnish identified information or documentation requisitioned under Section 92D(3). The notice initiating penalty proceedings was ambiguous because it did not specify the documents allegedly not furnished. The earlier notices relied upon were issued under Section 92CA(2), not under Section 92D(3), and did not establish a requisition requiring production within the statutory period. The specific notice under Section 92D(3) was answered within the prescribed period by furnishing the transfer-pricing study report. As the provision is penal and imposes penalty computed at two per cent of the value of international transactions, its procedural requirements require strict adherence.

Conclusion: The statutory prerequisites for imposition of penalty under Section 271G were not satisfied; the penalty was invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether corporate-guarantee commission was correctly restricted to 1%; (ii) Whether interest on loans advanced to associated enterprises should be computed at LIBOR alone or with a basis-point spread; (iii) Whether notional interest was chargeable on delayed receivables from associated enterprises; (iv) Whether the claim for brought-forward losses required verification.

Issue (i): Whether corporate-guarantee commission was correctly restricted to 1%.

Analysis: The earlier coordinate-bench decision for the assessee's own case had treated a 1% guarantee commission as fair and reasonable, having regard to inter-group guarantee rates and the assessee's own charging pattern. The same position governed the year under consideration.

Conclusion: Restriction of the corporate-guarantee adjustment to 1% was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on loans advanced to associated enterprises should be computed at LIBOR alone or with a basis-point spread.

Analysis: Although an earlier order had restricted the adjustment to LIBOR, the applicable market rate for such foreign loans was found to require a basis-point spread. LIBOR plus 200 basis points was treated as normal and reasonable.

Conclusion: Interest on outstanding loans shall be benchmarked at LIBOR plus 200 basis points, partly in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether notional interest was chargeable on delayed receivables from associated enterprises.

Analysis: The assessee had not charged interest on delayed payments from non-associated enterprises despite substantial sales to them. On that comparable conduct, no notional interest adjustment on receivables from associated enterprises was justified.

Conclusion: No notional interest adjustment on outstanding associated-enterprise receivables was permissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the claim for brought-forward losses required verification.

Analysis: The premise that prior appellate directions had conclusively allowed the claim was not borne out by the earlier orders. Verification of the losses and unabsorbed depreciation was therefore necessary.

Conclusion: The brought-forward-loss claim was remitted for verification and consequential allowance in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustment for loans is limited to LIBOR plus 200 basis points; the 1% corporate-guarantee benchmark and deletion of receivables interest remain undisturbed, while the loss claim awaits verification.

Ratio Decidendi: In transfer-pricing benchmarking, an arm's-length interest rate for cross-border loans may include an appropriate LIBOR spread, whereas delayed associated-enterprise receivables cannot attract notional interest where comparable delayed payments by non-associated enterprises are interest-free.

Issues: (i) Classification of roasted walnuts; (ii) Eligibility of roasted walnuts for preferential customs-duty benefit.

Issue (i): Classification of roasted walnuts.

Analysis: Tariff classification is governed by Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, the terms of the headings, and relevant Section and Chapter Notes. Heading 2008 covers fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants otherwise prepared or preserved. Roasting is distinct from drying: it is a high-heat treatment producing physical and chemical changes in the product. The processes specified for Chapter 8 do not include roasting, while Tariff Item 2008 19 91 specifically covers other roasted nuts and seeds. HSN Explanatory Notes and common trade understanding support this specific classification.

Conclusion: Roasted walnuts are classifiable under Tariff Item 2008 19 91 as other roasted nuts and seeds, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Eligibility of roasted walnuts for preferential customs-duty benefit.

Analysis: The claimed preferential basic customs-duty exemption under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus, as amended by Notification No. 41/2019, depends upon proof of origin to the satisfaction of the competent customs officer in accordance with the applicable ASEAN-India origin rules and the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020.

Conclusion: The preferential duty benefit is available only upon satisfactory proof that the goods originate in the relevant notified country, in favour of the assessee subject to fulfilment of the origin requirement.

Final Conclusion: The ruling confirms the tariff treatment of roasted walnuts and recognises their potential entitlement to the notified preferential rate upon compliance with origin requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: Nuts subjected to roasting, being a process distinct from drying and specifically covered by the tariff, are classifiable under the specific entry for other roasted nuts and seeds.

Issues: Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, inserted with effect from 26.05.2026, applies to pending insolvency applications concerning personal guarantors to corporate debtors and removes the interim-moratorium bar to the suit.

Analysis: Section 96(4) was introduced to address misuse of the interim moratorium by personal guarantors who initiated insolvency proceedings to obstruct recovery action. The amendment operates prospectively upon the existing status of a pending insolvency application and is retroactive or quasi-retroactive, rather than truly retrospective. The expression "is filed" encompasses applications filed before the amendment that remained pending when it came into force. The removal of the pre-admission protection does not impair a vested right, but restores creditors' ability to pursue remedies during pending proceedings.

Conclusion: Section 96(4) applies to the pending Section 95 application; the interim moratorium in favour of the personal guarantor stood vacated from the amendment's effective date, and the suit is not barred. The application for rejection of the plaint was rejected.

Issues: Whether the impugned anti-profiteering determinations concerning real-estate projects required fresh consideration under the project-specific methodology prescribed for computing profiteering benefit.

Analysis: The real-estate methodology based on the difference between input-tax-credit-to-turnover ratios in the pre-GST and post-GST periods was identified as unsuitable because construction expenditure, input-tax-credit accrual and buyer collections are not uniform throughout a project's lifecycle. The applicable approach requires computation of the total GST-related saving for each project and allocation of that saving on the basis of the total project area, so that purchasers of equivalent area receive equivalent benefit.

Conclusion: The profiteering determinations require fresh evaluation under the project-specific methodology applicable to real-estate projects.

Issues: Whether profiteering in a real-estate project could be determined by comparing the input-tax-credit-to-turnover ratios for the pre-GST and post-GST periods.

Analysis: The input tax credit and buyer collections in a real-estate project do not necessarily accrue uniformly during the project life cycle. A turnover-based comparison therefore lacks a direct correlation with the input tax credit attributable to a particular period. The applicable approach requires computation of the total GST-related savings for each project and allocation of that benefit on a per-square-foot basis, so that buyers of equivalent areas receive equivalent benefit.

Conclusion: The profiteering determination for the real-estate project must be reconsidered using a project-wise methodology based on total savings and per-square-foot allocation of benefit.

Issues: (i) Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation; (ii) whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible; and (iii) whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation.

Analysis: Although the notices arose from a common investigation and involved overlapping material, they concerned distinct subject matters, including live intercepted consignments, previously cleared consignments, and goods found at multiple data centres. Two notices had already been adjudicated, and directing common adjudication at this stage would require displacement of that adjudication while its validity was separately under challenge.

Conclusion: Appointment of a single Common Adjudicating Authority for all three notices was declined, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible.

Analysis: The order dated 19.08.2025 contained prima facie observations and directed adjournment only of the hearing before the Mumbai authority. It did not stay or restrain adjudication of the two notices pending before the competent authority at New Delhi.

Conclusion: The pending writ petition and the order dated 19.08.2025 did not render the New Delhi adjudication without jurisdiction, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Analysis: Availability of an alternative statutory remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction. However, the alleged non-consideration of replies, service of hearing notices, adequacy of hearing, limitation, and related objections required examination of the adjudication record and disputed factual matters. The statutory appellate authority was competent to examine those matters and grant appropriate relief.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was not invoked to determine the procedural, limitation, or substantive objections; those objections may be pursued before the statutory appellate forum, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The merits of the allegations, valuation, duty and penalty liability, limitation, and the individual natural-justice objections remain open for determination in the statutory appellate proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where objections to a consolidated customs adjudication depend on disputed facts and examination of the complete record, the statutory appellate remedy should ordinarily be pursued unless an inherent jurisdictional defect or exceptional ground is established.

Issues: Whether separately imported laptop LCD display panels, without video-signal converting components, are classifiable as computer parts under tariff item 84733099 or as flat panel display modules under heading 8524.

Analysis: Classification is governed sequentially by the General Rules for Interpretation, beginning with the terms of the headings and relevant Chapter Notes. Heading 8524 specifically covers flat panel display modules, including LCD, LED and OLED technologies, when presented separately and not integrated into another apparatus. Chapter Note 7 gives heading 8524 precedence for display modules having a display screen and lacking video-signal converting components. The imported panels were separately presented, retained their independent identity as flat panel display modules, and admittedly did not contain scaler ICs, decoder ICs or application processors. Their intended use as replacement laptop screens could not displace the specific tariff description in favour of the general heading for computer parts and accessories.

Conclusion: The imported laptop LCD panels are classifiable under heading 8524 and attract basic customs duty at 15%; classification under tariff item 84733099 is incorrect.

Issues: (i) Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A; (ii) Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs; (iii) Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo; (iv) Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (v) Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively; (vi) Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.

Issue (i): Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A.

Analysis: Section 196(1)(c) authorises the Board to levy fees or other charges for carrying out the purposes of the Code; this authority is not confined to registration and renewal fees payable by insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies and information utilities. Sections 196 and 240 disclose the Board's broad executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative role across the corporate insolvency resolution process, including matters concerning the committee of creditors, voting, resolution plans and process costs.

Conclusion: Regulation 31A was made within the Board's statutory authority; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs.

Analysis: Section 5(13)(e) is a residuary provision permitting costs specified by the Board, and Section 240(2)(d) expressly authorises regulations concerning such other costs. The distinct categories in Section 5(13)(a) to (d) do not constitute a common genus. Consequently, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis cannot restrict Section 5(13)(e). Regulation 31(ba), read with Regulation 31A, validly includes the regulatory fee within insolvency resolution process costs.

Conclusion: Regulation 31A is not ultra vires the Code; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (iii): Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo.

Analysis: For a regulatory fee, direct and arithmetically precise quid pro quo is unnecessary; a broad, general nexus between the levy and regulatory services is sufficient. The Board's regulation of insolvency service providers and its regulation-making, information, oversight and process-related functions provide an integrated regulatory framework benefiting corporate insolvency resolution process stakeholders, including resolution applicants. The levy supports the Board's regulatory functions and financial self-sufficiency.

Conclusion: The levy is a valid regulatory fee and not a tax; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (iv): Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: A regulatory fee need not correspond exactly to annual expenditure or yield no surplus. The audited figures showed that the levy enabled the Board to meet its expenditure after earlier deficits, and did not establish an excessive, confiscatory or disproportionate collection. The amounts remain available for the Board's regulatory functions rather than forming part of the general revenues of the State.

Conclusion: The regulatory fee is neither excessive nor arbitrary and does not violate Article 14; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (v): Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively.

Analysis: The proviso expressly applies to resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022 and is prospective in operation. Approval by the committee of creditors binds the committee and the resolution applicant as to commercial terms, but does not reduce the adjudicating authority to a ministerial role. The adjudicating authority must ensure compliance with Section 30(2), including priority payment of insolvency resolution process costs, and may require rectification or reconsideration in limited circumstances. No vested right was disturbed while approval remained pending.

Conclusion: The proviso is prospective and valid; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (vi): Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.

Analysis: The regulatory fee at 0.25 per cent of realisable value was not shown to be confiscatory or unreasonable. Sections 5(13)(e), 196(1)(c) and 240(2)(d) provide statutory guidance for the levy and its inclusion as a process cost. The challenged regulation is also subject to parliamentary laying under Section 241. The relevant enabling provisions and Regulation 31(ba) were not independently challenged.

Conclusion: Regulation 31A is neither a colourable exercise of power nor an instance of excessive delegation; the issue is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: Regulation 31A validly imposes regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost for resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory regulator may levy a non-excessive regulatory fee under an express power to carry out the purposes of the governing code where the levy bears a broad nexus to its regulatory functions; direct quid pro quo with each payer is not indispensable.

Issues: Whether homebuyers who invoked arbitration for refund and accepted and presented refund cheques could be recognised as financial creditors under Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Analysis: Section 5(7) requires that a financial debt be owed to a person, while Section 5(8)(f) treats amounts raised from an allottee in a real-estate project as having the commercial effect of borrowing. Section 3(11) requires a subsisting liability or obligation in respect of a claim due from the corporate debtor. The appellants invoked arbitration seeking refund of their sale consideration, accepted refund cheques, presented them for encashment, and pursued proceedings upon dishonour of those cheques. These acts were treated as abandonment of their position as continuing allottees and as inconsistent with a subsisting financial debt owed in that capacity. The principle against differential treatment of decree-holder allottees did not apply because the appellants' claim arose from their election to seek refund rather than from a continuing allotment.

Conclusion: The appellants were not entitled to recognition as financial creditors because no continuing financial debt was owed to them as allottees.

Issues: (i) Maintainability of the civil writ petitions challenging the ECIR and consequential measures under the PMLA; (ii) Availability of an alternative remedy before the Adjudicating Authority; (iii) Continuation of the ECIR after acceptance of the Cancellation Report in the original predicate FIR; (iv) Validity of the addendum incorporating an earlier FIR as an additional scheduled offence.

Issue (i): Maintainability of the civil writ petitions challenging the ECIR and consequential measures under the PMLA.

Analysis: An ECIR is an internal administrative document and is not equivalent to an FIR or the commencement of criminal prosecution. Measures concerning search, seizure, freezing and preservation of alleged proceeds of crime under Section 17 and Section 17(1A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 belong to the civil or executive stream of the statutory scheme until a prosecution complaint is filed before the Special Court under Section 44. A challenge to the jurisdictional basis for continuation of such administrative action is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The civil writ petitions were maintainable, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Availability of an alternative remedy before the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is confined to attachment, retention, freezing and related property measures. It does not extend to deciding whether the ECIR had a surviving jurisdictional foundation after extinction of its predicate offence or whether the later addendum was lawful. The alternative-remedy rule concerns discretionary entertainability and does not bar writ jurisdiction where the challenge is to the foundational legality of the administrative action.

Conclusion: The petitioners were not required to pursue the remedy before the Adjudicating Authority, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (iii): Continuation of the ECIR after acceptance of the Cancellation Report in the original predicate FIR.

Analysis: Property can qualify as proceeds of crime only when it is derived or obtained from criminal activity relating to a subsisting scheduled offence. Acceptance of the Cancellation Report, coupled with dismissal of the protest petition, brought the original predicate FIR to an end. A pending challenge to that order, without any stay or order reviving the predicate investigation, does not preserve a live scheduled offence for PMLA action. Revival may be sought if a superior court subsequently revives the predicate investigation.

Conclusion: The ECIR and all consequential coercive action insofar as based on the original predicate FIR could not continue and were quashed, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (iv): Validity of the addendum incorporating an earlier FIR as an additional scheduled offence.

Analysis: An addendum to an ECIR is not inherently impermissible because an ECIR is an administrative document. Its use remains subject to judicial review for legality, rationality, procedural fairness and proper exercise of statutory power. The earlier FIR had existed long before the ECIR and was known to the enforcement authority, yet was introduced only after the original predicate FIR had been cancelled. The two FIRs involved materially distinct allegations, properties, persons and transactions, and no sufficient same-transaction nexus was established. Introducing the earlier FIR to sustain an ECIR whose original foundation had ceased was illegal, procedurally improper and a colourable exercise of power.

Conclusion: The addendum and all coercive action taken pursuant to it were quashed, in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: A live scheduled offence generating proceeds of crime is indispensable to the exercise of powers under the PMLA; an extinguished ECIR cannot be sustained by retrospectively adding an unrelated earlier predicate FIR, though lawful fresh action or revival remains available where statutory requirements are met.

Ratio Decidendi: PMLA proceedings require a subsisting scheduled offence and identifiable proceeds of crime; once the predicate offence is judicially closed, an ECIR cannot continue or be revived through an arbitrary addendum unless the predicate proceedings are lawfully revived.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit availed on inputs covered by the supplier's invoices could be denied for alleged non-receipt of goods, and whether the extended period of limitation was invocable.

Analysis: The appellant produced valid input invoices, stock records, vendor ledger accounts, bank statements and freight-payment details showing receipt, accounting and payment for the inputs. The Revenue relied solely on material purportedly recovered from the supplier, without corroborative evidence in the appellant's proceedings; moreover, the supplier was not made a co-noticee. The transactions had also been recorded in RG 23A Part I and reflected through ER-1 returns. These disclosures negated suppression and did not support invocation of the extended period.

Conclusion: Denial of CENVAT credit was unsustainable on merits and barred by limitation; the demand relating to such credit was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit on services used for setting up a manufacturing plant remains admissible after omission of the expression "setting up" from the definition of input service with effect from 01.04.2011.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 contains a principal definition covering services used directly or indirectly, in or in relation to manufacture, besides inclusive and exclusion clauses. Setting up a factory has a direct nexus with manufacture because manufacture cannot commence without the facility. Deletion of "setting up" from the inclusive clause does not restrict services that independently fall within the principal clause. Credit is unavailable only where the particular service is covered by an exclusion clause. The record required service-wise verification of whether the disputed services were used for excluded construction, civil structure, foundation, or support-structure activities.

Conclusion: Services used for setting up a factory are eligible input services under the principal clause of Rule 2(l) after 01.04.2011, unless the particular service falls within an applicable exclusion clause.

Issues: Whether equipment moved from the Domestic Tariff Area to a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one petroleum contract and subsequently cleared into the Domestic Tariff Area under a fresh essentiality certificate for another contract qualifies as re-imported goods entitled to exemption under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The concessional import benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Customs is conditional upon the equipment being deployed for the petroleum operation certified under the relevant essentiality certificate. Condition No. 48 of that notification provides a specific mechanism for transfer of equipment to another specified person for a subsequent eligible petroleum operation, subject to prescribed undertakings and customs safeguards. That express mechanism cannot be displaced by an implied alternative route through a Free Trade Warehousing Zone yielding an additional fiscal benefit.

Analysis: The statutory fictions under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 regarding the customs treatment of Special Economic Zones and clearance into the Domestic Tariff Area operate for their prescribed purposes and do not create a universal re-import exemption. Re-import requires not merely identity of goods but continuity between the outward movement and their return. Equipment warehoused in a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one contract, and later cleared only upon securing a new domestic contract and a fresh essentiality certificate, is not returned in reversal of the earlier transaction. The original certified deployment is a closed transaction and the later clearance is founded on a distinct transaction. Rule 48(3) of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006 does not apply where the Free Trade Warehousing Zone merely holds the owner's goods without procuring them.

Conclusion: The subsequent clearance of the equipment from the Free Trade Warehousing Zone into the Domestic Tariff Area is a fresh import and not a re-import under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; the claimed exemption is unavailable against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether referral charges received for facilitating vehicle loans and insurance policies constitute taxable Business Auxiliary Service; (ii) Whether penalty for suppression could be sustained despite payment of the service-tax liability before issuance of the show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether referral charges received for facilitating vehicle loans and insurance policies constitute taxable Business Auxiliary Service.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers Business Auxiliary Service. The agreements with banks and the insurer showed that the assessee promoted and marketed their lending and insurance services by informing dealers and customers about the available facilities and facilitating customer referrals. The referral charges were consideration for that promotional activity.

Conclusion: The referral charges are taxable as Business Auxiliary Service, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for suppression could be sustained despite payment of the service-tax liability before issuance of the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires the Department to refrain from issuing a notice where the short-paid tax liability is discharged before notice. The entire liability had been paid before the show-cause notice, and uncertainty regarding taxability accounted for the non-disclosure of referral income under Business Auxiliary Service in the returns.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 is unsustainable and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Service tax remains payable on the referral charges, while the surviving penalty liability is removed.

Ratio Decidendi: Referral activity undertaken under agreements to promote banks' lending and insurers' services constitutes Business Auxiliary Service; where the tax liability is fully discharged before the show-cause notice, penalty cannot be sustained under the pre-notice payment framework.

Issues: Whether revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 could be exercised to direct initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271AAD for an addition made in the assessment.

Analysis: Section 271AAD confers the power to direct penalty upon the specified assessing and appellate authorities, but does not confer that power upon the Principal Commissioner. Penalty proceedings are distinct from assessment proceedings, and non-initiation of penalty in an assessment order does not render that order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The disallowance was also pending before the first appellate authority, which itself possessed statutory power to initiate penalty if warranted. Binding jurisdictional precedent establishes that a revisional authority cannot direct the assessing authority to undertake an action which the revisional authority cannot itself undertake.

Conclusion: The direction under Section 263 to initiate penalty under Section 271AAD was beyond jurisdiction; the revision order was invalid and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to anticipatory bail for the alleged offence of money laundering under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Anticipatory bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is governed by the twin conditions for bail under Section 45(1)(ii), requiring reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. The protection granted in a predicate offence does not automatically extend to the distinct offence of money laundering. Statements under Section 50, when corroborated by bank-account analysis and a financial trail, may constitute material connecting a person with proceeds of crime. The petitioner did not comply with summons requiring personal appearance, and the material disclosed a prima facie fund trail of alleged proceeds of crime to him. The gravity of economic offences also warranted a stringent approach.

Conclusion: The petitioner failed to satisfy the condition under Section 45(1)(ii) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; anticipatory bail was denied against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether appeals dismissed by the Tribunal as defective for unsigned memoranda should be restored for adjudication on merits.

Analysis: The unsigned memoranda constituted a curable and relatively trivial defect. Although the assessee failed to rectify the defects despite notice and was required to exercise greater diligence, refusal to restore the appeals would deny adjudication of the underlying tax disputes on merits and render the Tribunal's default dismissals final without such adjudication. Restoration was therefore warranted on payment of costs and rectification of the defects within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue; the Tribunal appeals were directed to be restored and decided on merits after curing the defects.

Issues: (i) Whether enhanced compensation received on compulsory acquisition of the land qualified for exemption under section 10(37); (ii) Whether capital gain from sale of the office premises was assessable as long-term capital gain despite its erroneous disclosure as short-term capital gain in the return and absence of a revised return.

Issue (i): Whether enhanced compensation received on compulsory acquisition of the land qualified for exemption under section 10(37).

Analysis: The original compensation arising from the same compulsory acquisition had been scrutinised and accepted after departmental verification of the land's agricultural character, ownership and use. The registered conveyance described the disputed survey lands as dry agricultural land, and the Adangal records evidenced agricultural operations. The Revenue's treatment of the cultivated extent as cents instead of hectares was erroneous; on correct conversion, the cultivation recorded substantially covered the landholding and the land acquired. Enhanced compensation from the same acquisition retained the character of the original compensation.

Conclusion: The enhanced compensation qualified for exemption under section 10(37); its denial was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether capital gain from sale of the office premises was assessable as long-term capital gain despite its erroneous disclosure as short-term capital gain in the return and absence of a revised return.

Analysis: The transaction was disclosed in the return and the original assessment had verified acquisition, payment, possession, ownership and period of holding before accepting long-term capital-gain treatment. The record established legal and beneficial ownership and continuous possession from 1995, notwithstanding later formal registration. Reclassification of an already disclosed transaction from short-term to long-term capital gain was a correction of its proper characterisation, not a fresh claim for deduction, exemption or relief. The restriction on accepting a fresh claim without a revised return did not govern such correction or the appellate jurisdiction to grant substantive relief.

Conclusion: The gain from sale of the office premises was assessable as long-term capital gain; the related addition was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Enhanced compensation from the compulsory acquisition is exempt, and the gain on sale of the office premises is taxable as long-term capital gain.