Issues: Whether the accused should be enlarged on bail pending investigation into alleged fraudulent input tax credit claims.

Analysis: The material investigation concerning the accused was substantially complete; the accused had remained in custody since 16.06.2026; and certain co-accused had already been granted bail. Balancing these circumstances against the nature and gravity of the allegations, further custodial detention was not considered necessary for the investigation.

Outcome: Bail granted on furnishing the prescribed bond and surety and complying with the monthly appearance requirement before the investigating officer until submission of the charge sheet.

Issues: Whether an addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) for the difference between stamp-duty value and purchase consideration could be made in the hands of a joint purchaser who had not contributed to the purchase consideration.

Analysis: Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 presumes equal interest in jointly acquired property only in the absence of evidence regarding the respective contributions. The evidence showed that the entire consideration was paid by the husband, while the assessee, though named as a co-purchaser, made no contribution. The Revenue neither rebutted this evidence nor conducted enquiry against the husband. The respective contribution towards acquisition is material for determining the person chargeable on the alleged benefit under section 56(2)(vii)(b).

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) could not be sustained in the hands of the assessee and was deleted.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiated solely on a revenue audit objection, without fresh tangible material after the original scrutiny assessment, was valid.

Analysis: The reopening was founded only on verification of the existing assessment record and the revenue audit objection. No new fact or tangible material, external to the original assessment record, was available to support the belief that income had escaped assessment. Reassessment on matters already examined in the original assessment amounted to an impermissible change of opinion under Section 147.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid; the addition made in the reassessment was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable without an established contravention or failure to comply with a statutory obligation; (ii) Whether a detention and demurrage waiver certificate was required for the period of Customs-attributable delay in permitting re-export.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable without an established contravention or failure to comply with a statutory obligation.

Analysis: Section 117 is attracted only where a contravention, abetment, or failure to comply with a duty imposed by the Customs Act is established and no separate penalty is prescribed. The recorded findings showed that the re-export request was bona fide, the goods were unobjectionable upon examination, the proposed transhipment failed owing to non-availability of a coastal vessel, and the requisite no-objections were available. No contravention or statutory failure by the appellant was identified. Discretion to impose penalty must be exercised rationally, fairly and proportionately; it cannot be a mechanical imposition of the statutory maximum.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 117 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a detention and demurrage waiver certificate was required for the period of Customs-attributable delay in permitting re-export.

Analysis: The goods continued to remain detained despite payment of the penalty under protest, and the Let Export Order was issued only subsequently. Detention and demurrage liability cannot be imposed upon an importer or exporter for a period attributable to delay or omission by Customs authorities, particularly where adjudication has concluded without duty, fine or penalty.

Conclusion: A certificate waiving detention and demurrage charges up to the date on which the Let Export Order was issued and made available was directed to be issued in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The monetary consequence imposed for the re-export request was removed, and Customs was required to extend statutory waiver protection against charges arising from its delay.

Ratio Decidendi: A discretionary customs penalty requires an established contravention and a rational, proportionate exercise of power; where Customs-attributable delay causes detention after adjudication favours the importer or exporter, the statutory waiver certificate must be issued.

Issues: Whether a provisional-release order imposing conditions without affording a personal hearing and without considering the pending request for re-test could be sustained.

Analysis: The right to seek re-test is material to classification and the eventual adjudication. The governing re-test procedure and the request for provisional release required consideration. A decision on provisional release is adjudicatory in character and requires adherence to principles of natural justice, including consideration of the applicant's contentions and an effective opportunity of hearing. The order neither recorded a hearing nor addressed the pending re-test request or the basis on which the stipulated conditions were considered viable.

Conclusion: The provisional-release order could not stand and a fresh reasoned determination is required after granting the assessee a personal hearing and permitting supporting evidence.

Issues: Whether redemption fine and penalty imposed for import of goods treated as e-waste should be reduced after the entire consignment was re-exported and was never cleared for home consumption.

Analysis: The goods were treated as e-waste on the basis of the Chartered Engineer's report and were permitted to be re-exported. The consignment was in fact re-exported in compliance with that direction and did not enter domestic circulation. The classification rested only on the Chartered Engineer's report, which was not conclusive evidence for classification of the imported goods. These circumstances warranted reduction of the monetary consequences.

Conclusion: The redemption fine and penalty were reduced to Rs. 50,000 each.

Issues: Whether the winding-up petition could validly be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal despite prior asset sales and liquidation steps.

Analysis: Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 permits transfer of winding-up proceedings to the National Company Law Tribunal after determining whether liquidation has reached an irreversible stage. Admission of a winding-up petition, appointment of a liquidator, possession of assets, or sale of assets by secured creditors outside the winding-up process does not, by itself, establish corporate death. The company retained assets under the custody of the receiver and the official liquidator, and the liquidation steps taken were limited. A financial creditor holding more than half of the financial debt could seek revival through the time-bound rehabilitative framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Conclusion: The winding-up proceedings had not reached an irreversible stage, and their transfer to the National Company Law Tribunal for possible revival was valid.

Issues: (i) Whether the recording and communication of reasons to believe for search, freezing and adjudication complied with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether property may be frozen under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 when its holder is not named as an accused in the scheduled offence or money-laundering case; (iii) Whether continued freezing of the bank accounts and fixed deposits was sustainable without specific evidence, quantification and a finding that the properties were involved in money laundering; (iv) Whether filing of a prosecution complaint before the Special Court ousted the appellate jurisdiction to direct release of seized records or frozen property.

Issue (i): Whether the recording and communication of reasons to believe for search, freezing and adjudication complied with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Reasons to believe under Section 17 had been recorded, as reflected in the material and the impugned order. There is no statutory requirement that those recorded reasons must be furnished to the affected person. The notice under Section 8(1) incorporated the relevant reasons; moreover, Section 8(1) does not require the Adjudicating Authority to separately record reasons in the manner contended.

Conclusion: The challenge based on absence or non-communication of reasons to believe fails and is against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether property may be frozen under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 when its holder is not named as an accused in the scheduled offence or money-laundering case.

Analysis: The statutory reach of proceedings concerning proceeds of crime is not confined to persons named as accused in the scheduled offence. Property held by any person involved in a process or activity connected with proceeds of crime may be proceeded against. The subsequent prosecution complaint also named the individual appellant as accused.

Conclusion: Absence of the property holder's name in the FIR, chargesheet or ECIR does not by itself invalidate freezing; this issue is against the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether continued freezing of the bank accounts and fixed deposits was sustainable without specific evidence, quantification and a finding that the properties were involved in money laundering.

Analysis: The material contained only general allegations concerning involvement in bribery, without identifying particular transactions, establishing receipt or possession of proceeds of crime, or quantifying proceeds attributable to the appellants. The alleged digital material was not produced and no concrete evidence linked the frozen assets to tainted funds. The explanations of lawful sources, supported by returns and business records, remained unrebutted. Section 8(2) requires a written finding, after adjudication, whether all or any property referred to in the notice is involved in money laundering. The impugned order authorised retention merely to facilitate investigation and did not record the required property-specific finding.

Conclusion: Continued freezing of the accounts and fixed deposits was unsustainable; this issue is in favour of the appellants.

Issue (iv): Whether filing of a prosecution complaint before the Special Court ousted the appellate jurisdiction to direct release of seized records or frozen property.

Analysis: A challenge to the confirmation order preserves the appellate jurisdiction under Section 26(4). The filing of a prosecution complaint does not displace that jurisdiction or prevent adjudication of the legality of continued retention or freezing. Proceedings for final consequences under Sections 8(7) and 8(8) remain subject to the deemed embargo while the confirmation order is under challenge.

Conclusion: Filing of the prosecution complaint did not oust appellate jurisdiction; this issue is in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The statutory preconditions for retaining and continuing the freezing of the identified properties were not established, and the impugned order could not be sustained against the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Continued retention or freezing under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requires specific material linking the property to proceeds of crime and a written adjudicatory finding that the property is involved in money laundering; investigative necessity alone is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether periodic royalties paid after 1 April 2016 under a mining lease executed on 16 August 2005 could be subjected to service tax under reverse charge following the expansion of taxability of services provided by Government; (ii) Whether suppression of facts or intent to evade was established so as to warrant penalty.

Issue (i): Whether periodic royalties paid after 1 April 2016 under a mining lease executed on 16 August 2005 could be subjected to service tax under reverse charge following the expansion of taxability of services provided by Government.

Analysis: Under Sections 66B and 66D(a)(iv) of the Finance Act, 1994, the relevant taxable event is when the service is provided or agreed to be provided. The assignment of the right to use the natural resource occurred under the mining lease executed in 2005, before 1 April 2016, when such Government service was brought within the taxable net. Subsequent periodic royalty payments did not alter the time at which the underlying service was agreed to be provided. The Point of Taxation Rules govern the time for payment of tax and do not determine whether a service is taxable. The settled treatment of pre-1 April 2016 agreements was applicable on materially identical facts.

Conclusion: Periodic royalty payments under the pre-1 April 2016 mining lease were not liable to service tax under reverse charge. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether suppression of facts or intent to evade was established so as to warrant penalty.

Analysis: The extracted iron ore was used as an input in the assessee's own manufacturing operations, and any service tax paid would have been available as CENVAT credit. This revenue-neutral position did not support an allegation of suppression of facts or intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Suppression of facts or intent to evade was not established, and no penalty was imposable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The pre-levy date of the mining-right assignment governed taxability, while the revenue-neutral nature of the transaction negated penal consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent expansion of service-tax liability cannot apply to an assignment of rights under an agreement entered before the levy became applicable; periodic payments under that agreement do not shift the taxable event.

Issues: Whether rejection of a Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme declaration on the basis of a summons allegedly evidencing a pending inquiry or investigation was legally sustainable.

Analysis: Section 106(2) of the Finance Act, 2013 permits rejection only where a qualifying inquiry, investigation or audit was pending on 1 March 2013. The summons merely sought annual reports, foreign-currency expenditure details, royalty agreements and returns; the requested material was promptly supplied. No suppression, mischief, defined investigative purpose, or consequential demand for tax, interest or penalty was shown. The summons was therefore routine and roving in nature, and did not acquire the character of an investigation under Section 106(2). The prescribed period for action under the Scheme could not be disregarded by creating an alternative departmental timeline, and no notice under Section 111 of the Finance Act, 2013 was issued within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The rejection of the declaration was unjustified; the declaration was entitled to acceptance and a discharge certificate in Form VCES-3 was required to be issued.

Issues: (i) Whether refund of accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 can be denied when the original availment of credit was not challenged under Rule 14; (ii) Whether general insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services qualify as input services for refund of credit attributable to exported business support and information technology software services.

Issue (i): Whether refund of accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 can be denied when the original availment of credit was not challenged under Rule 14.

Analysis: Rule 5 provides for refund of unutilised credit attributable to exports, whereas Rule 14 governs recovery of credit wrongly taken or utilised. The eligibility of credit already availed cannot be reopened at the refund stage where the Department did not dispute its availment under Rule 14.

Conclusion: Refund could not be denied by reassessing the admissibility of unchallenged CENVAT credit at the Rule 5 stage. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether general insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services qualify as input services for refund of credit attributable to exported business support and information technology software services.

Analysis: The applicable definition of input service in Rule 2(l) was exhaustive during the disputed period. The refund rejection rested solely on an alleged absence of nexus with exported output services, while the identified services had been recognised as input services under the applicable framework.

Conclusion: General insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services were eligible input services, and the related refund could not be rejected for want of nexus. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denial of refund of accumulated credit attributable to the exported services was set aside, with consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where CENVAT credit has not been challenged through the statutory recovery mechanism, its eligibility cannot be revisited to deny export-related refund under Rule 5; services falling within the applicable input-service definition remain eligible for such refund.

Issues: Whether reversal of Cenvat credit was payable on clearance of used refractory bricks as waste and scrap under Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Rule 3(5A) applies where capital goods are cleared as waste and scrap, while Rule 3(5) concerns goods removed as such. The refractory bricks were inputs used in manufacture and, after use, had become waste; they could not be characterised as capital goods or as goods removed as such. The settled treatment of waste arising from used refractory materials also did not support duty liability where such waste was not specified or classifiable in the tariff.

Conclusion: Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was inapplicable; no reversal of Cenvat credit, duty demand, interest, or penalty was sustainable against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the deposited amount representing interest was liable to be returned to the applicant following dismissal of the review petition.

Analysis: The review petition between the same parties had already been dismissed, and the applicant's repeated representations to the State were taken into account. The deposited sum of Rs. 30 crores was found to pertain only to interest.

Conclusion: The respondent-State was directed to return the deposited interest amount of Rs. 30 crores to the applicant within eight weeks.

Issues: Whether transport of taxable goods without an e-way bill at the time of interception justified tax and penalty under the statutory detention provisions despite subsequent production of the e-way bill.

Analysis: Rule 138(1) requires prescribed information to be furnished and an e-way bill to be generated before commencement of movement of goods exceeding the stipulated value. The e-way bill is an integral electronic mechanism for monitoring movement of taxable goods. The subsequently produced e-way bill did not cure its admitted absence during transit. The cited precedents were distinguishable because the electronic e-way bill was not generated before transportation, and the circumstances of the short cross-border movement of iron scrap supported an inference of intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: The absence of an e-way bill during transportation established intention to evade tax and warranted invocation of the detention and penalty provisions; the conclusion is in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether properties devolving upon a beneficiary through dissolution of a family trust are long-term capital assets by including the previous owner's holding period, and whether indexation is available from the previous owner's acquisition year.

Analysis: The properties devolved upon the assessee through succession, inheritance or devolution within Section 49(1)(iii)(a). Since the cost of acquisition was determined with reference to the previous owner, Explanation 1(b) to Section 2(42A) required inclusion of the period for which the properties were held by that owner. The same deeming framework applied in computing indexed cost of acquisition under Section 48; consequently, indexation had to be based on the year in which the previous owner first held the assets.

Conclusion: The gains from sale of the properties were long-term capital gains, with indexation available from the previous owner's acquisition year; the deletion of the short-term capital-gain addition and allowance of consequential long-term capital-gain claims were sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether stamp-duty payment could be treated as unexplained investment where its source was stated to be funds received from the assessee's father-in-law and his income-tax return was furnished.

Analysis: The income-tax return of the father-in-law established his identity and financial capacity. The material evidencing creditworthiness was neither disputed nor independently discredited, and the explanation concerning the source of the stamp-duty payment stood sufficiently substantiated.

Conclusion: The stamp-duty payment was not liable to be added as unexplained investment under Section 69; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether interest received on loans advanced to companies could be assessed as business income by invoking Section 28(ii)(a). (ii) Whether interest paid on borrowed funds used for advancing such loans was deductible under Section 57(iii).

Issue (i): Whether interest received on loans advanced to companies could be assessed as business income by invoking Section 28(ii)(a).

Analysis: Section 28(ii)(a) applies to compensation or payments connected with the termination or modification of an agency or management contract. The interest arose from loans advanced by the assessee to companies and no agency or management contract, or its termination or modification, was established. Though the lending activity was viewed as an adventure in the nature of trade, the Revenue could not substitute the stated basis of assessment under Section 28(ii)(a) with a different general basis under Section 28 at the appellate stage.

Conclusion: The interest income could not be assessed under Section 28(ii)(a) and remained taxable under Income from Other Sources, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest paid on borrowed funds used for advancing such loans was deductible under Section 57(iii).

Analysis: Section 57(iii) permits non-capital expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for earning income from other sources. The borrowed funds were used to advance loans that generated interest income offered to tax, establishing a reasonable and proximate nexus between the borrowing cost and the income earned. The genuineness of the expenditure and its correlation with the interest-bearing advances were not disputed. The disallowance founded on the Explanation to Section 37(1) could not survive once the income was held taxable under Income from Other Sources.

Conclusion: The interest expenditure was allowable as a deduction under Section 57(iii), in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Interest from the loan advances is chargeable under Income from Other Sources, with deduction for the corresponding borrowing cost where the nexus with earning that income is established.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest expenditure on borrowed funds is deductible under Section 57(iii) where it has a proximate nexus with interest income chargeable under Income from Other Sources; Section 28(ii)(a) cannot apply absent a payment connected with an agency or management contract.

Issues: Whether the Department established grounds for appellate interference with the Commissioner's discretionary decision to impose a monetary penalty instead of revoking the Customs Broker licence.

Analysis: Disciplinary proceedings under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2013 require the competent authority to assess the established breach and select an appropriate consequence. Appellate intervention in that discretion is confined to cases where it is arbitrary, perverse, or contrary to law; a different possible view does not justify substitution of the appellate forum's view. Licence revocation is a severe measure affecting the licensee's business and livelihood and is not an automatic consequence of every regulatory breach. The penalty must remain proportionate to the gravity of proven misconduct, and suspicion cannot substitute legal proof.

Conclusion: No arbitrariness, perversity, or legal infirmity was shown in imposing a penalty rather than revoking the licence; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ex parte assessment order confirming demand for input tax credit mismatch could stand without compliance with the verification procedure prescribed by Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST.

Analysis: The prescribed procedure requires the proper officer to obtain invoice-related details from the registered person and verify fulfilment of the conditions for input tax credit under Section 16 before confirming a demand based on mismatch between FORM GSTR-3B and FORM GSTR-2A. The materials indicated that this exercise had not been undertaken before the ex parte adjudication order was issued. The matter required fresh consideration after allowing the petitioner to submit supporting documents and receive a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication order was quashed, and the demand is to be reconsidered afresh in accordance with the circular and law.

Issues: (i) Whether exceeding the prescribed aggregate-turnover threshold caused lapse of the composition-scheme option and liability to tax under the regular scheme; (ii) Whether differential tax on post-lapse supplies was required to be computed on a cum-tax basis.

Issue (i): Whether exceeding the prescribed aggregate-turnover threshold caused lapse of the composition-scheme option and liability to tax under the regular scheme.

Analysis: Section 10(3) provides that the composition option lapses from the day aggregate turnover exceeds the prescribed limit. Rule 6(2) requires a person who ceases to satisfy the composition conditions to pay tax under the regular scheme from that date. The admitted turnover exceeded the threshold, and the demand figures had accounted for accepted e-way-bill errors.

Conclusion: The composition option lapsed from the date the threshold was crossed, and the appellants became liable to regular tax on supplies made thereafter. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether differential tax on post-lapse supplies was required to be computed on a cum-tax basis.

Analysis: A composition taxpayer cannot collect tax separately or claim input-tax credit during the composition period. As no separate tax collection was established, the invoice values represented total consideration inclusive of tax. Rule 35 therefore required extraction of the tax element from the declared value, notwithstanding that the statutory benefit was not specifically claimed earlier.

Conclusion: Differential tax must be recomputed by treating the declared value of post-lapse supplies as cum-tax and applying the Rule 35 formula. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of lapse of composition eligibility remains intact, but the tax base, and consequential interest and penalty, must be redetermined using cum-tax valuation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a composition taxpayer exceeds the statutory turnover threshold and has not separately collected tax, regular tax payable on supplies after lapse of the composition option must be determined by treating the declared consideration as tax-inclusive.