Issues: (i) Whether the exporter was entitled to refund of accumulated input tax credit where goods were delivered under the bill-to ship-to model despite toll-movement discrepancies and cancellation of registrations of indirect suppliers; (ii) Whether Revenue could raise fresh allegations and rely on additional material before the Tribunal that were not part of the show cause notices or prior proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the exporter was entitled to refund of accumulated input tax credit where goods were delivered under the bill-to ship-to model despite toll-movement discrepancies and cancellation of registrations of indirect suppliers.

Analysis: Section 16(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires fulfilment of the stipulated conditions for input tax credit. Tax payment, export of goods, and the direct supplier's continuing registration were undisputed. E-way bills issued under the bill-to ship-to model, transport documents, shipping bills, export general manifest details, transporter certification, and banking records substantiated delivery at the export location and subsequent export. The GST law does not require goods to commence movement from the registered premises of the supplier, nor does it prescribe toll-plaza receipts as a mandatory condition for credit. Cancellation of registration of suppliers beyond the direct supplier did not establish any irregularity attributable to the exporter.

Conclusion: Refund of accumulated input tax credit was admissible to the assessee; toll data and alleged irregularities of indirect suppliers did not justify denial.

Issue (ii): Whether Revenue could raise fresh allegations and rely on additional material before the Tribunal that were not part of the show cause notices or prior proceedings.

Analysis: The show cause notices were confined to the alleged transport-route discrepancy and cancellation of registrations of indirect suppliers. The further allegations concerning licensing, investigations, and other concerns were introduced for the first time at the appellate stage, without a request for admission of additional evidence or supporting investigation material. Rule 45(1) of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 and Rule 112(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 bar production of additional evidence before the Tribunal except in exceptional circumstances, which were not established.

Conclusion: The fresh grounds and unsupported additional material could not be considered; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's documented export transactions and corresponding input tax credit entitlement remain unaffected by non-statutory toll-data objections, indirect-supplier irregularities, or fresh appellate-stage allegations.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory conditions for input tax credit are fulfilled through undisputed transactional and export documents, credit cannot be denied merely on toll-movement discrepancies or alleged defaults of suppliers beyond the recipient's direct supplier; fresh allegations and evidence outside the show cause notice cannot be introduced in appeal without satisfying the prescribed exceptional grounds.

Issues: (i) Whether an importer using forged or manipulated transferable duty-credit scrips through an authorised customs-clearance agent can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser; (ii) Whether non-production of original scrips and allied documents, and denial of cross-examination of Customs officers, vitiate the proceedings for breach of natural justice; (iii) Whether penalties under Sections 112 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable where the importer claims lack of actual knowledge of the manipulation.

Issue (i): Whether an importer using forged or manipulated transferable duty-credit scrips through an authorised customs-clearance agent can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser.

Analysis: An authorised agent's acts within the scope of authority are attributable to the importer under Sections 182, 186 and 226 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and Section 147 of the Customs Act, 1962. The importer authorised the agent to undertake customs clearance and utilise scrips, obtained the resulting duty benefit, and could not disclaim the consequences of that agency.

Analysis: The equitable principle underlying Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 requires good faith and reasonable care. The excess value reflected in manipulated EDI records was never part of the entitlement issued by the DGFT and could not be transferred under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. The importer neither verified the scrips, their source, validity or available balance, nor questioned material irregularities in the clearance arrangements. Caveat emptor required such due diligence.

Conclusion: The importer cannot claim bona fide purchaser protection or avoid liability for duty benefits derived from manipulated scrips. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether non-production of original scrips and allied documents, and denial of cross-examination of Customs officers, vitiate the proceedings for breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The evidentiary basis comprised DGFT entitlement data, customs registration records, EDI transaction trails, electronic records and statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. Under Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, an adverse inference from non-production is discretionary and does not arise where the relevant facts are independently established.

Analysis: The importer had never possessed or independently verified the disputed original scrips and did not establish any actual prejudice from their absence. The denial of cross-examination likewise did not invalidate the proceedings because no material fact or resulting prejudice was identified.

Conclusion: The proceedings are not vitiated by non-production of original documents or denial of cross-examination. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Sections 112 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable where the importer claims lack of actual knowledge of the manipulation.

Analysis: Section 114A applies where duty is short-levied through fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression intended to evade duty. The importer filed Bills of Entry relying on scrips without verifying their existence, validity or credit balance, and directly benefited from the manipulated credits. Personal execution of the electronic manipulation was not necessary for the statutory penalty.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 114A excludes a separate penalty under Section 112 where penalty is imposed under Section 114A.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A is sustained, while the separate penalty under Section 112 is set aside. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The findings apply equally to the connected writ matters arising from the same investigation, and the customs-duty consequences founded on the manipulated duty-credit scrips remain enforceable subject to removal of the separate Section 112 penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: An importer that authorises an agent to use transferable duty-credit scrips and obtains the resulting benefit remains responsible for manipulated or excess credits where it failed to exercise reasonable diligence; absence of original instruments does not invalidate proceedings supported by independent reliable evidence and absent demonstrable prejudice.

Issues: Whether service tax paid on a contractual advance, where no service was rendered and the entire advance was recovered upon termination of the contract, was refundable without the limitation under Section 11B.

Analysis: The contractual advance was received against a project that was terminated before commencement, and no service was provided or consideration adjusted against contractual performance. The entire advance was recovered through encashment of the bank guarantee, while the incidence of the tax payment remained with the assessee. A payment made where no taxable service was rendered does not retain the character of service tax legally payable; it is a deposit with the Revenue. Consequently, the refund limitation applicable to duty under Section 11B did not govern the claim. In any event, the entitlement to refund arose upon termination of the contract and recovery of the advance.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not time-barred under Section 11B, and the assessee was entitled to refund with consequential relief.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notice and assessment orders for financial year 2020-21, issued and passed after the statutory cut-off date, were valid.

Analysis: Section 73(2) of the Telangana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governed the time limit for the proceedings. The notice dated 15.07.2025 and the orders dated 09.09.2025 were issued and passed after the applicable cut-off date of 28.02.2025. The proceedings therefore suffered from jurisdictional error.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice, assessment orders and consequential recovery notice were set aside as time-barred and without jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether penalties could be sustained where the short-paid service tax and interest had been paid before issuance of the show cause notice; (ii) Whether excess service tax paid in one month could be adjusted against liability in a later succeeding month under Rule 6(4A) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Issue (i): Whether penalties could be sustained where the short-paid service tax and interest had been paid before issuance of the show cause notice.

Analysis: Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 grants relief from penalty where the tax due and applicable interest are paid before issuance of the show cause notice. The payments and interest stood admitted and appropriated.

Conclusion: The penalties were not warranted and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether excess service tax paid in one month could be adjusted against liability in a later succeeding month under Rule 6(4A) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Analysis: Rule 6(4A) permits adjustment of excess tax paid against service-tax liability for a succeeding month or quarter. Applying Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, words in the singular include the plural; consequently, "succeeding month" or "quarter" encompasses succeeding months or quarters. The Rule imposes no requirement that adjustment must occur in the immediately following month or quarter.

Conclusion: Adjustment of the September 2009 excess payment against the January 2010 liability was permissible, and the related demand was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax payments already made remained validly appropriated, while the penalty liabilities and the demand founded on denial of the adjustment were unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Excess service tax validly paid may be adjusted against liability in any succeeding month or quarter under Rule 6(4A), absent an express restriction requiring adjustment in the immediately following period.

Issues: Whether the assessee should be afforded an opportunity to reply to the show-cause notice and contest the GST demand proceedings despite non-filing of a reply and dismissal of the statutory appeal as time-barred.

Analysis: The demand was confirmed under the statutory adjudication framework after no reply was filed to the show-cause notice, and the appellate challenge was rejected on limitation. The asserted bona fide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause for the omission warranted a justice-oriented approach. A meaningful opportunity to submit a reply, documents and supporting material, followed by reasonable hearing, was necessary before fresh adjudication.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to submit a reply and contest the demand proceedings afresh before the adjudicating authority, upon payment of costs.

Issues: Whether tax deducted at source from land-acquisition compensation was refundable to the legal heirs despite non-filing of returns for the relevant assessment year and absence of an application for condonation of delay.

Analysis: Compensation payable to land losers under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 was treated as not amenable to income-tax deduction. The rejection of the refund claim solely for non-filing of returns and absence of an application under Section 119(2)(b) was unsustainable, since the petitioners could seek condonation and file the relevant return. The revenue authorities were required to condone the delay, process the return and refund the TDS after receipt of the prescribed application and return.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to refund of the TDS deducted from the land-acquisition compensation; the rejection communication was quashed and consequential directions for condonation, processing of returns and refund were issued, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether seized cash could continue to be retained under Section 132B after completion of the searched person's assessment and be withheld against subsequently initiated reassessment proceedings concerning a non-searched assessee.

Analysis: The statutory charge over the seized cash ceased upon completion of the searched person's assessment, in which no demand concerning the cash was raised and the cash was accepted as belonging to the assessee. Subsequent reassessment proceedings against the assessee, who was not searched, could not sustain retention of the amount. The question whether the cash could originally have been treated as self-assessment tax remains for final consideration in the admitted appeal.

Outcome: The stay application was rejected; release of the net seized amount after adjustment of the stated tax liability was directed, while the appeal was admitted for adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether deletion of the addition for alleged bogus construction expenses was sustainable where the amount had already been considered in the original assessment; (ii) Whether deletion of the addition for alleged fictitious long-term capital loss was sustainable in reassessment proceedings without new information or material.

Issue (i): Whether deletion of the addition for alleged bogus construction expenses was sustainable where the amount had already been considered in the original assessment.

Analysis: The appellate authorities concurrently found that the amount had already been assessed to tax or considered while framing the assessment under Section 143(3) in relation to capital gains. This was a concurrent finding of fact, from which no substantial question of law arose for consideration under Section 260A.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deletion of the addition for alleged fictitious long-term capital loss was sustainable in reassessment proceedings without new information or material.

Analysis: The addition concerned an issue already considered in the original assessment under Section 143(3). No new information or material had come to the Assessing Officer's notice to support its reassessment.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent appellate relief deleting both additions remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent factual findings that an item was already considered in the original assessment, and that reassessment is unsupported by new material, do not give rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260A.

Issues: (i) Whether the negative lien created over the assessee's participating interests and receivables to secure loans obtained by associated enterprises constitutes an international transaction requiring arm's-length compensation; (ii) Whether the arm's-length price determined for the negative-lien arrangement was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the negative lien created over the assessee's participating interests and receivables to secure loans obtained by associated enterprises constitutes an international transaction requiring arm's-length compensation.

Analysis: The negative lien prevented the assessee from creating further charges over, or disposing of, its participating interests and receivables without the lender's consent. The holding companies held investments, whereas the assessee directly owned the underlying operating assets and remained a distinct legal entity protected by the corporate veil. The lien was therefore an independent and valuable security, not a mere consequence of the corporate guarantee furnished by the ultimate holding company. It restricted the assessee's borrowing and expansion capacity while securing loans availed by the associated enterprises. Bankruptcy of the borrower entities and invocation of the corporate guarantee did not cause the negative lien to cease, since the lender's security continued to operate during the bankruptcy process.

Conclusion: The negative lien is an international transaction for which the assessee is required to receive arm's-length compensation. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the arm's-length price determined for the negative-lien arrangement was sustainable.

Analysis: The bank-guarantee rates adopted by the Transfer Pricing Officer and the LIBOR-based approach directed by the Dispute Resolution Panel did not appropriately address the nature and consequences of a negative lien over the assessee's substantial business assets. The arm's-length price requires determination under the applicable transfer-pricing provisions with due regard to the restriction imposed on the assessee's capacity to borrow, expand, and offer its assets as security.

Conclusion: The existing arm's-length price determination is set aside and requires fresh computation by the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Final Conclusion: The negative-lien arrangement remains a compensable international transaction, but its arm's-length consideration must be determined afresh under the applicable transfer-pricing framework.

Ratio Decidendi: A negative lien over an operating subsidiary's real assets, voluntarily furnished to secure loans of associated enterprises and materially restricting the subsidiary's use of those assets, is a compensable international transaction notwithstanding the separate corporate identity of the entities.

Issues: Whether late-filing fee under Section 234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be levied through processing of TDS statements under Section 200A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for defaults relating to the period before 01.06.2015.

Analysis: The amendment to Section 200A enabling computation and demand of fee under Section 234E took effect from 01.06.2015. That amendment conferred substantive authority for such computation and could operate only prospectively. Therefore, TDS-statement defaults pertaining to periods before 01.06.2015 could not attract fee under Section 234E merely because the statements were filed or processed after that date.

Conclusion: The late-filing fee levied under Section 234E for the pre-01.06.2015 periods was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest on borrowed capital was disallowable where an interest-free advance to the assessee's son was allegedly made from borrowed funds for a non-business purpose.

Analysis: The assessee's own capital exceeded the interest-free advance made to his son. The bank overdraft had been obtained in earlier financial years for business purposes, and no evidence established a nexus or proximity between the borrowed funds and the advance. Where sufficient own funds are available to cover an interest-free advance, disallowance of interest on borrowed capital cannot be made merely because the advance was made without charging interest.

Conclusion: The interest disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii) was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the fifteen-working-day period for a competing open offer under Regulation 20(1) runs from the first acquirer's detailed public statement or from the subsequent letter of offer or its advertisement; (ii) Whether Regulation 11(1) permits exemption from the prescribed timelines for making a competing offer.

Issue (i): Whether the fifteen-working-day period for a competing open offer under Regulation 20(1) runs from the first acquirer's detailed public statement or from the subsequent letter of offer or its advertisement.

Analysis: Regulation 20(1) unambiguously requires a competing acquirer to make a public announcement within fifteen working days of the detailed public statement issued by the first acquirer. The letter of offer and its advertisement are distinct subsequent stages under the regulatory scheme. Regulation 20(8) requires identical timelines for competing offers; treating a later letter of offer as a detailed public statement would disrupt that scheme, create uncertainty, and confer an unequal advantage on a bidder who did not participate within the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The competing-offer period commenced from the detailed public statement issued on 04.10.2023, not from the later letter of offer or advertisement; the issue is decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether Regulation 11(1) permits exemption from the prescribed timelines for making a competing offer.

Analysis: Regulation 11(1) authorises exemption only from the obligation of an acquirer to make an open offer, subject to investor and market interests. It is not a general power to relax regulatory requirements or timelines governing an ongoing open-offer process. The appellant neither made the required competing public announcement within time nor complied with the deposit direction that conditionally extended the first offer process. Following closure of that process, an exemption from the competing-offer timelines could not arise.

Conclusion: Regulation 11(1) does not empower exemption from the timelines applicable to a competing offer; the issue is decided against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The statutory framework does not permit revival of a competing offer after expiry of the prescribed period and closure of the existing open offer, without prejudice to initiation of a fresh takeover process in accordance with the Regulations.

Ratio Decidendi: A competing acquirer must comply with the fifteen-working-day period measured from the first acquirer's detailed public statement, and the exemption power is confined to dispensing with an open-offer obligation rather than altering statutory timelines for a competing offer.

Issues: (i) Whether construction services rendered to the identified statutory bodies were eligible for exemption as services provided to Governmental Authorities under Entry 12 of the exemption notification; (ii) Whether the appellant satisfied the pre-01.03.2015 contract-execution and stamp-duty conditions under Entry 12A of the exemption notification.

Issue (i): Whether construction services rendered to the identified statutory bodies were eligible for exemption as services provided to Governmental Authorities under Entry 12 of the exemption notification.

Analysis: The service recipients listed in the work orders were authorities created under statute and consequently fell within the definition of Governmental Authority. Although the impugned order accepted exemption for certain services rendered to Government or Governmental Authorities, it denied the same treatment for other comparable authorities without reasons distinguishing their status.

Conclusion: The denial of Governmental Authority status to the other identified service recipients was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant satisfied the pre-01.03.2015 contract-execution and stamp-duty conditions under Entry 12A of the exemption notification.

Analysis: Entry 12A grants exemption for the specified construction services only where the contract was entered into and applicable stamp duty was paid before 01.03.2015. The earlier adjudication found the available certificates insufficient; the subsequently procured documents were not part of that record and require verification.

Conclusion: Eligibility for exemption under Entry 12A must be freshly determined after verification of the newly produced documents and relevant work contracts.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service-tax demand requires reconsideration because the service recipients' Governmental Authority status was wrongly denied without reasons and the documentary satisfaction of the conditional exemption remains to be verified.

Ratio Decidendi: Exemption for construction services supplied to statutory Governmental Authorities cannot be denied without a reasoned distinction, while entitlement under a conditional exemption depends upon verification of the stipulated contractual and stamp-duty requirements.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides the appellate remedy. The medical circumstances affecting the petitioner's accountant, supported by medical records, together with the peculiar facts of the case, constituted sufficient cause to permit pursuit of the appellate remedy. The merits of the input tax credit dispute were left for adjudication by the Appellate Authority.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned and the limitation-based dismissal of the appeal was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration and dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation warranted interference and restoration of registration.

Analysis: The statutory appellate authority could not condone delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 107 of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. However, the limitation provisions were not to be applied so as to deprive a taxpayer of the constitutional right to carry on trade and commerce under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Cancellation of registration neither conferred a corresponding right on the State nor advanced the GST regime; restoration would enable legitimate business operations and revenue collection. The earlier view permitting such relief in writ jurisdiction was followed.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration and the appellate order rejecting the appeal as time-barred were set aside, and the registration was held valid from 29.02.2024 upon compliance with filing of pending returns and payment of outstanding dues, interest, penalty and late fees under Rule 23(1) of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition for cash deposits was sustainable where the assessee established an opening cash balance and its availability through returns, cash-flow statements and statements of affairs; (ii) Whether the addition based on the excess of stamp-duty value over the purchase consideration was sustainable without referring the valuation dispute to the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Issue (i): Whether the addition for cash deposits was sustainable where the assessee established an opening cash balance and its availability through returns, cash-flow statements and statements of affairs.

Analysis: The recorded opening cash balance exceeded the cash deposited during the relevant year. The returns for earlier years, cash-flow statements and statements of affairs showed that the assessee was regularly assessed and possessed sufficient disclosed cash to explain the deposits.

Conclusion: The cash-deposit addition under Section 69A was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition based on the excess of stamp-duty value over the purchase consideration was sustainable without referring the valuation dispute to the Departmental Valuation Officer.

Analysis: The assessee disputed the stamp-duty valuation, supported the declared consideration, and sought valuation by the Departmental Valuation Officer. Where the valuation is specifically disputed, the correct value must be ascertained through such reference before an addition is made.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 56(2)(x) based on the valuation difference was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both additions were deleted, recognising the disclosed availability of cash and requiring proper valuation determination where stamp-duty valuation is disputed.

Issues: Whether the assessment was valid where the initial scrutiny notice was issued by a non-jurisdictional Assessing Officer, the case was transferred without a formal transfer order, and the jurisdictional Assessing Officer issued a fresh scrutiny notice beyond the prescribed limitation period.

Analysis: The initial notice was issued by an officer lacking jurisdiction. The subsequent handover of the case to the officer having pecuniary jurisdiction was only an internal administrative arrangement and was not supported by a formal transfer order. Further, the fresh notice issued by the latter officer was beyond the statutory period prescribed for issuance of a scrutiny notice. The assessment was therefore founded on invalid jurisdictional proceedings and a time-barred notice.

Conclusion: The assessment order was invalid in law and was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether cash deposits representing pre-school fee collections, recorded in the assessee's accounts and reflected through the income returned, could be assessed as unexplained money.

Analysis: Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies where money is not satisfactorily explained. The cash deposits were explained as fee collections from the pre-school, supported by details of collections and related expenses, and the resulting surplus had been disclosed in the return. The allegation that the receipts belonged to an educational society lacked basis because the society was registered after the relevant financial year. Once the deposits formed part of the accounted fee receipts and returned income, their treatment as unexplained money was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 28,47,400 under Section 69A was deleted in favour of the assessee.