Issues: Whether arrangement fees paid to the Asian Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation for processing overseas loans were liable to service tax under the reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: The statutory immunities under the Asian Development Bank Act, 1966 and the International Finance Corporation (Status, Immunities and Privileges) Act, 1958 exempted the operations and transactions of those institutions from taxation. The applicable exemption was also clarified through CBIC Circular No. 83/02/2019-GST dated 01.01.2019, extended mutatis mutandis to service tax by the circular dated 15.01.2019. The earlier decision applying these immunities to services supplied by ADB and IFC remained undisturbed after withdrawal of Revenue's civil appeals.

Conclusion: Arrangement fees paid to ADB and IFC were exempt from service tax, and no reverse-charge liability arose on the recipient.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice issued after expiry of the limitation applicable to non-fraud cases could be sustained under the extended limitation provision on a bare allegation of fraud or concealment of facts.

Analysis: The limitation for a notice under Section 73 for the relevant financial year, after accounting for extension of the annual-return filing date and exclusion of the COVID-19 period, expired on 28.02.2025. The impugned notice dated 13.06.2025 was consequently time-barred under that provision. Invocation of Section 74 required the notice itself to disclose allegations and material indicating fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. A counter affidavit could not supplement deficiencies in the notice. The notice merely used the expression "fraud or concealment of facts" without identifying how either was inferred or detected, demonstrating an unsupported and mechanical invocation of the extended limitation.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice could not validly be sustained under Section 74 and was barred by limitation; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation founded on fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts is invocable only where the show-cause notice itself sets out the allegations and material supporting that basis; such defects cannot be cured through pleadings filed before the Court.

Issues: Whether penalty for transport of goods without an e-way bill at the time of interception could be sustained where the e-way bill was generated shortly thereafter and the transaction was genuine, fully documented and unaccompanied by evidence of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was invoked because the e-way bill required under Rule 138(1) had not been generated when the vehicle was intercepted. The e-way bill was generated about nine minutes later and produced immediately. The motorcycles were traceable through invoices, engine and chassis numbers and registration requirements; purchase and sale invoices, challans, ledgers and bank records supported the transaction. No discrepancy in quantity, value or classification, or material indicating suppression, undervaluation, fake documents, unaccounted goods or tax evasion, was established. The lapse was therefore bona fide and procedural rather than part of an attempt to evade tax.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 129(3) was not sustainable and the penalty orders were liable to be set aside.

Issues: Whether reassessment could be initiated on the basis of alleged incorrect computation of loss following a share split when the underlying share transactions and valuation had already been scrutinised in the original assessment.

Analysis: The original scrutiny assessment specifically sought details of the purchase and sale of the relevant shares, the disparity between their purchase and sale prices, the applicable rates, unquoted-share holdings, and the capital gain or loss. Complete transaction, valuation, allotment and banking records were furnished, following which the assessment was completed. The reopening reasons relied on the same share transactions and the consequence of their 1:10 split, without identifying fresh tangible material or any non-disclosure of material facts.

Conclusion: Reopening on the self-same issue constituted an impermissible change of opinion and was in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A completed scrutiny assessment cannot be reopened merely by revisiting material and transactions already examined; reassessment requires fresh tangible material indicating escaped income and, where applicable, failure to make full and true disclosure.

Issues: Whether reassessment notices alleging that the partner had failed to disclose taxable interest on capital and remuneration purportedly receivable from the partnership firm were valid.

Analysis: The partnership deeds made payment of interest and remuneration dependent on mutual agreement and were therefore enabling rather than mandatory. The amended deed effective from 01.04.2009 expressly provided that no interest on partners' capital was payable, and no material established actual receipt of interest or remuneration by the petitioner. The reopening proceeded on an erroneous assumption that such amounts were necessarily payable merely because earlier deed clauses contemplated them. The identical basis for reopening the firm's assessments had already been found legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The reassessment notices were without jurisdiction and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether cash deposits made during the demonetisation period, stated to represent cash sales already reflected in the assessee's business results, could be assessed as unexplained cash credit.

Analysis: The purchases, stock-in-trade and sales were not doubted. Given the nature of the trading business, undisputed purchases reasonably supported corresponding sales. The increased bank deposits during demonetisation could result from the inability to use demonetised currency for cash purchases or expenditure, requiring available cash to be deposited in the bank. Since the profit embedded in the cash sales had already been offered to tax, treating the sale proceeds again as unexplained income would result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The cash deposits could not be treated as unexplained cash credit; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the entire gross professional receipts could be assessed as professional income where no return was filed and the assessee had offered 50% of such receipts as income.

Analysis: The assessment of professional income must reflect net income and not automatically the entire gross receipts merely because the assessee did not file a return or comply with assessment notices. Although acceptance of presumptive income in subsequent years under Section 44ADA does not itself confer the statutory benefit for the year in question, it is relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the income offered where the same profession continued and no material change in the earning activity was shown. The assessee's offer of 50% of receipts, payment of tax thereon, and the Revenue's consistent acceptance of that basis in subsequent years supported a reasonable estimation at 50% of gross receipts.

Conclusion: Professional income was directed to be assessed at 50% of gross professional receipts, amounting to Rs. 17,50,750, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Tribunal may refuse to admit an assessee's appeal solely because the amount involved is below two lakh rupees, without giving reasons on the merits.

Analysis: The second proviso to Section 35B(1) confers discretion on the Appellate Tribunal to refuse admission of specified appeals involving fine or penalty not exceeding two lakh rupees. That discretion does not dispense with the Tribunal's obligation, as a statutory quasi-judicial forum, to provide reasons. Reasons are integral to a valid adjudicatory decision. The Tribunal must consider the appeal and, if it finds on merits that admission is unwarranted, record reasons for refusing admission.

Conclusion: The Tribunal could not dismiss the appeals merely on the monetary limit without a reasoned consideration; the matter was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether sponsorship receipts from a women's marathon constituted receipts from trade, commerce or business so as to attract the proviso to section 2(15) and section 13(8); (ii) Whether furnishing Form No. 10BB instead of Form No. 10B with the return precluded exemption under section 11.

Issue (i): Whether sponsorship receipts from a women's marathon constituted receipts from trade, commerce or business so as to attract the proviso to section 2(15) and section 13(8).

Analysis: The marathon was directly connected with the charitable objects concerning women's health, fitness, awareness and empowerment. An object clause need not enumerate every programme or means adopted to fulfil its charitable ends. The treatment of sponsorship payments as advertising expenditure by sponsors did not determine the character of receipts in the hands of the charitable recipient. The quantum of sponsorship or surplus was not, by itself, determinative of commerciality; the decisive inquiry was the intrinsic nature, purpose and manner of the activity. No independent commercial undertaking or commercial services distinct from the charitable event were established. The 20% receipts test applied by the appellate authority was also inapplicable to the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: The sponsorship receipts did not arise from trade, commerce or business; the proviso to section 2(15) and section 13(8) were inapplicable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether furnishing Form No. 10BB instead of Form No. 10B with the return precluded exemption under section 11.

Analysis: The accounts had been audited before the return was filed, the assessee held valid registration under section 12A, and the correct Form No. 10B was furnished during assessment proceedings before completion of assessment. The incorrect form resulted from an erroneous claim under section 10(23C)(iv), and did not affect the substantive availability of the exemption claim or prevent its examination on merits.

Conclusion: The procedural error in furnishing the incorrect audit form did not extinguish the assessee's entitlement to exemption under section 11. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11 and the surplus assessed on denial of such exemption was liable to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Sponsorship associated with an activity genuinely and integrally undertaken to achieve charitable objects does not become trade, commerce or business merely because sponsors obtain promotional benefit or the activity generates substantial receipts or surplus; a curable procedural defect cannot defeat a substantively valid charitable exemption claim.

Issues: Whether penalty for failure to furnish transfer-pricing documentation could be sustained where the penalty notice did not identify the specific information or documents allegedly not furnished, and the transfer-pricing study report was furnished in response to the specific notice under Section 92D(3).

Analysis: Penalty under Section 271G requires a failure to furnish identified information or documentation requisitioned under Section 92D(3). The notice initiating penalty proceedings was ambiguous because it did not specify the documents allegedly not furnished. The earlier notices relied upon were issued under Section 92CA(2), not under Section 92D(3), and did not establish a requisition requiring production within the statutory period. The specific notice under Section 92D(3) was answered within the prescribed period by furnishing the transfer-pricing study report. As the provision is penal and imposes penalty computed at two per cent of the value of international transactions, its procedural requirements require strict adherence.

Conclusion: The statutory prerequisites for imposition of penalty under Section 271G were not satisfied; the penalty was invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether corporate-guarantee commission was correctly restricted to 1%; (ii) Whether interest on loans advanced to associated enterprises should be computed at LIBOR alone or with a basis-point spread; (iii) Whether notional interest was chargeable on delayed receivables from associated enterprises; (iv) Whether the claim for brought-forward losses required verification.

Issue (i): Whether corporate-guarantee commission was correctly restricted to 1%.

Analysis: The earlier coordinate-bench decision for the assessee's own case had treated a 1% guarantee commission as fair and reasonable, having regard to inter-group guarantee rates and the assessee's own charging pattern. The same position governed the year under consideration.

Conclusion: Restriction of the corporate-guarantee adjustment to 1% was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on loans advanced to associated enterprises should be computed at LIBOR alone or with a basis-point spread.

Analysis: Although an earlier order had restricted the adjustment to LIBOR, the applicable market rate for such foreign loans was found to require a basis-point spread. LIBOR plus 200 basis points was treated as normal and reasonable.

Conclusion: Interest on outstanding loans shall be benchmarked at LIBOR plus 200 basis points, partly in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether notional interest was chargeable on delayed receivables from associated enterprises.

Analysis: The assessee had not charged interest on delayed payments from non-associated enterprises despite substantial sales to them. On that comparable conduct, no notional interest adjustment on receivables from associated enterprises was justified.

Conclusion: No notional interest adjustment on outstanding associated-enterprise receivables was permissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the claim for brought-forward losses required verification.

Analysis: The premise that prior appellate directions had conclusively allowed the claim was not borne out by the earlier orders. Verification of the losses and unabsorbed depreciation was therefore necessary.

Conclusion: The brought-forward-loss claim was remitted for verification and consequential allowance in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustment for loans is limited to LIBOR plus 200 basis points; the 1% corporate-guarantee benchmark and deletion of receivables interest remain undisturbed, while the loss claim awaits verification.

Ratio Decidendi: In transfer-pricing benchmarking, an arm's-length interest rate for cross-border loans may include an appropriate LIBOR spread, whereas delayed associated-enterprise receivables cannot attract notional interest where comparable delayed payments by non-associated enterprises are interest-free.

Issues: (i) Classification of roasted walnuts; (ii) Eligibility of roasted walnuts for preferential customs-duty benefit.

Issue (i): Classification of roasted walnuts.

Analysis: Tariff classification is governed by Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, the terms of the headings, and relevant Section and Chapter Notes. Heading 2008 covers fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants otherwise prepared or preserved. Roasting is distinct from drying: it is a high-heat treatment producing physical and chemical changes in the product. The processes specified for Chapter 8 do not include roasting, while Tariff Item 2008 19 91 specifically covers other roasted nuts and seeds. HSN Explanatory Notes and common trade understanding support this specific classification.

Conclusion: Roasted walnuts are classifiable under Tariff Item 2008 19 91 as other roasted nuts and seeds, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Eligibility of roasted walnuts for preferential customs-duty benefit.

Analysis: The claimed preferential basic customs-duty exemption under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus, as amended by Notification No. 41/2019, depends upon proof of origin to the satisfaction of the competent customs officer in accordance with the applicable ASEAN-India origin rules and the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020.

Conclusion: The preferential duty benefit is available only upon satisfactory proof that the goods originate in the relevant notified country, in favour of the assessee subject to fulfilment of the origin requirement.

Final Conclusion: The ruling confirms the tariff treatment of roasted walnuts and recognises their potential entitlement to the notified preferential rate upon compliance with origin requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: Nuts subjected to roasting, being a process distinct from drying and specifically covered by the tariff, are classifiable under the specific entry for other roasted nuts and seeds.

Issues: Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, inserted with effect from 26.05.2026, applies to pending insolvency applications concerning personal guarantors to corporate debtors and removes the interim-moratorium bar to the suit.

Analysis: Section 96(4) was introduced to address misuse of the interim moratorium by personal guarantors who initiated insolvency proceedings to obstruct recovery action. The amendment operates prospectively upon the existing status of a pending insolvency application and is retroactive or quasi-retroactive, rather than truly retrospective. The expression "is filed" encompasses applications filed before the amendment that remained pending when it came into force. The removal of the pre-admission protection does not impair a vested right, but restores creditors' ability to pursue remedies during pending proceedings.

Conclusion: Section 96(4) applies to the pending Section 95 application; the interim moratorium in favour of the personal guarantor stood vacated from the amendment's effective date, and the suit is not barred. The application for rejection of the plaint was rejected.

Issues: Whether the impugned anti-profiteering determinations concerning real-estate projects required fresh consideration under the project-specific methodology prescribed for computing profiteering benefit.

Analysis: The real-estate methodology based on the difference between input-tax-credit-to-turnover ratios in the pre-GST and post-GST periods was identified as unsuitable because construction expenditure, input-tax-credit accrual and buyer collections are not uniform throughout a project's lifecycle. The applicable approach requires computation of the total GST-related saving for each project and allocation of that saving on the basis of the total project area, so that purchasers of equivalent area receive equivalent benefit.

Conclusion: The profiteering determinations require fresh evaluation under the project-specific methodology applicable to real-estate projects.

Issues: Whether profiteering in a real-estate project could be determined by comparing the input-tax-credit-to-turnover ratios for the pre-GST and post-GST periods.

Analysis: The input tax credit and buyer collections in a real-estate project do not necessarily accrue uniformly during the project life cycle. A turnover-based comparison therefore lacks a direct correlation with the input tax credit attributable to a particular period. The applicable approach requires computation of the total GST-related savings for each project and allocation of that benefit on a per-square-foot basis, so that buyers of equivalent areas receive equivalent benefit.

Conclusion: The profiteering determination for the real-estate project must be reconsidered using a project-wise methodology based on total savings and per-square-foot allocation of benefit.

Issues: (i) Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation; (ii) whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible; and (iii) whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation.

Analysis: Although the notices arose from a common investigation and involved overlapping material, they concerned distinct subject matters, including live intercepted consignments, previously cleared consignments, and goods found at multiple data centres. Two notices had already been adjudicated, and directing common adjudication at this stage would require displacement of that adjudication while its validity was separately under challenge.

Conclusion: Appointment of a single Common Adjudicating Authority for all three notices was declined, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible.

Analysis: The order dated 19.08.2025 contained prima facie observations and directed adjournment only of the hearing before the Mumbai authority. It did not stay or restrain adjudication of the two notices pending before the competent authority at New Delhi.

Conclusion: The pending writ petition and the order dated 19.08.2025 did not render the New Delhi adjudication without jurisdiction, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Analysis: Availability of an alternative statutory remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction. However, the alleged non-consideration of replies, service of hearing notices, adequacy of hearing, limitation, and related objections required examination of the adjudication record and disputed factual matters. The statutory appellate authority was competent to examine those matters and grant appropriate relief.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was not invoked to determine the procedural, limitation, or substantive objections; those objections may be pursued before the statutory appellate forum, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The merits of the allegations, valuation, duty and penalty liability, limitation, and the individual natural-justice objections remain open for determination in the statutory appellate proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where objections to a consolidated customs adjudication depend on disputed facts and examination of the complete record, the statutory appellate remedy should ordinarily be pursued unless an inherent jurisdictional defect or exceptional ground is established.

Issues: Whether separately imported laptop LCD display panels, without video-signal converting components, are classifiable as computer parts under tariff item 84733099 or as flat panel display modules under heading 8524.

Analysis: Classification is governed sequentially by the General Rules for Interpretation, beginning with the terms of the headings and relevant Chapter Notes. Heading 8524 specifically covers flat panel display modules, including LCD, LED and OLED technologies, when presented separately and not integrated into another apparatus. Chapter Note 7 gives heading 8524 precedence for display modules having a display screen and lacking video-signal converting components. The imported panels were separately presented, retained their independent identity as flat panel display modules, and admittedly did not contain scaler ICs, decoder ICs or application processors. Their intended use as replacement laptop screens could not displace the specific tariff description in favour of the general heading for computer parts and accessories.

Conclusion: The imported laptop LCD panels are classifiable under heading 8524 and attract basic customs duty at 15%; classification under tariff item 84733099 is incorrect.

Issues: (i) Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A; (ii) Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs; (iii) Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo; (iv) Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (v) Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively; (vi) Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.

Issue (i): Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A.

Analysis: Section 196(1)(c) authorises the Board to levy fees or other charges for carrying out the purposes of the Code; this authority is not confined to registration and renewal fees payable by insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies and information utilities. Sections 196 and 240 disclose the Board's broad executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative role across the corporate insolvency resolution process, including matters concerning the committee of creditors, voting, resolution plans and process costs.

Conclusion: Regulation 31A was made within the Board's statutory authority; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs.

Analysis: Section 5(13)(e) is a residuary provision permitting costs specified by the Board, and Section 240(2)(d) expressly authorises regulations concerning such other costs. The distinct categories in Section 5(13)(a) to (d) do not constitute a common genus. Consequently, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis cannot restrict Section 5(13)(e). Regulation 31(ba), read with Regulation 31A, validly includes the regulatory fee within insolvency resolution process costs.

Conclusion: Regulation 31A is not ultra vires the Code; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (iii): Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo.

Analysis: For a regulatory fee, direct and arithmetically precise quid pro quo is unnecessary; a broad, general nexus between the levy and regulatory services is sufficient. The Board's regulation of insolvency service providers and its regulation-making, information, oversight and process-related functions provide an integrated regulatory framework benefiting corporate insolvency resolution process stakeholders, including resolution applicants. The levy supports the Board's regulatory functions and financial self-sufficiency.

Conclusion: The levy is a valid regulatory fee and not a tax; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (iv): Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: A regulatory fee need not correspond exactly to annual expenditure or yield no surplus. The audited figures showed that the levy enabled the Board to meet its expenditure after earlier deficits, and did not establish an excessive, confiscatory or disproportionate collection. The amounts remain available for the Board's regulatory functions rather than forming part of the general revenues of the State.

Conclusion: The regulatory fee is neither excessive nor arbitrary and does not violate Article 14; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (v): Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively.

Analysis: The proviso expressly applies to resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022 and is prospective in operation. Approval by the committee of creditors binds the committee and the resolution applicant as to commercial terms, but does not reduce the adjudicating authority to a ministerial role. The adjudicating authority must ensure compliance with Section 30(2), including priority payment of insolvency resolution process costs, and may require rectification or reconsideration in limited circumstances. No vested right was disturbed while approval remained pending.

Conclusion: The proviso is prospective and valid; the issue is against the petitioners.

Issue (vi): Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.

Analysis: The regulatory fee at 0.25 per cent of realisable value was not shown to be confiscatory or unreasonable. Sections 5(13)(e), 196(1)(c) and 240(2)(d) provide statutory guidance for the levy and its inclusion as a process cost. The challenged regulation is also subject to parliamentary laying under Section 241. The relevant enabling provisions and Regulation 31(ba) were not independently challenged.

Conclusion: Regulation 31A is neither a colourable exercise of power nor an instance of excessive delegation; the issue is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: Regulation 31A validly imposes regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost for resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory regulator may levy a non-excessive regulatory fee under an express power to carry out the purposes of the governing code where the levy bears a broad nexus to its regulatory functions; direct quid pro quo with each payer is not indispensable.

Issues: Whether homebuyers who invoked arbitration for refund and accepted and presented refund cheques could be recognised as financial creditors under Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Analysis: Section 5(7) requires that a financial debt be owed to a person, while Section 5(8)(f) treats amounts raised from an allottee in a real-estate project as having the commercial effect of borrowing. Section 3(11) requires a subsisting liability or obligation in respect of a claim due from the corporate debtor. The appellants invoked arbitration seeking refund of their sale consideration, accepted refund cheques, presented them for encashment, and pursued proceedings upon dishonour of those cheques. These acts were treated as abandonment of their position as continuing allottees and as inconsistent with a subsisting financial debt owed in that capacity. The principle against differential treatment of decree-holder allottees did not apply because the appellants' claim arose from their election to seek refund rather than from a continuing allotment.

Conclusion: The appellants were not entitled to recognition as financial creditors because no continuing financial debt was owed to them as allottees.