Issues: (i) Whether confiscation of the gold seized from the assessee's premises under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable; (ii) Whether penalty under Sections 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether confiscation of the gold seized from the assessee's premises under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 permits reliance on statements to prove their contents only in the prescribed circumstances. The finding that the seized gold was smuggled substantially rested on a retracted statement and statements of other persons. The makers were not made available for cross-examination despite a specific request. Such untested statements could not constitute legal evidence against the assessee. The remaining material concerning a wider smuggling syndicate did not independently establish that the particular gold seized was smuggled.

Conclusion: The confiscation was unsustainable and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Sections 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable.

Analysis: The penalty was founded substantially on the same retracted and untested statements used to implicate the assessee in receipt and refining of smuggled gold. Denial of cross-examination violated Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 and the principles of natural justice. In the absence of admissible evidence independently establishing knowledge or involvement, the evidentiary basis for penalty failed.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The findings founded on retracted statements without the requested opportunity for cross-examination were vitiated, eliminating the legal basis for the customs consequences imposed on the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A retracted statement relied upon against a noticee cannot be treated as substantive evidence under Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 where requested cross-examination of its maker is denied; absent independent admissible evidence, confiscation and penalty cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether revocation proceedings could be sustained where statements relied upon in the show-cause notice and offence report were not supplied to the Customs Broker despite repeated requests.

Analysis: The relied-upon statements of the F-Card holder and G-Card holder formed a material basis of the allegations, but were not furnished to the appellant. This deprived the appellant of an effective opportunity to address, contradict, and make submissions on that material, contrary to the principles of natural justice applicable to proceedings under Regulation 17 of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Conclusion: The matter requires fresh adjudication after supplying the relied-upon statements and granting a reasonable opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice and enquiry report.

Issues: (i) Whether refund of excess service tax paid under mistake is subject to the one-year limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944; (ii) Whether the refund claim is barred by unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether refund of excess service tax paid under mistake is subject to the one-year limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 11B applies to refund of duty or tax legally leviable under the statutory scheme. The excess amount, having been paid inadvertently where no tax liability existed, lacked legal authority and was in the nature of a deposit. Article 265 of the Constitution of India prohibits retention of a tax amount without authority of law. The assessment-related refund principles relied upon by Revenue were inapplicable because the claim concerned refund of an excess deposit rather than reassessment of service tax.

Conclusion: The one-year limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 does not apply to refund of the excess amount paid under mistake; the issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the refund claim is barred by unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The invoices and the Superintendent's certificate established that the service tax amount forming the claim had not been recovered from service recipients. The assessee consequently discharged the burden of showing that the incidence of the excess payment had not been passed on to another person.

Conclusion: The refund claim is not barred by unjust enrichment; the issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Excess service tax paid without legal liability is refundable as a deposit where the assessee establishes that its incidence was not passed on.

Ratio Decidendi: An amount paid as tax under mistake, without an underlying taxable liability, is a refundable deposit outside the limitation regime for statutory duty refunds, provided unjust enrichment is disproved.

Issues: Whether the claimed reimbursed expenses could be excluded from taxable value on the basis that the appellant acted as a pure agent.

Analysis: The claim of reimbursement and pure-agent status was unsupported by contractual agreements or other documentary evidence correlating the disputed amounts with expenses incurred for clients. The initial burden to establish the factual basis for exclusion had not been discharged. The appellant was nevertheless permitted to produce the requisite evidence before the original authority; if reimbursement is established, the governing principle that service tax is not chargeable on reimbursed expenses is to be applied.

Outcome: The matter was remanded for de novo consideration.

Issues: Whether the hospital's retention of a share of patient fees under arrangements with consultant doctors for provision of healthcare services was taxable as Business Support Service before 1 July 2012 or as a taxable service thereafter.

Analysis: The contractual arrangements constituted mutually beneficial revenue-sharing arrangements under which the consultant doctors rendered professional services and the hospital managed and delivered healthcare services to patients, including supporting facilities and follow-up care. The retained share was not consideration separately attributable to infrastructural support supplied to the doctors. Treating that share as Business Support Service or another taxable service would be inconsistent with the exemption available to healthcare services rendered by clinical establishments. The applicable coordinate-bench rulings on identical arrangements had been accepted by the department.

Conclusion: The retained amount was not liable to service tax as Business Support Service or as a taxable service. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty under Rule 25 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 can be imposed upon suppliers that cleared their goods on payment of excise duty, merely because invoices did not correctly identify the buyer.

Analysis: Rule 25 is expressly subject to Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Its invocation therefore requires the conditions under Section 11AC, including non-levy, non-payment, short-levy, short-payment or erroneous refund of duty, to be satisfied. The goods supplied by the respondents were admittedly cleared on payment of the applicable excise duty. Incorrect or omitted buyer particulars in invoices, even if constituting a procedural lapse under Rule 11(2), did not establish any duty evasion by those suppliers or fulfil the statutory preconditions for penalty and confiscation under Rule 25.

Conclusion: Penalty under Rule 25 was not imposable on suppliers whose goods were cleared on payment of duty; the question was answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the accused should be enlarged on bail pending investigation into alleged fraudulent input tax credit claims.

Analysis: The material investigation concerning the accused was substantially complete; the accused had remained in custody since 16.06.2026; and certain co-accused had already been granted bail. Balancing these circumstances against the nature and gravity of the allegations, further custodial detention was not considered necessary for the investigation.

Outcome: Bail granted on furnishing the prescribed bond and surety and complying with the monthly appearance requirement before the investigating officer until submission of the charge sheet.

Issues: Whether an addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) for the difference between stamp-duty value and purchase consideration could be made in the hands of a joint purchaser who had not contributed to the purchase consideration.

Analysis: Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 presumes equal interest in jointly acquired property only in the absence of evidence regarding the respective contributions. The evidence showed that the entire consideration was paid by the husband, while the assessee, though named as a co-purchaser, made no contribution. The Revenue neither rebutted this evidence nor conducted enquiry against the husband. The respective contribution towards acquisition is material for determining the person chargeable on the alleged benefit under section 56(2)(vii)(b).

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) could not be sustained in the hands of the assessee and was deleted.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiated solely on a revenue audit objection, without fresh tangible material after the original scrutiny assessment, was valid.

Analysis: The reopening was founded only on verification of the existing assessment record and the revenue audit objection. No new fact or tangible material, external to the original assessment record, was available to support the belief that income had escaped assessment. Reassessment on matters already examined in the original assessment amounted to an impermissible change of opinion under Section 147.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid; the addition made in the reassessment was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable without an established contravention or failure to comply with a statutory obligation; (ii) Whether a detention and demurrage waiver certificate was required for the period of Customs-attributable delay in permitting re-export.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable without an established contravention or failure to comply with a statutory obligation.

Analysis: Section 117 is attracted only where a contravention, abetment, or failure to comply with a duty imposed by the Customs Act is established and no separate penalty is prescribed. The recorded findings showed that the re-export request was bona fide, the goods were unobjectionable upon examination, the proposed transhipment failed owing to non-availability of a coastal vessel, and the requisite no-objections were available. No contravention or statutory failure by the appellant was identified. Discretion to impose penalty must be exercised rationally, fairly and proportionately; it cannot be a mechanical imposition of the statutory maximum.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 117 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a detention and demurrage waiver certificate was required for the period of Customs-attributable delay in permitting re-export.

Analysis: The goods continued to remain detained despite payment of the penalty under protest, and the Let Export Order was issued only subsequently. Detention and demurrage liability cannot be imposed upon an importer or exporter for a period attributable to delay or omission by Customs authorities, particularly where adjudication has concluded without duty, fine or penalty.

Conclusion: A certificate waiving detention and demurrage charges up to the date on which the Let Export Order was issued and made available was directed to be issued in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The monetary consequence imposed for the re-export request was removed, and Customs was required to extend statutory waiver protection against charges arising from its delay.

Ratio Decidendi: A discretionary customs penalty requires an established contravention and a rational, proportionate exercise of power; where Customs-attributable delay causes detention after adjudication favours the importer or exporter, the statutory waiver certificate must be issued.

Issues: Whether a provisional-release order imposing conditions without affording a personal hearing and without considering the pending request for re-test could be sustained.

Analysis: The right to seek re-test is material to classification and the eventual adjudication. The governing re-test procedure and the request for provisional release required consideration. A decision on provisional release is adjudicatory in character and requires adherence to principles of natural justice, including consideration of the applicant's contentions and an effective opportunity of hearing. The order neither recorded a hearing nor addressed the pending re-test request or the basis on which the stipulated conditions were considered viable.

Conclusion: The provisional-release order could not stand and a fresh reasoned determination is required after granting the assessee a personal hearing and permitting supporting evidence.

Issues: Whether redemption fine and penalty imposed for import of goods treated as e-waste should be reduced after the entire consignment was re-exported and was never cleared for home consumption.

Analysis: The goods were treated as e-waste on the basis of the Chartered Engineer's report and were permitted to be re-exported. The consignment was in fact re-exported in compliance with that direction and did not enter domestic circulation. The classification rested only on the Chartered Engineer's report, which was not conclusive evidence for classification of the imported goods. These circumstances warranted reduction of the monetary consequences.

Conclusion: The redemption fine and penalty were reduced to Rs. 50,000 each.

Issues: Whether the winding-up petition could validly be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal despite prior asset sales and liquidation steps.

Analysis: Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 permits transfer of winding-up proceedings to the National Company Law Tribunal after determining whether liquidation has reached an irreversible stage. Admission of a winding-up petition, appointment of a liquidator, possession of assets, or sale of assets by secured creditors outside the winding-up process does not, by itself, establish corporate death. The company retained assets under the custody of the receiver and the official liquidator, and the liquidation steps taken were limited. A financial creditor holding more than half of the financial debt could seek revival through the time-bound rehabilitative framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Conclusion: The winding-up proceedings had not reached an irreversible stage, and their transfer to the National Company Law Tribunal for possible revival was valid.

Issues: (i) Whether the recording and communication of reasons to believe for search, freezing and adjudication complied with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether property may be frozen under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 when its holder is not named as an accused in the scheduled offence or money-laundering case; (iii) Whether continued freezing of the bank accounts and fixed deposits was sustainable without specific evidence, quantification and a finding that the properties were involved in money laundering; (iv) Whether filing of a prosecution complaint before the Special Court ousted the appellate jurisdiction to direct release of seized records or frozen property.

Issue (i): Whether the recording and communication of reasons to believe for search, freezing and adjudication complied with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Reasons to believe under Section 17 had been recorded, as reflected in the material and the impugned order. There is no statutory requirement that those recorded reasons must be furnished to the affected person. The notice under Section 8(1) incorporated the relevant reasons; moreover, Section 8(1) does not require the Adjudicating Authority to separately record reasons in the manner contended.

Conclusion: The challenge based on absence or non-communication of reasons to believe fails and is against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether property may be frozen under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 when its holder is not named as an accused in the scheduled offence or money-laundering case.

Analysis: The statutory reach of proceedings concerning proceeds of crime is not confined to persons named as accused in the scheduled offence. Property held by any person involved in a process or activity connected with proceeds of crime may be proceeded against. The subsequent prosecution complaint also named the individual appellant as accused.

Conclusion: Absence of the property holder's name in the FIR, chargesheet or ECIR does not by itself invalidate freezing; this issue is against the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether continued freezing of the bank accounts and fixed deposits was sustainable without specific evidence, quantification and a finding that the properties were involved in money laundering.

Analysis: The material contained only general allegations concerning involvement in bribery, without identifying particular transactions, establishing receipt or possession of proceeds of crime, or quantifying proceeds attributable to the appellants. The alleged digital material was not produced and no concrete evidence linked the frozen assets to tainted funds. The explanations of lawful sources, supported by returns and business records, remained unrebutted. Section 8(2) requires a written finding, after adjudication, whether all or any property referred to in the notice is involved in money laundering. The impugned order authorised retention merely to facilitate investigation and did not record the required property-specific finding.

Conclusion: Continued freezing of the accounts and fixed deposits was unsustainable; this issue is in favour of the appellants.

Issue (iv): Whether filing of a prosecution complaint before the Special Court ousted the appellate jurisdiction to direct release of seized records or frozen property.

Analysis: A challenge to the confirmation order preserves the appellate jurisdiction under Section 26(4). The filing of a prosecution complaint does not displace that jurisdiction or prevent adjudication of the legality of continued retention or freezing. Proceedings for final consequences under Sections 8(7) and 8(8) remain subject to the deemed embargo while the confirmation order is under challenge.

Conclusion: Filing of the prosecution complaint did not oust appellate jurisdiction; this issue is in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The statutory preconditions for retaining and continuing the freezing of the identified properties were not established, and the impugned order could not be sustained against the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Continued retention or freezing under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requires specific material linking the property to proceeds of crime and a written adjudicatory finding that the property is involved in money laundering; investigative necessity alone is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether periodic royalties paid after 1 April 2016 under a mining lease executed on 16 August 2005 could be subjected to service tax under reverse charge following the expansion of taxability of services provided by Government; (ii) Whether suppression of facts or intent to evade was established so as to warrant penalty.

Issue (i): Whether periodic royalties paid after 1 April 2016 under a mining lease executed on 16 August 2005 could be subjected to service tax under reverse charge following the expansion of taxability of services provided by Government.

Analysis: Under Sections 66B and 66D(a)(iv) of the Finance Act, 1994, the relevant taxable event is when the service is provided or agreed to be provided. The assignment of the right to use the natural resource occurred under the mining lease executed in 2005, before 1 April 2016, when such Government service was brought within the taxable net. Subsequent periodic royalty payments did not alter the time at which the underlying service was agreed to be provided. The Point of Taxation Rules govern the time for payment of tax and do not determine whether a service is taxable. The settled treatment of pre-1 April 2016 agreements was applicable on materially identical facts.

Conclusion: Periodic royalty payments under the pre-1 April 2016 mining lease were not liable to service tax under reverse charge. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether suppression of facts or intent to evade was established so as to warrant penalty.

Analysis: The extracted iron ore was used as an input in the assessee's own manufacturing operations, and any service tax paid would have been available as CENVAT credit. This revenue-neutral position did not support an allegation of suppression of facts or intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Suppression of facts or intent to evade was not established, and no penalty was imposable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The pre-levy date of the mining-right assignment governed taxability, while the revenue-neutral nature of the transaction negated penal consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent expansion of service-tax liability cannot apply to an assignment of rights under an agreement entered before the levy became applicable; periodic payments under that agreement do not shift the taxable event.

Issues: Whether rejection of a Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme declaration on the basis of a summons allegedly evidencing a pending inquiry or investigation was legally sustainable.

Analysis: Section 106(2) of the Finance Act, 2013 permits rejection only where a qualifying inquiry, investigation or audit was pending on 1 March 2013. The summons merely sought annual reports, foreign-currency expenditure details, royalty agreements and returns; the requested material was promptly supplied. No suppression, mischief, defined investigative purpose, or consequential demand for tax, interest or penalty was shown. The summons was therefore routine and roving in nature, and did not acquire the character of an investigation under Section 106(2). The prescribed period for action under the Scheme could not be disregarded by creating an alternative departmental timeline, and no notice under Section 111 of the Finance Act, 2013 was issued within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The rejection of the declaration was unjustified; the declaration was entitled to acceptance and a discharge certificate in Form VCES-3 was required to be issued.

Issues: (i) Whether refund of accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 can be denied when the original availment of credit was not challenged under Rule 14; (ii) Whether general insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services qualify as input services for refund of credit attributable to exported business support and information technology software services.

Issue (i): Whether refund of accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 can be denied when the original availment of credit was not challenged under Rule 14.

Analysis: Rule 5 provides for refund of unutilised credit attributable to exports, whereas Rule 14 governs recovery of credit wrongly taken or utilised. The eligibility of credit already availed cannot be reopened at the refund stage where the Department did not dispute its availment under Rule 14.

Conclusion: Refund could not be denied by reassessing the admissibility of unchallenged CENVAT credit at the Rule 5 stage. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether general insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services qualify as input services for refund of credit attributable to exported business support and information technology software services.

Analysis: The applicable definition of input service in Rule 2(l) was exhaustive during the disputed period. The refund rejection rested solely on an alleged absence of nexus with exported output services, while the identified services had been recognised as input services under the applicable framework.

Conclusion: General insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services were eligible input services, and the related refund could not be rejected for want of nexus. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denial of refund of accumulated credit attributable to the exported services was set aside, with consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where CENVAT credit has not been challenged through the statutory recovery mechanism, its eligibility cannot be revisited to deny export-related refund under Rule 5; services falling within the applicable input-service definition remain eligible for such refund.

Issues: Whether reversal of Cenvat credit was payable on clearance of used refractory bricks as waste and scrap under Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Rule 3(5A) applies where capital goods are cleared as waste and scrap, while Rule 3(5) concerns goods removed as such. The refractory bricks were inputs used in manufacture and, after use, had become waste; they could not be characterised as capital goods or as goods removed as such. The settled treatment of waste arising from used refractory materials also did not support duty liability where such waste was not specified or classifiable in the tariff.

Conclusion: Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was inapplicable; no reversal of Cenvat credit, duty demand, interest, or penalty was sustainable against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the deposited amount representing interest was liable to be returned to the applicant following dismissal of the review petition.

Analysis: The review petition between the same parties had already been dismissed, and the applicant's repeated representations to the State were taken into account. The deposited sum of Rs. 30 crores was found to pertain only to interest.

Conclusion: The respondent-State was directed to return the deposited interest amount of Rs. 30 crores to the applicant within eight weeks.

Issues: Whether transport of taxable goods without an e-way bill at the time of interception justified tax and penalty under the statutory detention provisions despite subsequent production of the e-way bill.

Analysis: Rule 138(1) requires prescribed information to be furnished and an e-way bill to be generated before commencement of movement of goods exceeding the stipulated value. The e-way bill is an integral electronic mechanism for monitoring movement of taxable goods. The subsequently produced e-way bill did not cure its admitted absence during transit. The cited precedents were distinguishable because the electronic e-way bill was not generated before transportation, and the circumstances of the short cross-border movement of iron scrap supported an inference of intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: The absence of an e-way bill during transportation established intention to evade tax and warranted invocation of the detention and penalty provisions; the conclusion is in favour of the Revenue.