Issues: (i) Whether the EPC contract was frustrated by efflux of time; (ii) Whether the amounts claimed under the EPC contract constituted operational debt; (iii) Whether a pre-existing dispute barred the insolvency application; and (iv) Whether the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the EPC contract was frustrated by efflux of time.

Analysis: The contractual termination provisions made termination elective and subject to stipulated notices. Neither party terminated the contract, and suspension due to non-payment did not amount to termination. Efflux of time concerns the natural expiry of a contract, whereas frustration under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 requires an unforeseen supervening impossibility. A suspension resulting from the parties' own non-performance is not such an impossibility, and time was not stipulated to be of the essence.

Conclusion: The EPC contract was not frustrated by efflux of time and continued to subsist.

Issue (ii): Whether the amounts claimed under the EPC contract constituted operational debt.

Analysis: Amounts payable under the contractual payment schedule were consideration for goods and works supplied under the EPC contract and consequently fell within operational debt. Suspension, idling and demobilization charges arose from the alleged contractual breach and were damages; such damages do not become operational debt unless assessed and crystallised by a competent forum.

Conclusion: Contractual milestone payments qualified as operational debt, but the claims for suspension, idling and demobilization charges did not qualify as operational debt unless adjudicated and crystallised.

Issue (iii): Whether a pre-existing dispute barred the insolvency application.

Analysis: A Section 9 application is barred only by a genuine, pre-existing dispute, which need not have culminated in litigation or arbitration but must be evidenced by conduct or communications. The corporate debtor did not respond to the repeated legal notices or the statutory demand notice and raised its defence only in response to the insolvency application. Its total and consistent silence was material evidence that no genuine dispute existed at the relevant time.

Conclusion: No pre-existing dispute existed to bar the Section 9 application.

Issue (iv): Whether the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Under Sections 3(12) and 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, read with Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation runs from the date on which the debt became due and payable and default occurred. Each invoice or payment default has its own limitation period; continued subsistence of the contract does not create a continuing cause of action for an accrued default. The liabilities were acknowledged in January and February 2012, but the insolvency application was not pursued within three years. Legal notices issued by the creditor could not reset limitation, since Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires a written acknowledgment by the party against whom the claim is made.

Conclusion: The Section 9 application was time-barred because the defaults occurred more than three years before its filing and no valid acknowledgment or condonation extended limitation.

Final Conclusion: The insolvency admission could not stand because the operational-debt claim invoked for insolvency was barred by limitation, notwithstanding that the EPC contract subsisted and no pre-existing dispute was established.

Ratio Decidendi: For a Section 9 insolvency application, limitation runs separately from the date each operational debt becomes due and unpaid; subsistence of the underlying contract and unilateral creditor notices do not create a continuing cause of action or extend limitation without a valid acknowledgment by the debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether transport services could be classified as Goods Transport Agency services where the service provider issued bills rather than documents specifically titled consignment notes; (ii) Whether service-tax demands founded solely on Form 26AS and other income-tax records, invoking the extended limitation period, were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether transport services could be classified as Goods Transport Agency services where the service provider issued bills rather than documents specifically titled consignment notes.

Analysis: Section 65(50b) of the Finance Act, 1994 defines a Goods Transport Agency as a person providing road transport of goods and issuing a consignment note "by whatever name called". No prescribed nomenclature or format is required; the substance and contents of the document evidencing carriage are material. Bills containing the essential particulars of transportation may therefore constitute consignment notes. Certificates issued by service recipients confirming receipt of GTA services and discharge of tax under reverse charge were reliable evidence of the nature of the services.

Conclusion: The services were GTA services, and classification could not be denied merely because bills, rather than documents expressly titled consignment notes, were issued. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service-tax demands founded solely on Form 26AS and other income-tax records, invoking the extended limitation period, were sustainable.

Analysis: Form 26AS and income-tax financial records are not statutory determinants of taxable turnover for service-tax purposes. The demands were raised without verification of books of account, invoices, or the underlying transactions. Further, the assessee regularly filed ST-3 returns and the Department possessed the relevant information when the first show-cause notice was issued. The same or similar facts could not subsequently support an allegation of suppression for invoking the extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The demands based solely on Form 26AS and confirmed by invoking the extended limitation period were unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax confirmations, interest, and penalties founded on the disputed differential turnover could not stand.

Issues: (i) Whether royalty paid for a licence to pre-install and sub-license operating software before 16.05.2008 was taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether royalty paid for a licence to pre-install and sub-license operating software before 16.05.2008 was taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service.

Analysis: Intellectual Property Right Service applied only to rights in specified or similarly recognised intangible property under Indian law, while copyright was expressly excluded. The notice and the adjudication did not identify or establish any recognised intellectual property right other than the copyright in the software. The licence granted a right to pre-install the copyrighted software and to sub-license its use with the computers; it did not alter the copyright character of the right. The specific levy on commercial exploitation of information technology software, including reproduction, distribution and sale, was introduced only from 16.05.2008, confirming that the activity was not covered under the pre-existing Intellectual Property Right Service entry.

Conclusion: The software licence was not taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service for the period before 16.05.2008, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.

Analysis: The departmental audit and subsequent correspondence had disclosed the relevant activity to the Department within the normal limitation period. Bona fide dispute over taxability, coupled with such disclosure, did not establish suppression with intent to evade payment. Further, any reverse-charge tax paid would have been available as Cenvat credit for manufacture of dutiable computers, creating a revenue-neutral position inconsistent with an intent to evade.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand, and consequently the related interest and penalties, could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A licence concerning copyrighted software cannot be taxed under the pre-16.05.2008 Intellectual Property Right Service entry where copyright is excluded and no other recognised intellectual property right is identified; extended limitation is unavailable absent suppression with intent to evade, particularly where the transaction is revenue neutral.

Issues: (i) Whether a show-cause notice and adjudication order generated on the GST portal without a digital or physical signature are legally valid; (ii) Whether denial of an effective personal hearing owing to unauthenticated and improperly communicated electronic documents justified exercise of writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (i): Whether a show-cause notice and adjudication order generated on the GST portal without a digital or physical signature are legally valid.

Analysis: Rule 26(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 mandates that electronic notices and orders must be authenticated through a digital signature certificate, e-signature, or another notified mode of signature or verification. Electronic issuance and authentication are cumulative requirements. A system-generated reference number merely tracks the document and cannot establish its authentication, accountability, or application of mind by the proper officer.

Conclusion: An unsigned electronic show-cause notice and adjudication order have no legal existence; the consequential demand and recovery proceedings founded on them are invalid. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether denial of an effective personal hearing owing to unauthenticated and improperly communicated electronic documents justified exercise of writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The unauthenticated documents were placed under the portal's additional notices category and were not otherwise served, resulting in the assessee remaining unaware of the proceedings and being unrepresented on the hearing date. This violated the mandatory personal-hearing requirement under Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. A statutory appeal does not bar writ jurisdiction where principles of natural justice are violated.

Conclusion: The denial of an effective opportunity of hearing vitiated the adjudication, and the alternative appellate remedy did not preclude writ relief. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revenue authorities may initiate fresh proceedings only through a duly authenticated notice and after providing an effective opportunity of hearing; the merits of the tax demand remain open.

Ratio Decidendi: Where electronic tax notices or orders are required to be authenticated, mere portal generation or a document reference number cannot substitute for the prescribed signature or verification; absence of authentication renders the proceedings void.

Issues: Whether the assessment based on contradictory auto-populated input tax credit figures required fresh adjudication.

Analysis: Prima facie contradictions appeared between the auto-populated ITC summary and the ITC reflected in the annual return. The asserted technical or clerical discrepancy required consideration by the adjudicating authority after affording an opportunity of hearing in accordance with principles of natural justice.

Outcome: The assessment order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority for a fresh order.

Issues: Whether the retired employees could pursue statutory remedies, including filing revised returns, in relation to exemption of leave encashment under the enhanced limit notified from 01.04.2023.

Outcome: The writ petitions were disposed of with liberty to avail remedies available under the Income-tax Act, 1961, and all rights and contentions were kept open.

Issues: (i) Whether attachment exceeded the identified proceeds of crime; (ii) Whether property not directly or indirectly derived from criminal activity could be attached as property of equivalent value; (iii) Whether an insurance policy acquired before the alleged scheduled offence could be attached; (iv) Whether an incorrect reference to an unrelated company invalidated the reasons to believe and attachment; (v) Whether discharge of one accused in the predicate offence required termination of proceedings against others; and (vi) Whether the appellant's property could be attached despite his not being an accused in the predicate offence.

Issue (i): Whether attachment exceeded the identified proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The cash-based modus operandi and concealment of substantial sale consideration prevented final and accurate quantification of the proceeds of crime. Attachment was not confined to the amount previously traced, and further proceeds of crime discovered during investigation could be attached. The insurance-policy premiums were found linked to funds layered through offshore entities and paid by the appellant's brother.

Conclusion: The attachment did not exceed the proceeds of crime and was valid, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether property not directly or indirectly derived from criminal activity could be attached as property of equivalent value.

Analysis: Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 includes not only property derived or obtained from scheduled criminal activity but also its value. Where directly derived property is unavailable, siphoned off, or cannot be traced, other property of equivalent value may be proceeded against, including property acquired before the criminal activity. The attached property was valued below the proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: Property of equivalent value was attachable, against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether an insurance policy acquired before the alleged scheduled offence could be attached.

Analysis: Although the policy was acquired in 1998, its premiums continued to be paid until 2014 by the appellant's brother from funds found to be intermingled with proceeds of crime. The subsequent use and layering of tainted funds for premium payments established the relevant nexus, and money laundering was treated as a continuing offence. A pre-existing asset may also be attached as equivalent-value property where directly derived proceeds are unavailable.

Conclusion: The insurance policy was validly attachable, against the appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether an incorrect reference to an unrelated company invalidated the reasons to believe and attachment.

Analysis: The incorrect company reference was an inadvertent error that did not displace the material demonstrating generation, existence, and use of proceeds of crime. The appellant's statement under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and supporting cheque disclosed that insurance premiums were paid through the brother's entity. The movable policy was also capable of transfer, warranting attachment.

Conclusion: The error did not invalidate the attachment or the reasons supporting it, against the appellant.

Issue (v): Whether discharge of one accused in the predicate offence required termination of proceedings against others.

Analysis: The brother's discharge rested on his own lack of knowledge and did not determine the role of the appellant or the principal accused in relation to the proceeds of crime. The appellant had not obtained discharge. Under Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the prior judgment was not relevant to determine the present appellant's position.

Conclusion: Discharge of the co-accused did not require termination of proceedings against the appellant, against the appellant.

Issue (vi): Whether the appellant's property could be attached despite his not being an accused in the predicate offence.

Analysis: Attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 extends to any person holding or involved with proceeds of crime and is not confined to persons named as accused in the scheduled offence. Restricting attachment to named accused would frustrate recovery and confiscation of proceeds of crime held in another person's name.

Conclusion: The appellant's property could be attached notwithstanding that he was not an accused in the predicate offence, against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed attachment of the insurance policy remained legally sustainable under the proceeds-of-crime and equivalent-value framework.

Issues: Whether appeals dismissed for non-compliance with the pre-deposit condition could be restored after the entire service-tax liability was subsequently recovered or paid.

Analysis: The entire amount directed to be deposited stood recovered by the Department and paid by the assessee, thereby satisfying the pre-deposit requirement under Section 35F. Dismissal for non-compliance should not permanently defeat the statutory right of appeal where belated compliance is established and the Revenue suffers no prejudice. Rule 41 empowers restoration of appeals where necessary to secure the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The Tribunal was required to restore the appeals for adjudication on merits after full compliance with the pre-deposit condition. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether an accountant's valuation report is permissible for valuing unquoted preference shares under Rule 11UA(1)(c)(c) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; (ii) Whether the valuation certificate was first produced before the Tribunal so as to attract Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; (iii) Whether the purchase price of Rs. 130 per preference share was below fair market value for purposes of Section 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether an accountant's valuation report is permissible for valuing unquoted preference shares under Rule 11UA(1)(c)(c) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: Rule 11UA(1)(c)(c) permits the assessee to obtain a valuation report from either a merchant banker or an accountant for unquoted shares and securities other than equity shares. The statutory framework therefore does not require a report solely from an independent valuer or merchant banker.

Conclusion: An accountant's valuation report is permissible. The issue is decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the valuation certificate was first produced before the Tribunal so as to attract Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: The record of the first appellate proceedings showed that the valuation certificate, based on audited books of account and attested by the managing director, had already been furnished and considered. It was therefore not additional evidence first tendered before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: Rule 46A was not attracted. The issue is decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the purchase price of Rs. 130 per preference share was below fair market value for purposes of Section 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The seller held a larger pool of preference shares, only a portion of which had been acquired from an NRI at Rs. 240 per share; no basis existed to assume that the shares transferred were exclusively that block. The audited financial statements also provided for redemption at Rs. 140 per share during the relevant period. The statutory valuation evidence and redemption terms supported the price of Rs. 130 per share, whereas the figure adopted from an isolated third-party transaction did not conform to the statutory valuation framework.

Conclusion: The price of Rs. 130 per share was within the statutory fair-market-value parameters, and Section 56(2)(viia) was not attracted. The issue is decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory valuation evidence validly supported the share-transfer consideration, leaving no substantial question of law for interference with the appellate determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the prescribed valuation rule permits an accountant's report, fair market value must be determined in accordance with that statutory method and cannot be displaced by an isolated comparable transaction lacking a statutory basis.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax could be demanded on consideration received for erection services rendered before 10.09.2004; (ii) Whether the residual service-tax demand for 2004-05 and 2005-06 could survive despite payment of the short-paid tax and invocation of the extended limitation period.

Issue (i): Whether service tax could be demanded on consideration received for erection services rendered before 10.09.2004.

Analysis: Erection services were not taxable until 10.09.2004. The applicable circular clarified that erection service became taxable together with commissioning and installation service from that date, and the notification exempted erection services received before that date.

Conclusion: No service tax was payable on the consideration received for erection work undertaken before 10.09.2004. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the residual service-tax demand for 2004-05 and 2005-06 could survive despite payment of the short-paid tax and invocation of the extended limitation period.

Analysis: The short-paid tax of Rs. 4,01,408 for 2004-05 and 2005-06 had already been discharged. The audit objection arose from information available in the assessee's records, and no suppression of material facts was established to sustain invocation of the extended period.

Conclusion: The residual demand was unsustainable both on merits and limitation; consequential interest and penalty could not survive. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Receipts for pre-taxability erection work are outside the levy, and no further tax, interest, or penalty is recoverable on the impugned demand.

Issues: Whether uploading a show cause notice on the common portal, without effective service on the assessee, could sustain adjudication under Section 74.

Analysis: The governing principle adopted was that mere uploading of a show cause notice on the common portal is not sufficient service where its receipt is not acknowledged and no reply is filed. In such circumstances, an ex parte adjudication cannot be sustained without affording the assessee an effective opportunity to respond and be heard. No factual basis was shown to distinguish the applicable principle.

Conclusion: Uploading the show cause notice on the common portal alone did not constitute adequate service; the assessee was entitled to the consequential restoration of the proceedings and opportunity contemplated by the applicable principle.

Issues: Whether input tax credit can be denied where the supplier allegedly failed to pay tax despite undisputed receipt of goods by the recipient.

Analysis: The department was directed to report whether recovery action, including issuance of a show-cause notice, had been initiated against the supplier and the status of such proceedings.

Outcome: The cross-objection was directed to be registered, and the appeal and cross-objection were listed together for hearing.

Issues: Whether preliminary reassessment measures comprising a notice under Section 148A(1), an order under Section 148A(3), and a notice under Section 148 can be challenged under Article 226 before reassessment is completed.

Analysis: The statutory reassessment framework provides an effective mechanism for the assessee to raise factual and jurisdictional objections before the Assessing Officer and, if aggrieved by the completed reassessment, before the appellate authorities. The impugned measures were preliminary and investigative; they neither determined tax liability nor foreclosed objections concerning the applicability of Section 152(3) or the validity of approval under Section 151. Threshold writ intervention is warranted only where there is a total absence of jurisdiction or a patent breach of a mandatory precondition. The objections raised required examination of the information and search-related material and did not establish such an exceptional case.

Conclusion: The preliminary reassessment measures cannot be assailed in writ jurisdiction at this stage; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice dated 31.03.2021 but digitally issued through email on 01.04.2021 was validly issued within the limitation period.

Analysis: The electronic record showed that, notwithstanding its stated date of 31.03.2021, the notice under section 148 was issued on 01.04.2021. The jurisdictional High Court decision on materially identical facts was applied, under which a notice dated 31.03.2021 but digitally signed and issued on 01.04.2021 was invalid.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred and invalid; the reassessment proceedings were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether excess tax deducted at source can be refunded where a return claiming refund is furnished in response to a notice under section 148 and the reassessment determines nil taxable income.

Analysis: Section 237 confers a substantive entitlement to refund where tax paid exceeds the tax properly chargeable. A reassessment resulting in acceptance of the returned income and determination of nil taxable income leaves no tax liability against which the tax deducted at source may be retained. No statutory prohibition bars refund merely because the return was furnished pursuant to section 148 rather than section 139. The refund arises consequentially from the reassessment itself and is not an independent claim outside its scope. Retention of tax not chargeable after completion of assessment would also be inconsistent with Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to refund of the excess tax deducted at source, along with consequential statutory interest, notwithstanding that the refund claim was made in a return filed pursuant to notice under section 148.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to approval under section 10(23C)(vi) despite generation of surplus, construction of educational infrastructure on trustees' land, and the earlier objection concerning State-law registration.

Analysis: The State-law registration objection ceased to survive after registration was obtained from the competent Devsthan authority. Construction on land owned by trustees could not, without material showing siphoning, private appropriation, or pecuniary benefit, establish diversion of institutional funds. The infrastructure was used for educational activities.

Analysis: Section 10(23C)(vi) requires that the institution exist solely for educational purposes and not for profit. Incidental surplus generated through educational activities does not establish a profit-oriented purpose where it is retained and deployed for educational infrastructure and facilities. No non-educational activity, distribution of surplus, diversion of income, or private benefit was established. The earlier scrutiny assessment accepting the assessee's position provided corroborative support, though it was not conclusive.

Conclusion: The assessee satisfied the conditions for approval under section 10(23C)(vi); the rejection was unsustainable and approval was directed to be granted.

Issues: Whether a co-operative housing society is entitled to deduction of interest earned on deposits with co-operative banks under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 80P(2)(d) requires that the assessee be a co-operative society and that the interest or dividend arise from investments with another co-operative society. The assessee satisfied both conditions, as the deposits were with co-operative banks registered under the applicable co-operative societies law. Section 80P(4) excludes a co-operative bank's own claim for deduction under section 80P, but does not restrict a co-operative society's deduction for interest received from a co-operative bank. The beneficial deduction provision was applied liberally, and the view favourable to the assessee was preferred where divergent non-jurisdictional High Court decisions existed.

Conclusion: Interest earned by the assessee co-operative housing society on deposits with co-operative banks qualifies for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether delay in filing a GST appeal could be condoned and the appeal restored for merits adjudication where the order-in-original was allegedly communicated only through uploading on the common portal.

Analysis: The statutory limitation under Section 107 was binding on the Appellate Authority, which lacked power to condone the delay. However, non-adjudication on merits would cause grave prejudice where the petitioner had shown that the delay resulted from circumstances beyond its control and had specifically asserted non-service of the order-in-original. Mere uploading on the common portal, without acknowledged receipt or participation, was treated as insufficient to trigger limitation. The consistent approach permitting merits consideration in such circumstances was applied.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned, the time-bar dismissal of the appeal was set aside, and the appeal was required to be entertained and adjudicated on merits upon compliance with the stipulated pre-deposit requirement.

Issues: Whether ex parte assessment and appellate orders concerning input tax credit mismatch were passed without adherence to the prescribed verification procedure and adequate opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The impugned orders were passed without following the procedure under Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022, which requires the proper officer to obtain invoice-related details and verify satisfaction of the conditions for input tax credit before confirming a mismatch demand. The Court noted the ex parte nature of the consequential orders and required fresh consideration upon a comprehensive representation, while leaving the adjudicating authority free to decide independently on merits.

Conclusion: No final determination was made on the tax demand or entitlement to input tax credit; the matter was directed to be reconsidered by the adjudicating authority after affording reasonable hearing.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the State GST show-cause notice and the interlocutory challenge to the Central GST adjudication order warranted exercise of writ jurisdiction despite the available statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The State GST show-cause notice stood overtaken by the subsequent Central GST proceedings and adjudication order. The interlocutory challenge to that adjudication order was unrelated to the original writ challenge, and no restraint had prevented the Central GST Proper Officer from initiating proceedings. No jurisdictional error in the adjudication order was established so as to justify exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. However, the petitioners had bona fide pursued the writ proceedings on mistaken legal advice while interim protection remained operative.

Conclusion: The challenge to the show-cause notice was infructuous and the interlocutory challenge to the adjudication order was misconceived; the petitioners were granted liberty to pursue the statutory appeal, to be considered on merits if filed within 30 days without objection as to limitation.