Issues: Whether the assessable value of provisionally assessed iron ore exports could be enhanced on the basis of departmental laboratory analysis despite the contractually determined final invoice value and banking-channel realization.

Analysis: Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 3 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007 make the price actually paid or payable the primary basis of export valuation. The buyer and seller were unrelated, the price was contractually adjustable according to quality parameters, and there was no evidence of additional remittance, side payment, flowback, or other consideration beyond the final invoice value supported by the Bank Realization Certificate. A laboratory result concerning iron content may establish quality but cannot, by itself, replace the transaction value with a notional value without a legally sustainable basis for rejecting that value. The undisclosed test report and selective reliance on separate reports for different parameters also failed to support the adverse assessment.

Conclusion: Enhancement of assessable value was unsustainable; the provisional assessments must be finalized on the genuine final transaction value actually realized by the assessee, upon verification of the relevant export documents.

Issues: Whether the one-year limitation stipulated for refund of Special Additional Duty under the amending customs notification could bar the refund claim.

Analysis: Notification No. 102/2007-Customs, as amended by Notification No. 93/2008-Customs, prescribed filing of the refund claim within one year from payment of Special Additional Duty. The limitation condition had been read down in binding jurisdictional precedent on the basis that a substantive limitation adversely affecting refund rights could not be imposed through subordinate legislation without statutory authority. The contrary view of another High Court did not displace the applicable precedent.

Conclusion: The one-year limitation introduced through Notification No. 93/2008-Customs could not defeat the assessee's refund claim for Special Additional Duty.

Issues: (i) Whether the remedy under Section 100(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 is exclusive, requiring exhaustion before an application under Section 98 may be made; (ii) Whether the facts established impracticability warranting an order under Section 98 for convening an extraordinary general meeting.

Issue (i): Whether the remedy under Section 100(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 is exclusive, requiring exhaustion before an application under Section 98 may be made.

Analysis: Section 100(4) confers an absolute additional right on requisitioning members to themselves call and hold an extraordinary general meeting where the Board fails to act on a valid requisition. Section 98 independently empowers the Tribunal to direct a meeting where it is impracticable to convene or conduct it in the prescribed manner. These remedies operate independently; recourse to Section 98 is not conditional upon prior exhaustion of Section 100(4).

Conclusion: Section 100(4) is an alternative and not an exclusive remedy; an application under Section 98 is maintainable without first invoking Section 100(4).

Issue (ii): Whether the facts established impracticability warranting an order under Section 98 for convening an extraordinary general meeting.

Analysis: The statutory jurisdiction under Section 98 is exceptional and must be exercised sparingly because corporate affairs ordinarily remain governed by internal democracy and domestic management. Impracticability must be established on facts from the perspective of reasonable prudence, showing that a meeting cannot realistically be convened without intervention. Mere division among directors and the Board's rejection of the requisition by a majority did not establish that an extraordinary general meeting could not be convened, particularly where the company had numerous other shareholders. No foundational facts or proof of impracticability were placed on record, and no attempt had been made to convene the meeting under Section 100(4).

Conclusion: The precondition of impracticability for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 98 was not established; the issue is decided in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The exceptional statutory power to direct convening of a company meeting cannot displace internal corporate processes absent a demonstrated factual necessity for intervention.

Ratio Decidendi: A requisitioning member may invoke Section 98 without first resorting to Section 100(4), but relief under Section 98 requires concrete facts establishing reasonable impracticability of convening the meeting through ordinary corporate mechanisms.

Issues: Whether the Committee of Creditors validly rejected the proposed resolution plan after it was remitted for reconsideration and the resolution applicant declined to revise it.

Analysis: The directions requiring consideration of statutory and stakeholder claims, and remitting the plan to the Committee of Creditors, were never challenged and had attained finality. The resolution applicant's affidavit itself contemplated revision of the plan, but it subsequently declined to revise the plan value or accommodate the additional claims. The Committee of Creditors was therefore entitled to reconsider and reject the plan. Its commercial decision concerning acceptance, rejection and liquidation remained non-justiciable, particularly since the plan had not received approval from the Adjudicating Authority. Section 33(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits the Committee of Creditors to resolve for liquidation before approval of a resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority.

Conclusion: The rejection of the proposed resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors, and the refusal to interfere with that decision, were valid.

Issues: Whether an unsuccessful scheme proponent that withdrew from the process after its scheme was not accepted could be compelled to deposit the earnest money deposit guarantee into the liquidation estate.

Analysis: The earnest money deposit secured submission of the appellant's proposed scheme. Once that scheme was not accepted and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration, the appellant retained the commercial choice whether to continue in the process. A scheme proponent undertakes to submit its own scheme, not to remain bound to formulate or pursue a scheme meeting the requirements of the committee of creditors or the Adjudicating Authority. The liquidator did not establish any legal basis for recovery of the guarantee amount after the appellant withdrew.

Conclusion: The appellant was not liable to pay the earnest money deposit guarantee to the liquidation estate; the recovery claim was unsustainable in law.

Issues: (i) Whether production before an available Magistrate other than the nearest Magistrate after court hours rendered the arrest or detention unlawful; (ii) Whether the grounds of arrest were communicated to the petitioner's relatives in breach of the constitutional requirement; (iii) Whether prolonged custody and the material on record warranted bail despite the statutory restrictions under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether production before an available Magistrate other than the nearest Magistrate after court hours rendered the arrest or detention unlawful.

Analysis: Production before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at night, instead of the nearer Magistrate who may not have been available after court hours, was treated as a precautionary measure. The petitioner was produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours, and no resulting prejudice was established.

Conclusion: The production before the available Magistrate did not vitiate the arrest or detention. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the grounds of arrest were communicated to the petitioner's relatives in breach of the constitutional requirement.

Analysis: The grounds of arrest were admittedly supplied to the petitioner. The subsequent search record showed that those documents were no longer with him, supporting the inference that he had handed them to relatives present at the premises. Prompt steps in the criminal proceeding, including moving for bail, also negatived any prima facie case that the relatives lacked knowledge of the arrest or its grounds, or that prejudice resulted.

Conclusion: No prima facie breach of the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest to the petitioner or his relatives was made out. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether prolonged custody and the material on record warranted bail despite the statutory restrictions under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Custody of about one year and two months was insufficient to override the statutory bail restrictions because the proceeding had progressed and charges were expected to be framed. The material allegedly linked the petitioner to numerous mule accounts, illegal betting operations and substantial proceeds of crime. The alleged leading role, prior abscondence, possibility of influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence, and risk of fleeing were material aggravating factors. The petitioner could not prima facie establish lack of guilt or that he would not commit an offence while on bail.

Conclusion: The statutory conditions for bail were not satisfied, and the custody period did not justify release. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The arrest-related objections did not establish illegality or prejudice at this stage, while the gravity of the alleged money-laundering activity, prima facie material, and risks to the process outweighed the claim based on incarceration.

Ratio Decidendi: Bail under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 requires satisfaction of the statutory threshold, and custody duration alone does not warrant release where prima facie incriminating material and a substantial flight or interference risk persist.

Issues: (i) Whether the aircraft arrangement constituted Supply of Tangible Goods Service or a transfer of possession and effective control outside that taxable entry; (ii) Whether amounts recorded as "other collections" were includible in the taxable value; (iii) Whether taxing the appellant on receipts already made subject to proceedings against the related concern resulted in double taxation; (iv) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was sustainable; and (v) Whether penalties under Sections 77 and 78 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the aircraft arrangement constituted Supply of Tangible Goods Service or a transfer of possession and effective control outside that taxable entry.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzzzj) applies where tangible goods are supplied for use without transfer of possession and effective control, whereas a transfer of the right to use goods requires exclusive legal possession and control. The contractual terms permitted the lessor to use the aircraft when not used by the lessee, required redelivery after each trip, retained operational, maintenance and running-cost responsibility with the lessor, and allowed termination on thirty days' notice. These features established that effective control and legal possession remained with the lessor.

Conclusion: The arrangement was taxable as Supply of Tangible Goods Service, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether amounts recorded as "other collections" were includible in the taxable value.

Analysis: The show-cause notices alleged only Supply of Tangible Goods Service concerning the aircraft lease. The other collections were neither alleged to arise from the lease nor shown to have a nexus with that transaction. Taxable value could not be expanded beyond the allegations forming the foundation of the notices.

Conclusion: Other collections were not includible in the taxable value, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether taxing the appellant on receipts already made subject to proceedings against the related concern resulted in double taxation.

Analysis: The assertion that the same lease receipts were already included in a demand proposed against the related concern remained uncontroverted. Confirmation of tax against the appellant on those identical receipts would duplicate the levy on the same transaction.

Conclusion: Tax could not be confirmed on receipts already subjected to demand against the related concern, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was sustainable.

Analysis: The Department had knowledge of the relevant transaction and receipts when it issued the earlier notice to the related concern. The subsequent notice proceeded on the same facts, without establishing a fresh positive act of suppression or an intent to evade payment. The prerequisites for the extended period were therefore absent.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable; only demands falling within the normal limitation period could survive, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether penalties under Sections 77 and 78 were sustainable.

Analysis: Fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade tax was not established. The circumstances also warranted the statutory benefit available for reasonable cause.

Conclusion: The penalties under Sections 77 and 78 were unsustainable and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Tax liability survives only for the applicable normal period on the taxable aircraft-supply arrangement, excluding unrelated collections and duplicate levy, without penalties.

Issues: Whether an amount deposited during investigation and remaining unspent in the personal ledger account, before determination of duty liability, attracts interest from the date of deposit at 12% per annum rather than interest only under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The amount was deposited before any determination or appropriation of duty liability and was refundable as a revenue deposit/unspent advance deposit. Such amount did not acquire the character of duty merely because it was credited in the personal ledger account. The statutory scheme under Sections 11B and 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 governing refund of duty and delayed statutory refunds was therefore inapplicable. The jurisdictional High Court decision on materially identical facts was treated as binding and as affirming interest from the date of deposit, including interest at 12% per annum where the Revenue had retained the amount for a prolonged period.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the refundable revenue deposit from the respective dates of deposit until refund.

Issues: Whether fertilizer subsidy received directly from the Government of India under the Nutrient Based Subsidy Policy is includable in the assessable value as additional consideration for levy of central excise duty.

Analysis: Section 4 bases valuation on transaction value where price is the sole consideration. Rule 6 permits addition only where additional consideration flows directly or indirectly from the buyer to the manufacturer. Subsidy paid independently by the Government under a policy scheme to make fertilizers affordable does not emanate from purchasers merely because its amount is linked to the quantity or category of fertilizers sold. The applicable Board clarification, binding on departmental authorities, also treats such fertilizer subsidy as not linked to the buyer.

Conclusion: The Government subsidy is not additional consideration flowing from the buyer and is not includable in the assessable value; the consequential duty, interest and penalty demands cannot survive.

Issues: (i) Whether bail granted to a foreign national accused of an NDPS offence involving commercial quantity was sustainable under the statutory conditions governing bail; (ii) Whether uniform safeguards concerning bail, sureties and monitoring of foreign nationals accused in NDPS cases involving commercial quantity could be issued.

Issue (i): Whether bail granted to a foreign national accused of an NDPS offence involving commercial quantity was sustainable under the statutory conditions governing bail.

Analysis: Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 requires satisfaction of both conditions that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. The material concerning the alleged role, the commercial quantity involved, prior conviction in an NDPS case, and the possibility of enhanced punishment under Section 31A required heightened scrutiny. Prolonged custody and the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 do not dispense with the mandatory statutory framework. The bail order did not record the requisite satisfaction under Section 37 or address the likelihood of reoffending. The accused also absconded after release and the surety furnished was found to be fictitious.

Conclusion: The grant of bail was unsustainable and the bail stood cancelled, against the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether uniform safeguards concerning bail, sureties and monitoring of foreign nationals accused in NDPS cases involving commercial quantity could be issued.

Analysis: Fabricated sureties and the absence of a uniform verification mechanism created a systemic gap capable of frustrating criminal proceedings. Article 142 of the Constitution of India permits limited measures to secure complete justice where existing procedures prove inadequate, without supplanting substantive law. The safeguards were confined to foreign nationals accused in NDPS cases involving commercial quantity and were calibrated to preserve personal liberty, proportionality and judicial discretion where appropriate.

Conclusion: Binding safeguards were issued requiring, among other measures, deposit of passport, FRRO registration, ordinarily two verified sureties, re-verification of the accused's address and contact details before release, disclosure of financial sources and bank accounts, intimation to the concerned Embassy, creation of centralised databases and digital verification systems, departmental inquiry where verified sureties are subsequently found fake, creation of lien or charge over surety property, and insertion of Form 47A under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Final Conclusion: A uniform and targeted bail-security framework was established for foreign nationals accused of commercial-quantity NDPS offences, while retaining the constitutional requirement that restrictions on liberty remain lawful and proportionate.

Ratio Decidendi: In commercial-quantity NDPS cases, the statutory twin conditions for bail must be affirmatively satisfied and cannot be displaced solely by the duration of pre-trial custody; Article 21 operates harmoniously within that statutory framework.

Issues: Whether approval by the Principal Commissioner for a notice issued after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year satisfied the sanction requirement under section 151(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The substituted reassessment regime differentiates the specified sanctioning authority according to the time elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Where more than three years have elapsed, approval must be granted by the higher authority specified in section 151(ii), not by the Principal Commissioner. The statutory safeguard is integral to the assumption of reassessment jurisdiction and cannot be treated as an internal administrative formality. The earlier notice deemed to be under section 148A(b), and the operation of TOLA, did not dispense with compliance with the prescribed authority requirement at the stage of the consequential notice. Approval by an authority other than the designated authority is not substantial compliance and is not curable under sections 292B or 292BB.

Conclusion: The approval granted by the Principal Commissioner was invalid under section 151(ii); consequently, the notice under section 148, the reassessment proceedings, and the reassessment order were without jurisdiction and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether GST can be levied on a penalty recovered from an employee for shortage of stock.

Analysis: Section 7 read with paragraph 5(e) of Schedule II applies where there is a supply of services, including an agreement to refrain from an act, tolerate an act or situation, or do an act. A penalty imposed for stock shortage in the course of employment arises from the employer-employee relationship and does not constitute a supply of goods or services between a supplier and recipient.

Conclusion: GST is not leviable on the penalty imposed upon the employee for stock shortage; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty for under-reporting of income in consequence of misreporting could be sustained on a transfer pricing adjustment where the Revenue did not establish any circumstance under Section 270A(9) and the adjustment arose from a change in transfer pricing methodology.

Analysis: The international transaction was disclosed in Form 3CEB, prescribed transfer pricing documentation was maintained, and the adjustment resulted from rejection of the assessee's benchmarking methodology and adoption of another Most Appropriate Method. Neither the assessment order, penalty order, nor transfer pricing order identified the applicable clause under Section 270A(9) or established misrepresentation, suppression of facts, failure to report an international transaction, or any other statutory instance of misreporting. Eligible transfer pricing adjustments are excluded from under-reported income under Section 270A(6)(d) when the prescribed conditions are met. The authorities cited by the Revenue concerned a distinct penalty framework and a defective-notice issue, and did not displace the statutory requirements under Section 270A.

Conclusion: The penalty for misreporting could not be sustained; deletion of the penalty was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to capital introduced through the value of jewellery and precious items; (ii) Whether the capital accretion of Rs. 2 crore representing jewellery and precious items was satisfactorily explained.

Issue (i): Whether Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to capital introduced through the value of jewellery and precious items.

Analysis: Section 68 covers any sum credited in the assessee's books and is not confined to a cash receipt in its physical form. The value of jewellery and precious items introduced as capital constitutes a sum credited in the books. No specific exemption applies merely because capital is introduced through such personal assets.

Conclusion: Section 68 applies to the capital introduction represented by the value of jewellery and precious items, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the capital accretion of Rs. 2 crore representing jewellery and precious items was satisfactorily explained.

Analysis: The assessment proceeded on an incorrect factual premise that the items had been received on the assessee's son's marriage, whereas the material showed the explanation to be gifts received on the assessee's own marriage and ancestral property inherited on the mother's death. The valuation report had been attempted to be filed before the Assessing Officer but could not be uploaded due to technical issues. The explanation for absence of wealth-tax returns was also found acceptable. These materials satisfactorily established the source of the capital accretion.

Conclusion: The source of the capital accretion was satisfactorily explained and the addition of Rs. 2 crore was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unexplained-credit addition cannot survive on the facts and evidence establishing the jewellery and precious items as explained capital.

Issues: Whether, for Assessment Year 2013-14, exemption under Section 54EC was available up to Rs. 1 crore where Rs. 50 lakh was invested in specified bonds in each of two financial years within six months of transfer of the long-term capital asset.

Analysis: Section 54EC(1) prescribed a six-month period from transfer for investment in long-term specified assets. Its first proviso imposed a ceiling of Rs. 50 lakh on investments made during any financial year. The transfer occurred on 29.12.2012 and investments of Rs. 50 lakh each were made on 28.03.2013 and 28.06.2013, respectively, within the prescribed six-month period but in separate financial years. The subsequently inserted second proviso, effective from Assessment Year 2015-16, introduced an aggregate cap across the financial year of transfer and the following financial year; it did not govern the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 54EC for the full investment of Rs. 1 crore; the disallowance of Rs. 50 lakh was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the impugned tax order and the rejection of the belated rectification application warranted interference and fresh adjudication.

Outcome: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was sent for fresh adjudication upon the petitioner making the stipulated tax deposit and filing a reply to the show-cause notice.

Issues: Whether the petitioner could be permitted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy against the assessment order notwithstanding limitation.

Analysis: The petitioner expressed willingness to clear the unpaid tax and interest and to make the prescribed deposit towards penalty. The writ jurisdiction was exercised to facilitate consideration of the statutory appeal on merits upon compliance with those requirements.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with directions to make the stipulated payments and file an appeal, which shall be considered on merits without reference to limitation upon compliance.

Issues: Whether prolonged undertrial incarceration and the absence of a realistic prospect of an early trial justified regular bail notwithstanding the twin conditions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The right to speedy trial is an integral component of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Although Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 ordinarily governs bail on merits, its stringent requirements cannot operate to sustain unreasonably prolonged pre-trial detention where delay is not attributable to the accused and trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time. The statutory custody thresholds under Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 do not exhaust or restrict the constitutional power to protect liberty; whether custody has become constitutionally excessive depends on a contextual assessment of the sentence, the stage and likely duration of trial, the accused's role, and risks of absconding or interference with evidence.

Analysis: The investigation had concluded, the prosecution case depended predominantly on documentary evidence already held by the investigating agency, and the matter remained at the cognizance stage despite extensive proposed evidence. The duration of custody, the foreseeable delay arising from the volume of witnesses and documents, and the absence of tangible material showing flight risk, vulnerable witnesses, or likelihood of evidence tampering established that continued incarceration would be disproportionate. The statutory fetters on bail accordingly stood diluted by the Article 21 guarantee.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to regular bail on the ground that continued custody amid a delayed trial would violate the constitutional right to personal liberty and speedy trial.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the rigours of Section 45 must yield to Article 21 where undertrial custody is unduly prolonged, trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time for reasons not attributable to the accused, and no concrete risk to the process of justice is shown.

Issues: Whether compound rubber manufactured by the industrial unit is excluded from sales-tax exemption under the negative list in clause (h) introduced into S.R.O. No. 1729/1993 by S.R.O. No. 38/1998.

Analysis: Clause (h) excludes treatment of raw rubber with chemicals to form a compound of rubber. Its wording is substantially similar to the exclusion previously considered under S.R.O. No. 1516/1990. The binding determination on the manufacturing process establishes that compound rubber is a finished rubber product, not merely rubber subjected to chemical mixing or a comparable processing activity. The comparable exclusion must therefore receive the same construction under S.R.O. No. 1729/1993.

Conclusion: Compound rubber is eligible for exemption under S.R.O. No. 1729/1993 and its claim cannot be curtailed by clause (h) introduced through S.R.O. No. 38/1998; the finding is in favour of the assessee.