Issues: Whether, for computing profits of the eligible cogeneration undertaking under section 80-IA(4), the low-pressure steam transferred to the paper division could be assigned nil cost and the entire common operating cost charged exclusively against electricity revenue.

Analysis: High-pressure and low-pressure steam were the same steam at different stages of an integrated extraction-condensing cogeneration process. The undertaking generated two commercially useful energy outputs-electricity and process steam-and extraction of steam for the paper division reduced the electricity that could otherwise have been generated. Absence of further fuel consumption after extraction did not eliminate the common fuel, boiler, water-treatment, labour, maintenance, depreciation and other costs embedded in the extracted steam. The steam was measurable, transferred to the paper division and used for paper drying; its meter readings, logbooks, reconciliations, audited accounts and professional certification disclosed no identified defect. The cost-reduction method adopted by the assessee and recognition of equivalent inter-unit steam revenue produced the same eligible profit. Under section 80-IA(8), the inter-unit transfer required examination at market value; assigning nil value to useful measurable steam without determining an alternative market value or establishing defects in the recorded value was impermissible. The materially identical earlier decision in the assessee's case was applicable, there being no demonstrated change in facts, law or binding contrary authority.

Conclusion: The nil-cost treatment of low-pressure steam and consequential recasting of the eligible undertaking's accounts were unsustainable. The disclosed profit of the eligible undertaking was required to be accepted and the claimed section 80-IA deduction allowed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether assignment by sale or transfer of long-term leasehold rights in land and building constitutes a taxable supply liable to GST.

Analysis: Assignment of leasehold rights by the original lessee to a third-party assignee transfers benefits arising from immovable property, with the assignee stepping into the position of the lessee. Such a transaction is outside the scope of supply under Section 7(1)(a) read with Clause 5(b) of Schedule II and Clause 5 of Schedule III, and is not chargeable to GST under Section 9. Consequently, no question arises of using input tax credit for discharging GST on that transaction.

Conclusion: Assignment of long-term leasehold rights in land and building is not subject to GST; the show-cause notice and demand order were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a writ petition challenging the Tribunal's recall order remains maintainable after the Tribunal has passed a final order pursuant to the recall.

Analysis: The recall order merged into and ceased to exist independently upon the Tribunal's final order. The final order had separately been challenged through the statutory tax appeal remedy; hence, the challenge to the antecedent recall order could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the recall order was not maintainable after merger with the final order, against the assessee.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order passed without granting the requested personal hearing could be sustained.

Analysis: The requested personal hearing was admittedly not afforded. Such denial constituted a flagrant breach of the principles of natural justice. An adjudicating authority must independently consider the reply to the show-cause notice and provide reasons for accepting or rejecting the explanation; a reply cannot be treated as an empty formality.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice and was set aside, with the assessee entitled to a fresh merits adjudication after a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the six-month period prescribed by Notification No. 22/2024-Central Tax for seeking rectification to avail the benefit of retrospective Section 16(5) is valid, particularly in the absence of a provision for extension in extraordinary circumstances.

Analysis: Section 148 authorises the Government to notify classes of registered persons and special procedures concerning registration, returns, payment and administration. The power to prescribe a special procedure was provisionally recognised. The remaining question requiring consideration is whether the notification's six-month limitation incorporates the safeguards required by Section 148, including a mechanism to address extraordinary circumstances.

Outcome: Matter listed for further hearing.

Issues: Whether subletting charges paid to MIDC as a condition for subletting leasehold property are deductible in computing taxable rental income, notwithstanding the statutory deduction under Section 24(a).

Analysis: The payment of subletting charges was a mandatory condition under the lease for earning rental income from the sublet property. The charges constituted an integral cost of earning that income, and taxable rental income had to be computed on the net amount after their reduction. The statutory deduction under Section 24(a) did not preclude this computation. The revenue had also accepted the claim in an earlier assessment year, and the contrary reliance on principles governing exemption notifications was inapposite.

Conclusion: The subletting charges paid to MIDC are deductible from rental income while computing income from house property; the disallowance is not sustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether an advance ruling on classification of roasted areca nuts could be issued where the identical question had already been decided by a court; (ii) Whether roasted walnuts are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 2008 19 91; (iii) Whether concessional-duty benefit under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus dated 01.06.2011 is available for the imported goods.

Issue (i): Whether an advance ruling on classification of roasted areca nuts could be issued where the identical question had already been decided by a court.

Analysis: The classification of roasted areca nuts as other roasted nuts and seeds had already been affirmed under the corresponding tariff entry. No distinguishing facts or new circumstances were shown. Section 28I(2)(b) bars an advance ruling where the question raised has already been decided by a court.

Conclusion: No advance ruling was issued on classification of roasted areca nuts because the question was barred by Section 28I(2)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (ii): Whether roasted walnuts are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 2008 19 91.

Analysis: High-temperature roasting changes the flavour, colour and texture of walnuts and makes them suitable for immediate consumption. Roasting exceeds the preservation treatments contemplated for fresh or dried nuts under Chapter 8. Heading 2008 specifically covers dry-roasted or fat-roasted nuts, so the specific Chapter 20 entry governs.

Conclusion: Roasted walnuts are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 2008 19 91, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether concessional-duty benefit under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus dated 01.06.2011 is available for the imported goods.

Analysis: Eligibility for exemption must be established strictly under the applicable notification, tariff entry and prevailing conditions on the date of import. The importer must establish the originating status of the goods under the applicable origin requirements.

Conclusion: The concessional-duty benefit is available only upon proof of the prescribed country of origin to the satisfaction of the competent customs officer.

Final Conclusion: The application received a binding classification ruling for roasted walnuts, while the request concerning roasted areca nuts could not be entertained because the identical classification issue stood previously decided; exemption entitlement remains dependent on proof of origin.

Ratio Decidendi: Roasted nuts, being prepared products specifically covered by Heading 2008, are not classifiable as fresh or dried nuts under Chapter 8; an advance ruling is barred where the identical question has already been decided by a court.

Issues: Whether an assessee that replied to a show-cause notice may invoke the applicable remedy of appeal where the order-in-original was served only by uploading it on the common portal.

Analysis: The petitioner's reply to the show-cause notice established knowledge of the notice. The governing principle for an order passed after contest and served solely through the common portal is that such portal upload does not trigger the limitation period for appeal; the assessee may avail the appellate remedy within the period prescribed by the applicable directions. The challenge to the State notifications was not pressed, while the challenge to the Central notifications remained subject to the Supreme Court's eventual decision.

Conclusion: The petitioner may avail the statutory appellate remedy in accordance with the governing directions; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest is payable on the refund of IGST collected on ocean freight from the date of its original payment.

Analysis: The claim was accepted as identical to the precedent governing refund of IGST levied on ocean freight. That precedent treats the declaration invalidating the levy as operative from inception, absent an express prospective limitation, and recognises that interest compensates the taxpayer for being deprived of the refunded amount during its retention by the authorities.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest on the refunded IGST in the manner specified in the governing precedent.

Issues: Whether rejection of condonation of an 18-day delay in furnishing Form 10B for claiming exemption was sustainable.

Analysis: The audit report was delayed by only 18 days during the continuing Covid-19 pandemic. The requirement of furnishing the audit report is procedural, and the report may be produced before the assessment or appellate authority upon sufficient cause. The pandemic-related inability to file the report was accepted as genuine, establishing genuine hardship. The delegated discretion under Section 119(2)(b) required a pragmatic application favouring substantial justice over technicality; the refusal did not reflect proper application of that discretion.

Conclusion: The rejection of condonation was invalid. The delayed Form 10B must be treated as having been filed within the prescribed period and taken into account for the exemption claim.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to regular bail in a prosecution alleging GST evasion through transportation of goods without invoices and e-way bills.

Analysis: The application was considered under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The record indicated that the accused was a transporter rather than a manufacturer or supplier, no computation or determination of GST liability attributable to him had been made, the charge sheet had been filed, he had remained in custody since 12.04.2026, and the trial was likely to take time. The assessment was made without commenting on the merits of the prosecution.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to regular bail.

Issues: Whether the Revenue established sufficient cause for condonation of 156 days' delay in filing an appeal.

Analysis: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits condonation where sufficient cause is shown. The explanation disclosed the departmental process of scrutiny, obtaining opinions and approvals, collection of documents, settlement of the appeal memorandum and final approval for filing. A justice-oriented and pragmatic approach applies to bona fide administrative delays, and the decisive consideration is the sufficiency of the cause rather than the length of delay. The explanation was not shown to be mala fide or factually incorrect. Handwritten insertion of dates in the application did not, by itself, establish that it was mechanical or stereotyped.

Conclusion: The delay was sufficiently and bona fide explained and was condoned in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether consideration received on sale of transferable development rights obtained in exchange for surrendered land is chargeable to capital gains tax and the cost of acquisition deductible therefrom; (ii) Whether the scrutiny assessment was confined to verification of the refund claim and excluded examination of the transferable development rights receipt; (iii) Whether acceptance of exemption for similar transferable development rights receipts in the assessment of the assessee's brother required identical treatment.

Issue (i): Whether consideration received on sale of transferable development rights obtained in exchange for surrendered land is chargeable to capital gains tax and the cost of acquisition deductible therefrom.

Analysis: Transferable development rights are property and therefore capital assets. The surrender of land for transferable development rights constituted an exchange, followed by a separate transfer of the rights for cash. Unlike self-generated transferable development rights arising solely from regulatory entitlement, the rights in question were acquired by giving up an identifiable capital asset. Their cost of acquisition was consequently ascertainable as the cost attributable to the land surrendered. The computation mechanism did not fail, and the principle applicable where an asset has no conceivable cost of acquisition was inapplicable. The subsequent amendment concerning intangible assets for which no consideration is paid did not displace the actual cost incurred through surrender of land.

Conclusion: The sale consideration of the transferable development rights is chargeable to capital gains tax, against the assessee; however, the capital gains must be recomputed after deduction of the cost of acquisition attributable to the land exchanged.

Issue (ii): Whether the scrutiny assessment was confined to verification of the refund claim and excluded examination of the transferable development rights receipt.

Analysis: The notice merely identified the refund claim as an initial matter for verification and did not state that the case had been selected for limited scrutiny. It did not restrict examination of the chargeability of the receipt claimed as exempt.

Conclusion: The assessment was not confined to limited scrutiny, and examination of the transferable development rights receipt was valid, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether acceptance of exemption for similar transferable development rights receipts in the assessment of the assessee's brother required identical treatment.

Analysis: An assessment order in another taxpayer's case, without a conscious and binding acceptance of the same legal position on identical facts, does not establish a legal right to identical treatment. An erroneous or unexamined assessment does not bind the Revenue in a separate assessment, and estoppel does not operate against the correct application of statute.

Conclusion: The assessment of the assessee's brother did not require exemption of the receipt in the present case, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The receipt remains taxable as capital gains, with the allowable cost of land surrendered required to be deducted in computing the taxable gain.

Ratio Decidendi: Where transferable development rights are acquired in exchange for surrender of land, the land surrendered supplies an ascertainable cost of acquisition, so the capital gains computation mechanism remains operative on their subsequent sale.

Issues: Whether the condition of furnishing a bank guarantee equivalent to approximately 80% of the value of imported goods for their provisional release was excessive, and the appropriate conditions for release pending adjudication.

Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 permits release of seized goods on conditions that safeguard Revenue during pending adjudication while enabling the importer to deal with the goods. A bank guarantee fixed at approximately 80% of the goods' value was onerous. Since the anti-dumping duty liability remained under investigation and no merits determination was made, a balanced security condition was required.

Conclusion: The provisional-release condition was modified to require a bank guarantee of 30% of the differential duty together with a bond for the full value of the seized goods; the goods were directed to be released in a time-bound manner.

Issues: Whether interim relief should be granted against the securities-market debarment to enable completion of the approved preferential issue of fully convertible warrants and limited mutual-fund transactions.

Analysis: The preferential issue had been approved by 76.64% of the public shareholders, who comprised about 96% of the shareholding, and was expected to raise substantial capital. No charge concerning dealing in securities had been made against the company. The regulatory position that the investment could proceed after expiry of the debarment, without identifying any other legal bar, supported limited interim protection. The merits of the underlying proceedings were expressly kept open.

Outcome: Limited interim stay granted to permit completion of the preferential warrant issue upon deposit of the penalties, with the debarment otherwise continuing; the time for issuance was extended by one week and ordinary-course mutual-fund transactions were permitted.

Issues: Whether admission of the corporate insolvency resolution process application was liable to be set aside because the financial creditor relied on photocopies of documents.

Analysis: Section 7 permits ascertainment of default from information-utility records or other evidence furnished by the financial creditor. The undisputed record of default from NeSL, the corporate debtor's acknowledged loan liabilities and deposit pursuant to the DRAT order, and the absence of a specific challenge to the pleaded date of default established default. A claimed factual error in the NCLT's recording of a concession could not be raised in the writ petition without first seeking correction of the NCLT order through an application for speaking to the minutes.

Conclusion: The admission of the application under Section 7 was valid, and no ground for writ interference was made out.