Issues: Whether refund could be withheld during pendency of the Revenue's appeal without a specific order by the Commissioner under Section 54(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 90(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits communication of deficiencies in a refund application through Form GST RFD-03. However, the record did not disclose any proceeding or exercise by the Commissioner under Section 54(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for withholding the claimed refund during the pendency of the appeal. Exercise of that power required issuance of notice, opportunity of hearing, and a reasoned determination.

Conclusion: Refund cannot be withheld during pendency of the appeal without the Commissioner passing a specific order under Section 54(11) after notice and opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory power to withhold a GST refund pending appeal must be exercised through a specific reasoned order after complying with notice and hearing requirements.

Issues: Whether dismissal of the statutory appeal solely on limitation was sustainable where the show-cause notice was uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation, preventing an effective response.

Analysis: The notice-placement resulted in the petitioners being unable to respond within time. This constituted a prima facie breach of principles of natural justice. As the appellate authority dismissed the appeal on limitation without examining merits, the circumstances warranted intervention and fresh appellate consideration.

Conclusion: The appellate order dismissing the appeal on limitation was set aside, and the appeal was directed to be admitted and decided afresh on merits after hearing the petitioners.

Issues: Whether rejection of the application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration without intimating the date and time of personal hearing was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 30(2) requires that an application for revocation of cancellation of registration must not be rejected without an opportunity of hearing. A proper and effective hearing requires prior intimation of the appointed date and time. The show-cause notice referred to a possible personal hearing but did not specify its date or time. The rejection order, founded only on failure to reply, was also cryptic and non-speaking.

Conclusion: The rejection order was unsustainable for denial of a proper and effective opportunity of hearing and for being non-speaking; the Proper Officer must reconsider the revocation application after duly notifying and affording personal hearing.

Issues: Whether service tax was payable on royalty paid during April 2016 to June 2017 under a mining lease granted by the State Government before 1 April 2016.

Analysis: Services provided by Governments became taxable from 1 April 2016. The mining lease had, however, been granted in 2012. The Tribunal applied its earlier decisions, whose view had not been interfered with by the Supreme Court, that royalty paid under mining rights granted before the levy became effective did not attract service tax merely because payment was made after that date.

Conclusion: No service tax was payable on the royalty paid during the disputed period because the mining lease was granted before 1 April 2016.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority could, under Section 161 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, rectify an ex parte adjudication that failed to consider the assessee's replies by issuing a further ex parte demand order without notice, rather than recalling the original order and granting a hearing.

Analysis: Section 161 permits rectification of an error apparent on the face of the record, including suo motu rectification within the prescribed period. A procedural review may also be exercised to cure a fundamental procedural defect. However, complete non-consideration of the assessee's replies and denial of hearing vitiated the original adjudication. The error could not be cured through a merits-based reconsideration resulting in another ex parte demand. As the rectified action adversely affected the assessee, notice and compliance with principles of natural justice were required; the proviso permitting rectification without notice did not apply merely because the demand was reduced.

Conclusion: The further ex parte order was impermissible and invalid. The original adjudication required recall and fresh determination only after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: Writ petition disposed of with directions to provide the order-in-appeal and permit recourse to the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether an adjustment made under section 143(1)(a) and retained without independent scrutiny in an assessment under section 143(3) could be challenged in an appeal against the assessment order; (ii) Whether employees' PF/ESI contributions could be disallowed through a section 143(1)(a) adjustment under section 36(1)(va) when the allowability of delayed payments was a debatable issue on the date of intimation; (iii) Whether further disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D could be sustained where the assessee's suo motu disallowance exceeded the amount computed by considering only investments yielding exempt income, including while computing book profit for AY 2018-19.

Issue (i): Whether an adjustment made under section 143(1)(a) and retained without independent scrutiny in an assessment under section 143(3) could be challenged in an appeal against the assessment order.

Analysis: The adjustment remained embedded in the assessed income because the Assessing Officer adopted the income determined in the intimation as the starting point and made no independent examination or finding on that adjustment. A taxpayer aggrieved by the resultant assessment liability may contest the retained adjustment in the appeal against the assessment order. The absence of a separate appeal against the intimation does not defeat that substantive appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to challenge the retained section 143(1)(a) adjustment, including its jurisdictional validity, in the appeal against the section 143(3) assessment; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether employees' PF/ESI contributions could be disallowed through a section 143(1)(a) adjustment under section 36(1)(va) when the allowability of delayed payments was a debatable issue on the date of intimation.

Analysis: On the date of the intimation, divergent judicial views existed regarding contributions deposited after the welfare-law due dates but before the return-filing due date, and the jurisdictional view supported allowability. The limited summary-adjustment mechanism cannot be used to adjudicate a contentious legal question. A subsequent settlement of the law does not retrospectively remove the debatable character of the issue at the time the intimation was issued.

Conclusion: The section 143(1)(a) disallowance of employees' PF/ESI contributions was impermissible and was deleted; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether further disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D could be sustained where the assessee's suo motu disallowance exceeded the amount computed by considering only investments yielding exempt income, including while computing book profit for AY 2018-19.

Analysis: For computing the Rule 8D disallowance, only investments that actually yielded exempt income during the relevant year were relevant. On that basis, the computed amounts for both years were lower than the sums already disallowed by the assessee. For AY 2018-19, the additional disallowance was also not sustainable in book-profit computation because it did not fall within the prescribed adjustments under section 115JB.

Conclusion: No further disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was warranted for either year, and the corresponding book-profit adjustment for AY 2018-19 could not survive; in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The invalid PF/ESI adjustment and the additional exempt-income disallowances were eliminated, while the claimed donation deduction requires factual verification.

Ratio Decidendi: A summary adjustment under section 143(1)(a) cannot be made on a legal issue that was debatable when the intimation was issued; subsequent judicial settlement does not retrospectively make that issue apparent from the return.

Issues: Whether a regular criminal court could grant interim custody of goods seized under the Customs Act, 1962 where no prior sanction for prosecution or cognizance of a Customs offence had been recorded.

Analysis: Sections 110 and 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 provide the special statutory mechanism for seizure and provisional release of goods pending adjudication. Confiscation and penalties are to be adjudicated by the officers specified under Sections 122 and 122A. Although a complaint referred to Section 135, the record disclosed neither the prior sanction mandated by Section 137 nor an order taking cognizance. In the absence of cognizance of an offence under the Customs Act, the criminal court could not invoke the general power under Section 497 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to order release of the seized goods, overriding the special Customs regime.

Conclusion: The regular criminal court lacked jurisdiction to grant zimma of the Customs-seized areca nuts; the order granting their release was without jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the dividend distribution tax rate could be determined under the India-Netherlands Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement instead of Section 115-O.

Analysis: In light of the pending Supreme Court proceedings against the jurisdictional High Court ruling on the same question and the direction to consider staying similar matters, judicial discipline required that the issue not be adjudicated at this stage.

Outcome: The issue was restored for fresh adjudication after the Supreme Court decision.

Issues: Whether the CIT(A) could restore the merits for fresh assessment without specifically adjudicating the assessee's jurisdictional and legal grounds challenging reassessment.

Analysis: Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires an appellate order to state the points for determination, the decision on those points, and reasons for the decision. The discretionary power under the proviso to Section 251(1)(a) to set aside a best-judgment assessment does not displace the obligation to decide substantive jurisdictional objections. A challenge to the assumption of jurisdiction, including objections to notice, statutory procedure and disposal of objections, goes to the root of reassessment and must be addressed before merits. The effect of the post-death filing through the deceased assessee's electronic account requires examination on the record, without any present opinion on that issue.

Conclusion: No. The jurisdictional and legal grounds must first be adjudicated through a reasoned and speaking order before the merits of the additions are addressed; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the interest disallowances required fresh adjudication in view of the remand of connected issues concerning unsecured loans and interest for the preceding assessment year.

Analysis: The connected appeal for the preceding assessment year, involving similar unsecured-loan and interest-disallowance issues, had been restored for de novo adjudication. Its outcome was material to the adjudication for the relevant year. No opinion was expressed on the merits, and fresh consideration was directed after affording adequate opportunity of hearing.

Outcome: The matter was restored to the appellate authority for fresh adjudication along with the connected preceding-year appeal.

Issues: Whether reassessment could validly be reopened to recharacterise income from sale of property already assessed as long-term capital gains as business income.

Analysis: The original scrutiny assessment had considered the sale transaction and assessed the resultant income as long-term capital gains. The property, acquired in 2005 and 2006, had consistently been reflected as a fixed asset. The subsequent reopening, prompted by an audit objection, sought a different tax characterisation solely from material already on the assessment record. No fresh tangible material independent of that record was shown to establish escapement of income. A reassessment founded merely on a different view of the same facts constitutes an impermissible change of opinion.

Conclusion: The reopening and consequent reassessment were invalid; the assessee succeeds on the jurisdictional issue.

Issues: Whether a domestic company eligible for the 25% tax rate could be taxed at 30% merely because it referred to an incorrect statutory provision while applying the lower rate in its return.

Analysis: Paragraph E of the applicable Finance Act prescribed a 25% rate for a domestic company with turnover below Rs. 250 crores. The statutory rate had to be applied according to the assessee's eligibility; an erroneous reference to section 115BA could not justify levy at a higher rate contrary to the Finance Act.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to taxation at 25% instead of 30%, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the entire cash and cheque deposits in the assessee's bank account could be assessed as unexplained cash credits, or whether only the income embedded in those deposits was taxable.

Analysis: The credits included transactions connected with the assessee's xerox and fabric-trading activities, and the withdrawals from the bank account had not been accounted for while making the addition. Although the supporting handmade bills were not accepted as reliable, the entirety of the bank credits could not be treated as taxable income where the assessee's small-trading activity and transaction details, including stock particulars, were on record. Estimation under the presumptive-taxation standard of 8% was appropriate for determining the real income embedded in the alleged bogus cash receipts.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, only 8% of the alleged bogus cash receipts deposited in the bank account is taxable as income, rather than the entire deposits.

Issues: (i) Whether the National Faceless Assessment Centre had jurisdiction to complete the reassessment under Sections 147, 144 and 144B before issuance of CBDT Notification No. 18/2022 dated 29.03.2022; (ii) Whether the additions towards cash payments and rent income, made in an ex parte assessment, required fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the National Faceless Assessment Centre had jurisdiction to complete the reassessment under Sections 147, 144 and 144B before issuance of CBDT Notification No. 18/2022 dated 29.03.2022.

Analysis: Section 144B, effective from 01.04.2021, established the faceless assessment framework. The CBDT orders issued under Section 119, including the amended order dated 22.09.2021, directed that assessments, including reassessments under Section 147, be completed by the National Faceless Assessment Centre except specified exclusions. The case did not fall within the exclusion for reassessments facing a limitation expiring on 30.09.2021. The statutory framework, the binding CBDT directions, and Section 147A introduced by the Finance Act, 2026 supported concurrent authority of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer and the faceless assessment machinery. The contrary coordinate-bench decisions concerned assessments undertaken under Section 151A and did not consider the applicable faceless-assessment scheme, CBDT directions, or Section 147A.

Conclusion: The National Faceless Assessment Centre validly assumed jurisdiction and the reassessment was not legally infirm. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the additions towards cash payments and rent income, made in an ex parte assessment, required fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The assessment was completed ex parte under Section 144. The assessee's continuing mental illness was accepted as explaining the inability to participate effectively in the assessment proceedings. Fair opportunity required that the additions be reconsidered after allowing the assessee an effective opportunity to furnish supporting material.

Conclusion: The additions relating to cash payments and rent income require fresh adjudication by the first appellate authority after providing three effective opportunities to the assessee. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment remains legally valid, but the disputed additions must be reconsidered on merits through fresh appellate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment under Section 147 could validly be completed through the faceless assessment mechanism where Section 144B and binding CBDT directions under Section 119 authorized such procedure, notwithstanding the later notification under Section 151A.

Issues: (i) Whether depreciation on the opening written-down value of goodwill arising on amalgamation could be disallowed in a subsequent assessment year after depreciation on that goodwill had been allowed in the year of amalgamation and had attained finality; (ii) Whether vendor compliance expenses deducted by an overseas customer from export sale proceeds were allowable as business expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether depreciation on the opening written-down value of goodwill arising on amalgamation could be disallowed in a subsequent assessment year after depreciation on that goodwill had been allowed in the year of amalgamation and had attained finality.

Analysis: The goodwill entered the block of intangible assets in the year of amalgamation, when the assessee's depreciation claim was allowed by the appellate authority. That determination was not challenged by the Revenue and was implemented by the Assessing Officer. In the relevant year, there was no fresh amalgamation, valuation, or addition to the block; the claim was confined to depreciation on the opening written-down value. Explanation 5 to section 32(1) makes depreciation a mandatory allowance once the statutory conditions are met. In the absence of a change in facts, law, or the composition of the asset block, the basis on which the opening written-down value was determined in the concluded earlier year could not be re-agitated. The goodwill was also an eligible intangible asset, and no defect in the underlying valuation approved under the amalgamation scheme was established.

Conclusion: Depreciation on the opening written-down value of the goodwill was allowable; the deletion of the disallowance was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether vendor compliance expenses deducted by an overseas customer from export sale proceeds were allowable as business expenditure.

Analysis: The contemporaneous material furnished during assessment, including the customer-program documents, cost-wise break-up, ledger entries, and deduction and remittance statements, established that the amounts were deductions from export proceeds for slotting, promotional, display, store-support, and related retail-sales activities. No additional evidence was introduced at the appellate stage. The expenditure had a direct nexus with the export business, and the increase was explained by expansion of the relevant retail program. No specific defect was identified in the documents, and the absence of separate invoices did not justify disallowance where the expenditure was incurred through deductions from sale proceeds. The related activities were undertaken outside India in connection with export sales; accordingly, the embedded income did not accrue or arise in India.

Conclusion: The vendor compliance expenses were allowable business expenditure; the deletion of the disallowance was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The depreciation claim based on the settled opening written-down value of goodwill and the claim for substantiated export-related vendor compliance expenditure remain allowable.

Issues: Whether the setting aside of revocation of the Customs Broker licence for alleged violations of Regulations 10(d), 10(e) and 10(f) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018, gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: The revocation proceedings concerned alleged regulatory breaches in relation to export shipments for which Let Export Orders had been issued under Section 51 of the Customs Act, 1962. CESTAT found the allegations unsustainable by applying its reasoned decision in an identical matter concerning the same exporter. No material factual distinction between that matter and the present case was demonstrated, and the Revenue had accepted the earlier CESTAT decision without challenge.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose; the order setting aside revocation of the Customs Broker licence stood undisturbed.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal could set aside the licensing order on the grounds of inordinate delay in the inquiry and identity of the investigating and inquiry officers, without determining the alleged breaches of customs broker obligations on merits.

Analysis: The record showed that the inquiry report followed the show-cause notice within the prescribed period; consequently, the premise of inordinate delay and resulting prejudice was factually incorrect. The officers performing the investigation and inquiry functions were different. The finding of a breach of the principles of natural justice was therefore also founded on an incorrect factual premise. The alleged violations of the customs broker obligations had not been examined on merits.

Conclusion: The setting aside of the licensing order was unsustainable; the alleged violations of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 must be adjudicated on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's activities were classifiable as Site Formation and Clearance Service or Works Contract Service; (ii) Whether a sub-contractor was liable to service tax where the main contractor allegedly paid tax on the entire contract value; (iii) Whether the extended period for raising the service-tax demand was invocable.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's activities were classifiable as Site Formation and Clearance Service or Works Contract Service.

Analysis: The contractual activities predominantly comprised excavation, earthwork, transportation, filling, dozing, compacting, dust suppression, and handling of rocks. Applying the dominant nature of the composite contract, the activities were found to be principally site formation and clearance activities rather than works contract service.

Conclusion: The services were classifiable as Site Formation and Clearance Service, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a sub-contractor was liable to service tax where the main contractor allegedly paid tax on the entire contract value.

Analysis: The settled position was applied that a sub-contractor providing taxable services to a main contractor has an independent liability to discharge service tax. Any entitlement of the main contractor to avail credit of tax paid by the sub-contractor does not remove that liability.

Conclusion: The sub-contractor was liable to pay service tax on the services provided to the main contractor, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period for raising the service-tax demand was invocable.

Analysis: The dispute regarding taxability of sub-contractor services involved an interpretative controversy that had persisted until the departmental clarification issued in 2007. In the absence of cogent evidence of deliberate suppression or wilful misstatement, the extended limitation period could not be applied.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the demand was barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Though the services were taxable and the sub-contractor bore an independent tax liability, recovery could not be sustained because it depended upon an impermissible invocation of the extended limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tax liability turns on a bona fide interpretative dispute and there is no cogent evidence of wilful suppression or deliberate misstatement, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked.

Issues: Whether the assessee's delayed application for regular approval under section 80G(5) could be rejected under the former limitation regime after clause (iv) of the first proviso had come into force.

Analysis: Clause (iv) of the first proviso to section 80G(5), effective from 01.10.2024, independently permits a trust whose activities have commenced to apply for approval after commencement of its activities. Since the rejection order was passed after the amended provision took effect, the application could not be treated as non-maintainable merely for non-compliance with the time limit applicable under the earlier clause (iii) regime. Registration granted under section 12AB also indicated that the trust's activities were genuine.

Conclusion: The rejection based solely on delay was set aside, and the application was restored for consideration under clause (iv)(B) of the first proviso to section 80G(5) in accordance with law after a reasonable opportunity of hearing.