Appellate inquiry powers permit requisitioned evidence, while government-financed educational exemption depends on prescribed grant-to-receipts eligibility.
Section 250(4) empowers the first appellate authority to call for or direct further inquiry independently of Rule 46A. Material requisitioned under that power is not voluntary additional evidence, while Rule 46A(4) preserves the authority's ability to obtain documents or witness evidence. Educational institutions existing solely for education without profit motive qualify for exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab) when Government grants exceed half of total receipts; registration under Section 12A or 12AB is not required for that exemption. Cash-deposit additions require reconciliation with cash books, bank entries and supporting records; where verification is incomplete, the source of deposits requires fresh factual examination.
Issues: (i) Whether material requisitioned by the first appellate authority under its statutory inquiry power could be treated as additional evidence barred by Rule 46A; (ii) Whether the educational institution qualified for exemption as substantially financed by the Government; (iii) Whether the addition for cash deposits was sustainable without reconciliation of the deposits with the books and supporting records.
Issue (i): Whether material requisitioned by the first appellate authority under its statutory inquiry power could be treated as additional evidence barred by Rule 46A.
Analysis: Section 250(4) independently empowers the appellate authority to make or direct further inquiry for effective disposal of an appeal. Rule 46A regulates evidence voluntarily tendered by an assessee, while Rule 46A(4) preserves the appellate authority's power to call for documents or witnesses. Material specifically called for by the appellate authority cannot therefore be equated with voluntary additional evidence, and no prejudice from the inquiry was established.
Conclusion: The material called for under Section 250(4) was not inadmissible additional evidence under Rule 46A; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the educational institution qualified for exemption as substantially financed by the Government.
Analysis: Exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab) requires that the institution exist solely for educational purposes without a profit motive and be wholly or substantially financed by the Government. Rule 2BBB treats Government grants exceeding fifty per cent of total receipts as substantial financing. The verified records showed Government grants exceeding fifty per cent of total receipts, and there was no dispute that the institution pursued only educational objects without profit motive. Registration under Section 12A or Section 12AB was not a condition for this independent exemption.
Conclusion: The institution satisfied Section 10(23C)(iiiab) and was entitled to exemption; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the addition for cash deposits was sustainable without reconciliation of the deposits with the books and supporting records.
Analysis: Although the explanation was that the deposits represented fees, arrears, other receipts and re-deposited withdrawals recorded in the books, there was no clear factual finding reconciling the cash deposits with the cash book, bank entries and supporting evidence. The issue required factual verification.
Conclusion: The deletion of the cash-deposit addition was set aside and the issue was restored for fresh examination; this issue was decided in favour of the Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab) remains available, while the source and reconciliation of cash deposits require fresh factual determination.
Ratio Decidendi: Evidence called for by the appellate authority under its independent statutory inquiry power is not voluntary additional evidence governed by Rule 46A, and an educational institution is substantially Government-financed where the prescribed grant-to-receipts threshold is met.