Issues: Whether the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy against the assessment order.

Analysis: The petitioner sought liberty to pursue an appeal, including a delay-condonation application, and the Court declined to comment on the merits of the challenge to the assessment order. It directed the appellate authority to consider delay in light of the stated circumstances and, if satisfied, decide the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The petitioner was relegated to the appellate remedy and permitted to file an appeal within two weeks with statutory pre-deposit and an application for condonation of delay.

Issues: Whether an appeal rejected solely for non-payment of the mandatory pre-deposit could be restored for adjudication on merits upon permitting payment of the prescribed deposit.

Analysis: The appellate order had rejected the statutory appeal without examining its merits because the prescribed 10% pre-deposit had not been made. The petitioner undertook to make that deposit if afforded an opportunity, and restoration was made conditional upon payment within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The appellate rejection was set aside and the petitioner was permitted to make the mandatory pre-deposit within two weeks; upon payment, the appeal must be considered on merits.

Issues: Whether the State tax assessment for irregular availment of input tax credit, insofar as it overlapped with Central tax proceedings for the same period and issue, required fresh consideration.

Analysis: The proceedings indicated that the input tax credit disallowance in both assessments appeared to arise from the discrepancy between the supplier's GSTR-1 and the assessee's GSTR-3B, although the Central proceedings covered a larger period. The State assessment also contained a distinct audit-based charge of underreporting tax liability. The assessee's reply and documents, including the plea of parallel proceedings, required consideration in a fresh adjudication.

Outcome: The assessment order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the order classifying the petitioner as fraud complied with the requirement of a reasoned order, and whether the bank could be permitted to recommence fraud-classification proceedings for the relevant review period.

Issue (i): Whether the order classifying the petitioner as fraud complied with the requirement of a reasoned order.

Analysis: Clause 2.1.1.4 of the Fraud Master Circular of 2024 requires the bank to serve a reasoned order setting out the relevant facts and circumstances relied upon, the response to the show-cause notice, and the reasons for classification. The impugned order merely reproduced the forensic auditor's observations and recorded the opportunities afforded to the petitioner, without addressing the petitioner's defences or explaining their rejection. Its contents substantially replicated the show-cause notice before declaring the petitioner as fraud.

Conclusion: The fraud-classification order was wholly unreasoned and unsustainable, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the bank could be permitted to recommence fraud-classification proceedings for the review period from 1 April 2014 to 4 December 2018.

Analysis: The forensic audit report attributed no fraudulent transaction to the petitioner during his tenure as director. The petitioner had ceased to be a director before the account became an NPA, and the record did not establish that he had executed a personal guarantee. In these peculiar circumstances, fraud proceedings against him for the review period could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The bank was denied liberty to reinitiate fraud-classification proceedings against the petitioner for the specified review period, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The fraud classification lacks a legally sustainable basis and cannot be revived on the forensic audit material relating to the specified review period.

Ratio Decidendi: A fraud-classification order must independently address the noticee's response and state reasons for rejecting it; a reproduction of the show-cause notice and audit observations does not satisfy the requirement of a reasoned decision.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 validates reassessment proceedings initiated against an assessee who had died before initiation. (ii) Whether a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued to a deceased assessee is curable under Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (iii) Whether the legal representative waived the jurisdictional objection through filing a return or participating in proceedings under Section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (iv) Whether reassessment proceedings may be sustained on equitable grounds despite non-fulfilment of statutory jurisdictional requirements. (v) Whether quashing the invalid reassessment notice constitutes a finding or direction permitting a fresh notice beyond limitation under Section 150 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 validates reassessment proceedings initiated against an assessee who had died before initiation.

Analysis: Section 159(2)(a) permits continuation against a legal representative only where proceedings were validly commenced during the assessee's lifetime. Section 159(2)(b) permits proceedings that could have been initiated against the deceased to be initiated directly against the legal representative, who is deemed to be an assessee; it does not authorise initiation in the name of a dead person. No statutory duty requires legal representatives to intimate the Department of the assessee's death.

Conclusion: Section 159 does not validate proceedings initiated against a deceased assessee; a fresh notice had to be issued directly to the legal representative within the prescribed limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued to a deceased assessee is curable under Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: A valid notice under Section 148 is the foundational condition for assumption of reassessment jurisdiction and must be addressed to a legally existing person. A notice issued to a deceased person is not a technical mistake, defect, or omission in substance conforming to the Act, but an inherent jurisdictional defect. Section 292B cannot cure such a defect or permit substitution of the legal representative after initiation.

Conclusion: The notice issued to the deceased assessee was void ab initio and was not curable under Section 292B; all consequential proceedings were null and void. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the legal representative waived the jurisdictional objection through filing a return or participating in proceedings under Section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 292BB applies where the assessee has appeared or cooperated without timely objecting to defective service. Here, the assessee was already dead, and the legal representative raised the jurisdictional objection from the outset rather than furnishing material in response to the inquiry notices. In any event, participation, waiver, acquiescence, or consent cannot confer statutory jurisdiction or create an estoppel against law.

Conclusion: Section 292BB did not validate the notice or constitute a waiver of the jurisdictional objection by the legal representative. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether reassessment proceedings may be sustained on equitable grounds despite non-fulfilment of statutory jurisdictional requirements.

Analysis: Tax liability and reassessment jurisdiction must arise strictly from the statutory language. Equitable doctrines, including estoppel, waiver, acquiescence, approbate and reprobate, cannot supply a jurisdictional condition omitted by the statute. Although filing and electronic verification of the deceased's return was contrary to the statutory scheme, that conduct could not confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue; action regarding that conduct remains governed independently by law.

Conclusion: Reassessment proceedings cannot be sustained on equitable considerations where the mandatory statutory conditions for jurisdiction are absent. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether quashing the invalid reassessment notice constitutes a finding or direction permitting a fresh notice beyond limitation under Section 150 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 150(1) removes the ordinary limitation only where reassessment is necessary to give effect to a finding or direction in a qualifying proceeding. An order merely declaring the initiation against a deceased person void ab initio neither directs reassessment nor supplies a finding requiring a fresh notice. Section 150 cannot be used to revive proceedings where the period for valid issuance of notice to the legal representative under Section 149 has expired.

Conclusion: The quashing order is not a finding or direction under Section 150(1), and the Revenue cannot issue a fresh notice to the legal representative beyond limitation on that basis. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A reassessment jurisdiction can be exercised against the estate of a deceased assessee only through a valid and timely statutory initiation against the legal representative; an initiation addressed to the deceased has no legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating reassessment must be issued to a legally existing assessee or, after death, directly to the legal representative within limitation; a notice to a deceased person is a non-curable jurisdictional nullity that cannot be validated by statutory deeming provisions, participation, equity, or a subsequent court order.

Issues: Whether registration granted to the trust under section 12AB could be applied to earlier assessment years whose appeals were pending before the Tribunal, and whether its income for those years was exempt under sections 11 to 13.

Analysis: The first proviso to section 12A(2) is a beneficial and curative provision intended to relieve genuine charitable institutions from hardship caused by absence of registration in earlier years. Appellate proceedings are a continuation of assessment proceedings; therefore, an appeal pending before the Tribunal is deemed to be an assessment proceeding pending before the Assessing Officer for applying the proviso. The trust's objects and activities remained unchanged, and there was no prior refusal or cancellation of registration. Its accounts further showed application exceeding 85% of total receipts in every year under appeal.

Conclusion: The subsequently granted registration applies to assessment year 2016-17 and the subsequent years under appeal. The trust is entitled to exemption under sections 11 to 13, and the additions are liable to be deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment could be made for captive inter-unit transfer of power where no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed due to returned losses, and, alternatively, the appropriate market value of such power; (ii) Whether export commission paid to non-resident agents for procuring orders outside India was disallowable for failure to deduct tax at source.

Issue (i): Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment could be made for captive inter-unit transfer of power where no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed due to returned losses, and, alternatively, the appropriate market value of such power.

Analysis: The deduction under section 80-IA was not claimed because the assessee returned losses, and the transfer-pricing adjustment had been quantified only protectively. In the absence of a claimed deduction, no adjustment arose under the normal provisions. Independently, market value for electricity captively transferred was determined by reference to the tariff charged by the distribution company to industrial consumers.

Conclusion: The deletion of the transfer-pricing adjustment was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether export commission paid to non-resident agents for procuring orders outside India was disallowable for failure to deduct tax at source.

Analysis: The non-resident agents procured export orders outside India, had no permanent establishment in India, and rendered no services in India. The commission therefore was not chargeable to tax in India, with the consequence that no deduction of tax at source was required.

Conclusion: The deletion of the disallowance of export commission was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No taxable adjustment survived in respect of either the captive-power transfer or the foreign export commission.

Ratio Decidendi: Where no section 80-IA deduction is claimed, a protective adjustment relating to eligible-unit profits cannot be made; commission to non-resident agents for services wholly rendered outside India, absent an Indian permanent establishment, is not subject to tax deduction at source.

Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit is payable at 12% per annum from the date of deposit until its realisation.

Analysis: The amount deposited pursuant to the appellate pre-deposit requirement retained the character of a pre-deposit. Applying the precedent governing delayed refund of such deposits, interest was held payable from the date of deposit until refund, and the applicable rate was fixed at 12% per annum.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the refunded pre-deposit from the date of deposit until its realisation.

Issues: (i) Whether miscellaneous income arising from write-off or recovery of advances from defaulting subcontractors was taxable as agreeing to tolerate an act; (ii) whether infrastructure services supplied to HSIIDC qualified for exemption as services provided to a governmental authority; (iii) whether relief for road-work components of composite contracts was proper; (iv) whether the extended period and penalty could be invoked.

Issue (i): Whether miscellaneous income arising from write-off or recovery of advances from defaulting subcontractors was taxable as agreeing to tolerate an act.

Analysis: Taxability of toleration requires an agreement or contractual understanding obliging a person to tolerate an act or situation, with consideration specifically flowing for that tolerance. Recovery, forfeiture, compensation, or adjustment resulting from breach does not constitute consideration without a service nexus. The amounts arose because subcontractors failed to perform or delivered deficient work; there was no contractual clause allowing deliberate default upon payment of charges or any agreement to tolerate deficient performance.

Conclusion: The miscellaneous income was not consideration for agreeing to tolerate an act and was not taxable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether infrastructure services supplied to HSIIDC qualified for exemption as services provided to a governmental authority.

Analysis: HSIIDC was under complete State governmental control and performed infrastructure and civic-utility functions, including development of industrial areas, roads, bridges, water management and public amenities, substantially corresponding to municipal functions under Article 243W. The contracted works-roads, footpaths, boundary walls, drainage, water supply and electrification-were infrastructure and public-utility works, and no material established predominant commercial exploitation.

Conclusion: HSIIDC qualified as a governmental authority and the infrastructure services were exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-ST; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether relief for road-work components of composite contracts was proper.

Analysis: The composite contracts contained separable components with independent rates. Classification depended upon the nature of each discernible component, and road-construction services enjoyed the applicable exclusion or exemption during the relevant period.

Conclusion: Relief in respect of the road-work components was proper; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period and penalty could be invoked.

Analysis: The assessee was registered, regularly filed returns, and had disclosed the relevant records that were subject to audit. The dispute was interpretational and arose from audit scrutiny. Suppression requires deliberate intent to evade tax and cannot be inferred merely from a subsequent departmental interpretation of disclosed facts.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the penalty was unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed miscellaneous-income levy, the levy on infrastructure services to HSIIDC, and the extended-period consequences were negated, while the road-work relief was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts recovered or written off for contractual breach are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act absent a prior obligation to tolerate the breach for consideration; infrastructure services to a State-controlled body performing municipal functions qualify for the governmental-authority exemption where the works are public-utility infrastructure.

Issues: (i) Whether refundable die-development deposits forfeited upon a customer's contractual default form additional consideration and are includible in transaction value; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of duty; (iii) Whether equal penalty was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether refundable die-development deposits forfeited upon a customer's contractual default form additional consideration and are includible in transaction value.

Analysis: Section 4(3)(d) requires a direct and proximate nexus between the amount sought to be added and consideration for the sale of excisable goods. The deposits were refundable on fulfilment of minimum lifting obligations and were retained only on the customer's breach. Their retention therefore arose from contractual default, not from manufacture, clearance, or sale of the aluminium profiles. They compensated the manufacturer for loss associated with customer-specific dies and retained the character of liquidated damages rather than sale price. Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 is a valuation mechanism and cannot independently enlarge transaction value unless the amount first qualifies as consideration under Section 4. The uncontroverted amortisation of die cost in the assessable value also supported the absence of any basis for a further inclusion.

Conclusion: The forfeited deposits are contractual compensation and not additional consideration; they are not includible in transaction value. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of duty.

Analysis: The dispute concerned the legal character and valuation treatment of deposits recorded in the books and statutory records. The Revenue did not establish deliberate concealment, fraud, wilful misstatement, or intent to evade duty. A bona fide interpretational dispute on valuation does not satisfy the requirements for invoking the extended period under the proviso to Section 11A(1).

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation is unavailable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether equal penalty was sustainable.

Analysis: Since the duty demand was unsustainable and the necessary elements of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty were not established, the statutory basis for equal penalty was absent.

Conclusion: Equal penalty is not sustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Forfeited refundable security deposits arising from customer default remain liquidated damages outside the assessable value, and neither the extended recovery period nor penal consequences can be founded on their non-inclusion.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts retained solely as compensation for breach of contractual obligations, without a direct and proximate nexus to the price of goods sold, do not constitute consideration includible in transaction value.

Issues: Whether criminal proceedings for alleged forgery and use of forged documents could continue against a co-accused when identical proceedings against a similarly placed co-accused had been quashed after the underlying VAT liability was conclusively resolved.

Analysis: The only allegation concerned non-payment of VAT. The reassessment creating tax, interest and penalty liability had been set aside in appeal, and the consequent tax liability had attained finality. A coordinate bench had already quashed the proceedings against a similarly placed co-accused on that basis. The petitioner was entitled to equivalent treatment.

Conclusion: The criminal proceedings against the petitioner could not continue and were quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether uploading a show-cause notice or order-in-original only in the 'View Additional Notices and Orders' tab on the GST Common Portal constitutes valid service under Sections 146 and 169 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) What consequential relief is available where proceedings or appeals were affected by such portal-only service.

Issue (i): Whether uploading a show-cause notice or order-in-original only in the 'View Additional Notices and Orders' tab on the GST Common Portal constitutes valid service under Sections 146 and 169 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 169 permits service by making a communication available on the Common Portal, but Section 146 requires the Government to notify that portal for specified functions or other prescribed purposes. The notifications issued under Section 146 notified the relevant portals for registration, tax payment, returns, settlement of integrated tax, e-way bills and e-invoicing; none notified www.gst.gov.in for service of show-cause notices or orders. Rule 142 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 also did not prescribe portal-uploading as a mode for service of such notices or orders. An e-mail merely intimating that a document has been uploaded, without transmitting the notice or order itself, is not service by e-mail under Section 169(1)(c). The inaccessible and inconspicuous placement of communications on the portal further militates against treating such uploading as effective statutory service.

Conclusion: Mere uploading of a show-cause notice or order-in-original on the 'View Additional Notices and Orders' tab is not valid service and does not, by itself, trigger statutory consequences against the assessee.

Issue (ii): What consequential relief is available where proceedings or appeals were affected by such portal-only service.

Analysis: Where an assessee neither acknowledged receipt of the portal-uploaded show-cause notice nor filed a reply, an ex parte adjudication founded on that notice cannot stand and the matter must return to the show-cause notice stage with an opportunity to respond and be heard. Where an order-in-original was passed after contest but was served only through portal-uploading, the limitation for appeal was not triggered. However, where the assessee had responded to the show-cause notice and contested the proceedings, defective service cannot be invoked to invalidate the adjudication solely on that ground, consistently with Section 160(2).

Conclusion: Ex parte proceedings based solely on an unacknowledged portal-uploaded show-cause notice are restored to the notice stage; appeals rejected as time-barred due to portal-only service are restored for merits adjudication; and assessees may file replies or appeals within four weeks, as applicable. These directions are in favour of the assessee, subject to the exception for matters already contested on merits.

Final Conclusion: Portal-based communication can produce legal consequences only when it conforms to the statutory framework for service or where the recipient has acted upon it; otherwise, the affected assessee must receive an effective opportunity to contest the demand or pursue appellate remedies.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Common Portal has not been notified or prescribed for service of notices and orders, mere uploading of such communications on the portal, without actual transmission by a statutorily valid mode or acknowledgment and participation by the assessee, is not valid service under Section 169 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: Whether reassessment can be sustained for a disallowance unrelated to the recorded reason for reopening where no addition is made on the issue that formed the basis of reopening.

Analysis: The recorded basis for reopening was the alleged non-accounting of the variable component of professional fees payable to doctors. No addition was made on that issue; instead, interest expenditure was disallowed. Binding jurisdictional precedent establishes that other escaped income may be assessed in reassessment only where an addition is made on the issue forming the recorded basis for reopening. The contrary view was expressly not accepted by the jurisdictional High Court.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid because no addition was made on the original reopening issue; the unrelated interest disallowance could not be sustained. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether revisionary jurisdiction could be exercised over a penalty order after its findings had merged with the appellate order granting the assessee's claim for premium expenditure.

Analysis: The appellate order in the quantum proceedings had accepted the explanation for the amount of premium expenditure and directed deletion of the corresponding addition. The appellate order in the penalty proceedings took cognizance of that quantum finding and allowed the assessee's substantive grounds. The penalty order therefore stood merged with the appellate order, precluding revision of that penalty order as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Conclusion: Exercise of revisionary jurisdiction over the penalty order was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether donations that also constitute corporate social responsibility expenditure under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 are eligible for deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Corporate social responsibility expenditure and business expenditure operate in distinct statutory fields. Explanation 2 to Section 37(1), which excludes corporate social responsibility expenditure from business-expenditure deduction, cannot be imported into the separate deduction regime under Chapter VI-A. Section 80G contains specific restrictions for donations made towards certain identified funds pursuant to corporate social responsibility obligations; absent an express prohibition, such restriction cannot be extended to donations made to other eligible institutions.

Conclusion: Eligible donations remain deductible under Section 80G notwithstanding that they are also counted towards the assessee's corporate social responsibility obligation; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty for delayed furnishing of a tax-audit report was leviable where the accounts had been audited, the report was uploaded before completion of assessment, and reasonable cause for delay was established.

Analysis: Section 44AB requires audit and furnishing of the audit report within the prescribed period, while Section 271B provides for penalty for failure to obtain audit or furnish the required report. Section 273B overrides Section 271B where the assessee proves reasonable cause. Penalty proceedings are quasi-criminal and levy is not automatic; the authority must judicially consider whether the default was deliberate, contumacious, dishonest, or in conscious disregard of the statutory obligation. The accounts were maintained, audited, and the audit report was uploaded before assessment concluded. The delay was attributable to the prior auditor's negligence, requiring replacement of the auditor. The breach was technical, caused no loss to the revenue, and involved neither mala fides nor wilful or absolute default.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271B was not sustainable; reasonable cause was established and the penalty was cancelled.

Issues: Whether execution of the joint development agreement, coupled with grant of possession and an irrevocable power of attorney to the developer, constituted a transfer under section 2(47)(v) so as to give rise to taxable capital gains in the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: The agreement preserved the owners' status and provided that the developer held possession only as their representative for development and construction. Such possession was permissive and limited to development activity, rather than possession delivered in part performance of a contract for transfer under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Consequently, section 2(47)(v) was inapplicable. For a qualifying individual development agreement, capital gains are generally chargeable on issuance of the completion certificate under section 45(5A), rather than merely on execution of the agreement.

Conclusion: Execution of the joint development agreement did not effect a transfer of the capital asset during the relevant previous year; no capital gains were taxable on that basis in the assessment year concerned.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice was barred by limitation or lacked the requisite approval; (ii) Whether the addition for unexplained investment in immovable property was sustainable; (iii) Whether the disallowance of house rent allowance exemption was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice was barred by limitation or lacked the requisite approval.

Analysis: At the stage of proceedings under the reassessment provisions, the available information showed unreported salary income and purchase of immovable property exceeding INR 50 lakh. The subsequent assessment of a lower total income did not alter the position that the income chargeable to tax escaping assessment, on the information then available, exceeded INR 50 lakh. The notice was also issued with prior approval of the competent authority under the applicable approval provision.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was within limitation and validly approved, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition for unexplained investment in immovable property was sustainable.

Analysis: The housing loan component of the property consideration had been accepted. The bank statements and payment details substantiated that the balance consideration was paid from the assessee's personal savings held in bank accounts.

Conclusion: The addition sustained for unexplained investment was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the disallowance of house rent allowance exemption was justified.

Analysis: The Form 16, salary records, rent receipt and computation established the allowance received, rent paid and salary components. Applying the prescribed least-of-three computation under the HRA exemption rule, the claimed exemption was correctly computed.

Conclusion: The HRA exemption was allowable and the disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment challenge failed, while the additions relating to the property investment and HRA exemption were removed.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment limitation is determined with reference to information indicating escaped income at the time of initiation, while an addition cannot survive where reliable bank evidence establishes the explained source of investment; HRA exemption must be computed under the prescribed least-of-three formula.

Issues: Whether the success fee paid for advisory services facilitating the sale of shares was deductible in computing capital gains.

Analysis: Section 48(i) permits deduction of expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer of a capital asset. The engagement, invoice, payment, consultant's confirmation and transaction-related correspondence established that the consultant facilitated the divestment of the assessee's shareholding. The buyer's statement that no middleman or agent was engaged did not displace this evidence, since the consultant acted as an adviser rather than as an agent or broker. The advisory services had a direct nexus with the assessee's transfer of shares, and the fee was incurred wholly and exclusively for that transfer.

Conclusion: The success fee was allowable as a deduction while computing the capital gains arising from the share sale, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the denial of exemption for long-term capital gains from sale of listed shares and the consequential additions as unexplained credit and alleged commission were sustainable.

Analysis: The purchase and sale transactions were supported by banking-channel payments, recognised stock-exchange trading, securities transaction tax, contract documentation and demat-account delivery. The material relied upon by the Revenue did not establish a live link between the assessee, the scrip, and the alleged entry providers. No adverse statutory order concerning the company or its promoters was produced. Consistent coordinate-bench decisions concerning the same scrip and materially similar transactions had accepted the documented transactions as genuine. The challenge to reopening was left open as academic after relief on merits.

Conclusion: The long-term capital gains claim was allowable; the additions under Sections 68 and 69C were deleted in favour of the assessee.