Issues: Whether, for applying Section 56(2)(x) to acquisition of immovable property, the stamp duty value on the allotment date may be adopted where consideration was paid through banking channels before registration.

Analysis: The first and second provisos permit adoption of the stamp duty value as on the date of an agreement fixing consideration where full or part consideration has been paid through prescribed banking modes on or before that date. The property was allotted in 2008 at the stated consideration; instalments were paid through banking channels during 2008 to 2014, and possession was delivered in 2014. An allotment letter may constitute an agreement for sale for this purpose. The subsequent registration in 2017 did not require adoption of the stamp duty value prevailing on the registration date.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to the benefit of the provisos to Section 56(2)(x); the stamp duty value as on the 2008 allotment date, rather than the 2017 registration date, must be adopted.

Issues: Whether proceedings against an "other person" under section 153C could be initiated after 01.04.2021 where the original search occurred before that date but the seized material was received and satisfaction was recorded thereafter.

Analysis: The first proviso to section 153C(1) deems the date of initiation of search, for an "other person", as the date on which seized books, documents or assets are received by that person's jurisdictional Assessing Officer. This deemed date governs the relevant assessment years and, consistently with the authorities applied, also governs the exclusion in section 153C(3). The statutory transition after 01.04.2021 excludes recourse to section 153C for searches deemed to have been initiated on or after that date. The satisfaction in the assessee's case was recorded on 26.11.2021; hence, the relevant deemed date fell after the cut-off. The Revenue's contention that the legal fiction was confined to computation of the assessment block and that the original search date alone controlled was not accepted.

Conclusion: The section 153C notices and consequential assessments were without jurisdiction and could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether delay in filing the appeals and the absence of a claim in the original or revised return barred consideration of the exemption claims; (ii) Whether compensation received by BSNL employees under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 qualified for exemption as retrenchment compensation under Section 10(10B); (iii) Whether the entire leave encashment received by such retired BSNL employees was exempt under Section 10(10AA).

Issue (i): Whether delay in filing the appeals and the absence of a claim in the original or revised return barred consideration of the exemption claims.

Analysis: On identical facts, comparable delays had been condoned in numerous cases involving BSNL employees. The restriction on making a fresh claim without a revised return applied to the Assessing Officer and did not curtail the appellate authorities' powers. The claims arose from an erroneous claim under an incorrect provision and could be entertained in appellate proceedings.

Conclusion: The delays were condoned and the claims were maintainable before the appellate authorities, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether compensation received by BSNL employees under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 qualified for exemption as retrenchment compensation under Section 10(10B).

Analysis: Coordinate Bench decisions had consistently treated the compensation received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 as retrenchment compensation eligible for exemption. The employees' earlier claim under a different provision did not defeat their substantive entitlement.

Conclusion: The compensation qualified for exemption under Section 10(10B), in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether the entire leave encashment received by such retired BSNL employees was exempt under Section 10(10AA).

Analysis: The retired BSNL employees were treated as Central Government employees for leave-encashment exemption. The enhanced exemption limit under the beneficial notification was applied in appellate proceedings, consistently with coordinate decisions.

Conclusion: The entire leave encashment was eligible for exemption under Section 10(10AA), in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The assessees were entitled to substantive exemption for both retrenchment compensation and leave encashment notwithstanding delay, procedural objections, or an earlier claim under an incorrect provision.

Ratio Decidendi: Appellate authorities may condone comparable delays and entertain a substantiated exemption claim not correctly made in the return where the taxpayer's substantive entitlement is established and the restriction applicable to the Assessing Officer does not limit appellate powers.

Issues: Whether a reassessment order can survive where no notice under Section 143(2) was issued after the assessee filed a return in response to notice under Section 148, notwithstanding that the return was treated as invalid for want of e-verification.

Analysis: Issuance of notice under Section 143(2) after a return is filed pursuant to notice under Section 148 is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement. The obligation is not displaced merely because the return was treated as invalid by the processing centre. Participation in reassessment proceedings cannot cure the absence of this statutory notice under Section 292BB.

Conclusion: The reassessment order was vitiated and nullified for want of the mandatory notice under Section 143(2), in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether foreign sale proceeds already considered and taxed through a final settlement order under the Income-tax Act, 1961 could again be assessed as undisclosed foreign income under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015.

Analysis: The foreign exhibition-sale transactions and related sales returns were considered in the settlement proceedings. The Settlement Commission made additions for the relevant assessment years as business income, including amounts linked to cash receipts through hawala, under the computation provisions governing profits and gains of business or profession. Section 4(2) of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 excludes from total undisclosed foreign income a variation in foreign-source income assessed under the Income-tax Act, 1961 in accordance with Section 29 to Section 43C. Section 4(3) correspondingly prevents income included under the 2015 Act from forming part of total income under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The settlement order had attained conclusiveness and was neither declared void nor modified. Reassessment of the same income under the 2015 Act would therefore result in impermissible double taxation.

Conclusion: The additions under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 were not sustainable; the deletions granted for all three assessment years were upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioners should be granted regular bail in a money-laundering case despite the nature of the allegations.

Analysis: The alleged transactions were from 2013-2014. The petitioners had already undergone substantial incarceration in connected predicate-offence cases and had remained in custody in the present case for over sixteen months. Although a prosecution complaint had been filed, charges had not been framed and an early completion of trial was unlikely.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to be enlarged on bail.

Issues: Whether cancellation of regular bail was warranted where the bail order bypassed the statutory requirements and evidentiary presumptions applicable to an alleged money-laundering offence.

Analysis: Cancellation of bail may rest either on post-release supervening misconduct or, independently, on inherent perversity or foundational illegality in the order granting bail. Although no post-release misconduct was established, that requirement does not apply where the original bail order ignores vital material or mandatory statutory restrictions.

Analysis: The material comprising cash ledgers, digital transaction records and transaction slips recovered during search was relevant documentary evidence at the bail stage. The presumption concerning proceeds of crime could not be displaced by requiring direct oral implication by depositors. The accused's status as an external broker did not exclude liability where the statutory language covers persons directly or indirectly involved in processes connected with proceeds of crime. The money-laundering allegation remained independently assessable notwithstanding delay or closure of a predicate FIR, and the period of custody could not override the mandatory twin conditions for bail.

Conclusion: The bail order was inherently perverse and contrary to the mandatory requirements governing bail under the anti-money-laundering statute; cancellation of bail was therefore justified without proof of supervening misconduct.

Issues: Whether a service-tax recovery demand may be enforced against the legal representatives of a deceased sole proprietor in the absence of statutory machinery provisions authorising such recovery.

Analysis: A proprietorship has no legal personality distinct from its proprietor. The governing recovery framework contains no machinery for assessment or recovery against the estate or legal representatives of a deceased person. The principle applicable to recovery provisions pari materia with Section 11 of the Central Excise Act was applied: sums cannot become payable by legal heirs merely because the demand had been determined during the proprietor's lifetime.

Conclusion: Recovery of the deceased proprietor's service-tax dues from the legal representatives was impermissible; the garnishee demand notice was quashed.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked to sustain service-tax demand solely on Income-tax Department third-party data, absent evidence of wilful suppression or intent to evade tax.

Analysis: The demand for October 2014 to March 2015 was raised through a show-cause notice dated 28.09.2020 by invoking the extended limitation period. The material relied upon consisted solely of third-party Income-tax data. The assessee had a bona fide belief that its services were exempt under entries 12 and 29(h) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST. Mere non-registration, non-payment, or a discrepancy between Income-tax data and service-tax disclosures did not establish fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or a deliberate intent to evade tax. The Department bore the burden to establish the statutory conditions for the extended period, which was not discharged.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the surviving service-tax demand was time-barred and was set aside.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked to raise service-tax demand solely on third-party income-tax data without proof of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax.

Analysis: The demand was founded solely on information received from the Income Tax Department showing a discrepancy between receipts reflected in Form 26AS and the absence of service-tax returns. Such third-party data, without corroborative material establishing the statutory ingredients for the extended limitation period, does not establish deliberate suppression or mala fide intent. Mere non-payment or non-filing does not by itself amount to wilful default; the Department bears the burden to prove a positive act demonstrating intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was unsustainable, and the demand was time-barred. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was warranted with the concurrent orders dismissing the private complaint for want of sufficient grounds to proceed.

Analysis: Revisional scrutiny is confined to correctness, legality and propriety of the challenged order, and does not permit substitution of a possible alternate view absent patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error or material irregularity. At the stage of Sections 200 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the material need only disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding; where it does not prima facie disclose the alleged offences, dismissal of the complaint is justified. The complaint was instituted about five years after the transaction without satisfactory explanation, and the material concerning the alleged forged communication, shipment valuation and additional commission did not establish a prima facie criminal offence. The dispute was essentially civil in nature.

Conclusion: No ground for interference with the orders dismissing the complaint was made out; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the alleged transfer of 100% shareholding in the company to the appellants was legally valid; (ii) Whether the company's immovable property was validly transferred to the fourth appellant through book entries.

Issue (i): Whether the alleged transfer of 100% shareholding in the company to the appellants was legally valid.

Analysis: The alleged transfer lacked an executed and stamped share-transfer deed, endorsement or delivery of the original share certificates, and compliance with the prescribed statutory procedure. The contemporaneous ROC filings and annual returns consistently recorded the respondents as 100% shareholders. The later unilateral retrospective revisions of financial statements and annual returns could not displace those records. The memorandum of understanding also left the final consideration to be subsequently settled and did not establish a completed share transfer.

Conclusion: The alleged transfer of 100% shareholding was non-est and void; the respondents remained the 100% shareholders. This issue is against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the company's immovable property was validly transferred to the fourth appellant through book entries.

Analysis: The claimed transfer rested only on accounting entries adjusting an unsecured loan and was unsupported by a registered conveyance or other instrument capable of transferring immovable property. The fourth appellant was not a party to the memorandum of understanding relied upon, and the amount shown in its accounts was treated as a loan rather than consideration for acquisition of the property. Continued payment of rent also contradicted the alleged transfer.

Conclusion: The purported transfer of the immovable property through book entries was illegal, null and void. This issue is against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The respondents' ownership and membership rights in the company remain protected, and the impugned transactions cannot affect the company's shareholding or immovable asset.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer of shares and immovable property requires compliance with the mandatory statutory formalities; unilateral accounting or statutory-record entries cannot create title in the absence of the legally required transfer instruments.

Issues: Whether a trust providing transport facilities to school students for charges is engaged in a charitable purpose of education and is entitled to registration under section 12AB.

Analysis: Registration requires satisfaction regarding the genuineness of the activities and their charitable character. A facility that assists education does not, merely by such connection, amount to advancement or imparting of education. The determinative consideration is whether the activity itself has a direct, proximate and dominant nexus with advancement of education, rather than whether it facilitates an educational institution. The trust provided transport services to a defined class of students for consideration and generated recurring surplus; its relationship with beneficiaries was contractual. Although surplus alone does not negate charity, that principle applies only where the underlying activity is charitable. The registration authority may ascertain the true substance and predominant purpose of the activities and is not confined to the charitable recitals in the trust deed.

Conclusion: The transport activity constituted a commercial service and not advancement of education as a charitable purpose; rejection of registration under section 12AB was upheld against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether interest and dividend income earned by a co-operative credit society from bank deposits and investments qualifies for deduction as business income; (ii) Whether reassessment initiated beyond three years was valid where the surviving alleged escaped income was below the statutory threshold; (iii) Whether penalty proceedings founded on a quantum assessment already restored for fresh assessment should be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether interest and dividend income earned by a co-operative credit society from bank deposits and investments qualifies for deduction as business income.

Analysis: A co-operative society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members may treat interest and dividend earned from compulsory, fixed-deposit and savings-bank deposits as attributable to that business where the deposits represent funds deployed in the ordinary course of the regulated lending activity. The jurisdictional precedent distinguishing deposits of a society's own surplus or operational funds from retained amounts payable to members was binding. The restriction applicable to interest from a co-operative bank under the separate investment deduction provision did not govern the claim under the business-income deduction provision.

Conclusion: The interest and dividend income qualified for deduction in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment initiated beyond three years was valid where the surviving alleged escaped income was below the statutory threshold.

Analysis: Although reopening was initiated on information of cash deposits exceeding the extended-limitation threshold, no addition was ultimately made for unexplained cash deposits. The only surviving basis was disallowance of deduction, amounting to less than the prescribed threshold and not represented in the requisite form of asset, expenditure or book entry. Extended limitation could not be sustained by relying on an initial allegation that did not survive after the assessee's explanation.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred and invalid; consequently, the reassessment order was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty proceedings founded on a quantum assessment already restored for fresh assessment should be sustained.

Analysis: The penalty was solely consequential to a quantum assessment that had been restored for fresh assessment following disposal of the condonation petition. The penalty determination therefore required reconsideration after the fresh quantum outcome.

Conclusion: The penalty order was set aside and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh proceedings, if required by the fresh assessment, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deduction claim was upheld and the reassessment for the earlier year was invalidated, while the penalty matter was returned for determination dependent on the fresh quantum assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended reassessment limitation is unavailable where the alleged escaped income that actually survives assessment does not meet the statutory monetary threshold.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's allegation that GST payment was forcibly obtained was sustainable at the interim stage in light of the undisclosed anticipatory-bail proceedings and the recorded statement concerning payment.

Analysis: The material placed on record, including the withdrawal pursis stating that reasonable amounts had been deposited and the recorded proceedings concerning payment, prima facie indicated voluntary payment. The non-disclosure of the anticipatory-bail application and its withdrawal was treated as material and required explanation.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to deposit costs and file an affidavit explaining the suppression of facts; the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether licence or royalty payment was revenue expenditure; (ii) whether provision for warranty was deductible; (iii) whether specified software companies were to be excluded as functionally dissimilar comparables; (iv) whether specified software companies were to be included as functionally comparable comparables; (v) whether working-capital adjustment was allowable; (vi) whether foreign-exchange fluctuation was operating in nature for transfer-pricing purposes; (vii) whether capacity-utilisation adjustment required fresh determination; (viii) whether transfer-pricing adjustment in the manufacturing segment had to be confined to international transactions; (ix) whether amortisation of goodwill was non-operating expenditure; and (x) whether adjustment for non-cenvatable customs duty was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether licence or royalty payment was revenue expenditure.

Analysis: Consistent treatment in the assessee's earlier assessment years, including acceptance in a remand proceeding, supported treatment of the payment as incurred in the ordinary course of business. No change in facts was established for the relevant year.

Conclusion: The licence or royalty payment was revenue expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether provision for warranty was deductible.

Analysis: Under Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a warranty provision based on historical experience, product-wise trends and a scientific method of estimation represents an accrued liability rather than a contingent liability. The provision was supported by the assessee's past experience and actual warranty expenditure.

Conclusion: The provision for warranty was allowable as a deduction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether specified software companies were to be excluded as functionally dissimilar comparables.

Analysis: The excluded companies were engaged in software products, product development, research and development, outsourced product development, or had significant intangible assets and mixed revenue streams without reliable segmental data. Those functions materially differed from a captive software-development service provider.

Conclusion: CG-VAK Software Exports Ltd., Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd. and Persistent Systems Ltd. were rightly excluded from the comparable set, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether specified software companies were to be included as functionally comparable comparables.

Analysis: Professional software services, ERP implementation, support and maintenance were treated as software-development services. Software testing was also regarded as part of the software-development life cycle. The relevant companies derived substantially all their revenue from software services.

Conclusion: Akshay Software Technologies Ltd. and Cigniti Technologies Ltd. were rightly included in the comparable set, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether working-capital adjustment was allowable.

Analysis: The direction to determine the working-capital adjustment afresh followed the approach adopted in the assessee's earlier years, where the adjustment had been granted in the consequential proceedings. Differences materially affecting price or profit require appropriate examination under Rule 10(3) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Conclusion: The direction for working-capital adjustment and fresh determination was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether foreign-exchange fluctuation was operating in nature for transfer-pricing purposes.

Analysis: Foreign-exchange fluctuation relating to the assessee's import-intensive manufacturing operations affected its operating costs and required consistent treatment in computing the transfer-pricing margin. The approach followed in the earlier assessment year had allowed the relevant adjustment after comparison of the import content of the assessee and comparables.

Conclusion: Foreign-exchange fluctuation was rightly treated as operating in nature for transfer-pricing computation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether capacity-utilisation adjustment required fresh determination.

Analysis: Since the capacity-utilisation details of comparable companies were unavailable in the public domain, the transfer-pricing authorities were required to obtain relevant information, where necessary by exercising powers under Section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and determine the adjustment after giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The direction for fresh determination of capacity-utilisation adjustment was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether transfer-pricing adjustment in the manufacturing segment had to be confined to international transactions.

Analysis: Transfer-pricing benchmarking under Section 92CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns controlled international transactions with associated enterprises and cannot be extended to the entire segmental turnover, including uncontrolled transactions.

Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustment was rightly restricted to international transactions with associated enterprises, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ix): Whether amortisation of goodwill was non-operating expenditure.

Analysis: The goodwill arose from an extraordinary business acquisition and its amortisation did not relate to regular operating activities. It was therefore excluded from the operating-cost base for determining the transfer-pricing margin.

Conclusion: Amortisation of goodwill was rightly treated as non-operating expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (x): Whether adjustment for non-cenvatable customs duty was allowable.

Analysis: The assessee's significantly higher import content resulted in customs-duty costs not borne comparably by domestic-input comparables. This material cost difference warranted adjustment in determining the appropriate profit level indicator.

Conclusion: Adjustment for non-cenvatable customs duty was rightly allowed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The substantive determinations on revenue deduction and transfer-pricing benchmarking, comparability and adjustments remain governed by the consistent findings reached for the assessee's earlier assessment years.

Issues: Whether an adverse GST adjudication order could stand when the registered person was not afforded a personal hearing mandated by statute.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of personal hearing before an adverse decision is made. The notices recorded the date, time and venue of personal hearing as "NA", establishing that no oral hearing was made available. The statutory requirements of a written reply and an oral hearing are independent safeguards; failure to submit a written reply does not extinguish the right to a personal hearing. The procedural defect was apparent and material, making recourse to the alternative remedy inappropriate.

Conclusion: The adverse adjudication order was invalid for denial of the mandatory opportunity of personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether service of a show-cause notice solely through the GST portal is valid where the taxpayer's registration had already been cancelled.

Analysis: Portal-based communication is a permissible mode of service, but effective service must be ensured through the modes provided by law. Since the registration stood cancelled before issuance of the show-cause notice, the taxpayer was not required to monitor the GST portal. The undisputed service exclusively through the portal consequently did not amount to valid service. An adverse adjudication also requires an opportunity of personal hearing where sought.

Conclusion: Service of the show-cause notice exclusively on the GST portal after cancellation of registration was invalid; the adjudication could not be sustained and the taxpayer must be afforded a personal hearing if requested.

Ratio Decidendi: Where GST registration is cancelled before issuance of a show-cause notice, exclusive uploading of the notice on the GST portal does not constitute valid service, as the former registrant cannot be obliged to monitor that portal.

Issues: Whether reassessment notice and the order under section 148A(d), issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, were valid where approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner rather than the authority prescribed under section 151(ii).

Analysis: For Assessment Year 2018-19, the notice under section 148 and the order under section 148A(d) were issued on 12.04.2022, after three years from the end of the assessment year. Under section 151(ii), as then applicable, sanction was required from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General. The proviso inserted into section 151 by the Finance Act, 2023, which permits computation of the three-year period by considering exclusions and extensions under section 149(1), was expressly effective from 01.04.2023 and could not retrospectively validate a sanction granted in April 2022. Sanction under section 151 is a jurisdictional condition precedent; the limitation extensions under section 149 could not be imported into section 151 before insertion of that proviso.

Conclusion: The approval granted by the Principal Commissioner was not approval by the specified authority under section 151(ii); consequently, the order under section 148A(d), notice under section 148 and consequential reassessment were void ab initio and liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether further relief was required against a summons issued to an advocate for a legal opinion after its withdrawal.

Analysis: The summons issued under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 had been withdrawn, rendering the challenge infructuous. The order noted that summoning an advocate who rendered a legal opinion should ordinarily occur only in rare and exceptional circumstances and that authorities should exercise due care and caution in such cases.

Outcome: The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of as infructuous following withdrawal of the summons.