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Issues: (i) Whether a delay of 603 days in filing the revision petition was supported by sufficient cause; (ii) Whether the concurrent conviction and sentence for cheque dishonour warranted revisional interference.
Issue (i): Whether a delay of 603 days in filing the revision petition was supported by sufficient cause.
Analysis: The explanation that the previous counsel falsely assured the petitioner that a revision had been filed was unsupported by fee receipts, an affidavit of that counsel, a complaint, or particulars of follow-up. The petitioner's sustained participation in the trial and appellate proceedings was inconsistent with the claimed prolonged reliance on unverified oral assurances. Illiteracy did not dispense with the requirement of ordinary diligence. A bona fide and acceptable explanation is necessary before delay can be condoned.
Conclusion: The delay was not supported by sufficient cause; condonation was declined, against the petitioner.
Issue (ii): Whether the concurrent conviction and sentence for cheque dishonour warranted revisional interference.
Analysis: Admission of the cheque, signature, dishonour and the correctness of the notice address activated the presumptions of consideration and discharge of debt or liability. The petitioner was required to establish a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. His account materially shifted regarding the lender, number of security cheques, repayment amount and manner of payment. The bank record did not establish repayment and indicated that the cheque book remained in his possession after the alleged delivery of security cheques. The absence of any demand for return of the cheques or complaint regarding their alleged misuse further undermined the defence. The concurrent findings were based on proper appreciation of evidence, and the sentence was proportionate.
Conclusion: The statutory presumptions remained unrebutted; the conviction and sentence required no interference, against the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The challenge failed both on limitation and on the merits, leaving the conviction for cheque dishonour and the sentence intact.
Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a dishonoured cheque is admitted and the statutory presumptions arise, a materially inconsistent and unsupported defence does not rebut them on a preponderance of probabilities; delay requires a bona fide and substantiated explanation.
Cheque dishonour presumptions remain unrebutted where the accused presents inconsistent, unsupported repayment and security-cheque defences.
A bona fide, substantiated explanation is required to condone delay in filing a revision petition; unsupported claims that prior counsel falsely assured a litigant of filing, without records, affidavit, complaint or follow-up particulars, do not establish sufficient cause. Illiteracy does not remove the duty of ordinary diligence. In cheque dishonour proceedings, admission of the cheque, signature, dishonour and correct notice address triggers presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability. The accused must raise a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. Materially inconsistent repayment and security-cheque claims, unsupported by bank evidence or steps to recover allegedly misused cheques, fail to rebut those presumptions.
Dishonour of cheque - Condonation of delay - Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt - Sufficient cause and litigant diligence - rebuttal of presumptions as to consideration - Presumption of Consideration - Preponderance of Probabilities - Probable Defence - Concurrent Findings - Seeking condonation of delay of 603 days in filing the petition Condonation of delay - bona fide explanation - Default of counsel - proof and litigant diligence - HELD THAT: - In Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, [2025 (5) TMI 2262 - SUPREME COURT] the Supreme Court reiterated that while considering a plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the Court is to ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered, and only when the explanation and the opposition to it stand on an equal footing may the court look to the merits of the main matter. The case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji and Ors.[1987 (2) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT] commends a liberal, justice-oriented construction of “sufficient cause”, but does not dispense with the requirement of a bona fide and acceptable explanation. Equally, the principle laid in Rafiq v. Munshilal[1981 (4) TMI 255 - SUPREME COURT] and Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. [1979 (4) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT] that a litigant ought not to suffer for the default of his counsel, protects a litigant whose account of such default is credible and established on record. None of these decisions lays down that a bare and unsupported allegation against a previous counsel must, in every case, be accepted as “sufficient cause”. The explanation that the previous counsel had falsely assured the petitioner that the revision had been filed was unsupported by any receipt, affidavit, complaint or particulars of the alleged follow-up. The petitioner's conduct in actively contesting the proceedings at every earlier stage was inconsistent with his claim that he remained inactive for a prolonged period without seeking even basic confirmation of filing. Illiteracy did not dispense with ordinary diligence. The governing principle is that bona fides of the explanation must first be established; a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" does not require acceptance of an unsubstantiated allegation of counsel's default. [Paras 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] The explanation did not constitute sufficient cause, and condonation of delay was declined. Presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act - Probable defence - blank signed cheque - Cheque dishonour - concurrent conviction - HELD THAT: - Admission of the cheque and signature, proof of dishonour, and proof of dispatch of notice attracted the presumptions that the instrument was supported by consideration and issued towards a debt or liability. Though rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities, those presumptions were not displaced by a defence which materially changed as to the lender, the number of security cheques, and the manner and amount of repayment. The defence passbook did not establish repayment and indicated that the cheque book remained in the petitioner's use after the alleged delivery of blank cheques. The absence of any demand for return of the alleged security cheques or complaint concerning their alleged misuse further rendered the defence improbable. Lack of independent documentation of the friendly cash loan did not assist the petitioner after he failed to discharge the evidential burden. [Paras 40, 41, 42, 43, 44] The statutory presumptions remained unrebutted; the concurrent conviction and sentence disclosed no illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference. Final Conclusion: The revision was dismissed as barred by unexplained delay and, independently, as disclosing no ground to interfere with the concurrent conviction and sentence for cheque dishonour.