Issues: (i) Whether the FOR destination contractual terms made the buyer's premises the place of removal and required inclusion of freight, insurance, loading and unloading charges in assessable value; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period and penalty were invocable.

Issue (i): Whether the FOR destination contractual terms made the buyer's premises the place of removal and required inclusion of freight, insurance, loading and unloading charges in assessable value.

Analysis: The purchase orders made the supplier responsible for safe delivery, transit loss or damage, insurance, transport and unloading, and expressly retained ownership with the supplier until goods were delivered at the buyer's site in good condition. These terms established that sale was completed at destination rather than at the factory gate. Where the factory is not the place of removal, the transportation cost from the factory to the place of removal is not excludable under Rule 5.

Conclusion: Buyer's premises were the place of removal, and freight, insurance, loading and unloading charges incurred up to destination were includable in the assessable value, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period and penalty were invocable.

Analysis: The material contractual clauses demonstrating destination sale, retained ownership and inclusion of freight were not specifically disclosed, and the undervaluation emerged only upon detailed scrutiny of the purchase orders. No material showed that the asserted bona fide belief was founded on reasonable diligence, legal advice or departmental clarification. The non-disclosure established suppression resulting in short payment of duty.

Conclusion: The extended limitation period was validly invoked and penalty was sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The valuation was required to include all costs incurred up to delivery at the buyer's premises, and the duty liability with consequential interest and penalty remained enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Under an FOR destination contract where title and transit risk remain with the seller until delivery at the buyer's premises, that premises is the place of removal and all costs incurred up to delivery form part of assessable value.

Issues: (i) Whether the dispute concerning the contractual methodology for calculating GST was arbitrable; (ii) Whether the arbitral award applying the MoRTH SOP to an item-rate contract and granting GST, penalty and interest could be sustained; (iii) Whether the invalid portions of the award could be severed while preserving the independent award relating to the Dispute Review Expert's fee.

Issue (i): Whether the dispute concerning the contractual methodology for calculating GST was arbitrable.

Analysis: A contractual dispute concerning which party must bear, reimburse, or calculate the tax impact under agreed contractual arrangements is distinct from a statutory tax dispute requiring determination of taxability, classification, rate, exemption, assessment, or rights against the taxing authority. The controversy concerned the inter se contractual choice between the MoRTH SOP and State Government Orders for computing GST impact; it did not require determination of statutory tax liability or bind the taxing authority. The objection to arbitrability was also not raised before the Arbitral Tribunal under the statutory jurisdictional mechanism.

Conclusion: The GST-calculation dispute was arbitrable and this finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the arbitral award applying the MoRTH SOP to an item-rate contract and granting GST, penalty and interest could be sustained.

Analysis: The contractual incorporation of MoRTH specifications was confined to technical requirements for road construction and did not incorporate MoRTH tax arrangements. The contract contained its own tax clause, while the State Government Orders governing GST computation were binding executive instructions for the department. The MoRTH SOP was directory, was framed for EPC contracts, and did not become applicable to the item-rate contract without a clear contractual stipulation, material evidence, or mutual agreement. The award did not cogently address the applicable State Government Orders, the GST transitional provisions, or evidence establishing that a quantified tax shortfall, interest, and penalty were actually incurred by the contractor due solely to the department's default. Making the awarded amounts subject to future GST assessment also left the determination indeterminate.

Conclusion: The findings awarding GST, penalty and interest on the basis of the MoRTH SOP were patently illegal and were set aside, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the invalid portions of the award could be severed while preserving the independent award relating to the Dispute Review Expert's fee.

Analysis: An arbitral award may be modified only where the offending and valid portions are legally and practically severable. The GST-related claims were the dominant but separable component of the award. The finding that the contract was item-rate based was consensual, and the award of the department's unpaid share of the Dispute Review Expert's fee was independent of the GST adjudication.

Conclusion: The GST-related findings were severed for fresh adjudication, while the award of Rs. 66,500 with stipulated interest towards the Dispute Review Expert's fee and the consensual finding on the nature of the contract were preserved, partly in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The contractual tax dispute remains capable of arbitral determination, but its recomputation must proceed under the contractual terms, applicable State instructions, and relevant GST transitional framework rather than an unincorporated MoRTH EPC guideline.

Ratio Decidendi: A contractual dispute over the inter se computation or reimbursement of tax is arbitrable, but an arbitral award is vulnerable to patent illegality where it imports an inapplicable tax guideline into the contract, disregards binding contractual and regulatory material, and awards tax consequences without cogent evidentiary findings.

Issues: Whether the applicant accused of offences under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was entitled to bail pending trial.

Analysis: The investigation was complete and the complaint had been filed, but charges had not been framed and the trial had not commenced. The alleged tax evasion had yet to be assessed under Sections 73 and 74, though criminal prosecution remained independent of assessment proceedings. The prosecution case was founded predominantly on documentary, electronic and statement evidence; the offences were triable by a Magistrate, carried a maximum sentence of five years, and were compoundable. The applicant had no criminal antecedents, had remained in custody for a substantial period, and no material established a risk of absconding, witness intimidation, evidence tampering, repetition of offences, or subversion of justice. Presumption of innocence, personal liberty, and the right to a speedy trial required that pre-conviction detention not become punitive where completion of trial was unlikely within a reasonable time.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to bail pending trial.

Ratio Decidendi: Bail should ordinarily be granted in a GST prosecution founded on documentary evidence where investigation is complete, trial is unlikely to conclude soon, the accused has no antecedents, and the prosecution shows no concrete risk to the trial process.

Issues: Whether an ex parte adjudication under Section 73(9) could stand where the show-cause notice, reminder and adjudication order were uploaded only in the additional notices and orders tab, and no date, time or venue of personal hearing was specified.

Analysis: Section 73(9) requires determination after considering the representation, if any, of the taxable person. Uploading the relevant communications only in the additional notices and orders tab did not amount to effective communication. Further, the show-cause notice and reminder did not specify the particulars of personal hearing, depriving the petitioners of an effective opportunity to reply and be heard.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication was vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice and non-compliance with Section 73(9), in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the writ jurisdiction should be exercised to determine GST liability and exemption eligibility when applications seeking advance rulings on the same questions are pending before the Authority for Advance Ruling.

Analysis: The statutory advance-ruling framework specifically entrusts questions of classification, applicability of exemption notifications and tax liability to the Authority for Advance Ruling, with a further appellate remedy. The earlier impediment to consideration of the applications, namely lack of quorum, ceased upon appointment of the Union Government member. Since the specialised statutory forum is functional and has already been approached, merits adjudication in writ proceedings was not warranted.

Outcome: The writ petitions were disposed of, leaving all questions of fact and law open for independent determination by the Authority for Advance Ruling.

Issues: Whether disposal of a faceless income-tax appeal without providing the requested virtual hearing violates principles of natural justice.

Analysis: Appellate hearing presupposes an opportunity for the assessee or authorised representative to be heard physically or through a virtual mode. Written submissions, adjournment requests and the appeal memorandum cannot substitute an oral or personal hearing. Although hearing notices had been issued and written submissions were filed, the requested virtual hearing was admittedly not provided, nor was any video-conferencing link communicated. This deprived the assessee of an effective opportunity to explain the transactions and resulted in failure of justice.

Conclusion: Disposal of the appeal without providing the requested virtual hearing violated principles of natural justice and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalties based solely on statements recorded during investigation could be sustained without compliance with the statutory procedure for admitting those statements in evidence.

Analysis: Statements recorded under Section 108 can prove their contents in adjudication only after the maker is examined before the adjudicating authority, the authority determines that admission is warranted in the interests of justice, and the affected person is afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The prescribed procedure under Section 138B is mandatory. As that procedure was not followed, the statements of the appellant and exporters had no evidentiary relevance. The contrary authority relied upon by the department was inapplicable because it had not considered the binding Supreme Court position.

Conclusion: The penalties under Sections 114(iii) and 114AA, being founded on inadmissible statements, could not be sustained and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the alleged errors in the final order concerning the applicability of the statutory presumption for seized gold, confiscation, evidentiary appreciation, non-consideration of precedents, and dropping of penalties constituted mistakes apparent from the record rectifiable under Section 129C(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Rectification jurisdiction is confined to manifest, self-evident errors ascertainable without elaborate reasoning, debate, or re-appreciation of evidence. It cannot be exercised as a power of review to revisit findings on facts, legal application, confiscation, or the evidentiary basis of the original order. The objections raised sought reconsideration of conclusions already reached in the final order, including the application of Section 123 to unmarked crude gold seized on reasonable belief of smuggling. The binding principles declared by the Supreme Court and the jurisdictional High Court prevailed over any contrary coordinate-bench view, and no Larger Bench reference was required. The precedents and grounds alleged to have been overlooked had either been considered or did not disclose a patent error. The setting aside of personal penalties did not invalidate the separately reasoned confiscation findings.

Conclusion: No mistake apparent from the record was established; the application sought an impermissible review of the final order.

Ratio Decidendi: Rectification jurisdiction cannot be used to reopen debatable factual or legal findings, re-appreciate evidence, or substitute a concluded decision; only a manifest error apparent from the record is rectifiable.

Issues: (i) Whether the exclusive off-take arrangements for supply of stainless-steel slabs and hot rolled coils constituted exclusive dealing or refusal to deal causing an appreciable adverse effect on competition; (ii) Whether the upstream arrangements resulted in denial of market access and abuse of dominant position in the CRSS market; (iii) Whether the Jindal Saathi programme and associated MoUs created exclusionary customer lock-in or otherwise abused dominant position.

Issue (i): Whether the exclusive off-take arrangements for supply of stainless-steel slabs and hot rolled coils constituted exclusive dealing or refusal to deal causing an appreciable adverse effect on competition.

Analysis: The arrangements formed part of a joint venture intended to secure captive long-term supplies through take-or-pay commitments. No direct evidence showed that any competing manufacturer sought inputs from the relevant suppliers and was refused supply. Multiple domestic and international sources, including BIS-certified overseas suppliers, remained available. The record did not establish entry barriers, exit of competitors, input foreclosure, consumer harm, or appreciable adverse effect on competition under the factors in Section 19(3).

Conclusion: The arrangements did not prima facie contravene Sections 3(4)(b) or 3(4)(d) of the Competition Act, 2002; the finding is against the Informant.

Issue (ii): Whether the upstream arrangements resulted in denial of market access and abuse of dominant position in the CRSS market.

Analysis: The appropriate markets were vertically related markets for supply of stainless-steel slabs and hot rolled coils used for CRSS manufacture in India, and CRSS in India. Although OP-1 prima facie held a dominant position in the downstream CRSS market owing to its scale, resources, integration and market presence, it was not dominant upstream. No evidence established that competitors were denied inputs, suffered production constraints, reduced output, market exit, or competitive disadvantage attributable to the arrangements. Alternative supply channels and domestic producers remained available.

Conclusion: No prima facie abuse through denial of market access under Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act, 2002 was made out; the finding is against the Informant.

Issue (iii): Whether the Jindal Saathi programme and associated MoUs created exclusionary customer lock-in or otherwise abused dominant position.

Analysis: The MoUs and programme were voluntary, non-binding and did not require minimum purchases, exclusive sourcing, or impose penalties for sourcing from competitors. Volume-linked incentives were incremental and commercially available, while inspection and traceability requirements served the stated anti-counterfeiting and brand-protection purposes. Participation was not a condition for purchasing material, and market participants remained free to procure from alternative suppliers. No evidence demonstrated lock-in, loss of customers, foreclosure, or denial of market access.

Conclusion: The Jindal Saathi programme and MoUs did not prima facie amount to abuse under Sections 4(2)(a) or 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act, 2002; the finding is against the Informant.

Final Conclusion: No prima facie contravention of the competition law provisions was established in respect of either the upstream supply arrangements or the downstream incentive arrangements.

Ratio Decidendi: Exclusive supply or incentive arrangements do not establish anti-competitive foreclosure or abuse without material showing actual denial of access, exclusionary effects, or appreciable adverse effect on competition where viable alternative sources and commercial freedom remain available.

Issues: (i) Whether cash refund of CENVAT credit claimed through a revised ST-3 return was available where the revised return was filed one day beyond the period prescribed under Rule 7B of the Service Tax Rules, 1994; (ii) Whether the claimed CENVAT credit was admissible despite non-production of supporting invoices, proof of payment and clarification regarding excluded input services; (iii) Whether the post-remand proceedings impermissibly introduced a new ground for rejection of the refund claim.

Issue (i): Whether cash refund of CENVAT credit claimed through a revised ST-3 return was available where the revised return was filed one day beyond the period prescribed under Rule 7B of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Analysis: Section 142(9)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits cash refund only where a return under the existing law is revised after the appointed day but within the time limit prescribed under that law. The 45-day period in Rule 7B was treated as mandatory. Rule 7C, providing for late fee in respect of returns under Rule 7, does not extend to revised returns under Rule 7B. The circular concerning deemed filing dates was confined to reverse-charge invoices and did not assist the claim.

Conclusion: The revised ST-3 return filed beyond the prescribed period could not support a refund claim under Section 142(9)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the claimed CENVAT credit was admissible despite non-production of supporting invoices, proof of payment and clarification regarding excluded input services.

Analysis: Although transitional provisions may enable cash refund of legitimately accrued credit that was not transitioned, the claimant must establish the eligibility and correctness of that credit. The appellant did not furnish primary invoices and proof of payment in numerous instances, did not satisfactorily address invoice discrepancies, and failed to substantiate the business nexus of services such as rent-a-cab and outdoor catering, which fell within excluded categories unless their eligibility was established. The burden of proving admissibility remained undischarged.

Conclusion: The claimed CENVAT credit was not established as admissible and consequently could not be refunded; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the post-remand proceedings impermissibly introduced a new ground for rejection of the refund claim.

Analysis: The earlier adjudication had noted the absence of records necessary to verify admissibility of the credit. The subsequent proceedings addressed compliance with Section 142(9)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, an essential statutory condition for the refund claim, while the admissibility concerns continued to arise from the same claim and record.

Conclusion: The post-remand examination did not constitute an impermissible initiation of proceedings on a new ground; this issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Cash refund of transitional CENVAT credit requires both timely revision of the return under the existing law and proof that the underlying credit is legally admissible.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund under Section 142(9)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unavailable where the revised return is filed beyond the mandatory period under the existing law or where the claimant fails to establish the admissibility of the CENVAT credit.

Issues: Whether denial of CENVAT credit and consequential penalties could be sustained solely on an alleged stock shortage determined by eye estimation during physical verification.

Analysis: The stock-verification record did not contain item-wise bifurcation or details establishing actual physical weighment of pipes and tubes of varying dimensions. The claimed verification of a substantial quantity within about ten hours was not supported by a reliable methodology. A shortage founded only on eye estimation, without concrete corroborative evidence of clandestine manufacture or removal, could not sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The alleged shortage determined on eye estimation was unsustainable; the denial of CENVAT credit and penalties were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the writ petition, previously disposed of solely on limitation, should be restored after the earlier order was set aside, and whether coercive recovery and penalty action should be restrained pending further proceedings.

Analysis: The earlier disposal addressed only limitation. The Supreme Court's subsequent ruling required limitation to be computed under the applicable relaxation legislation, while the remaining challenges, including whether the reassessment notice fell within the surviving period, had not been adjudicated. Restoration was therefore appropriate to permit consideration of those unresolved issues without requiring a fresh petition. The question of maintainability in view of the alternate statutory remedy was expressly kept open.

Outcome: The writ petition was restored and listed for admission; coercive action pursuant to the assessment order, demand notice and penalty notices was restrained until further orders.

Issues: Whether penalty for abetment of attempted export of prohibited goods could be sustained against a Custom House Agent's employee on allegations of negligence and failure to produce an intermediary before the investigating authority.

Analysis: Abetment requires instigation, intentional aid, conspiracy, or a wilful omission facilitating the prohibited act; negligence alone does not establish the requisite intention, knowledge, or deliberate assistance. The material showed only that the employee introduced the intermediary to a colleague and arranged containers in the ordinary course of forwarding business. The containers had been examined and sealed by the Bhutanese and Indian customs authorities, and a Custom House Agent was not obliged to inspect their contents. The employee responded to the show-cause notice, gave a statement and contact information, and no material established participation in, or knowledge of, the smuggling conspiracy. Failure of the intermediary to appear despite an assurance to produce him could not, by itself, constitute abetment.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable; the issue was answered affirmatively in favour of the assessee and the penalty order was set aside.

Issues: Whether the bank-guarantee security required for provisional release of imported garments not involved in intellectual-property-rights contravention could be reduced.

Analysis: The duty on the declared value, if concessional treatment under the applicable customs notification were available, was substantially lower than the security initially demanded. The request concerned only garments not bearing reputed brands and not affected by intellectual-property-rights issues. The fourfold enhancement of value was not conclusively established at this provisional stage. A comparable decision supported reduction of disproportionate security while preserving revenue interests through a bond for the full stipulated amount.

Conclusion: The bank-guarantee requirement was reduced to Rs.20,00,000, with a bond required for Rs.1,99,31,514; the eligible goods were to be released on provisional assessment upon compliance.

Issues: Whether the security required for provisional release of imported garments not involved in intellectual-property-rights contravention could be reduced.

Analysis: The duty on the declared value, if preferential treatment under the cited customs notification were extended, was substantially lower than the security originally required. The request concerned only unbranded garments outside the intellectual-property-rights dispute, and the fourfold enhancement of value remained uncertain. The comparable approach of reducing security for provisional release supported a proportionate bank-guarantee requirement while safeguarding the full disputed amount through a bond.

Conclusion: The bank guarantee for provisional release was reduced to Rs.1 crore, with a bond required for Rs.10,47,59,354; release was confined to goods not subject to intellectual-property-rights contravention litigation.

Issues: Whether the security required for provisional release of imported non-branded readymade garments claiming SAFTA concessional-duty benefit should be reduced.

Analysis: The declared-value duty liability, if the claimed concessional benefit applied, was substantially lower than the security initially required. The requested release concerned garments not implicated in intellectual-property-rights contravention, while the enhanced valuation was based on a fourfold increase that was not conclusively established at this stage. A comparable decision reducing the security requirement supported a proportionate modification while retaining security through a bond for the full originally stipulated amount.

Conclusion: The bank-guarantee requirement for provisional release of the eligible goods was reduced to Rs.11,00,000, with a bond to be executed for Rs.1,06,48,823; upon compliance, the goods were to be released on provisional assessment basis.

Issues: Whether amendment of a pending company petition to include rectification of the register of members and challenges to subsequent resolutions and amendments to the articles of association could be permitted while keeping the limitation objection open for final adjudication.

Analysis: The original petition had already pleaded that the share transfer was illegal and invoked Sections 58 and 59 along with oppression and mismanagement reliefs. The proposed rectification prayer was therefore consequential to the pleaded challenge rather than a new and unrelated cause of action. The challenges to the later extraordinary general meeting resolutions concerned subsequent developments during pendency of the petition. Where an amendment is necessary to determine the real controversy and limitation is arguable or depends upon facts, limitation may be determined at the final hearing rather than at the amendment stage. The appellate jurisdiction does not warrant substitution of a reasonably exercised discretionary order absent arbitrariness, perversity, or disregard of settled principles.

Conclusion: The amendment was validly allowed, with all objections on limitation and the merits of the amended pleadings remaining open for determination in the company petition.

Issues: Whether reimbursement by the Board of Apprenticeship Training of 50% of stipends paid by the appellant to apprentices under a statutory training obligation constituted taxable consideration for commercial training and coaching service during April 2012 to December 2014.

Analysis: Taxability under the Finance Act, 1994 requires a service-provider and service-recipient relationship founded on commercial consideration. The amount received was an uncontroverted reimbursement of half the statutory stipend paid to apprentices, without any mark-up, and was in the nature of a welfare grant rather than a charge for a service rendered to the Board. The appellant was, at most, a pure agent transmitting the reimbursed stipend. Before the amendment effective from 14 May 2015, Section 67 did not permit inclusion of expenditure or costs incurred in providing a service where they were not consideration paid as quid pro quo for that service.

Conclusion: The stipend reimbursement was not taxable consideration and could not be included in the taxable value for the disputed period; the service-tax demand, interest and penalty were unsustainable.