Issues: Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge a GST assessment order where the statutory appeal had become time-barred and a rectification application was pending.

Analysis: The statutory appellate remedy was available but had become barred by limitation. The pending rectification application also appeared to be time-barred. Expiry of the period for pursuing the statutory appeal does not, by itself, justify exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the assessment order was not maintainable in extraordinary jurisdiction merely because the statutory appeal was time-barred; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Lapse of the limitation period for a statutory appeal is not a ground for invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction to obtain relief against a fiscal assessment order.

Issues: Whether rejection of the statutory appeal without affording a hearing and by a one-line unreasoned order was sustainable.

Analysis: The appellate rejection recorded only "Incorrect declaration of Order issuing Authority by Taxpayer", without reasons, and was passed without hearing the petitioner. An order affecting rights must comply with principles of natural justice and disclose reasons; a cryptic rejection without a hearing does not meet those requirements.

Conclusion: The appellate rejection was set aside as contrary to principles of natural justice, and the appeal was remanded for de novo hearing and a reasoned decision on merits.

Issues: Whether input tax credit for March 2019 could be denied for breach of the time limit under Section 16(4), despite the return having been furnished before the cut-off date recognised by Section 16(5).

Analysis: Section 16(5) permits input tax credit where the relevant return is furnished by 30.11.2021. The return for March 2019 was furnished on 13.12.2019, which falls within that cut-off. The denial founded solely on Section 16(4) therefore required reconsideration under Section 16(5), subject to satisfaction of other eligibility conditions.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to reconsideration of the input tax credit claim for March 2019 under Section 16(5), and the denial based on Section 16(4) cannot stand.

Issues: Whether the rejected GST refund claim should be reconsidered pending completion of investigation into the genuineness of suppliers and underlying transactions.

Analysis: The refund had been rejected while the authorities' investigation into the supply chain remained ongoing. Since the actual suppliers and movement of goods were unverified, and the outcome of that investigation could determine the legitimacy of the transactions and the related input tax credit, a fresh determination after completing the investigation was warranted. The merits of the refund claim were not adjudicated and all contentions were kept open.

Conclusion: The refund claim must be decided afresh after completion of the investigation into the genuineness of the suppliers and transactions.

Issues: Whether refund of unutilized input tax credit on zero-rated export services could be denied for the period in question by classifying the supplier as an intermediary, despite refunds having been granted for identical services in preceding and succeeding periods.

Analysis: The department had treated the petitioner as an exporter of services and granted refunds of unutilized input tax credit for the same services both before and after the disputed period. No material established that the services supplied during the intervening period were distinct or warranted classification as intermediary services. A contrary classification for that isolated period was inconsistent, arbitrary and discriminatory.

Conclusion: Refund could not be denied by treating the petitioner as an intermediary; the petitioner was entitled to refund of unutilized input tax credit with applicable interest.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal had appellate jurisdiction over an order concerning confiscation of gold brought into India as baggage.

Analysis: Clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 129A excludes the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction in baggage matters. As the seized gold had been brought into India as baggage, the statutory revisionary remedy lay before the Revisionary Authority of the Government of India.

Conclusion: The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction; the appellants may pursue a revision application before the Revisionary Authority of the Government of India.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal concerning confiscation of gold brought into India as baggage.

Analysis: Clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 129A excludes the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction over orders relating to baggage. As the disputed gold had been brought as baggage and was seized at the airport, the statutory remedy against the appellate order lay before the Revisionary Authority of the Government of India. The appellant's invocation of the Tribunal's jurisdiction was treated as a bona fide error.

Conclusion: The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction; the appellant may pursue a revision application before the Revisionary Authority of the Government of India.

Issues: Whether money-laundering proceedings against the petitioners could continue when the entity from which they were alleged to have received tainted funds had been finally discharged on the finding that the transaction did not involve proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The allegations against the petitioners arose solely from their transactions with the said entity. That entity stood discharged in both the scheduled-offence and PMLA proceedings, under unchallenged orders which found that the money forming the subject of the transaction was not proceeds of crime. Under Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3, property must have been derived or obtained from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence before an offence of money laundering can arise. In the absence of proceeds of crime linked to the transaction, the foundational ingredient for the alleged offence was absent.

Conclusion: The PMLA proceedings and the orders issuing process and refusing discharge were quashed qua the petitioners, in favour of the petitioners.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration, alleged to have been made without a proper opportunity, warranted directions for consideration of revocation.

Analysis: The petitioner had discontinued business and failed to file monthly GST returns but intended to resume operations. The absence of a proper opportunity before cancellation, together with the accepted applicability of directions issued in similar matters, warranted permitting a revocation application subject to payment of outstanding taxes and filing of proposed returns.

Conclusion: The petitioner was permitted to seek revocation of registration, and the registering authority was directed to consider the application within the stipulated period after receipt of tax payment and required returns.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy against the assessment order.

Analysis: The petitioner sought liberty to pursue an appeal, including a delay-condonation application, and the Court declined to comment on the merits of the challenge to the assessment order. It directed the appellate authority to consider delay in light of the stated circumstances and, if satisfied, decide the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The petitioner was relegated to the appellate remedy and permitted to file an appeal within two weeks with statutory pre-deposit and an application for condonation of delay.

Issues: Whether an appeal rejected solely for non-payment of the mandatory pre-deposit could be restored for adjudication on merits upon permitting payment of the prescribed deposit.

Analysis: The appellate order had rejected the statutory appeal without examining its merits because the prescribed 10% pre-deposit had not been made. The petitioner undertook to make that deposit if afforded an opportunity, and restoration was made conditional upon payment within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The appellate rejection was set aside and the petitioner was permitted to make the mandatory pre-deposit within two weeks; upon payment, the appeal must be considered on merits.

Issues: Whether the State tax assessment for irregular availment of input tax credit, insofar as it overlapped with Central tax proceedings for the same period and issue, required fresh consideration.

Analysis: The proceedings indicated that the input tax credit disallowance in both assessments appeared to arise from the discrepancy between the supplier's GSTR-1 and the assessee's GSTR-3B, although the Central proceedings covered a larger period. The State assessment also contained a distinct audit-based charge of underreporting tax liability. The assessee's reply and documents, including the plea of parallel proceedings, required consideration in a fresh adjudication.

Outcome: The assessment order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the order classifying the petitioner as fraud complied with the requirement of a reasoned order, and whether the bank could be permitted to recommence fraud-classification proceedings for the relevant review period.

Issue (i): Whether the order classifying the petitioner as fraud complied with the requirement of a reasoned order.

Analysis: Clause 2.1.1.4 of the Fraud Master Circular of 2024 requires the bank to serve a reasoned order setting out the relevant facts and circumstances relied upon, the response to the show-cause notice, and the reasons for classification. The impugned order merely reproduced the forensic auditor's observations and recorded the opportunities afforded to the petitioner, without addressing the petitioner's defences or explaining their rejection. Its contents substantially replicated the show-cause notice before declaring the petitioner as fraud.

Conclusion: The fraud-classification order was wholly unreasoned and unsustainable, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the bank could be permitted to recommence fraud-classification proceedings for the review period from 1 April 2014 to 4 December 2018.

Analysis: The forensic audit report attributed no fraudulent transaction to the petitioner during his tenure as director. The petitioner had ceased to be a director before the account became an NPA, and the record did not establish that he had executed a personal guarantee. In these peculiar circumstances, fraud proceedings against him for the review period could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The bank was denied liberty to reinitiate fraud-classification proceedings against the petitioner for the specified review period, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The fraud classification lacks a legally sustainable basis and cannot be revived on the forensic audit material relating to the specified review period.

Ratio Decidendi: A fraud-classification order must independently address the noticee's response and state reasons for rejecting it; a reproduction of the show-cause notice and audit observations does not satisfy the requirement of a reasoned decision.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 validates reassessment proceedings initiated against an assessee who had died before initiation. (ii) Whether a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued to a deceased assessee is curable under Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (iii) Whether the legal representative waived the jurisdictional objection through filing a return or participating in proceedings under Section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (iv) Whether reassessment proceedings may be sustained on equitable grounds despite non-fulfilment of statutory jurisdictional requirements. (v) Whether quashing the invalid reassessment notice constitutes a finding or direction permitting a fresh notice beyond limitation under Section 150 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 validates reassessment proceedings initiated against an assessee who had died before initiation.

Analysis: Section 159(2)(a) permits continuation against a legal representative only where proceedings were validly commenced during the assessee's lifetime. Section 159(2)(b) permits proceedings that could have been initiated against the deceased to be initiated directly against the legal representative, who is deemed to be an assessee; it does not authorise initiation in the name of a dead person. No statutory duty requires legal representatives to intimate the Department of the assessee's death.

Conclusion: Section 159 does not validate proceedings initiated against a deceased assessee; a fresh notice had to be issued directly to the legal representative within the prescribed limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued to a deceased assessee is curable under Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: A valid notice under Section 148 is the foundational condition for assumption of reassessment jurisdiction and must be addressed to a legally existing person. A notice issued to a deceased person is not a technical mistake, defect, or omission in substance conforming to the Act, but an inherent jurisdictional defect. Section 292B cannot cure such a defect or permit substitution of the legal representative after initiation.

Conclusion: The notice issued to the deceased assessee was void ab initio and was not curable under Section 292B; all consequential proceedings were null and void. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the legal representative waived the jurisdictional objection through filing a return or participating in proceedings under Section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 292BB applies where the assessee has appeared or cooperated without timely objecting to defective service. Here, the assessee was already dead, and the legal representative raised the jurisdictional objection from the outset rather than furnishing material in response to the inquiry notices. In any event, participation, waiver, acquiescence, or consent cannot confer statutory jurisdiction or create an estoppel against law.

Conclusion: Section 292BB did not validate the notice or constitute a waiver of the jurisdictional objection by the legal representative. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether reassessment proceedings may be sustained on equitable grounds despite non-fulfilment of statutory jurisdictional requirements.

Analysis: Tax liability and reassessment jurisdiction must arise strictly from the statutory language. Equitable doctrines, including estoppel, waiver, acquiescence, approbate and reprobate, cannot supply a jurisdictional condition omitted by the statute. Although filing and electronic verification of the deceased's return was contrary to the statutory scheme, that conduct could not confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue; action regarding that conduct remains governed independently by law.

Conclusion: Reassessment proceedings cannot be sustained on equitable considerations where the mandatory statutory conditions for jurisdiction are absent. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether quashing the invalid reassessment notice constitutes a finding or direction permitting a fresh notice beyond limitation under Section 150 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 150(1) removes the ordinary limitation only where reassessment is necessary to give effect to a finding or direction in a qualifying proceeding. An order merely declaring the initiation against a deceased person void ab initio neither directs reassessment nor supplies a finding requiring a fresh notice. Section 150 cannot be used to revive proceedings where the period for valid issuance of notice to the legal representative under Section 149 has expired.

Conclusion: The quashing order is not a finding or direction under Section 150(1), and the Revenue cannot issue a fresh notice to the legal representative beyond limitation on that basis. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A reassessment jurisdiction can be exercised against the estate of a deceased assessee only through a valid and timely statutory initiation against the legal representative; an initiation addressed to the deceased has no legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating reassessment must be issued to a legally existing assessee or, after death, directly to the legal representative within limitation; a notice to a deceased person is a non-curable jurisdictional nullity that cannot be validated by statutory deeming provisions, participation, equity, or a subsequent court order.

Issues: Whether registration granted to the trust under section 12AB could be applied to earlier assessment years whose appeals were pending before the Tribunal, and whether its income for those years was exempt under sections 11 to 13.

Analysis: The first proviso to section 12A(2) is a beneficial and curative provision intended to relieve genuine charitable institutions from hardship caused by absence of registration in earlier years. Appellate proceedings are a continuation of assessment proceedings; therefore, an appeal pending before the Tribunal is deemed to be an assessment proceeding pending before the Assessing Officer for applying the proviso. The trust's objects and activities remained unchanged, and there was no prior refusal or cancellation of registration. Its accounts further showed application exceeding 85% of total receipts in every year under appeal.

Conclusion: The subsequently granted registration applies to assessment year 2016-17 and the subsequent years under appeal. The trust is entitled to exemption under sections 11 to 13, and the additions are liable to be deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment could be made for captive inter-unit transfer of power where no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed due to returned losses, and, alternatively, the appropriate market value of such power; (ii) Whether export commission paid to non-resident agents for procuring orders outside India was disallowable for failure to deduct tax at source.

Issue (i): Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment could be made for captive inter-unit transfer of power where no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed due to returned losses, and, alternatively, the appropriate market value of such power.

Analysis: The deduction under section 80-IA was not claimed because the assessee returned losses, and the transfer-pricing adjustment had been quantified only protectively. In the absence of a claimed deduction, no adjustment arose under the normal provisions. Independently, market value for electricity captively transferred was determined by reference to the tariff charged by the distribution company to industrial consumers.

Conclusion: The deletion of the transfer-pricing adjustment was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether export commission paid to non-resident agents for procuring orders outside India was disallowable for failure to deduct tax at source.

Analysis: The non-resident agents procured export orders outside India, had no permanent establishment in India, and rendered no services in India. The commission therefore was not chargeable to tax in India, with the consequence that no deduction of tax at source was required.

Conclusion: The deletion of the disallowance of export commission was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No taxable adjustment survived in respect of either the captive-power transfer or the foreign export commission.

Ratio Decidendi: Where no section 80-IA deduction is claimed, a protective adjustment relating to eligible-unit profits cannot be made; commission to non-resident agents for services wholly rendered outside India, absent an Indian permanent establishment, is not subject to tax deduction at source.

Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit is payable at 12% per annum from the date of deposit until its realisation.

Analysis: The amount deposited pursuant to the appellate pre-deposit requirement retained the character of a pre-deposit. Applying the precedent governing delayed refund of such deposits, interest was held payable from the date of deposit until refund, and the applicable rate was fixed at 12% per annum.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the refunded pre-deposit from the date of deposit until its realisation.

Issues: (i) Whether miscellaneous income arising from write-off or recovery of advances from defaulting subcontractors was taxable as agreeing to tolerate an act; (ii) whether infrastructure services supplied to HSIIDC qualified for exemption as services provided to a governmental authority; (iii) whether relief for road-work components of composite contracts was proper; (iv) whether the extended period and penalty could be invoked.

Issue (i): Whether miscellaneous income arising from write-off or recovery of advances from defaulting subcontractors was taxable as agreeing to tolerate an act.

Analysis: Taxability of toleration requires an agreement or contractual understanding obliging a person to tolerate an act or situation, with consideration specifically flowing for that tolerance. Recovery, forfeiture, compensation, or adjustment resulting from breach does not constitute consideration without a service nexus. The amounts arose because subcontractors failed to perform or delivered deficient work; there was no contractual clause allowing deliberate default upon payment of charges or any agreement to tolerate deficient performance.

Conclusion: The miscellaneous income was not consideration for agreeing to tolerate an act and was not taxable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether infrastructure services supplied to HSIIDC qualified for exemption as services provided to a governmental authority.

Analysis: HSIIDC was under complete State governmental control and performed infrastructure and civic-utility functions, including development of industrial areas, roads, bridges, water management and public amenities, substantially corresponding to municipal functions under Article 243W. The contracted works-roads, footpaths, boundary walls, drainage, water supply and electrification-were infrastructure and public-utility works, and no material established predominant commercial exploitation.

Conclusion: HSIIDC qualified as a governmental authority and the infrastructure services were exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-ST; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether relief for road-work components of composite contracts was proper.

Analysis: The composite contracts contained separable components with independent rates. Classification depended upon the nature of each discernible component, and road-construction services enjoyed the applicable exclusion or exemption during the relevant period.

Conclusion: Relief in respect of the road-work components was proper; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period and penalty could be invoked.

Analysis: The assessee was registered, regularly filed returns, and had disclosed the relevant records that were subject to audit. The dispute was interpretational and arose from audit scrutiny. Suppression requires deliberate intent to evade tax and cannot be inferred merely from a subsequent departmental interpretation of disclosed facts.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the penalty was unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed miscellaneous-income levy, the levy on infrastructure services to HSIIDC, and the extended-period consequences were negated, while the road-work relief was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts recovered or written off for contractual breach are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act absent a prior obligation to tolerate the breach for consideration; infrastructure services to a State-controlled body performing municipal functions qualify for the governmental-authority exemption where the works are public-utility infrastructure.

Issues: (i) Whether refundable die-development deposits forfeited upon a customer's contractual default form additional consideration and are includible in transaction value; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of duty; (iii) Whether equal penalty was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether refundable die-development deposits forfeited upon a customer's contractual default form additional consideration and are includible in transaction value.

Analysis: Section 4(3)(d) requires a direct and proximate nexus between the amount sought to be added and consideration for the sale of excisable goods. The deposits were refundable on fulfilment of minimum lifting obligations and were retained only on the customer's breach. Their retention therefore arose from contractual default, not from manufacture, clearance, or sale of the aluminium profiles. They compensated the manufacturer for loss associated with customer-specific dies and retained the character of liquidated damages rather than sale price. Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 is a valuation mechanism and cannot independently enlarge transaction value unless the amount first qualifies as consideration under Section 4. The uncontroverted amortisation of die cost in the assessable value also supported the absence of any basis for a further inclusion.

Conclusion: The forfeited deposits are contractual compensation and not additional consideration; they are not includible in transaction value. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of duty.

Analysis: The dispute concerned the legal character and valuation treatment of deposits recorded in the books and statutory records. The Revenue did not establish deliberate concealment, fraud, wilful misstatement, or intent to evade duty. A bona fide interpretational dispute on valuation does not satisfy the requirements for invoking the extended period under the proviso to Section 11A(1).

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation is unavailable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether equal penalty was sustainable.

Analysis: Since the duty demand was unsustainable and the necessary elements of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty were not established, the statutory basis for equal penalty was absent.

Conclusion: Equal penalty is not sustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Forfeited refundable security deposits arising from customer default remain liquidated damages outside the assessable value, and neither the extended recovery period nor penal consequences can be founded on their non-inclusion.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts retained solely as compensation for breach of contractual obligations, without a direct and proximate nexus to the price of goods sold, do not constitute consideration includible in transaction value.

Issues: Whether criminal proceedings for alleged forgery and use of forged documents could continue against a co-accused when identical proceedings against a similarly placed co-accused had been quashed after the underlying VAT liability was conclusively resolved.

Analysis: The only allegation concerned non-payment of VAT. The reassessment creating tax, interest and penalty liability had been set aside in appeal, and the consequent tax liability had attained finality. A coordinate bench had already quashed the proceedings against a similarly placed co-accused on that basis. The petitioner was entitled to equivalent treatment.

Conclusion: The criminal proceedings against the petitioner could not continue and were quashed.