Issues: (i) Whether the indexed cost of the demolished building was allowable in computing capital gains on sale of the land; (ii) Whether stamp duty paid under a family settlement deed was deductible in computing capital gains; (iii) Whether exemption under Section 54 was available where vacant land was transferred after demolition of the residential structure; (iv) Whether exemption under Section 54F was available in respect of investment in two residential flats.

Issue (i): Whether the indexed cost of the demolished building was allowable in computing capital gains on sale of the land.

Analysis: The remand material, including municipal records and purchaser confirmation, established that a building existed before the sale and was demolished pursuant to the arrangement requiring delivery of vacant possession. The land and superstructure formed a composite capital asset during negotiation, and demolition was integral to the transfer transaction. The description of the conveyed asset as vacant land could not override the actual substance of the transaction for computing real capital gains. The extinguishment of rights in the demolished structure required consideration under the capital-gains computation provisions.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to deduction of the indexed cost or fair market value of the demolished building as cost of improvement, subject to verification and computation by the Assessing Officer; the consequential capital loss may be set off against gains from the land transfer in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether stamp duty paid under a family settlement deed was deductible in computing capital gains.

Analysis: Expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for perfecting title to a capital asset may be deductible, but the record did not establish the extent to which the stamp duty under the family settlement deed related specifically to the transferred property and the assessee's share therein.

Conclusion: The claim is restored for verification, and the portion of stamp duty relatable to the transferred property and the assessee's share shall be allowed as a deduction in accordance with law.

Issue (iii): Whether exemption under Section 54 was available where vacant land was transferred after demolition of the residential structure.

Analysis: The registered sale deeds transferred vacant land after the superstructure had been demolished. The statutory precondition of transfer of a residential house was therefore not fulfilled.

Conclusion: Exemption under Section 54 is not available to the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether exemption under Section 54F was available in respect of investment in two residential flats.

Analysis: The amended provision applicable to the relevant assessment year restricts exemption to investment in one residential house in India. Pre-amendment authorities permitting exemption for multiple units did not govern the claim. However, the assessee's affidavit concerning ownership of any other residential property during the relevant financial year required factual verification.

Conclusion: Subject to verification that the assessee did not own disqualifying residential property, exemption under Section 54F shall be granted only for one new residential unit involving the higher investment.

Final Conclusion: Capital gains are to be recomputed after verification of the demolished structure's indexed cost, the relatable stamp-duty expenditure, and eligibility for limited Section 54F relief, while the Section 54 claim remains unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: For capital-gains computation, the substance of an integrated land-sale transaction prevails over the conveyance description, and the cost of a building demolished as an integral condition of sale cannot be ignored; post-amendment exemption under Section 54F is confined to one residential house in India.

Issues: (i) Whether an assertion in pleadings filed before the Supreme Court, without adjudication on that assertion, binds other courts or determines the statutory regime governing an entity; (ii) Whether mandamus could issue without a prior demand to the statutory authorities and their refusal or neglect to act.

Issue (i): Whether an assertion in pleadings filed before the Supreme Court, without adjudication on that assertion, binds other courts or determines the statutory regime governing an entity.

Analysis: The status of the Supreme Court as a court of record preserves the authenticity of its records and establishes that a pleading was made; it does not confer binding legal force upon an unadjudicated assertion in that pleading. Binding force under Article 141 attaches to law declared through a decision, namely the ratio arising from questions raised and decided, and not to a party's averment on which no finding was rendered. The applicable statutory regime must be determined under the governing statutory framework, having regard to the entity's objects, activities, area of operation and relevant circumstances, and cannot depend on a party's admission, understanding or assertion.

Conclusion: An unadjudicated assertion in Supreme Court pleadings neither constitutes a declaration of law nor conclusively establishes the statutory regime governing the entity; this issue is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether mandamus could issue without a prior demand to the statutory authorities and their refusal or neglect to act.

Analysis: Ordinarily, mandamus requires a demonstrated failure to perform a mandatory duty. The applicant must first make a distinct demand requiring performance and establish refusal or neglect by the concerned authority within a reasonable time. No prior complaint, representation, demand, or refusal was established. Further, the statutory authority had asserted absence of jurisdiction, authority and control over the entity, rendering the premise of the requested directions doubtful.

Conclusion: In the absence of a prior demand and refusal, no mandamus was warranted; this issue is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appellant could not rely on an unadjudicated pleading to establish applicability of the asserted corporate law regime, and the prerequisites for invoking mandamus were not satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi: A pleading recorded in proceedings before a court of record has no binding substantive force absent adjudication, and mandamus ordinarily requires a prior demand for performance of a mandatory duty followed by refusal or neglect.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 73(2) mandates a minimum three-month interval between issuance of the show-cause notice and the adjudication order; (ii) Whether two assessment orders for the same assessment period could proceed on mutually inconsistent bases regarding the exempt or taxable character of supplies.

Issue (i): Whether Section 73(2) mandates a minimum three-month interval between issuance of the show-cause notice and the adjudication order.

Analysis: Section 73(2) must be read with Section 73(10), which prescribes the outer limitation for issuance of the adjudication order. The requirement that notice be issued at least three months before expiry of that limitation ensures adequate time for meaningful adjudication and prevents issuance of notice immediately before the limitation deadline. It does not prescribe a compulsory three-month gap between notice and adjudication where the notice was issued more than three months before the statutory deadline. A reasonable interval and reasonable opportunity to respond remain necessary under principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: Section 73(2) does not require a mandatory three-month interval between the show-cause notice and the adjudication order; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether two assessment orders for the same assessment period could proceed on mutually inconsistent bases regarding the exempt or taxable character of supplies.

Analysis: One order treated input tax credit as having been availed and utilised in respect of exempt supplies, whereas the other proceeded on the basis that the supplies were taxable and not exempt. These inconsistent factual and legal premises warranted fresh consideration, including examination of whether the supplies were exempt.

Conclusion: The contradictory assessment bases cannot stand and require reconsideration after reasonable opportunity; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessments require fresh, consistent adjudication upon fulfilment of the stipulated tax remittance condition.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice requirement linked to the statutory limitation for adjudication cannot be construed as imposing a separate fixed interval between the notice and the adjudication order, although reasonable opportunity to answer the notice must be afforded.

Issues: Whether the authority could reopen, review, recall or substantially modify a concluded order-in-appeal through a rectification-of-mistake order.

Analysis: The controversy was held to be directly covered by the binding coordinate-bench decision governing the validity of the impugned proceedings. Applying that decision, the impugned rectification order and the concluded appellate order could not stand.

Conclusion: The impugned rectification order and order-in-appeal were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The application for condonation of delay and the Special Leave Petition were dismissed.

Issues: Whether an ex parte assessment and consequential proceedings could stand where statutory notices were sent to the email addresses of the assessee's former statutory auditor and the assessee was thereby unable to respond.

Analysis: The material showed that the assessee did not receive or respond to the notice for scrutiny, the notice seeking information, and the final show-cause notice because they were sent to the former statutory auditor's email addresses. The assessment was consequently completed without the assessee's reply or participation. A justice-oriented approach required that the assessee be afforded a further effective opportunity to contest the proceedings.

Conclusion: The ex parte assessment and consequential demand and penalty proceedings were set aside in favour of the assessee, with fresh consideration from the stage of reply to the scrutiny notice after providing a sufficient and reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether reassessment orders and consequential notices could stand when the replies and material furnished by the petitioners were not considered and no opportunity was afforded before passing the orders under Section 148A(d).

Analysis: The impugned orders did not consider the contentions raised in the replies. A fresh opportunity was warranted to enable the petitioners to furnish additional pleadings and documents in response to the notices under Section 148A(b), followed by reconsideration in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The orders under Section 148A(d) and all consequential proceedings and notices were set aside, and the matter was restored for fresh reconsideration from the stage of the Section 148A(b) notices, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether input tax credit for April 2018 to March 2019 could be denied for delayed returns despite the returns having been filed within the cut-off prescribed by Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 16(5) extends eligibility for input tax credit where returns for the relevant period were furnished by 30.11.2021. The returns concerned were filed between 24.05.2018 and 27.10.2019, and therefore fell within that statutory cut-off. The denial founded on Section 16(4) could not be sustained without giving effect to Section 16(5).

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to consideration of input tax credit under Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, subject to fulfilment of other eligibility requirements.

Issues: (i) Whether the Bhuj Court had territorial jurisdiction over the suit; (ii) Whether defendants nos. 1 to 4 breached the contract notwithstanding expiry of the letters of credit; (iii) Whether the counterclaim of the unregistered partnership firm was maintainable; (iv) Whether defendants nos. 5 and 6 were liable along with defendants nos. 1 to 4; (v) Whether the decretal amount required modification for export-related expenses incurred by defendant no. 1.

Issue (i): Whether the Bhuj Court had territorial jurisdiction over the suit.

Analysis: The contract was accepted at Kandla, goods were dispatched from Kandla, and payment under the arrangement was receivable through the plaintiff's bank at Kandla. Delivery to the carrier at Kandla for transmission was prima facie delivery to the buyer under Section 39(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The subsequent arrangement for airlifting from Bombay did not displace the part of the cause of action arising at Kandla.

Conclusion: The Bhuj Court had territorial jurisdiction; this finding is against defendants nos. 1 to 4.

Issue (ii): Whether defendants nos. 1 to 4 breached the contract notwithstanding expiry of the letters of credit.

Analysis: The purchase orders and subsequent conduct established a subsisting contractual arrangement distinct from the payment mechanism under the letters of credit. Defendants nos. 1 to 4 caused the second and third consignments to be exported, received payment from the foreign buyers, and withheld payment from the plaintiff. Expiry of the letters of credit did not terminate the underlying contract where the parties continued to perform it.

Conclusion: Defendants nos. 1 to 4 committed breach of contract and remained liable for the value of the second and third consignments; this finding is in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue (iii): Whether the counterclaim of the unregistered partnership firm was maintainable.

Analysis: The counterclaim sought enforcement of contractual rights by an admittedly unregistered partnership firm. Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 applies to a claim of set-off or other proceeding enforcing contractual rights, and the statutory bar consequently applied to the counterclaim.

Conclusion: The counterclaim was not maintainable and was rightly rejected; this finding is against defendants nos. 1 to 4.

Issue (iv): Whether defendants nos. 5 and 6 were liable along with defendants nos. 1 to 4.

Analysis: The evidence did not establish independent liability of the clearing and forwarding agent or the bank for the plaintiff's claim. The bank acted on the documents presented, while no evidentiary basis established liability of the clearing and forwarding agent for the non-payment.

Conclusion: Dismissal of the suit against defendants nos. 5 and 6 was upheld; this finding is against the plaintiff.

Issue (v): Whether the decretal amount required modification for export-related expenses incurred by defendant no. 1.

Analysis: Although the counterclaim was barred, the evidence established that defendant no. 1 had incurred specified expenses for airfreight, returned or deficient goods, demurrage, and clearing and forwarding charges in exporting the second and third consignments. Those expenses were required to be reimbursed and set off against the decretal amount to render substantial justice.

Conclusion: The decree was reduced by Rs. 13,66,118 from Rs. 49,81,336 to Rs. 36,15,218 with proportionate interest; this finding is partly in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 4.

Final Conclusion: The plaintiff's contractual entitlement against defendants nos. 1 to 4 subsists, subject to reimbursement of proven export-related expenses, while the rejection of the counterclaim and exoneration of defendants nos. 5 and 6 remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Expiry of a letter of credit does not extinguish an independently subsisting sale contract where subsequent conduct establishes continued performance, and a contractual claim by an unregistered partnership firm is barred under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Issues: Whether steps were required to enable consideration of the application for a temporary GST ID to facilitate the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The parties could not apprise the Court of the status of issuance of the temporary ID. The respondents stated that the application would be dealt with by the competent authority in accordance with law, which course was accepted by the petitioner.

Outcome: The competent authority was expected to pass appropriate orders on the temporary-ID application within 30 days.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order is vitiated where the quasi-judicial officer had countersigned and approved the investigation report leading to initiation of prosecution in the same matter.

Analysis: The officer who adjudicated the show-cause notice had earlier approved the investigation report for initiation of prosecution. The objection to this overlap was not adequately addressed. A quasi-judicial decision-maker must be free from circumstances creating a reasonable apprehension of bias; proof of actual bias or partiality is unnecessary. The combination of approving the investigative action and adjudicating the resulting proceedings undermined the required appearance of impartiality.

Conclusion: The adjudication and appellate orders were vitiated by the reasonable apprehension of bias and were quashed; the matter was directed to be decided afresh by a competent authority other than an individual who performed the investigative, approval and quasi-judicial roles.

Issues: Whether the arrest, remand and detention for alleged cess evasion under the Health Security Se National Security Cess Act, 2025 were lawful.

Analysis: The alleged offence carried a maximum punishment of five years and was therefore governed by the safeguards applicable to arrest for offences punishable below seven years under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Although grounds of arrest accompanied the arrest memo, the record showed that arrest authorisation was issued after the actual arrest; the arrest time was inconsistently recorded; no family member or nominated person was shown to have received the arrest memo or been informed; the memo did not record communication of the right to legal assistance; and the witnesses were strangers to the arrestee. The asserted revenue evasion had also not been founded on audit or assessment under the Act. These deficiencies did not justify custodial arrest.

Conclusion: The arrest, remand and detention were illegal and were set aside; the petitioner was directed to be released forthwith.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice and demand order were liable to be quashed for defective service and denial of opportunity; (ii) Whether extraordinary writ relief could be granted despite the assessee's conduct after bank attachment and its failure to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice and demand order were liable to be quashed for defective service and denial of opportunity.

Analysis: The demand notice specified the discrepancies concerning short payment of tax, excess input tax credit claimed in GSTR-3B compared with GSTR-2A, and the amounts payable. The demand order recorded that the final reminder had been sent to the registered email address under Section 169(1)(c). The assessee neither specifically denied receipt of that email nor disclosed the actual input tax credit accruing in GSTR-2A or substantively answered the allegations of excess credit and suppression of turnover. Mere assertions concerning the portal tab in which the documents were uploaded did not establish non-service or a denial of effective opportunity.

Conclusion: The challenge based on defective service and denial of natural justice fails, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether extraordinary writ relief could be granted despite the assessee's conduct after bank attachment and its failure to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: After attachment of its bank accounts, the assessee furnished an undertaking to clear the outstanding demand, supplied post-dated cheques, obtained removal of the account hold, and permitted one cheque to be encashed. It did not contemporaneously protest that the undertaking or cheques were furnished under duress, nor did it pursue the available appeal under Section 107. The later plea of compulsion was treated as an afterthought. Extraordinary writ jurisdiction is discretionary and is unavailable to a litigant not approaching with bona fide conduct and clean hands.

Conclusion: Extraordinary writ relief is refused, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The GST demand proceedings remain unaffected, and costs were imposed for the assessee's lack of bona fides.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ challenge to a GST demand alleging defective service cannot succeed where the assessee fails to specifically controvert service through its registered email or address the substantive demand allegations, and its subsequent conduct demonstrates acquiescence without bona fide challenge.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST demand order should be entertained despite the available statutory appeal.

Analysis: A statutory appeal against the adjudication order is available under Section 107. The challenge to the circular was not adjudicated on merits and was left open for appropriate future proceedings. To prevent prejudice in pursuing the appeal, the period spent before the High Court was directed to be excluded in computing limitation if the appeal is filed within 30 days.

Outcome: The writ petition was dismissed with liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether deduction under Section 54F was allowable where the assessee purchased a residential property from her husband.

Analysis: The purchase was a registered transaction for market-value consideration, supported by payment through disclosed funds and payment of stamp duty. The sole basis for denial was the alleged arrangement to enable the spouse to set off capital gains against business losses. The spouse's business losses arose after the property transaction and could not have been anticipated on the purchase date. A related-party purchase is not, by itself, a colourable device where the transaction is genuine and falls within the statutory framework. Legitimate tax planning does not invalidate an otherwise lawful transaction merely because it results in a tax benefit.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 54F; the disallowance was deleted.

Issues: Liability for cost recovery charges at an inland container depot where the prescribed benchmark volume of trade was not achieved, and the treatment of charges for subsequent periods.

Analysis: The controversy between two State instrumentalities was resolved through judicially facilitated mediation. The accepted terms distinguished the period in which the benchmark was admittedly not achieved from later periods requiring verification of benchmark compliance. Waiver for later periods was made contingent upon the customs authority's assessment under the applicable law, with reciprocal adjustment and release of amounts due.

Conclusion: CONCOR is liable to bear cost recovery charges for 2009-10. For subsequent periods, waiver shall be granted where benchmark compliance is established on verification, and any amounts due shall be adjusted and released in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether refunds already sanctioned pursuant to orders that attained finality could be recovered or rejected on the ground of unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The entitlement to refund, including the absence of unjust enrichment, had been determined in the assessee's earlier proceedings and that determination stood affirmed upon dismissal of the Revenue's appeal. The assessee had issued credit notes returning the duty component to buyers, and the Chartered Accountant's certificate supported that the incidence of duty had not ultimately been passed on. A subsequent view on unjust enrichment could not reopen a concluded refund entitlement or sustain recovery in executory proceedings. Finality of litigation precludes vexing a person twice on the same cause.

Conclusion: The recovery demand and rejection of the refunds on the ground of unjust enrichment were unsustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether statutory interest is payable on the tax refund released after withdrawal of the departmental revision under the monetary-limit litigation policy.

Analysis: Section 56 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 provides that every refundable amount shall carry interest at fifteen per cent per annum from the date of its deposit. The refund was admittedly released following withdrawal of the departmental revision, but without interest. The statutory language imposed an unequivocal obligation to pay interest and did not permit withholding it merely because the underlying litigation ended through withdrawal under the State litigation policy.

Conclusion: Statutory interest on the refunded amount is payable to the assessee in accordance with Section 56 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994.

Issues: (i) Whether cancellation of GST registration without a personal hearing complied with the statutory requirement and principles of natural justice; (ii) Whether rejection of the application for revocation of cancellation was valid despite prior filing of returns and payment of late fees, on the basis of an unsigned or unidentified notice lacking DIN, and whether a subsequent circular could validate that notice retrospectively.

Issue (i): Whether cancellation of GST registration without a personal hearing complied with the statutory requirement and principles of natural justice.

Analysis: Section 75(4) required a personal hearing before an adverse action. Only a show-cause notice was issued and no separate opportunity of personal hearing was afforded; the prescribed process requiring fixation of hearing dates was not followed. The cancellation consequently suffered from violation of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration was invalid for breach of the statutory hearing requirement and principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the application for revocation of cancellation was valid despite prior filing of returns and payment of late fees, on the basis of an unsigned or unidentified notice lacking DIN, and whether a subsequent circular could validate that notice retrospectively.

Analysis: The returns and late fees had been furnished before the notice concerning revocation. The notice did not disclose the name or designation of its issuing authority and lacked the then-mandatory DIN. The later circular dispensing with DIN for portal-generated communications carrying a verifiable reference number could not retrospectively cure the defects in the earlier notice. The material already available on record was not considered.

Conclusion: Rejection of revocation was invalid; the subsequent circular could not retrospectively validate the defective notice, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The foundational cancellation and revocation actions being vitiated, the consequential appellate orders founded on those actions could not stand; registration was directed to be restored and litigation costs were awarded.

Ratio Decidendi: An adverse GST registration action taken without the statutorily required personal hearing is void, and a subsequent administrative circular cannot retrospectively cure defects in an earlier notice or order.

Issues: Whether late filing fee under Section 46(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be levied on Supplementary Bills of Entry filed to clear excess quantity of imported bulk cargo.

Analysis: The original Bills of Entry had been filed within time, and the excess coal was part of the same imported consignments. The Import General Manifests had also been amended; consequently, the contrary factual premise in the appellate order was unsupported by the record. The statutory scheme permits late charges only where the proper officer is not satisfied that sufficient cause existed. The delay in filing the Supplementary Bills of Entry was not attributable to any fault or lack of bona fides of the importer and resulted from excess bulk cargo remaining after clearance of the manifested quantity. The applicable discretion to levy or waive charges must be exercised judiciously rather than mechanically.

Conclusion: The late filing fee levied on the Supplementary Bills of Entry was unwarranted and legally unsustainable.