Issues: Whether a refund application electronically filed within the prescribed period could be rejected as time-barred merely because its manual copy was filed later.

Analysis: Rule 97A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 uses the expression "include" while permitting manual filing in addition to electronic filing. The provision therefore enables manual filing and does not displace an online refund application already acknowledged within the statutory period. The online application acknowledged on 12.02.2019 was required to be treated as the relevant filing for considering the refund claim.

Conclusion: The rejection of the refund claim on the basis of the later manual filing was illegal and arbitrary; the refund application must be reconsidered with reference to the timely online application.

Issues: Whether registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G, granted pursuant to a binding jurisdictional High Court judgment, could be made subject to the outcome of a proposed challenge before the Supreme Court.

Analysis: A jurisdictional High Court judgment remains binding on authorities within its territorial jurisdiction unless stayed, modified or reversed by a competent court. A contemplated or pending challenge before a superior forum does not diminish that binding force. Having granted registration and approval in compliance with the High Court judgment, the statutory authority could not dilute the grant through caveats founded on speculative future developments. No statutory mechanism authorised the conversion of an effective registration or approval into a tentative recognition subject to a possible future outcome.

Conclusion: The caveats making the registration, approval and consequential benefits subject to the outcome of a proposed Supreme Court challenge were unsustainable and were directed to be deleted; the assessee was entitled to the registration and approval without qualification or conditional rider.

Issues: Whether the corporate insolvency resolution process could be closed where no claims had been received following the public announcement and the parties had entered into discharge arrangements.

Analysis: The public announcement had been issued, yet the resolution professional confirmed that no claims were received in the corporate insolvency resolution process. Applying the principle that insolvency proceedings may be closed in appropriate circumstances, including where there is no subsisting claimant or impediment to closure, the discharge arrangements supported termination of the process. The consequential release of the bank lien and disbursement was directed in accordance with the discharge agreements.

Conclusion: The corporate insolvency resolution process was closed, the impugned order was set aside, and the bank lien was withdrawn for disbursement under the discharge agreements.

Issues: Whether delay in filing the statutory GST appeal could be condoned where the assessment order was uploaded under an incorrect portal category and was consequently not noticed by the assessee within the prescribed limitation period.

Analysis: Although the Appellate Authority is bound by the limitation framework under Section 107, the delay resulted from circumstances beyond the assessee's control: the assessment order was uploaded under "Additional Notices and Orders" rather than the prescribed "Notices and Orders" category. Refusal to permit the appeal in these circumstances would cause grave prejudice by denying adjudication on merits. The consistent approach in comparable matters supported exercise of writ jurisdiction to enable consideration of the appeal.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned in favour of the assessee, and the Appellate Authority was directed to entertain and decide the appeal on merits if filed within 30 days from uploading of the order.

Issues: Whether investment in two adjacent residential properties, acquired through separate registered deeds and amalgamated later, qualifies as investment in one residential house for exemption under Section 54F.

Analysis: The properties were separately purchased from distinct legal persons through separate registered deeds and were treated as separate residential houses until their subsequent amalgamation. The later municipal amalgamation itself established that the properties were separate at the time of acquisition. Authorities concerning multiple units or floors constituting one house were inapplicable because the present properties were independent houses subsequently amalgamated. The post-2015 statutory requirement of investment in one residential house could not be overridden on these facts.

Conclusion: The second property was not eligible for Section 54F exemption; the disallowance to that extent was restored, against the assessee.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice issued after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year was validly sanctioned by the specified authority.

Analysis: For AY 2018-19, the notice under Section 148 was issued on 26.04.2022, after expiry of three years from the end of that assessment year. Section 151(ii) required prior approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner, or Director General. The approval was instead granted by the Principal Commissioner, who was not the specified authority for that period. The subsequently inserted Section 292BC does not validate approval granted by an authority other than the authority prescribed under the Act.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice lacked valid jurisdictional approval; consequently, the reassessment was invalid and was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Section 151 mandates sanction from a higher specified authority after expiry of the prescribed three-year period, approval by a non-specified authority vitiates the reassessment for want of jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether caveats making registration under section 12AB and consequential benefits subject to a proposed challenge before the Supreme Court could be retained after registration was granted pursuant to a binding jurisdictional High Court judgment.

Analysis: A jurisdictional High Court judgment remains binding on authorities within its territorial jurisdiction unless stayed, modified or reversed. A contemplated or pending challenge before a superior forum does not diminish that binding force. Registration granted in compliance with such judgment must be decided under the law prevailing on the date of grant; no statutory mechanism permits the authority to render the registration tentative by reference to speculative future proceedings. The caveats also exceeded the High Court directions and created uncertainty inconsistent with the statutory scheme of registration.

Conclusion: The caveats qualifying the registration and consequential benefits were unsustainable and were directed to be deleted; the assessee was entitled to unqualified registration under section 12AB.

Issues: Whether refund of accumulated unutilized Cenvat credit could be denied on the ground that the input services lacked nexus with the exported output services.

Analysis: The rejection was founded on an earlier appellate order disallowing refund in respect of various input services for want of nexus. That earlier basis had subsequently been overturned in the assessee's own case, wherein the nexus issue concerning the relevant input services was treated as settled and refund was allowed. The same ground could therefore not support denial in the present period.

Conclusion: Refund could not be denied for want of nexus between the input services and output services; the assessee was entitled to the consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Once the nexus of the relevant input services with exported output services stands settled in the assessee's favour, refund of accumulated Cenvat credit cannot be denied on that identical ground.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was payable on interconnection usage charges for the period before such service was made taxable; (ii) Whether service tax was payable on surcharge collected for delayed payment of telephone bills; (iii) Whether telephone services through public telephones at airports and hospitals, for which no bills were raised, were exempt from service tax.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was payable on interconnection usage charges for the period before such service was made taxable.

Analysis: The applicable clarification stated that interconnection usage services were not covered by the pre-amendment taxable-service definition and became taxable only upon the subsequent inclusion of such charges within telecommunication service. The demand related to the period before that amendment took effect.

Conclusion: Interconnection usage charges were not liable to service tax for the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax was payable on surcharge collected for delayed payment of telephone bills.

Analysis: The applicable clarification treated delayed-payment surcharge as an amount that did not alter the value of the taxable telephone service and therefore did not attract service tax.

Conclusion: Surcharge collected for delayed payment of telephone bills was not liable to service tax, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether telephone services through public telephones at airports and hospitals, for which no bills were raised, were exempt from service tax.

Analysis: Public calls made through the telephones installed at airports and hospitals were not billed, and the specified exemption applied to those services.

Conclusion: The public telephone services were exempt from service tax, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: None of the three categories could sustain a service-tax demand; the associated interest and penalty consequently had no basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A service-tax levy cannot be imposed where the service was not taxable during the relevant period, where the amount collected does not form part of taxable value, or where a specific exemption applies.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty imposed on appellant no. 1 for dealing with confiscated cigarettes was sustainable; (ii) Whether the penalty imposed on appellant no. 2 was excessive.

Issue (i): Whether penalty imposed on appellant no. 1 for dealing with confiscated cigarettes was sustainable.

Analysis: Appellant no. 1 failed to produce documents substantiating its asserted receipt of the cigarettes from appellant no. 2 and their subsequent return to appellant no. 2, despite substantial time having elapsed. The claimed transactions consequently remained unsupported.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed on appellant no. 1 was sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed on appellant no. 2 was excessive.

Analysis: The penalty of Rs. 45 lakh was assessed against the value of the confiscated cigarettes, namely Rs. 87,69,260, and was found to be highly excessive.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed on appellant no. 2 was reduced to Rs. 25 lakh, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalty liability of appellant no. 1 remains intact, while appellant no. 2 receives reduction in the quantum of penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty for dealings in confiscated goods must be proportionate to the value of the goods and circumstances of the case.

Outcome: Both connected appeals were allowed pursuant to the settlement, and the impugned orders were set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) should be condoned; (ii) Whether the penalty appeal should be restored for adjudication on merits after condonation of delay.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) should be condoned.

Analysis: The delay arose because tax communications were sent to the email address of the assessee's consultant, who was severely affected by COVID-19 and subsequently died. The assessee had filed the return and disclosed substantial taxable income, and there was no material indicating that the delayed filing was wilful or deliberate. Where technical considerations conflict with substantial justice, substantial justice should prevail in the absence of intentional delay.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty appeal should be restored for adjudication on merits after condonation of delay.

Analysis: The penalty order had been passed ex parte for want of compliance, while the first appellate authority had declined to admit the appeal solely on limitation and had not decided the penalty grounds on merits. A merits adjudication after affording reasonable opportunity was therefore required.

Conclusion: The appeal was restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh adjudication on merits after affording reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection was removed and the penalty dispute was directed to be decided afresh on merits; no determination was made on the validity of the penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Delay attributable to a consultant's incapacity and death, without evidence of deliberate default by the assessee, warrants condonation where refusal would defeat adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether GST can be deducted from compensation paid for compulsory acquisition of land and structures.

Analysis: GST under Article 366(12A) is attracted to a supply of goods or services. Land and buildings attached to it are immovable property; compulsory acquisition is an expropriation through exercise of eminent domain, not a voluntary supply, sale of goods, or provision of services by the landowner. No statutory basis was shown for levying GST on compensation awarded for the acquired land or structure.

Conclusion: Deduction of GST from the acquisition compensation was without authority of law and in excess of power.

Issues: Whether, after unsigned assessment orders were quashed, the authorities could be permitted to reissue the same orders after curing the signature defect, including through a successor officer, with protection against limitation.

Analysis: Orders issued without either digital or manual signature had already been quashed, and that quashing was not challenged by the official respondents. Once an order is quashed, the authorities may initiate and conclude fresh proceedings in accordance with law, but cannot cure the defect and reissue the very same quashed order. A successor officer cannot be authorised to issue the same predetermined order after hearing the assessee, since such hearing would be merely formal. The direction insulating any reissued order from limitation was consequently unsustainable.

Conclusion: The authorities cannot reissue the same quashed orders by affixing signatures or through successor officers, nor can such orders receive protection from limitation; they retain liberty to issue fresh orders in accordance with law and due procedure. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year were valid where approval under Section 151 was granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax rather than the prescribed higher authority.

Analysis: For a reassessment notice issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, Section 151 required prior sanction from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General, as applicable. The approval obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax was consequently incompetent, rendering the consequential reassessment action invalid.

Conclusion: The approval was invalid for want of sanction by the competent statutory authority; the assessment order was therefore rightly quashed. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a penalty for misreporting of income can be sustained without specifying the applicable limb of Section 270A(9) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Penalty proceedings for misreporting require identification of the precise statutory limb under which the alleged default falls. Neither the assessment proceedings nor the penalty action specified which of the six limbs in Section 270A(9) was attracted. This omission deprived the assessee of a definite charge and rendered the penalty action legally defective.

Conclusion: The penalty was invalid and was struck down.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order demanding tax, interest and penalty exceeding the aggregate amount specified in the show-cause notice is sustainable under Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 75(7) limits the demand in an order to the amount specified in the notice and prohibits confirmation on grounds other than those stated in the notice. The notice specified an aggregate demand of Rs. 57.60 crore towards tax, interest and penalty, whereas the impugned order raised an aggregate demand of Rs. 59.20 crore. The excess demand was ex facie inconsistent with the statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The demand order was unsustainable for contravention of Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether appellate and consequential assessment proceedings could continue after acceptance of settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 and issuance of Form No. 4.

Analysis: The acceptance of the settlement application, payment of the determined amount, and issuance of Form No. 4 made the assessment for the relevant year conclusive and final under the Scheme. Upon being notified of issuance of Form No. 2 and the pending settlement application, the appellate authority ought not to have remanded the assessment; it should have deferred disposal until the final settlement certificate and then disposed of the appeal consistently with the settlement. Continuation of the remand and consequential proceedings produced unwarranted multiplicity of litigation.

Conclusion: The settlement certificate in Form No. 4 remains conclusive under the Scheme, and the appellate, Tribunal and consequential proceedings founded on the remand order cannot survive.

Issues: (i) Whether the cost of land acquired before transfer of the original capital asset may form part of the cost of construction of a new residential house for exemption under section 54F; (ii) Whether exemption under section 54F is unavailable because unutilised consideration was not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme by the due date under section 139(1), despite its actual investment in construction within three years.

Issue (i): Whether the cost of land acquired before transfer of the original capital asset may form part of the cost of construction of a new residential house for exemption under section 54F.

Analysis: Section 54F(1) requires construction of a residential house within three years of transfer but does not require that the land on which it is constructed must also have been acquired after that transfer. Land is an integral component of a residential house, and excluding its cost would artificially segregate the land from the completed residential unit. A beneficial and purposive construction of the exemption provision supports inclusion of land cost where the house is constructed within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The cost of land purchased before transfer of the original asset forms part of the cost of the new residential house for section 54F exemption. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether exemption under section 54F is unavailable because unutilised consideration was not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme by the due date under section 139(1), despite its actual investment in construction within three years.

Analysis: The deposit requirement in section 54F(4) preserves unutilised funds for their eventual application to the specified residential investment. Where the entire consideration is actually invested in constructing the house within the three-year statutory period, the substantive purpose of the provision is fulfilled. Non-deposit in the Scheme cannot override actual and timely utilization for construction.

Conclusion: Non-deposit in the Capital Gains Account Scheme does not defeat section 54F exemption where the consideration is actually invested in construction within three years. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee remains entitled to the claimed capital-gains exemption for both the pre-transfer land cost and the subsequently incurred construction expenditure.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 54F must be purposively applied: land cost integral to a residential house is includible notwithstanding pre-transfer acquisition, and actual investment in construction within the prescribed period satisfies the substantive exemption requirement despite non-deposit of unutilised funds in the Capital Gains Account Scheme.

Issues: Whether disclosed turnover could be enhanced merely because books of account were not produced during survey, without cogent adverse material supporting undisclosed purchases and sales.

Analysis: Non-production of books of account at the time of survey justified their rejection and a best-judgment assessment, but did not by itself permit enhancement of turnover. No discrepancy or other adverse material was found during the survey to support estimation of undisclosed purchases or sales.

Conclusion: The disclosed turnover was required to be accepted; enhancement based solely on presumption in the absence of cogent material was impermissible, in favour of the assessee.