Issues: Whether the appellate acquittal for the alleged offence of dishonour of cheques was sustainable where one cheque was presented after expiry of its validity, another was presented before its date, and the demand notice claimed the aggregate amount of all seven cheques without valid service.

Analysis: A cheque presented after its validity period cannot found proceedings for dishonour, and a post-dated cheque presented before its date cannot support such proceedings. The demand notice included amounts under both the expired and prematurely presented cheques along with the remaining cheques. Further, the notice was returned with the endorsement "not known", which was not valid service; no further steps were taken to effect service. A demand notice in a penal proceeding must accurately and validly demand the dishonoured cheque amount.

Conclusion: The acquittal was sustainable; the requirements for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were not fulfilled.

Issues: Whether QFT Tubes, imported separately and used as a component of an ELISA kit, qualify for the 5% concessional basic customs duty available to ELISA kits under Serial No. 166(A) of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs.

Analysis: The notification extends the concession to specified diagnostic kits or equipment, including ELISA kits, but does not extend it to their individual components. QFT Tubes are blood-collection glass tubes containing antigens and are only one of several components required for an ELISA kit; they do not themselves constitute an ELISA kit in commercial or common parlance. Functional interdependence and intended use with an ELISA plate cannot enlarge the scope of an exemption entry. Exemption notifications require strict construction, and end use is not relevant to classification unless the tariff entry expressly makes use or adaptation a criterion. The relevant condition is that of the goods at importation.

Conclusion: QFT Tubes imported separately are not eligible for the concessional duty exemption prescribed for ELISA kits; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether preferential customs-duty benefit based on certificates of origin could be denied without following the prescribed procedure for verification of those certificates.

Analysis: A claim for preferential concession supported by a certificate of origin issued by the designated authority of the exporting country is governed by the Interim Rules of Origin. Where there is doubt regarding the authenticity of the certificate or accuracy of origin particulars, Rule 15 of Annexure B requires the importing party to seek retroactive verification from the issuing authority. The investigation relied on statements and third-party material without obtaining verification from the Thai issuing authority. The prescribed mechanism for questioning and rejecting the certificates was therefore not followed.

Conclusion: The preferential-notification benefit could not be denied; the duty demand and penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration; (ii) Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Issue (i): Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration.

Analysis: Section 220 requires the Board to constitute a Disciplinary Committee consisting only of whole-time members. The statutory composition of the Board and the service rules distinguish the Chairperson from a whole-time member. The delegation order authorised the Chairperson to constitute committees, but specifically reserved disposal of show-cause notices and cancellation of registration to the Disciplinary Committee. A statutory power required to be exercised in a prescribed manner cannot be exercised otherwise.

Conclusion: The Chairperson lacked jurisdiction to act as the Disciplinary Committee; the cancellation order was a nullity. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Analysis: Sections 218 to 220 establish a sequence in which the Board, upon reasonable grounds, directs inspection or investigation, receives the resulting report, and may then issue a show-cause notice for disciplinary consideration. The prior inspection covering the petitioner's assignments, including the concerned corporate debtor, found no illegality. That report could not be disregarded while initiating proceedings directly from appellate observations, particularly when independent consideration had been required. The issuing officer also did not correspond with the authority designated under the applicable delegation order. The factual circumstances, including unavailable records and the company's non-going-concern status, required an appropriate statutory inquiry before disciplinary action.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and consequential disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by non-compliance with the mandatory inspection and investigation framework. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The statutory defects do not preclude the Board from initiating and pursuing fresh action on the same matters in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute confines disciplinary authority to a committee composed only of specified members and requires inspection or investigation before disciplinary action, an order made by an unauthorised functionary without following that statutory process is void.

Issues: (i) Whether non-disposal of the intervention application before recording completion of the sale and liquidation process caused prejudice to the appellant; (ii) Whether the liquidator could sell the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights, and the corporate debtor's legal entity, in liquidation despite the appellant's ownership and contractual rights under the BOT, lease and shareholders' arrangements.

Issue (i): Whether non-disposal of the intervention application before recording completion of the sale and liquidation process caused prejudice to the appellant.

Analysis: The intervention application sought participation, a copy of the sale application and a condition that transfer of leased land be subject to a board resolution; it did not seek cancellation of the completed sales, sale certificates or sale agreement. The sale-completion order was subject to pending litigation, and the intervention application was later withdrawn. In the absence of a contemporaneous challenge to the sale process or an effective substantive relief, recording completion of sale and liquidation was ministerial and caused no prejudice, though both applications ought preferably to have been disposed of together.

Conclusion: Non-disposal of the intervention application simultaneously with the sale-completion application did not prejudice the appellant; the finding is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the liquidator could sell the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights, and the corporate debtor's legal entity, in liquidation despite the appellant's ownership and contractual rights under the BOT, lease and shareholders' arrangements.

Analysis: The concession, lease and shareholders' arrangements created a bundle of leasehold, operational and project rights in favour of the corporate debtor for the concession term. Although ownership of the land remained with the appellant, the corporate debtor's leasehold rights and rights to operate the project were assets capable of inclusion in the liquidation estate and sale by auction. The appellant had not terminated the contractual arrangements, and its creditor claims had already been rejected conclusively. Its equity contribution ranked last in the statutory distribution waterfall; the equity could not pass to the purchaser. The liquidation sale extinguished pre-existing liabilities consistently with the clean slate principle, while the purchaser acquired no superior rights and remained bound by the surviving BOT obligations, including remittance of the facility at the end of the stipulated term. No material irregularity, fraud or substantial undervaluation in the sale was established to warrant interference with the liquidator's commercial decision.

Conclusion: The sale of the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights and its legal entity was valid, subject to preservation of the appellant's BOT rights; the finding is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The auction purchaser may exercise only the rights formerly vested in the corporate debtor, and remains bound to transfer the facility in accordance with the corporate debtor's BOT obligations at the end of the concession term.

Ratio Decidendi: Leasehold and contractual development or operational rights vested in a corporate debtor constitute liquidation assets capable of sale by the liquidator; a sale purchaser takes no better rights than the corporate debtor and remains bound by subsisting contractual obligations.

Issues: (i) Whether the order directing de-sealing of the project property was sustainable when sealing and confiscation preceded commencement of CIRP; (ii) Whether the Resolution Professional was authorised to challenge the order remanding the resolution plan; (iii) Whether contractual possession and development rights under the hire-purchase agreement constituted assets of the corporate debtor and whether the resolution plan could deal with the statutory authority's land and unauthorised construction.

Issue (i): Whether the order directing de-sealing of the project property was sustainable when sealing and confiscation preceded commencement of CIRP.

Analysis: The material established that the property was sealed in August 2019 and confiscated in July 2021, whereas CIRP commenced in May 2022. The statutory action was founded on unauthorised construction contrary to the sanctioned plan, and not on a post-moratorium recovery action. The premise that sealing occurred during moratorium was therefore erroneous.

Conclusion: The de-sealing order was unsustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the Resolution Professional was authorised to challenge the order remanding the resolution plan.

Analysis: The Committee of Creditors had resolved to authorise the Resolution Professional to file the appeal, and that authorisation was not controverted. The appeal was consequently not an independent action by the Resolution Professional.

Conclusion: The appeal filed by the Resolution Professional was maintainable.

Issue (iii): Whether contractual possession and development rights under the hire-purchase agreement constituted assets of the corporate debtor and whether the resolution plan could deal with the statutory authority's land and unauthorised construction.

Analysis: The hire-purchase arrangement reserved title in the statutory authority until full payment and execution of conveyance, but conferred possession, construction, commercial exploitation, transfer of constructed units and a right to seek conveyance upon compliance. These valuable contractual and development rights could constitute assets under the insolvency framework if they subsisted on the insolvency commencement date. No formal cancellation of the agreement or allotment had been made, and regulatory sealing could not by itself establish contractual termination. Nevertheless, the Resolution Professional could acquire no superior right or title, and statutory ownership could not be compulsorily transferred through a resolution plan. The plan impermissibly proceeded as if the land belonged to the corporate debtor, required transfer of the land and approvals, and sought to prevent imposition of compounding charges and require regularisation of unauthorised construction. Regularisation or compounding remained within the statutory authority's exclusive domain and required compliance with applicable law.

Conclusion: The corporate debtor's subsisting contractual and development rights were capable of treatment as assets, but the resolution plan could not transfer the statutory authority's ownership or compel regularisation of unauthorised construction; remand to the Committee of Creditors for reconsideration was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The resolution plan must be reformulated by treating only legally subsisting contractual and development rights as part of the insolvency estate, while preserving the statutory authority's title and regulatory powers.

Ratio Decidendi: Contractual possession and development rights that subsist on the insolvency commencement date may constitute assets of a corporate debtor, but insolvency resolution cannot create superior title, divest a statutory authority of its land, or override mandatory statutory approval and regularisation requirements.

Issues: Whether the PMLA prosecution had territorial jurisdiction at Gurugram and whether, in view of the scheduled offence having been transferred to Delhi and part of the alleged money-laundering activity occurring there, the proceeding should be transferred to the PMLA Special Court at Delhi.

Analysis: Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires the offence punishable under Section 4 and the connected scheduled offence to be tried by the Special Court having jurisdiction over the money-laundering offence. Money laundering may involve several processes or activities, including acquiring, concealing, possessing, using, or projecting proceeds of crime as untainted property. By virtue of Section 178(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence consisting of acts occurring in different local areas may be tried by a court having jurisdiction over any such area, and Section 46 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act applies the Code's procedure subject to consistency with the Act. The proceeds of crime were acquired at Gurugram, where the underlying project and attached land were situated, giving the Gurugram Special Court jurisdiction. However, cash, jewellery, vehicles, and fixed deposits constituting proceeds of crime were also seized or attached at Delhi, giving the Delhi Special Court concurrent jurisdiction. Since the scheduled offence had already been transferred to Delhi, the statutory requirement that the PMLA offence and the scheduled offence be tried by the same Special Court made transfer expedient in the interests of justice.

Conclusion: The PMLA prosecution was not without jurisdiction at Gurugram, but the proceeding was required to be transferred to the Special Judge, PMLA, Saket Court Complex, Delhi.

Issues: Whether the six-month limitation for claiming refund under the retrospective service-tax exemption commences from the date of presidential assent to the Finance Act, 2017 or from the date of the service-provider certificate required to support the refund application.

Analysis: Section 104 of the Finance Act, 2017 retrospectively exempted the relevant one-time upfront amount for long-term industrial-plot leases and provided for refund of tax already collected, with a six-month period for filing the claim. The refund application had to be accompanied by SIPCOT's certificate confirming payment of service tax. Since that certificate was issued on 19.12.2017, the limitation could commence only upon its issuance; the application filed on 26.02.2018 was consequently within six months. The Tribunal's computation from the date of presidential assent disregarded the mandatory supporting certificate.

Conclusion: The refund claim was within limitation, and the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether refund amounts withheld for want of evidence that service tax deducted by the Rajasthan Housing Board was deposited with the Revenue were admissible; (ii) Whether interest on the refunded service tax was payable at 12% from the dates of tax payment, or only at the statutory rate after the prescribed period from the refund applications.

Issue (i): Whether refund amounts withheld for want of evidence that service tax deducted by the Rajasthan Housing Board was deposited with the Revenue were admissible.

Analysis: A refund claimant must furnish documentary evidence establishing payment of the duty or tax claimed as refund. The narration in a show-cause notice of the claimant's assertion that tax had been deducted by the awarder does not establish actual deduction, deposit in the Government account, or absence of a separate refund to the awarder. No challans, certificates, or equivalent primary evidence established the relevant payments.

Conclusion: The withheld refund amounts were correctly denied for lack of documentary proof of duty payment, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on the refunded service tax was payable at 12% from the dates of tax payment, or only at the statutory rate after the prescribed period from the refund applications.

Analysis: Refund claims for tax voluntarily paid under self-assessment fall within the statutory refund mechanism. Such payments cannot be treated as revenue deposits merely because they were subsequently asserted to have been made under a mistake of law. Interest on delayed refund accrues only after expiry of three months from receipt of the refund application, and the Tribunal cannot award equitable or compensatory interest beyond the statutory framework. The record showed that the refunds were ultimately made pursuant to the appellate orders, beyond the statutory three-month period.

Conclusion: The appellants are entitled to interest at 6% per annum from expiry of three months after their respective refund applications until payment of the sanctioned refunds, in favour of the assessee; interest at 12% from the dates of tax payment is denied.

Final Conclusion: The statutory refund regime governs both the evidentiary entitlement to refund and interest for delay; only proven refund claims qualify, and delayed payment of sanctioned refunds attracts interest at the notified statutory rate.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax voluntarily paid under self-assessment and claimed back as refund remains governed by the statutory refund provisions, and interest is payable only at the notified rate from expiry of three months after receipt of a valid refund application.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit was admissible where the imported aluminium scrap was not received in the factory and credit was availed on invalid, exhausted or fictitious documents; (ii) Whether the demand of duty for clandestine removal, invocation of the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible where the imported aluminium scrap was not received in the factory and credit was availed on invalid, exhausted or fictitious documents.

Analysis: Rule 3(1) requires receipt of inputs in the factory for availment of credit. Documentary endorsements showed diversion of imported scrap away from the factory; the material was corroborated by statements of the customs house agents and cargo personnel. The appellant did not produce supporting Cenvat records or invoices, while its statements admitted non-receipt of scrap and departmental investigation established that the stated suppliers had made no supplies.

Conclusion: The Cenvat credit was wrongly availed and its reversal was sustainable, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand of duty for clandestine removal, invocation of the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: Parallel invoices, transport and freight records, booking registers, delivery documents and statements established clearances of final products without invoices and without payment of duty. The evidence demonstrated fraudulent conduct causing duty evasion, rather than a procedural lapse, and supported invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalties.

Conclusion: The duty demand for clandestine removal, extended limitation and penalties were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed reversal of inadmissible credit, excise-duty demand, extended limitation and penalties remain enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Cenvat credit is unavailable where inputs are not actually received in the registered factory, and corroborated documentary and testimonial evidence of undisclosed clearances establishes clandestine removal and justifies the extended limitation period where fraud is shown.

Issues: (i) Whether the charge of clandestine removal was established; (ii) Whether individual penalties were justified.

Issue (i): Whether the charge of clandestine removal was established.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority rejected the requested cross-examination despite treating the reply as interim, but did not communicate that rejection or grant a further opportunity to file a final reply on merits. The demand was consequently determined solely on the show-cause allegations. Seeking cross-examination was a permissible means of disputing the alleged admissions, notwithstanding that the statements had not been formally retracted. The proceedings therefore breached audi alteram partem and denied a reasonable opportunity to defend.

Conclusion: The allegation of clandestine removal was not proved; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether individual penalties were justified.

Analysis: The penalised individuals were likewise not afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their defence. The procedural infirmity that invalidated the demand equally affected the penalties.

Conclusion: The individual penalties could not be sustained; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand and penalties were set aside because the adjudication was conducted in breach of natural justice, and a remand was considered purposeless given the age of the alleged activity.

Ratio Decidendi: Where liability is founded on statements and the noticees seek cross-examination, rejection of that request without communicating the decision and affording a further effective opportunity to answer the case violates audi alteram partem and vitiates the adjudication.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation for demanding central excise duty could validly be invoked.

Analysis: The Department had been informed through prior correspondence of the assessee's intended procurement and packing/labelling activities in respect of crankshafts. It could not, after three years, claim ignorance of those material facts. Further, despite the direction to issue a proper recovery notice, the show-cause notice was issued beyond one year, and the lower orders did not address these facts. The extended period was therefore invoked without justification.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was legally unsustainable; consequently, the duty demand and consequential penalty could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether Rule 8A(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957, requiring a degree in Agricultural Science and prescribed experience for registration as a valuer of agricultural land, is unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether rejection of the petitioner's application for registration as an agricultural-land valuer for want of the prescribed qualification was valid.

Issue (i): Whether Rule 8A(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957, requiring a degree in Agricultural Science and prescribed experience for registration as a valuer of agricultural land, is unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Section 34AB of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 authorises distinct qualifications for valuers of different asset classes. Rule 8A prescribes qualifications corresponding to the specialised nature of each asset. Agricultural-land valuation entails assessment of soil quality and fertility, irrigation, cultivation, crops, productivity, land classification, access, comparable sales and other agricultural characteristics reflected in the prescribed valuation form. A degree in Agricultural Science with farm-valuation experience bears a rational nexus to this object. The alternative eligibility extended to specified former Government officers rests on their substantial practical experience in land administration and valuation, constituting a valid classification. A statutory qualification is not invalid merely because another professional qualification may also enable a person to undertake valuation work.

Conclusion: Rule 8A(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957 is constitutionally valid and does not violate Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution of India. The issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the petitioner's application for registration as an agricultural-land valuer for want of the prescribed qualification was valid.

Analysis: The petitioner held a Civil Engineering qualification and was registered for valuation of non-agricultural immovable properties, but did not possess the Agricultural Science degree and farm-valuation experience required by Rule 8A(3). Registration for a different asset category could not substitute compliance with the distinct statutory qualifications applicable to agricultural lands.

Conclusion: Rejection of the application for registration as a valuer of agricultural land was valid. The issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The prescribed specialised qualification regime for agricultural-land valuers remains enforceable, and civil-engineering credentials do not confer eligibility for that separate registration category.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory rule prescribing specialised qualifications for valuation of a distinct class of assets is valid where the qualification has a rational nexus with the expertise required, and an experience-based alternative for specified public officers constitutes a reasonable classification.

Issues: Whether, following a search initiated after 1 April 2021, a pending return for which scrutiny assessment remained within limitation could be assessed under Section 143(3), or could only be dealt with through reassessment under Section 148.

Analysis: The post-2021 framework does not expressly bar scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) merely because a search under Section 132 has taken place. The substitution of Section 132(8) expressly recognises assessment under Section 143(3) in relation to seized material. The deeming fiction in Explanation 2 to Section 148 enables reassessment where a completed assessment or intimation is followed by search, or where the time for regular processing or scrutiny assessment has expired; it does not displace a timely pending original assessment. The notice under Section 143(2) and the assessment order were within the applicable statutory limitation. The assessee had also participated in the assessment proceedings without objection.

Conclusion: A timely pending original assessment after search could validly be completed under Section 143(3); recourse to Section 148 was not mandatory. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order and notice for Assessment Year 2015-16 were barred by limitation under the substituted reassessment regime.

Analysis: The alleged escaped income exceeded the monetary threshold applicable to the extended limitation under the erstwhile regime. The notice issued under the erstwhile regime on 30.06.2021 was within the surviving six-year period. Pursuant to the legal fiction governing such notices, the subsequent notice under Section 148A(b) was issued on 27.05.2022. As no reply was furnished within the permitted period, the order under Section 148A(d) and consequential notice under Section 148, both dated 28.07.2022, were issued within the period computed after excluding the time allowed for reply and completion of the statutory process. The stated concession concerning Assessment Year 2015-16 did not apply where the escaped income exceeded the prescribed threshold.

Conclusion: The reassessment order and notice were within limitation and valid; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether assessment orders passed for non-filing of returns are deemed withdrawn upon subsequent filing of the prescribed returns with applicable late fee under Section 62(2).

Analysis: Section 62(2) provides that an assessment made for failure to furnish returns is deemed withdrawn when the registered person furnishes the requisite returns within the stipulated framework and pays the applicable late fee. The returns for the relevant periods were filed and the prescribed late fee was paid. The benefit of the amended provision, consistently applied to condone delay in furnishing GSTR-3B returns, was therefore available.

Conclusion: The assessment orders stood deemed withdrawn, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether adjustment of an earlier mortgage debt towards property consideration could be assessed as unexplained money in the year of purchase; (ii) Whether addition based solely on the difference between purchase consideration and stamp duty value was sustainable where the stamp valuation was disputed; (iii) Whether the entire cash deposits could be treated as unexplained money without objectively examining the assessee's explanation and supporting confirmations.

Issue (i): Whether adjustment of an earlier mortgage debt towards property consideration could be assessed as unexplained money in the year of purchase.

Analysis: The registered sale deed recorded adjustment of the consideration against a mortgage debt created under an earlier registered mortgage deed. No material established that the registered documents were false or that unexplained money was invested during the relevant previous year. Any inquiry into the source of the earlier mortgage advance belonged to the year in which that advance was made.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained money was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether addition based solely on the difference between purchase consideration and stamp duty value was sustainable where the stamp valuation was disputed.

Analysis: Stamp duty guideline value is a statutory benchmark and cannot invariably be equated with actual fair market value. Despite the assessee's consistent objection, no independent material was brought to establish that the property's fair market value exceeded the recorded consideration.

Conclusion: The addition based on the stamp duty value differential was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the entire cash deposits could be treated as unexplained money without objectively examining the assessee's explanation and supporting confirmations.

Analysis: The assessee had furnished an explanation for the deposits and sought to produce confirmations. The appellate authority rejected the material on technical grounds without examining it or obtaining a remand report. An unsatisfactory explanation does not automatically require a deeming addition; the statutory discretion must be exercised on the facts after proper verification.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash deposits was unjustified and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All substantive additions were deleted; the challenge to the scrutiny notice was left open as academic.

Issues: Whether a notice under section 143(2) not conforming to the format prescribed by the CBDT Instruction dated 23.06.2017 invalidates the consequent assessment despite section 292B.

Analysis: Section 143(2) requires a timely notice requiring the assessee to attend and produce supporting evidence; neither the Act nor the Rules prescribes a statutory format or requires disclosure of the category of scrutiny. The classifications of limited, complete and manual scrutiny arise from departmental administration and cannot be imported as additional statutory conditions for assumption of jurisdiction. Although the CBDT Instruction binds departmental authorities, its breach does not automatically nullify proceedings unless it affects a statutory condition precedent or causes demonstrated prejudice. Where the notice conveyed selection for scrutiny, was issued and served within time, and enabled effective participation, a format deviation is an irregularity of form. Section 292B preserves a notice that is in substance and effect consistent with the Act's purpose, namely initiation of scrutiny and opportunity to substantiate the return.

Conclusion: Non-conformity with the prescribed CBDT format does not by itself invalidate a notice under section 143(2) or the consequential assessment; the defect is procedural and is curable under section 292B. The question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether, for Assessment Year 2024-25, a resident individual opting for the concessional tax regime could claim rebate under section 87A against income-tax payable where total income included short-term capital gains taxable at the special rate under section 111A.

Analysis: Section 87A, as applicable to Assessment Year 2024-25, grants rebate where the prescribed total-income condition is satisfied under section 115BAC(1A), without distinguishing between normal-rate income and special-rate income. Neither section 87A nor section 111A contains an express exclusion of tax on short-term capital gains from the rebate computation. The restriction expressly enacted for long-term capital gains under section 112A demonstrates that an exclusion, when intended, is specifically provided. The overriding formulation in section 115BAC(1A) concerns computation at concessional and special rates and does not curtail an independent statutory rebate absent an explicit restriction. The subsequent prospective restriction reinforces that no such embargo applied for the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: Rebate under section 87A was available against income-tax on total income, including tax payable on short-term capital gains under section 111A, for Assessment Year 2024-25. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether addition of 6% of purported donations as income was sustainable after deletion of the addition under Section 68; (ii) Whether the political party remained entitled to exemption under Section 13A.

Issue (i): Whether addition of 6% of purported donations as income was sustainable after deletion of the addition under Section 68.

Analysis: The factual finding that bogus donation receipts were issued, the purported donations were returned to the contributors, and the arrangement enabled improper deductions was not open to interference in an appeal under Section 260A. The 6% addition represented income earned from facilitating the false receipts rather than the entire purported donation amount.

Conclusion: Addition of 6% of the purported donations as income was sustainable, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the political party remained entitled to exemption under Section 13A.

Analysis: The books did not reflect a true and correct position, and the required reports to the Election Commission were either improperly filed or not filed. These violations of the second proviso to Section 13A disentitled the political party from claiming the exemption.

Conclusion: The political party was not entitled to exemption under Section 13A, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions attributable to the receipt-facilitation arrangement and denial of the claimed political-party exemption were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory exemption cannot be claimed where the claimant's accounts and mandatory reporting fail to disclose genuine transactions, and concurrent factual findings of such violations are not revisited in an appeal confined to questions of law.