Issues: Whether an application for insolvency resolution against a personal guarantor under Section 95(1) is maintainable before the NCLT where no CIRP or liquidation proceeding has been initiated against the corporate debtor.

Analysis: The statutory scheme treats liability under a guarantee as financial debt and does not make proceedings against a personal guarantor conditional upon prior or pending CIRP against the corporate debtor. The NCLT's jurisdiction concerning a personal guarantor is not excluded merely because no proceeding has been commenced against the corporate debtor. The personal guarantor's liability is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; consequently, the creditor is not required to exhaust remedies against the corporate debtor before proceeding against the guarantor. A financial creditor has concurrent and independent remedies to proceed against the corporate debtor and/or its personal guarantor, and may elect to invoke the personal guarantee directly.

Conclusion: An application under Section 95(1) against a personal guarantor is maintainable before the NCLT even without initiation, pendency, or conclusion of CIRP or liquidation against the corporate debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether Minimum Demand Charges recovered where gas consumption falls below the booked quantity are liable to Service Tax as consideration for transportation of gas through pipeline or conduit service; (ii) Whether marketing margin received in connection with sale of natural gas is liable to Service Tax as consideration for a taxable service.

Issue (i): Whether Minimum Demand Charges recovered where gas consumption falls below the booked quantity are liable to Service Tax as consideration for transportation of gas through pipeline or conduit service.

Analysis: Minimum Demand Charges arise upon the customer failing to lift the stipulated minimum quantity of gas. The amount is penal in character for non-utilisation of the booked quantity and is not consideration for any additional or independent transportation service supplied by the assessee. The issue stood settled in the assessee's own earlier final orders.

Conclusion: Minimum Demand Charges are not liable to Service Tax. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether marketing margin received in connection with sale of natural gas is liable to Service Tax as consideration for a taxable service.

Analysis: Marketing margin forms part of the consideration for sale of gas, on which VAT has been discharged. It is not attributable to a service independently supplied to the purchaser; activities before the completed sale are undertaken by the seller for itself, without an identifiable service provider-service recipient relationship. The prior rulings involving the same assessee and the settled treatment of marketing margin were followed.

Conclusion: Marketing margin is not liable to Service Tax. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed Service Tax demands on Minimum Demand Charges and marketing margin cannot be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts recovered as a penalty for failure to lift a minimum contracted quantity, and margins forming part of the taxed sale value of goods without an independent service relationship, do not constitute consideration for a taxable service.

Issues: (i) Whether a revised return filed after an income-tax inspection protects a dealer from assessment for purchase suppression, consequential sales suppression, and estimated additions; (ii) Whether penalty for suppressed turnover was validly imposed.

Issue (i): Whether a revised return filed after an income-tax inspection protects a dealer from assessment for purchase suppression, consequential sales suppression, and estimated additions.

Analysis: The detected excess gold and silver stock was supported by inspection materials and remained unreconciled even after the revised return. A post-inspection disclosure does not establish that the prior failure to maintain true and complete accounts was bona fide. The Tribunal had independently evaluated the facts and reduced the equal additions from 100% to 10%, treating the subsequent tax payment as a mitigating circumstance. The precedents disallowing equal additions in the absence of material, or where full disclosure had been made, were inapplicable because the disclosure here was neither voluntary nor complete.

Conclusion: The assessment for purchase suppression, consequential sales suppression, and the reduced estimated additions was validly sustained against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for suppressed turnover was validly imposed.

Analysis: The unreconciled stock discrepancy and incomplete post-inspection disclosure justified the finding of suppression. The statutory explanation prescribed penalty by reference to the suppressed turnover determined in best-judgment assessment, and the assessee failed to justify the omission.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 12(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 was validly sustained against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A revised return submitted only after detection does not negate willful suppression; it may justify moderation of estimated addition but does not preclude assessment or statutory penalty where suppression remains unexplained.

Ratio Decidendi: A dealer seeking to rely on a post-inspection revised return must establish that the earlier non-disclosure was not willful; subsequent payment or disclosure may mitigate estimated addition but cannot erase proved and unreconciled suppression or bar penalty.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration warranted interference when the tax liability had subsequently been quantified.

Analysis: The departmental record established that an order quantifying the tax liability had been passed under Section 74. The factual premise that no quantified liability existed was therefore incorrect. The petitioner sought liberty to pursue challenge against that order and to seek revocation after payment of tax or after finality of such challenge.

Conclusion: No interference with the rejection order was warranted; the petitioner could pursue the available legal remedies and thereafter seek revocation in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the rent reasonableness certificate was validly issued without considering the lease deed and the prescribed material for assessment or reassessment of fair rent.

Analysis: The hiring committee had been furnished with the lease deed but did not consider it while fixing rent. It also failed to consider the applicable assessment or reassessment material prescribing recognised valuation principles and prevailing market rent as alternative methods for determining reasonable rent. The certificate was therefore issued without consideration of material relevant to the determination.

Conclusion: The rent reasonableness certificate was quashed, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered in accordance with the relevant lease deed and fair-rent assessment material, in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the entire value of purchases treated as bogus could be added as income where the corresponding sales were undisputed and stock records evidenced movement of goods.

Analysis: The additional stock records were admitted, as they were authenticated and prepared from primary purchase and sale invoices. The records showed no variation between purchases and sales. Since the sales were accepted and no disproportionate sales were identified, the goods sold could not be treated as representing nonexistent purchases merely because the stated suppliers were found to be non-genuine. Tax is chargeable on income or profit and not on gross purchase receipts; accordingly, only the profit embedded in such purchases was liable to be assessed.

Conclusion: The addition of the entire alleged bogus-purchase value was unsustainable. Only profit at 1.15% of that value, amounting to Rs. 2,56,437, was directed to be treated as income, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeals before the first appellate authority should have been condoned and the penalty appeals adjudicated on merits.

Analysis: The delay was attributed to the director responsible for legal and financial matters suffering a heart stroke, while the remaining directors lacked knowledge of the applicable legal procedure. The first appellate authority rejected the condonation application without affording an opportunity and dismissed the appeals without addressing the challenges to the penalties. A meritorious matter should not be excluded solely on limitation, particularly where the appeals concern penalties.

Conclusion: The delay was required to be condoned and the penalty appeals restored for adjudication on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest earned by a co-operative credit society on fixed deposits with co-operative banks qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The interest was received solely from three co-operative banks. Applying the jurisdictional High Court ruling that a co-operative bank registered under the State co-operative societies law is a co-operative society, interest derived from such banks falls within the deduction available under Section 80P(2)(d).

Conclusion: Interest received from the three co-operative banks qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d); the assessee is entitled to the deduction claimed.

Issues: (i) Whether deductions claimed for provisions for non-performing assets were allowable under Section 36(1)(viia); (ii) Whether accrued interest on non-performing assets was taxable on accrual basis in the hands of a co-operative bank; (iii) Whether deduction under Section 80P(2)(c)(ii) was allowable to the co-operative bank.

Issue (i): Whether deductions claimed for provisions for non-performing assets were allowable under Section 36(1)(viia).

Analysis: The deductions actually claimed for provisions were below the amounts computed as eligible deductions. The first appellate authority's factual findings, based on the remand report and the record, remained uncontroverted.

Conclusion: The deductions under Section 36(1)(viia) were allowable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether accrued interest on non-performing assets was taxable on accrual basis in the hands of a co-operative bank.

Analysis: The bank was bound by RBI directions requiring interest on non-performing assets to be recognised on receipt basis, and had consistently followed that method. The amendment extending Section 43D treatment to co-operative banks was regarded as curative and retrospective, removing the distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled co-operative banks for this purpose.

Conclusion: Interest on non-performing assets was taxable on receipt basis and not on accrual basis. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether deduction under Section 80P(2)(c)(ii) was allowable to the co-operative bank.

Analysis: The deduction had been allowed in earlier years, and the position that it was available to a co-operative society including a co-operative bank was not controverted.

Conclusion: The deduction under Section 80P(2)(c)(ii) was allowable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletions and deductions sustained by the first appellate authority remain effective for all the assessment years concerned.

Issues: Whether the derivative-trading loss claimed by the assessee was genuine and allowable.

Analysis: The derivative options were acquired shortly before expiry and allowed to lapse, resulting in losses in nearly every transaction. The broker involved had admitted to participating in organised, premeditated trades intended to create artificial derivative losses. Contract notes, execution through a registered broker and banking-channel payments did not, by themselves, establish genuineness once the Revenue's investigation shifted the burden to the assessee. The assessee did not produce cogent rebuttal material, including evidence from the broker, to displace the investigation findings. The right of cross-examination was not absolute on these facts.

Conclusion: The derivative-trading loss was not genuine and its disallowance was upheld against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the refund claim for export duty illegally collected from an SEZ developer was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether refund was barred by unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether the refund claim for export duty illegally collected from an SEZ developer was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The duty levy had been declared unconstitutional and that determination attained finality. The assessee had pursued refund before the SEZ authority and thereafter before the customs authorities as directed by them. On the record, the claim could not be treated as delayed. Further, an amount forcibly collected under an illegal levy is refundable notwithstanding the ordinary statutory refund limitation.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund was barred by unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The assessee established through contractor documentation, payment evidence and Chartered Accountant certificates that it bore the export-duty incidence. The steel was used for development of the SEZ and was neither resold nor used in manufacture of goods for sale. As the assessee was the ultimate buyer and had not passed the incidence to another person, the statutory presumption of passing on duty incidence did not apply.

Conclusion: Unjust enrichment was not established and could not bar refund, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to refund of the illegally collected duty in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A claimant that proves it bore an illegally collected duty as the ultimate buyer and did not pass its incidence to another person is entitled to refund; the statutory presumption of passing on duty is rebutted by cogent evidence.

Issues: Whether the contractor was entitled to refund of the amount deducted following a reduction in excise duty despite the agreed firm contract price.

Analysis: The work orders incorporated the tender documents and the contract agreement, under which quoted rates included taxes and duties and statutory variations in taxes and duties were reimbursable on actuals. The firm-price condition was construed with the incorporated tax-variation clauses as a whole. Section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 applies unless the contract manifests a different intention. The contractual arrangement showed that the tax component was to be borne by the purchaser: an increase would be reimbursed to the supplier, while a reduction correspondingly benefited the purchaser. Retention of the savings from reduced excise duty by the supplier, without any change in its costs or agreed profit, would result in unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: The contractor was not entitled to refund of the deduction arising from the reduction in excise duty; the benefit of the reduced tax was payable to the respondent.

Issues: Whether the appellate acquittal for the alleged offence of dishonour of cheques was sustainable where one cheque was presented after expiry of its validity, another was presented before its date, and the demand notice claimed the aggregate amount of all seven cheques without valid service.

Analysis: A cheque presented after its validity period cannot found proceedings for dishonour, and a post-dated cheque presented before its date cannot support such proceedings. The demand notice included amounts under both the expired and prematurely presented cheques along with the remaining cheques. Further, the notice was returned with the endorsement "not known", which was not valid service; no further steps were taken to effect service. A demand notice in a penal proceeding must accurately and validly demand the dishonoured cheque amount.

Conclusion: The acquittal was sustainable; the requirements for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were not fulfilled.

Issues: Whether QFT Tubes, imported separately and used as a component of an ELISA kit, qualify for the 5% concessional basic customs duty available to ELISA kits under Serial No. 166(A) of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs.

Analysis: The notification extends the concession to specified diagnostic kits or equipment, including ELISA kits, but does not extend it to their individual components. QFT Tubes are blood-collection glass tubes containing antigens and are only one of several components required for an ELISA kit; they do not themselves constitute an ELISA kit in commercial or common parlance. Functional interdependence and intended use with an ELISA plate cannot enlarge the scope of an exemption entry. Exemption notifications require strict construction, and end use is not relevant to classification unless the tariff entry expressly makes use or adaptation a criterion. The relevant condition is that of the goods at importation.

Conclusion: QFT Tubes imported separately are not eligible for the concessional duty exemption prescribed for ELISA kits; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether preferential customs-duty benefit based on certificates of origin could be denied without following the prescribed procedure for verification of those certificates.

Analysis: A claim for preferential concession supported by a certificate of origin issued by the designated authority of the exporting country is governed by the Interim Rules of Origin. Where there is doubt regarding the authenticity of the certificate or accuracy of origin particulars, Rule 15 of Annexure B requires the importing party to seek retroactive verification from the issuing authority. The investigation relied on statements and third-party material without obtaining verification from the Thai issuing authority. The prescribed mechanism for questioning and rejecting the certificates was therefore not followed.

Conclusion: The preferential-notification benefit could not be denied; the duty demand and penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration; (ii) Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Issue (i): Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration.

Analysis: Section 220 requires the Board to constitute a Disciplinary Committee consisting only of whole-time members. The statutory composition of the Board and the service rules distinguish the Chairperson from a whole-time member. The delegation order authorised the Chairperson to constitute committees, but specifically reserved disposal of show-cause notices and cancellation of registration to the Disciplinary Committee. A statutory power required to be exercised in a prescribed manner cannot be exercised otherwise.

Conclusion: The Chairperson lacked jurisdiction to act as the Disciplinary Committee; the cancellation order was a nullity. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Analysis: Sections 218 to 220 establish a sequence in which the Board, upon reasonable grounds, directs inspection or investigation, receives the resulting report, and may then issue a show-cause notice for disciplinary consideration. The prior inspection covering the petitioner's assignments, including the concerned corporate debtor, found no illegality. That report could not be disregarded while initiating proceedings directly from appellate observations, particularly when independent consideration had been required. The issuing officer also did not correspond with the authority designated under the applicable delegation order. The factual circumstances, including unavailable records and the company's non-going-concern status, required an appropriate statutory inquiry before disciplinary action.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and consequential disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by non-compliance with the mandatory inspection and investigation framework. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The statutory defects do not preclude the Board from initiating and pursuing fresh action on the same matters in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute confines disciplinary authority to a committee composed only of specified members and requires inspection or investigation before disciplinary action, an order made by an unauthorised functionary without following that statutory process is void.

Issues: (i) Whether non-disposal of the intervention application before recording completion of the sale and liquidation process caused prejudice to the appellant; (ii) Whether the liquidator could sell the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights, and the corporate debtor's legal entity, in liquidation despite the appellant's ownership and contractual rights under the BOT, lease and shareholders' arrangements.

Issue (i): Whether non-disposal of the intervention application before recording completion of the sale and liquidation process caused prejudice to the appellant.

Analysis: The intervention application sought participation, a copy of the sale application and a condition that transfer of leased land be subject to a board resolution; it did not seek cancellation of the completed sales, sale certificates or sale agreement. The sale-completion order was subject to pending litigation, and the intervention application was later withdrawn. In the absence of a contemporaneous challenge to the sale process or an effective substantive relief, recording completion of sale and liquidation was ministerial and caused no prejudice, though both applications ought preferably to have been disposed of together.

Conclusion: Non-disposal of the intervention application simultaneously with the sale-completion application did not prejudice the appellant; the finding is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the liquidator could sell the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights, and the corporate debtor's legal entity, in liquidation despite the appellant's ownership and contractual rights under the BOT, lease and shareholders' arrangements.

Analysis: The concession, lease and shareholders' arrangements created a bundle of leasehold, operational and project rights in favour of the corporate debtor for the concession term. Although ownership of the land remained with the appellant, the corporate debtor's leasehold rights and rights to operate the project were assets capable of inclusion in the liquidation estate and sale by auction. The appellant had not terminated the contractual arrangements, and its creditor claims had already been rejected conclusively. Its equity contribution ranked last in the statutory distribution waterfall; the equity could not pass to the purchaser. The liquidation sale extinguished pre-existing liabilities consistently with the clean slate principle, while the purchaser acquired no superior rights and remained bound by the surviving BOT obligations, including remittance of the facility at the end of the stipulated term. No material irregularity, fraud or substantial undervaluation in the sale was established to warrant interference with the liquidator's commercial decision.

Conclusion: The sale of the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights and its legal entity was valid, subject to preservation of the appellant's BOT rights; the finding is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The auction purchaser may exercise only the rights formerly vested in the corporate debtor, and remains bound to transfer the facility in accordance with the corporate debtor's BOT obligations at the end of the concession term.

Ratio Decidendi: Leasehold and contractual development or operational rights vested in a corporate debtor constitute liquidation assets capable of sale by the liquidator; a sale purchaser takes no better rights than the corporate debtor and remains bound by subsisting contractual obligations.

Issues: (i) Whether the order directing de-sealing of the project property was sustainable when sealing and confiscation preceded commencement of CIRP; (ii) Whether the Resolution Professional was authorised to challenge the order remanding the resolution plan; (iii) Whether contractual possession and development rights under the hire-purchase agreement constituted assets of the corporate debtor and whether the resolution plan could deal with the statutory authority's land and unauthorised construction.

Issue (i): Whether the order directing de-sealing of the project property was sustainable when sealing and confiscation preceded commencement of CIRP.

Analysis: The material established that the property was sealed in August 2019 and confiscated in July 2021, whereas CIRP commenced in May 2022. The statutory action was founded on unauthorised construction contrary to the sanctioned plan, and not on a post-moratorium recovery action. The premise that sealing occurred during moratorium was therefore erroneous.

Conclusion: The de-sealing order was unsustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the Resolution Professional was authorised to challenge the order remanding the resolution plan.

Analysis: The Committee of Creditors had resolved to authorise the Resolution Professional to file the appeal, and that authorisation was not controverted. The appeal was consequently not an independent action by the Resolution Professional.

Conclusion: The appeal filed by the Resolution Professional was maintainable.

Issue (iii): Whether contractual possession and development rights under the hire-purchase agreement constituted assets of the corporate debtor and whether the resolution plan could deal with the statutory authority's land and unauthorised construction.

Analysis: The hire-purchase arrangement reserved title in the statutory authority until full payment and execution of conveyance, but conferred possession, construction, commercial exploitation, transfer of constructed units and a right to seek conveyance upon compliance. These valuable contractual and development rights could constitute assets under the insolvency framework if they subsisted on the insolvency commencement date. No formal cancellation of the agreement or allotment had been made, and regulatory sealing could not by itself establish contractual termination. Nevertheless, the Resolution Professional could acquire no superior right or title, and statutory ownership could not be compulsorily transferred through a resolution plan. The plan impermissibly proceeded as if the land belonged to the corporate debtor, required transfer of the land and approvals, and sought to prevent imposition of compounding charges and require regularisation of unauthorised construction. Regularisation or compounding remained within the statutory authority's exclusive domain and required compliance with applicable law.

Conclusion: The corporate debtor's subsisting contractual and development rights were capable of treatment as assets, but the resolution plan could not transfer the statutory authority's ownership or compel regularisation of unauthorised construction; remand to the Committee of Creditors for reconsideration was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The resolution plan must be reformulated by treating only legally subsisting contractual and development rights as part of the insolvency estate, while preserving the statutory authority's title and regulatory powers.

Ratio Decidendi: Contractual possession and development rights that subsist on the insolvency commencement date may constitute assets of a corporate debtor, but insolvency resolution cannot create superior title, divest a statutory authority of its land, or override mandatory statutory approval and regularisation requirements.

Issues: Whether the PMLA prosecution had territorial jurisdiction at Gurugram and whether, in view of the scheduled offence having been transferred to Delhi and part of the alleged money-laundering activity occurring there, the proceeding should be transferred to the PMLA Special Court at Delhi.

Analysis: Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires the offence punishable under Section 4 and the connected scheduled offence to be tried by the Special Court having jurisdiction over the money-laundering offence. Money laundering may involve several processes or activities, including acquiring, concealing, possessing, using, or projecting proceeds of crime as untainted property. By virtue of Section 178(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence consisting of acts occurring in different local areas may be tried by a court having jurisdiction over any such area, and Section 46 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act applies the Code's procedure subject to consistency with the Act. The proceeds of crime were acquired at Gurugram, where the underlying project and attached land were situated, giving the Gurugram Special Court jurisdiction. However, cash, jewellery, vehicles, and fixed deposits constituting proceeds of crime were also seized or attached at Delhi, giving the Delhi Special Court concurrent jurisdiction. Since the scheduled offence had already been transferred to Delhi, the statutory requirement that the PMLA offence and the scheduled offence be tried by the same Special Court made transfer expedient in the interests of justice.

Conclusion: The PMLA prosecution was not without jurisdiction at Gurugram, but the proceeding was required to be transferred to the Special Judge, PMLA, Saket Court Complex, Delhi.

Issues: Whether the six-month limitation for claiming refund under the retrospective service-tax exemption commences from the date of presidential assent to the Finance Act, 2017 or from the date of the service-provider certificate required to support the refund application.

Analysis: Section 104 of the Finance Act, 2017 retrospectively exempted the relevant one-time upfront amount for long-term industrial-plot leases and provided for refund of tax already collected, with a six-month period for filing the claim. The refund application had to be accompanied by SIPCOT's certificate confirming payment of service tax. Since that certificate was issued on 19.12.2017, the limitation could commence only upon its issuance; the application filed on 26.02.2018 was consequently within six months. The Tribunal's computation from the date of presidential assent disregarded the mandatory supporting certificate.

Conclusion: The refund claim was within limitation, and the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.