Issues: Whether the ex parte adjudication order passed under Section 74 for the tax period July 2017 to December 2017 was liable to be set aside and the assessee granted an opportunity to respond to the show cause notice.

Analysis: The petition arose from a show cause notice and an ex parte order under the GST enactments. The material circumstances noted were the medical and personal difficulties affecting the person managing the business, the assertion that the adjudication order was uploaded under the portal tab for additional notices and orders, and the resulting failure to respond or prefer an appeal in time. In that background, relief was granted by restoring the opportunity to contest the proceedings, while protecting the revenue by directing a deposit of part of the disputed tax after adjustment of any amount already recovered from the electronic cash ledger.

Conclusion: The ex parte order dated 30.12.2024 was set aside and the assessee was granted a fresh opportunity to reply to the show cause notice, subject to deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- after giving credit to any recovery already made. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee shows credible circumstances explaining failure to contest GST proceedings and the adjudication has proceeded ex parte, a fresh opportunity may be granted by setting aside the order and restoring the show cause proceedings subject to a protective deposit safeguarding the revenue.

Issues: Whether the notice-issuing authority had jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice under the relevant GST framework, and whether the petitioner should be required to participate in the proceedings while the writ petition remains pending.

Analysis: A jurisdictional objection was raised against the show-cause notice issued for the tax period October 2022 to March 2023, contending that the notification governing the Bureau of Investigation officers conferred investigative powers but not authority to issue a notice for short payment or non-payment of tax. The Court found a prima facie case warranting hearing of the writ petition, while also noting that the petitioner should respond to the show-cause notice and take part in the proceedings. To preserve the subject matter of the petition, the Court directed that the respondent may decide the show-cause notice, but such decision would remain unenforced against the petitioner until disposal of the writ petition or further order.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to participate in the proceedings and with interim protection against enforcement of any decision on the show-cause notice.

Issues: Whether notice for reopening of assessment for A.Y. 2012-13 under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it was founded on investigation material referring to another entity, namely Royal Arcade Private, without any demonstrated connection between that entity and the petitioner.

Analysis: The reopening was initiated nearly six years after the relevant assessment year on the basis of investigation material comprising the statement of an alleged accommodation entry provider and an email from the Investigation Wing. The recorded basis referred to Royal Arcade Private as the beneficiary entity. The petitioner specifically objected that it was not Royal Arcade Private and had no connection with that entity. No material was shown establishing that the petitioner was the said entity or was otherwise linked to it. The objections order also failed to deal with this foundational objection, and the affidavit in reply remained silent on the absence of such link. In these circumstances, the reassessment lacked the necessary factual nexus between the information relied upon and the petitioner sought to be reassessed.

Conclusion: The notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for reopening the assessment was invalid and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether advances received by the assessee for identifying, procuring and acquiring lands for third-party business projects could be taxed under Section 56(2)(ix) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as sums received in the course of negotiations for transfer of a capital asset; (ii) Whether the outstanding advances could be treated as forfeited merely because they remained unpaid for several years without any refund claim.

Issue (i): Whether advances received by the assessee for identifying, procuring and acquiring lands for third-party business projects could be taxed under Section 56(2)(ix) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as sums received in the course of negotiations for transfer of a capital asset.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(ix) applies only where money is received as an advance or otherwise in the course of negotiations for transfer of a capital asset, and where the negotiations do not result in transfer. The transaction in question was not between a transferor and transferee negotiating transfer of the assessee's capital asset. The amounts were made available to the assessee to locate, procure and acquire lands for the business projects of the fund providers. In that business context, the lands proposed to be acquired partook the character of stock-in-trade and not capital assets. Since Section 2(14) excludes stock-in-trade from the definition of capital asset, the foundational requirement of Section 56(2)(ix) was absent.

Conclusion: Section 56(2)(ix) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not attracted; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the outstanding advances could be treated as forfeited merely because they remained unpaid for several years without any refund claim.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(ix) further requires actual forfeiture of the sum received. The advances continued to be reflected as liabilities in the assessee's books as on 31.03.2015, and their existence stood confirmed. Mere passage of time and absence of an immediate refund claim did not establish that the assessee had become absolutely entitled to retain the amounts. The concept of forfeiture required something more than efflux of time, and the reasoning accepted in relation to cessation of liability under Section 41(1) reinforced that non-traceability or inaction by the creditor does not by itself extinguish a liability in law.

Conclusion: The advances were not forfeited within the meaning of Section 56(2)(ix) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was upheld because the transaction did not involve an advance in the course of negotiation for transfer of a capital asset and no forfeiture was established in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 56(2)(ix) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies only where money is received in the course of negotiations for transfer of a capital asset and is subsequently forfeited; advances received for business procurement of stock-in-trade do not satisfy that provision, and mere lapse of time without legal extinguishment of liability does not amount to forfeiture.

Issues: Whether the revised monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 17.09.2024 applies to a pending revenue appeal, and whether an exception introduced later by the CBDT Circular dated 15.03.2024 can be invoked to continue an appeal filed before that exception came into force.

Analysis: The applicable legal framework was the CBDT regime governing monetary limits for departmental appeals and the exceptions carved out thereunder. The High Court followed its earlier precedents holding that revised monetary limits apply even to pending appeals. It also applied the settled position that exceptions introduced by later circulars operate prospectively and cannot validate prosecution of an appeal already filed before such exception was introduced. Since the appeal had been filed on 10.04.2023 and the exception relied upon by the Revenue was introduced only on 15.03.2024, that exception was unavailable for this appeal. The separate contention that the case did not fall within the TDS/TCS exception was expressly left open and not decided.

Conclusion: The revised monetary limit under the CBDT Circular dated 17.09.2024 governed the pending appeal, the later exception introduced on 15.03.2024 was inapplicable to an appeal already filed on 10.04.2023, and the appeal was therefore disposed of on the ground that the tax effect was below the prescribed monetary limit.

Ratio Decidendi: Revised CBDT monetary-limit circulars apply to pending departmental appeals, but exceptions introduced by a later circular operate only prospectively and cannot be invoked for appeals instituted before the date of such exception.

Issues: (i) Whether the revised monetary limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024 dated 17.09.2024 apply to pending income-tax appeals; (ii) Whether an exception introduced by CBDT Circular dated 15.03.2024 could be relied upon to continue an appeal that had been filed before the introduction of that exception.

Issue (i): Whether the revised monetary limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024 dated 17.09.2024 apply to pending income-tax appeals.

Analysis: The applicable legal framework was the CBDT policy governing monetary limits for departmental appeals. The binding position followed was that revised monetary-limit circulars apply not only to fresh appeals but also to pending appeals. Since the tax effect in the present appeal was below Rs. 2 crores under the circular dated 17.09.2024, the pending appeal became governed by that revised threshold.

Conclusion: The revised monetary limits under CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024 dated 17.09.2024 apply to pending appeals; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an exception introduced by CBDT Circular dated 15.03.2024 could be relied upon to continue an appeal that had been filed before the introduction of that exception.

Analysis: The legal framework considered was the operation of exceptions carved out in CBDT circulars. The governing principle applied was that such exceptions operate prospectively from the date of their introduction and do not validate prosecution of appeals already filed before that date. As the appeal had been lodged on 16.06.2023 and the relied-upon exception was introduced only on 15.03.2024, that exception was unavailable for sustaining the appeal. The further contention on whether the case factually fell within the exception was left open and was not adjudicated.

Conclusion: The exception introduced by the CBDT Circular dated 15.03.2024 could not be invoked for an appeal filed earlier; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal could not be continued once the revised monetary-limit circular rendered the tax effect insufficient and the later-introduced exception was inapplicable to the already-filed appeal; the revenue's questions of law were left open for consideration in an appropriate case.

Ratio Decidendi: Revised CBDT monetary-limit circulars govern pending departmental appeals, but exceptions introduced by later circulars operate only prospectively and cannot be applied to appeals instituted before the date of such exception.

Issues: Whether a notice under section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequential order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 are sustainable when no inquiry under section 148A(a) is conducted despite prior approval having been obtained for such inquiry.

Analysis: Section 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contemplates that, before issuing notice under section 148, the Assessing Officer may conduct an inquiry under clause (a) with the prior approval of the specified authority and thereafter serve a notice under clause (b) on the basis of the information and the results of inquiry, if any. In the present matter, the approval was obtained for conducting inquiry, but the record showed that no such inquiry was carried out before issuance of the notice under section 148A(b). The subsequent completion of preliminary proceedings under section 148A(d) and issuance of notice under section 148 could not cure the initial defect.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148A(b), the consequential order under section 148A(d), and the notice under section 148 were held unsustainable and were quashed; the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer to conduct inquiry in accordance with section 148A(a) and proceed afresh according to law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where inquiry is proposed under section 148A(a), the Assessing Officer must conduct such inquiry after obtaining prior approval of the specified authority before issuing notice under section 148A(b); failure to do so vitiates the reassessment initiation and its consequential steps.

Issues: (i) whether the revisionary orders under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained where the assessments under section 153A were found to have been framed after adequate enquiry and under the pressure or dictates of higher departmental authorities; (ii) whether the transfer-pricing adjustment on an interest-free loan to a wholly owned foreign subsidiary was justified; and (iii) whether the disallowance of purchases from NETG was correctly deleted.

Issue (i): whether the revisionary orders under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained where the assessments under section 153A were found to have been framed after adequate enquiry and under the pressure or dictates of higher departmental authorities.

Analysis: The record showed detailed questionnaires, replies, office notes and departmental correspondence demonstrating that the Assessing Officer had examined the issues raised in the section 263 notices during the original assessments. The Tribunal further held that the later and complete set of inter-departmental correspondence, which had not been fully available in the earlier round, established that the revisionary proceedings were initiated and pursued under the influence of higher authorities and not on an independent satisfaction of the Commissioner. In that setting, the assumptions of error and prejudice required for section 263 were not made out.

Conclusion: The revisionary orders under section 263 were quashed. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the transfer-pricing adjustment on an interest-free loan to a wholly owned foreign subsidiary was justified.

Analysis: The subsidiary was set up for the assessee's overseas business expansion, and the funds were advanced as shareholder support in the nature of quasi-equity or informal capital. On those facts, the Tribunal accepted that the transaction could not be benchmarked by notional interest in the manner adopted by the Transfer Pricing Officer and that the commercial objective of capital support to the overseas entity was relevant in assessing the arm's length character of the transaction.

Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustment was deleted. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether the disallowance of purchases from NETG was correctly deleted.

Analysis: The purchases were supported by import documents, banking channels, prior contractual arrangements, and evidence of actual receipt and use in the assessee's business. The expiry of the distributorship agreement, by itself, did not make the purchases non-genuine or non-business related, particularly where the purchases were made to discharge continuing commercial commitments and the revenue had not disproved their genuineness.

Conclusion: The deletion of the disallowance was upheld. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the principal jurisdictional challenge to the section 263 proceedings, and the revenue's appeal failed; the remaining tax additions considered on merits were either sustained or not interfered with only to the extent reflected in the separate issue-wise findings.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 263 cannot be invoked unless the assessment order is shown, on objective material, to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, and a revisional order cannot stand where the assessment record shows adequate enquiry and the revisional action itself is found to be lacking independent application of mind.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notices issued beyond three years were valid when the recorded escapement in relation to each event was below the statutory threshold of fifty lakh rupees and the transactions comprised separate events or occasions.

Analysis: The reopening was tested against section 149 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly clause (b) and sub-section (1A). The seized digital material showed two distinct sets of payments for different purposes, namely furniture purchases and interior designing fees. The cumulative figure could not be used to club separate events for invoking the extended limitation where each event, viewed separately, did not satisfy the statutory threshold. The condition precedent for reopening beyond three years was therefore not met.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and the consequent reassessment proceedings were held to be barred by limitation and were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessment was invalid because the notice under section 143(2) was issued by an Assessing Officer who lacked jurisdiction under CBDT Instruction No. 01/2011.

Analysis: The assessee's returned income fell within the category where, under the Board instruction, jurisdiction lay with the Income-tax Officer and not with the Assistant Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner. The notice under section 143(2) was issued by an officer lacking such jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction to initiate scrutiny is a condition precedent, the defect was held to be jurisdictional and not curable. The assessment framed on the basis of that notice was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The notice under section 143(2) was invalid and the assessment order was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge succeeded and the additions were not examined on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A scrutiny assessment initiated by a notice issued by an officer lacking the jurisdiction prescribed by the applicable CBDT instruction is void for want of jurisdiction, and the resulting assessment cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether transportation of goods by individual truck owners was taxable as Goods Transport Agency service where the transport documents were described as pay slips, and whether absence of documents formally titled as consignment notes defeated the service tax levy and refund rejection.

Analysis: The definition under Section 65(50b) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers any person providing transport of goods by road who issues a consignment note, by whatever name called. The statutory focus is on the nature and contents of the document rather than the status of the transporter or the label used for the document. The pay slips in question contained vehicle details, description and quantity of goods, loading and unloading points, and acknowledgment by the transporter, thereby substantially answering the description of a consignment note within Rule 4B of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The fact that the transporters were individual truck owners did not exclude them from the scope of Goods Transport Agency service. The cited authorities were found distinguishable because, in those matters, no transport documents answering the description of consignment notes were issued.

Conclusion: The transportation services were rightly classified as Goods Transport Agency service, the service tax levy was valid, and the refund claim was not sustainable; the issue was decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the refund claim for Krishi Kalyan Cess and Swachh Bharat Cess under section 142(5) of the CGST Act was barred by limitation; (ii) whether the refund was hit by the principle of unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether the refund claim for Krishi Kalyan Cess and Swachh Bharat Cess under section 142(5) of the CGST Act was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The refund arose from cancellation of insurance policies after tax had been paid under the existing law for services that were not ultimately provided. The Tribunal followed its earlier view that claims under section 142(5) are to be dealt with under the existing law and are not to be rejected merely on the ground of delay or time bar. The refund mechanism was treated as governed by the substantive entitlement arising from non-provision of service, rather than the date of original tax payment.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the refund was hit by the principle of unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and section 142(5) of the CGST Act require return of the amount to the person from whom it was received, and do not mandate direct payment to the insured under section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938. On the facts, the amount attributable to the cancelled policies had been returned through the financing/agent channel and ultimately reached the service recipient. The Tribunal therefore found no basis to invoke unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: The refund was not hit by unjust enrichment.

Final Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to refund of the cesses claimed under section 142(5) of the CGST Act, and the impugned rejection was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim under section 142(5) of the CGST Act for tax paid on services not provided cannot be denied merely as time barred, and unjust enrichment does not arise where the amount has been returned to the person from whom it was received in accordance with the service tax refund mechanism.

Issues: (i) Whether the review petition disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record in the earlier judgment dismissing the assessee's tax appeal; (ii) Whether the assessee's fresh appeal against the KVAT assessment and consequential demand could succeed on the grounds of lack of opportunity, loss of books of account, and incorrect adoption of turnover.

Issue (i): Whether the review petition disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record in the earlier judgment dismissing the assessee's tax appeal.

Analysis: The review challenge was founded on the contention that the earlier judgment proceeded on an erroneous factual basis regarding opportunity to produce books of account and the correctness of turnover reflected in Form 26AS/Form 16. The record showed that these aspects had already been urged and addressed in the earlier decision. Applying the settled limits of review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a review could not be used for rehearing or correction of an alleged erroneous decision unless a self-evident error appeared on the face of the record.

Conclusion: No error apparent on the face of the record was made out; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee's fresh appeal against the KVAT assessment and consequential demand could succeed on the grounds of lack of opportunity, loss of books of account, and incorrect adoption of turnover.

Analysis: The appeal under Section 66(1) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 raised challenges to the assessment, reassessment, disallowance of deductions and input tax credit, and demand of tax, interest and penalty. The core grievance was that adequate opportunity had not been given after loss of records due to theft. The same factual and legal grounds had already been dealt with in the earlier coordinate bench decision, which recorded that despite opportunity, the assessee had not produced the books of account even at the appellate stage. Since the review against that earlier judgment failed, the findings in that decision continued to govern the present appeal, and the challenge based on consultant misconduct and non-production of records could not displace the assessment.

Conclusion: The challenge to the assessment and consequential demand failed; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The earlier judgment remained undisturbed in review, and the substantially identical challenge to the KVAT assessment was governed by that binding determination, leaving the revenue demand intact.

Ratio Decidendi: Review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is confined to self-evident error apparent on the face of the record and cannot be invoked to reargue matters already decided; where an assessee, despite opportunity, fails to produce supporting books and records, a substantially identical tax appeal governed by an earlier coordinate bench ruling cannot succeed.

Issues: Whether an assessee, having originally declared VAT at 12.5% on iron and steel used in a works contract and not having filed a revised return, could seek reduction of the rate to 4% during reassessment and contend that levy at the declared higher rate was contrary to law.

Analysis: The assessee had filed returns for 2005-06 declaring VAT at 12.5% on iron and steel and did not file a revised return under Section 35(4) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2005. The claim for reduction to 4% was first raised during reassessment proceedings nearly three years later. Applying the binding coordinate bench decisions holding that no benefit beyond what is claimed in the original or revised return can be granted by the assessing or appellate authorities, the Court treated the absence of a revised return as decisive. In that view, the challenge founded on the assessee having declared a rate higher than what was asserted to be legally payable did not justify interference.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to reduction of VAT from 12.5% to 4% in the absence of a revised return, and the issue was decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of by directing the petitioner to avail the statutory appellate remedy against the order passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, with the clarification that limitation would not be a bar for filing the appeal within the time granted.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration for non-furnishing of returns should be set aside and the registration restored subject to compliance with tax dues and filing obligations.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled on the ground of non-filing of returns under the GST law. The Court noted that there was no allegation of a dubious device to evade tax and that cancellation would be counterproductive, as the petitioners would be unable to carry on business or raise invoices, which would also impede revenue recovery. The Court held that a pragmatic approach was warranted and that the petitioners should be permitted to regularise the default by filing returns and paying the applicable tax, interest, penalty and fine.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was set aside conditionally, with restoration of registration directed upon compliance within the stipulated period; failing compliance, the writ petition would stand dismissed automatically.

Final Conclusion: The petitioners obtained conditional relief against cancellation of GST registration, and the matter was disposed of with restoration dependent on timely compliance with filing and payment requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: Cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns may be interfered with where the default is capable of regularisation and restoration of registration would better serve revenue interests, subject to full compliance with statutory dues and return filing.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to registration under section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite the finding that its activities were confined to its members and lacked charitable character; (ii) whether approval under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be denied solely because the registration application was rejected and the assessee was said to be functioning on mutuality principles.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to registration under section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite the finding that its activities were confined to its members and lacked charitable character.

Analysis: The assessee was a statutory professional body engaged in registration, training, standard-setting, monitoring and related regulatory functions for social auditors. The activities were held to be comparable to those of other statutory professional bodies that discharge public functions and regulate a profession under statute. Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition on section 2(15), the Tribunal held that such bodies, when they prescribe standards, conduct training and enforce discipline under statutory control, do not ipso facto carry on trade, commerce or business. The objection that the benefit was confined to members was rejected because the activities were found to advance a broader public purpose and fall within charitable objects.

Conclusion: Registration under section 12A was held to be admissible and the refusal was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether approval under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be denied solely because the registration application was rejected and the assessee was said to be functioning on mutuality principles.

Analysis: The denial of section 80G approval was founded on the rejection of regular registration and on the view that the assessee had not carried out charitable activity. Once the Tribunal held that the assessee's objects and functions were charitable and covered by section 2(15), the basis for refusing section 80G approval ceased to survive. The mutuality objection was also not accepted in view of the statutory and regulatory character of the assessee's functions.

Conclusion: The refusal of approval under section 80G was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's objects and activities were treated as charitable in nature, the impugned denials of registration and approval were quashed, and both appeals succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory professional body performing compulsory regulatory, educational and disciplinary functions under law does not, merely because it deals with its members and charges fees, cease to be engaged in charitable activity for the purpose of section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the dividend received from JM Equity Hybrid Fund could be treated as return of capital and reduced from the cost of acquisition of units, thereby recomputing the assessee's short-term capital loss into short-term capital gain, in the absence of any specific statutory provision and without satisfaction of the conditions of section 94(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee had specifically objected that the show cause notice and assessment order did not identify the statutory provision under which the adjustment was made. The Assessing Officer proceeded on general allegations arising from survey material concerning JM Financial Asset Management Ltd., but no material was brought to show that the assessee knowingly participated in any sham arrangement. The Tribunal noted that section 94(7) is the specific anti-dividend-stripping provision and that its conditions are cumulative. On the facts, the purchase and sale dates did not satisfy the statutory time-limits for both dividends. The Tribunal also relied on the principle that dividend stripping transactions are not sham per se and that losses can be ignored only within the framework of section 94(7).

Conclusion: The adjustment made by treating the dividend as return of capital was unjustified, and the disallowance of short-term capital loss together with the recomputed short-term capital gain could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on merits, and the addition arising from the dividend-stripping adjustment was deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: A dividend-stripping loss can be denied only when the specific statutory conditions of section 94(7) are satisfied; in the absence of that provision's applicability and without material linking the assessee to any sham transaction, dividend received cannot be recharacterised as return of capital.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings and the assessment framed under section 147 read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid where notice under section 148 had been issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year but approval had been obtained only from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax and not from the authority specified under section 151(ii).

Analysis: For assessment year 2018-19, notice under section 148 was issued on 28.04.2022, i.e. after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. In such a situation, the statute required prior approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or, where applicable, the Chief Commissioner or Director General under section 151(ii). The approval actually obtained was from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, which did not satisfy the statutory mandate. The absence of approval from the correct specified authority went to the root of jurisdiction. Once the reassessment was found invalid on this ground, the other challenges to the additions became academic.

Conclusion: The reassessment and the assessment order were invalid for want of proper sanction under section 151(ii) and were quashed.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled, in reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to reduce the income from house property originally disclosed in the return filed under section 139(1) on the ground that the higher disclosure was allegedly inadvertent and related partly to the spouse's share.

Analysis: The assessee had voluntarily disclosed the higher house property income in the original return. In the reassessment return, the disclosure was reduced on the plea that certain rental receipts belonged to the spouse or represented her share in jointly owned properties. The Tribunal held that reassessment under section 147 is meant to bring to tax escaped income and cannot be converted into a proceeding for review or revision of concluded matters at the instance of the assessee. Relying on the settled principle that concluded issues cannot be reagitated in reassessment unless they relate to escaped income, the Tribunal found that the attempted reduction of the originally disclosed house property income was not permissible.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to withdraw or reduce the income earlier offered in the original return through the reassessment return, and the addition sustained by the lower authorities was upheld.