Specific averments under Negotiable Instruments law are required to prosecute a director for cheque dishonour.

A complaint seeking prosecution of a director under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act must contain clear and specific averments that the director was, at the relevant time, in charge of and responsible for the company's business. General statements about day-to-day management, without particulars of the director's role in the cheque transaction, issuance, execution, or dishonour, are insufficient. Mere designation as a director does not satisfy Section 141, which requires conjunctive and foundational pleadings identifying responsibility for the offence. On the pleaded facts, continuation of the prosecution was treated as an abuse of process and the proceeding against the petitioner was liable to be quashed.

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Issues: Whether the criminal proceeding under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be quashed for want of specific averments showing that the petitioner, a Director, was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time.

Analysis: The complaint contained only general assertions that the accused directors were engaged in managing the company's day-to-day affairs. It did not state with specificity the petitioner's role in the transaction, his participation in issuance or execution of the cheque, or the manner in which he was responsible for the dishonour. The governing law requires a clear and unambiguous averment that the person sought to be prosecuted was, at the time of the offence, in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Mere designation as a Director is insufficient, and the words used in Section 141 are to be read conjunctively. In the absence of foundational pleadings and any specific allegation identifying the signatory of the cheque or the petitioner's role, continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process.

Conclusion: The proceeding against the petitioner was held liable to be quashed.

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