Statutory limitation under Customs law bars condonation beyond the fixed outer period, excluding section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Section 128(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 allows an appeal within 60 days from communication of the order and permits condonation only for a further 30 days on sufficient cause. An appeal filed beyond that outer limit cannot be entertained, because the Commissioner (Appeals) lacks jurisdiction to condone delay after expiry of the statutory extension and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply where the special statute fixes an exclusive condonable period. Any challenge to procedural defects in the original adjudication cannot be examined once the appeal is time-barred.

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Issues: Whether the Commissioner (Appeals) could entertain an appeal filed beyond the normal period of 60 days and the further condonable period of 30 days under section 128(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 128(1) prescribes a limitation period of 60 days from the date of communication of the order and permits condonation of delay only up to a further 30 days on sufficient cause being shown. Once the appeal is filed beyond that extended period, the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. The principle is reinforced by the settled position that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply where the special statute expressly limits the condonable period. The challenge based on alleged procedural lapse in the original adjudication could not be examined once the appeal itself was time-barred.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal as time-barred was correct, and the delay could not be condoned beyond the statutory outer limit.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a fixed limitation period together with a limited condonable extension, the appellate authority has no power to condone delay beyond that outer limit, and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stands excluded.

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